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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the processes and dynamics of administrative reform in the Lebanese
multi-confessional context. It explores whether these processes exhibit special features or
characteristics and the extent to which they are conditioned by the realities of the Lebanese
pluralistic environment. The orientation in this thesis is indeed consistent with recent writings in
the administrative reform literature, which emphasize the contextual distinctiveness of
administration and reform in each country and the need to account for embedded contextual
differences. The research thus attempts to place Lebanese administrative reform in a specific
historical, cultural, and political frame of reference and link it to the realities of pluralism and
sectarian politics in Lebanon. Further, the research undertakes an in-depth case study
examination of two adrninistrtive ectocs (tee 	 a&3 ad	 &i g
greater insight into post-war Lebanese reform patterns and dynamics. The research highlights
the complexity of administrative reform and the fact that reform endeavors are invariably
conditioned by a multitude of embedded and contingent factors, cultural, political and
economic. The research also suggests the potential influence of the regional and international
environments on country-specific programs of planned change. Indeed, the research suggests
that the complex inter-relationships of these various factors and their specific constellations in
specific periods can exert a significant influence on the course and fate of reform initiatives and
help account for the specific reform trajectories observed in Lebanon before and after the war.
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"Administration is not an end in itself but a series of communication channels, which should
transmit the needs and aspirations of the people and ensure that these are reflected and respected
in the way in which a state is governed. Equally, these channels must be structured to transmit
the aims and objectives of the government to the people. It is, therefore, essential that
administrative structures be adapted to socio-cultural conditions and traditions if they are to
contribute in a positive and vital way to development" (UNESCO, 1982, p.1).
This quote from a book on the problems of adaptation of public administration to different
socio-cultural contexts is particularly relevant in the case of Lebanon. Indeed, it has long been
realized that administrative reforms in Lebanon cannot simply be undertaken in accordance with
neutral scientific principles and western management techniques. Rather, the orientation ought
to be evolutionary and endogenous. The reason for this is that the administrative system in
Lebanon needs to continually adjust to the special peculiarities of Lebanese society and to the
realities of a pluralistic political system characterized by compromise, and representation.
As one author puts it, "Lebanon is a nation of communities" (Moore, 1997, p.12). The Lebanese
society comprises two broad religious categories (Muslims and Christians) which are in turn
subdivided into various sects: Sunnis, Shias, Druzes, Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek
Catholics, and Armenians, among others. The coexistence of these various minorities over the
years has necessitated special political and administrative arrangements to achieve a viable and
satisfactory system for all. Indeed, the main function of the administration and highest priority
reform objective in Lebanon has consistently been equitable and proportional bureaucratic
representation. This is where multi-ethnicity converges/clashes with administrative reforms.
In this context, administrative reforms cannot be conceived solely as technical instruments
designed to improve the efficiency of the Lebanese government machinery. They invariably
serve as means to achieve various other social and political objectives. Indeed, administrative
reforms in Lebanon have consistently been used, over the years, as instruments of socio-
political struggle for power and for resources, besides being means for social accommodation
and mechanisms to absorb demands. They are as such an integral part of the processes of
incremental adjustment of the Lebanese system to the wants and needs of a pluralistic society.
The orientation to administrative reforms adopted in this thesis is consistent with the ecological
emphasis of some writings in comparative administration. These writings stress the need to
consider administration as a subsystem of the larger society, rather than a self-contained entity,
relentlessly pursuing the goals of instrumental efficiency (Riggs, 1961). In this sense, the
prevailing societal values, distribution of political power, communication flows, economic and
technical arrangements and political styles are presumed to exert influence on administrative
behavior and performance. Such a view does not imply that administration must be a pale
reflection of the prevailing culture or balance of political forces in the larger society. Rather, it
suggests the possibility of the administration serving important salient values in society, other
than efficiency or cost effectiveness.
This orientation is also consistent with recent neo-institutional writings about administrative
reforms. The 'neo institutionalism' movement underlines the potential significance and
explanatory power of the institutional context and larger environmental factors (culture, social
norms) in shaping and determining social and political outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996).
Specifically, the new sociological institutionalism argues that many organizations often adopt an
institutional practice, not because it advances The metns-erids 	 'uit' v Tht
Rather, organizations embrace specific institutional norms or practices because the latter are
widely valued within the broader cultural environment. Thus technically inefficient institutions
may persist, because they contribute to harmony/stability, and because they are deeply
embedded in culture and tradition (Lowndes, 1996).
Consistent with this broad orientation, the thesis will analyze administrative reforms in Lebanon
within the broader institutional, cultural, and political context in which they thrive. The most
important ecological or contextual element in this regard is that of communal pluralism.
Communal pluralism is the essential reality of Lebanese government and society. Communal
issues in Lebanon are very salient, interwoven into every issue of public policy and public
management that they must be explicitly accounted for in any comprehensive account of reform
endeavors. The realities of pluralism and politicized ethnicity indeed force the Lebanese
administration to operate within a highly political environment and give the Lebanese
bureaucracy a highly political flavor.
DEFINITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
In recent decades, rising economic pressures coupled with a widespread disillusionment with
the performance of public bureaucracies have made administrative reform a universal political
theme. Almost all countries, irrespective of political outlook or developmental stage have
recognized the need to reform the machinery of government to adapt it to constantly changing
needs and realities. But while it has been generally accepted that government performance
should improve through deliberate reform interventions, there is considerably less unanimity
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and decisiveness as to what should be changed, what measures should be adopted, and what
strategies should be pursued (Caiden, 1982).
There is also little consensus and unanimity on a precise definition of administrative reform.
Most scholars conducting research on the subject do not make an attempt to define the concept
explicitly. There is tacit agreement, however, that while change may involve no more than
natural adaptation to political, economic and organizational forces, the word reform is usually
used to refer to deliberate, rational human intervention with the aim of effecting improvements
in public administration. The following definitions illustrate this point:
Administrative reform is the artificial inducement of administrative transformation
against resistance. It is artificial because it is man-made, deliberate, and planned; it is not
natural, accidental or automatic. It is induced because it involves persuasion, argument,
and the ultimate threat of sanctions (Caiden, 1969, p. 65).
Administrative reform refers to planned or at least premeditated, systematic change in
administrative structures and processes aimed at effecting a general improvement in
administrative output or related characteristics (Hammergren, 1983, p. 4).
The two definitions of administrative reform quoted here underline the premeditated aspect of
reform. Administrative reform is thus in essence directed action or planned change. They also
underline a general tendency in the literature to equate administrative reform with
administrative reorganization. Scholars tend to characterize administrative reform as a deliberate
attempt to change bureaucratic structures and procedures with the aim of improving the output
of the administration. However as Khan aptly notes "structural changes in organization will not
be of much help, unless the human factor in administration is suitably tackled" (Khan, 1981, p.
41). Administrative reform thus has an important attitudinal aspect, which has often been
neglected. Noting this gap in the literature, Khan provides a comprehensive definition of
administrative reform, which combines the institutional and attitudinal aspects. He writes,
Administrative reform is a deliberate attempt to change both a) the structures and
procedures of the public bureaucracy (i.e. the institutional aspect) and b) the attitudes and
behavior of the public bureaucrats involved (i.e. the attitudinal aspect), in order to
promote organizational effectiveness and attain national development goals (Khan, 1981,
p. 44).
Such a definition is superior to the definitions provided above on several counts. First, it clearly
identifies the purpose of administrative reform, which Caiden' s definition for example fails to
do. Second, it combines the organizational and attitudinal aspects of reform, and recognizes the
importance of altering structures as well as behaviors and attitudes. Indeed, the experience of
most developing countries with administrative reform clearly shows that structural changes are
often futile if the administrative culture remains intact. More than just reorganization, successful
reform must therefore deploy a mixture of mutually reinforcing instruments, organizational and
3
behavioral and must involve simultaneous and sustained efforts on both fronts. Programs of
change which utilize a combination of both approaches have proven to be more effective and
sustainable on the long run.
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: A NOTE ON THE LITERATURE
Over the past two decades, there has been a remarkable change in the conception and treatment
of administrative reform in the literature. The early writings on administrative reform (1950
through 1970) were narrow, technical, and purely prescriptive, mostly concerned with providing
guidelines on how to reform the administration. They were often permeated by a bias toward
Western bureaucracies in general, Max Weber's bureaucracy as well as classical management
theory in particular. The belief was in the possibility of a universal prescriptive model of
reform, applicable to all political systems, regardless of their differences. Moreovei in those
writings, the political side of reforms was accorded only scant attention.
Toward the end of the 1 970s, the earlier perspective on reform was gradually replaced by a new
set of approaches. This emerged in part as a reaction to the perceived failure of the previous
paradigm. The new tendency is away from the Weberian model, away from the principles of
classical management theory, and away from the strong be)ief in uni versa) so)tions. T)e trem3
is more toward such issues as contingency theory, and the relationships between an organization
and its environment. In this new set of writings, the organizational environment is elevated to an
extremely important position and there is greater awareness of the political component of
administrative development.
Central to those new writings is the notion that administrative reform can only be undertaken
within a wider context and in association with broader social, political and economic reforms.
With the exception of minor changes of a technical nature, reforms can only be effective
when designed with proper attention to the environment in which the organization
operates... In an extreme form, administrative reform can be considered part of societal
reform, government organization and bureaucracy being part of or related to other
systems, political, social or otherwise. Changes in the governmental machinery and its
mode of operation may occur under the impact of other systems and may also affect these
(Leemans, 1972, p.1 19).
Given this new orientation, administrative reform can no longer be viewed narrowly to include
internal/technical changes and improvements within a bureaucratic system.
The term administrative reform does not so much refer to internal changes in government
as to concerted efforts to alter a system of consequential relationships, that while
involving the executive branch of bureaucracy or public service, transcends the
boundaries of government (Barzelay, 1993, p.1 2).
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Moreover, the experience of many developing countries with administrative reforms strongly
suggests that reform efforts often falter not because of technical barriers or constraints but
because of obstacles of a socio-political nature.
One of the widespread weaknesses of administrative reform is neglect and inability to
bring about adjustments in closely related aspects of politics without which
administrative reform cannot achieve its goals (Dror, 1976, pp.7-8).
Montgomery eloquently explains that "administrative reform is a political process that adjusts
the relationship between a bureaucracy and other elements in society.. .Both the purposes of
reform and the evils to which it is addressed vary with their political circumstances"
(Montgomery, 1969, p. 1). Dey also recognizes the political aspect or component of reform. He
points out that,
Public administration's basic character, content and size of functioning is greatly
influenced by the political environment and its institutional dynamics and processes, in
not merely setting national goals and priorities, or deciding between competing values
and allocating resources, but also in devising the most effective instruments for
translating these policies into successful programs (Dey, 1974, p.236).
Similarly, the definition of Chapman and Greenaway underscores the importance of the social
and political environment of reform.
Administrative reform is the process of making changes in administrative structures or
procedures within the public services because they have become out of line with the
expectations or values of the social and political environment. This means that the
process itself is not necessarily a developmental one towards a clearly defined goal set in
advance, but a complex matter of acceding to pressures, communicating and discussing
ideas, stimulating comments from groups with potential interests, and making judgments
within the administrative system about tactics and timing for the introduction of
particular changes (Chapman and Greenaway, 1980, p. 183).
Riggs (1970) sums it up very eloquently. He writes,
The subject of administrative reform needs to be looked at contextually, which is to say,
as part of a comprehensive view of government as a system of interdependent elements.
Such a framework might help avoid oversimplified types of linear thinking, which often
lead to simplistic or symptomatic reforms that only aggravate the very conditions we seek
to overcome (Riggs, 1970, p. 567).
Recent writings also emphasize the contextual distinctiveness of administration and policy in
each country and the importance of national political systems and institutions in accounting for
reform action or non-action (Caiden, 1991; Wright, 1994; Hood, 1995; Pollitt and Summa,
1997; Peters, 1997a; Turner and Hulme, 1997; Premfors, 1998; Kiill, 1999; Maor and Jones,
1999; Guyomarch, 1999). The optimism and faith of earlier administrative theories has thus
gradually given way to grounded pragmatism and skepticism. Even the term administrative
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reform has become un-favored in some quarters because of its association with bureaucracy and
with an earlier era of failed prescriptions and interventions, or because it does not convey the
increased range of issues under consideration (Turner and Hulme, 1997).
The essential feature, then, of administrative reform is the relationship of administrative changes
to characteristics or pressures from the broader social and political environment. Administrative
reform hence cannot be conceived as a narrow, technical phenomenon, nor as a strictly political
one, but as a dynamic process that is simultaneously political as well as technical, and which
constitutes an integral part of the general functioning processes of a political system.
Administrative reforms in Lebanon will thus be analyzed using this dimension or perspective.
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN PLURALISTIC SOCIETIES
Ethnic plurality has an impact on notions of political development in general and administrative
reforms in particular. In fact, what distinguishes political and administrative processes in plural
societies from those in homogenous states is the fact that communal affiliation tends to
determine access to (and exclusion from) influential and remunerative positions. In other words,
successful communal politics brings quick rewards - one has advantages because one belongs to
a certain community. Naturally, the contrary also holds: defeat for a community or an adverse
position relative to power entails serious disadvantages for its members.
The pursuit of political and economic interests by means of ethnic associations tends to be more
pronounced in plural societies. This is so precisely because individuals will come to evaluate
their position from a communal reference point. Improvements to the status of the community
will reflect positively on its members. The opposite also holds true. The consequence is often
the politicization of communities in the pursuit of greater social mobility and material rewards.
Such politicization along communal lines is likely to reflect on all the different aspects of the
system, including processes of administrative reforms.
Indeed, administrative reforms in pluralistic societies are often rooted in representation and
aimed principally at balancing the divergent factional interests in society. They are as such
invariably implicated in the struggle for power and for resources, and serve as important
mechanisms for social accommodation and the absorption of demands. In such complex
pluralistic context, as is the case in Lebanon, reform efforts necessarily entail bargaining,
negotiation and compromise, and are primarily oriented towards promoting consensus by means
of achieving an effective equilibrium among the various competing factions.
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This dissertation is a study of administrative reforms in Lebanon. It is an attempt at analyzing
the dynamics of administrative reform within a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional society.
Specifically, this thesis seeks to explore the interaction of pluralism, politics, and administrative
reforms in the Lebanese polity and to analyze how such complex interaction reflects on reform
processes and their outcomes. Within this broad orientation, it is possible to develop four
specific sets of objectives for this thesis:
1. To place administrative reform in a specific social, political, and historical context and link
it to the realities of pluralism and sectarian politics in Lebanon.
2. To link administrative reform to embedded institutional factors (the nature of the Lebanese
political system, administration and society in general) as these have been hypothesized in
the literature to have a significant influence on the fate of reform initiatives.
3. To link administrative reform in Lebanon to the specific constellation of cultural, political
and economic factors in specific periods from independence (1943) until the present.
4. To examine post-war reform dynamics and policies in specific administrative sectors and
hence gain greater insight into Lebanese post-war reform patterns.
RESEARCH METHODS
The first part of the research is mainly qualitative and emphasizes the importance of the social
and political context for understanding the phenomenon of administrative reforms in Lebanon.
Emphasis on the social/political context implies attention to what has come before and what
surrounds the focus of the study. Such emphasis is particularly important as our understanding
of the meaning and orientation to administrative reforms in Lebanon can easily become
distorted if the social/political context is ignored or not accorded the attention its evident
importance merits.
The first chapters (3-6) thus attempt to place administrative reform in a specific social, political
and historical context. This approach is consistent with recent writings about administrative
reform, which relate it to the specific cultural and political environment in which it thrives.
Moreover, the research is historically grounded given that many political and ideological
currents in Lebanon today reference the past. Lebanon is indeed one of those few countries in
the world that still lives in the past and whose problems and aspirations mirror those of earlier
generations.
The second part of the research (chapters 7-9) attempts to examine the general dynamics of
administrative reform before the war of 1975, as well as the specific reforms that have been
initiated starting in the early 1990s. The research will show how reform dynamics (before and
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after the war) have invariably reflected the country's social and political realities. The analysis
of overall reform dynamics will in turn be supplemented by an in-depth case study examination
of two vital sectors for the post-war Lebanese economy, telecommunications and transportation.
The case study has often been stereotyped as a weak sibling among social science methods and
as having insufficient precision (or quantification), objectivity and rigor; case studies
nevertheless continue to be used extensively in social science research, especially in practice-
oriented fields (e.g. urban planning, public administration and social work), as well as in
evaluation research (Yin, 1994). The continuing, even increasing usage of this method suggests
that the case study presents specific strengths and weaknesses as a research tool, which may
help account for the criticisms traditionally raised as well as its relevance / usefulness in
particular circumstances.
Yin (1994) suggests that case studies present distinct advantages when examining contemporary
events in which contextual conditions are believed to be pertinent to the phenomenon of
interest. In this respect, case studies help to cope with the entangled situation between
phenomenon and context, while also capturing the complexity, richness and subtlety of more
specific phenomena. The contemplated analysis of post-war reform patterns in
telecommunications and transportation comprises precisely an examination of contemporary
events in which contextual influences are hypothesized to be highly pertinent and interwoven
with theoretical and empirical concerns.
While other research methods may also try to deal with phenomenon and context, their ability to
account for contextual conditions remains rather limited. Experiments for example deliberately
divorce a phenomenon from its context, so that attention can be focused on a few variables. A
history may try to deal with the entangled situation between phenomenon and context, but the
interest usually lies with non-contemporary events. Finally, surveys exhibit a limited capacity to
investigate the context in view of the continuous need to limit the number of variables and to
fall safely within the number of respondents that can be surveyed (Yin, 1994).
Because phenomenon and context are not always distinguishable in real-life situations, the case
study presents a unique strength in this regard, which in turn has implications for a whole set of
other technical characteristics, including data collection and data analysis strategies (Yin, 1994).
In this respect, the case study offers specific advantages in terms of its ability to a) cope with the
technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data
points; b) rely on a full variety of evidence (documents, artifacts, interviews, observations) and
on multiple triangulation for dealing with problems of validity and bias and c) benefit from the
prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 1994).
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Notwithstanding these advantages, the case study continues to be viewed by some investigators
as a less desirable form of inquiry, primarily because of expressed concerns over
generalizability and representativeness. "These aspects of the case study approach -
representativeness and generalizability- are often viewed by its detractors as major weaknesses.
However, to advocates of the approach, these methodological points can be answered and,
moreover, turned into a positive virtue" (Rose, 1991, p.102). Indeed, it has often been argued
that much of the criticism directed at the case study over these issues is based on a degree of
methodological confusion and a misunderstanding of the logic of this research strategy
(Mitchell, 1983; Yin, 1994).
Under the influence of quantitative methodology, representativeness has come to mean
typicality in the sense of a statistically reliable random sample from a population. In case-study
research, by contrast, it is considered more appropriate to treat representativeness in terms of a
qualitative logic for the selection of cases rather than a quantitative logic of sampling from a
population (Rose, 1991). Mitchell (1983) specifically develops this argument by characterizing
the case study approach in terms of a detailed examination of an event or series of related events
which the analyst believes exhibits the operation of some identifiable theoretical principle.
This theoretical orientation to representativeness also has implications for generalizability, in
that generalizability in case study research depends on the cogency of the theoretical reasoning
for the validity of any logical inferences from a case / cases (Mitchell, 1983, p. 207). The
underlying difference is thus rooted in a distinction between statistical and logical inference.
Yin (1994) further clarifies that case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions, and
not to populations or universes. "The investigator's goal is to expand and generalize theories
(analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)" (Yin,
l994,p. 10).
Typicality in the statistical sense is therefore not a major concern in case study research:
atypical cases may be deliberately chosen because they correspondingly possess greater
explanatory power. Similarly, whereas generalizability in quantitative approaches depends on
the ability to extrapolate with statistical confidence from a random sample to the population
from which it was drawn, generalizability in case study research depends upon the cogency of
the theoretical reasoning, the validity of the logical inferences, and must be qualified by the
relevant contextual conditions (Mitchell, 1983). The principles of qualitative selection of cases
and logical inference hence tend to govern case study research whether implicitly or explicitly.
In light of these clarifications, it becomes possible to justify the choice of cases for this research
and the contemplated logic for design and analysis. The construction of a manageable research
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design dictated the application of the principle of qualitative selection of cases, yet a deliberate
decision was made to use a multiple-case design in view of the fact that "evidence from multiple
cases is often considered more compelling and the overall study is therefore regarded as being
more robust" (Yin, 1994, p. 45). Moreover, a multiple-case design provides opportunities for
comparison andlor replication in the sense that evidence can be sought and evaluated both for
individual cases as well as across sectors or cases.
Hence the logic of qualitative selection of cases implied that the choice of cases for this research
had to be carefully undertaken. A large number of sectors were initially considered and through
a process of selective elimination, the choice settled on transport and telecommunications. The
two sectors were selected in view of their strategic significance in the wake of the war. Indeed,
given the focus of the case study examination on post-war reform patterns in Lebanon, it was
considered important to select sectors that were accorded attention in the wake of the war and
were thus in a better position to illustrate the nature and dynamics of post-war reform initiatives.
Indeed, while some sectors have experienced stagnation in the post-war period (e.g. agriculture),
others were accorded priority attention by the government, with growth and investment
generally concentrated in activities related to the rehabilitation of the infrastructure. The
Horizon 2000 plan (1995-2007) which has been adopted as the framework for the countly's
reconstruction effort indeed covered a variety of sectors (e.g. electricity, telecommunications,
transport, education, public health, environment, tourism and industry) but the bulk of
investments (US$ 17.8 billion or 42% of the total) targeted the rehabilitation of the
infrastructure and restoration of the capacity of basic infrastructure sectors (LJNDP, 1997).
Aside from the concentration of investment in infrastructure-related sectors and hence the better
chances of investigating meaningful reform interventions through a focus on the selected cases,
telecom and transport presented other specific characteristics which also help account for their
selection. Telecommunications is indeed the largest sector of the Lebanese administration, with
the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications having 7834 positions established by cadre. A
variety of actors are also involved in this sector, including a semi-autonomous agency
(OGERO), two private mobile operators (Libancell and Cellis) and a multitude of data and
internet service providers which can all be considered as subunits or embedded units of analysis.
Indeed, Yin (1994) outlines in his comprehensive book on case study research four types of case
study designs, based on a 2*2 matrix. The matrix assumes that single and multiple case designs
reflect different design situations, and that within these two types, there also can be multiple
units of analysis. "For the case study strategy, the four types of designs are a) single-case
(holistic) designs, b) single-case (embedded) designs, c) multiple-case (holistic) designs, and d)
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multiple-case (embedded) designs" (Yin, 1994, p. 38). The main rationale for incorporating
subunits of analysis within a multiple-case design is to reconcile breadth of coverage with
intensive-ness, focusing the case study inquiry and significantly enhancing the insights into the
single case.
Yin (1994) suggests that while the notion of embedded units of analysis should be used with
care to preserve the unitary aspects of each case and avoid a change in the nature or orientation
of the research, the embedded design is nevertheless advantageous as it can add greater
versatility and enable the basic design to be adapted to meet various theoretical and practical
requirements. By inviting close inspection of specific subunits, this design element adds
significant opportunities for extensive analysis, allowing a deeper / fuller understanding of the
entire case. The challenge however is to be able to identify logical subunits, which in turn is
related to the characteristics of the particular case and the way the initial research questions have
been defined (Yin, 1994).
The case study examination of telecommunications can indeed be conducted along such lines, as
logical embedded units of analysis are easily delineated e.g. the fixed line segment, the cellular
segment, the data and intemet segments allowing the construction of a rich / interesting research
design. This is hardly possible had other sectors been chosen, as for example the industrial
sector which is characterized in Lebanon by the dominance of small private economic
establishments (72 % of industrial establishments are individual or family establishments
employing less than five workers) or the agricultural sector, which continues to be a net
importing sector in Lebanon, dominated by small farming networks and owners of small-scale
land and real estate.
The choice of the transport sector, on the other hand, was determined by a number of factors: a)
its vital importance as a strategic pillar in the reconstruction and development process b) its role
in promoting national economic competitiveness and achieving urban and quality of life goals;
and c) the complex institutional organization of this sector and the involvement of a large
number of actors in transport-related functions (e.g. MOT, MPW, MOl, MOE, CDR, CEGP,
CEPVB), thus allowing to survey the jurisdictional assignment of authorities and
responsibilities among various ministries / governmental bodies of the Lebanese administration.
It is in this last respect that the choice of the transport sector offers distinct advantages and may
represent an example of the critical case (Yin, 1994; Rose, 1991) in the sense of being better
suited for the testing of theoretical propositions relating to administrative reform in Lebanon.
This is precisely the case because of the necessary visible and active involvement of the public
sector in transport-related functions as opposed to its more contracted role in such sectors as
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industry, tourism, agriculture or even health and education, which continue to be dominated in
Lebanon by a dynamic private sector'.
While the logic of qualitative selection of cases governed the choice of sectors for this research,
various data collectionldata analysis methods were used to increase the validity of the logical
inferences drawn from the case study examination. Most important in this respect is the use of
multiple sources of evidence (archival records, documents, reports and interviews) and multiple
triangulation (multiple levels of analysis / multiple sources of evidence / multiple informants) to
corroborate the evidence, rule out alternative explanations / interpretations and derive plausible
inferences and analytic conclusions.
Several authors have indeed noted the unique strength of the case study approach in terms of its
ability to make use of a full variety of evidence and data collection techniques (Rose, 1991; Yin
1994). In this respect, aside from the review of relevant documents / reports relating to transport
and telecommunications, the case study examination will also rely on the systematic
interviewing of key informants in the sectors to corroborate the documentary evidence, facilitate
access to immediate follow-up data for clarification and omissions, and further promote critical
analysis, validity checks and triangulation.
The case study examination will make use of the semistructured interview also referred to as the
interview guide approach, in which topics/issues to be covered are specified in advance, leaving
the interviewer to decide on the sequence / wording of questions in the course of the interview.
This type of interview has been described as particularly suited for interviewing professionals
who can not be reached on many separate occasions, and as a midway between the extremes of
formality/informality, directiveness/non-directiveness, and standardizationlun-standardization
(Bernard, 2000), thus allowing to reconcile systematic data collection with flexibility.
Indeed, the main advantage of the semi-structured interview is its flexibility, whereby it retains
much of the freewheeling quality of unstructured interviewing, allowing to build greater
rapport, follow leads and uncover new topics of interest that might have otherwise been
overlooked. The ability to periodically deviate from the order of questioning also allows the
interviewer to create a more fluid informational exchange, thereby increasing rapport and the
quality of the responses (Mutchnick and Berg, 1996). Semistructured interviews are thus useful
in preserving nuances of conversation that might prove important or yield otherwise
unanticipated areas of investigation.
The Ministry of Public Health assumes for example sole responsibility for the public health sector in Lebanon,
with 80% of its budget going into reimbursement of hospital care provided by the private sector. Similarly, the
limited budget of the Ministry of Education goes to cover essentially the operation costs of public education,
which accounts for less than 30% of students enrolled in general education in Lebanon (UNDP, 1997).
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Like other types of interviews, semi-structured interviews are nevertheless open to problems of
bias, poor recall, poor/inaccurate articulation, or even observer effects in the sense of becoming
too much identified with the perspectives of particular informants (Hughes, 1996). A reasonable
approach is to target different types of informants in a quest for alternative explanations and
interpretations and to corroborate interview data with other sources of information (Yin, 1994).
Hence, the main advantage of using multiple sources of evidence is the development of
converging lines of inquiry through a process of cross-validation or multiple triangulation.
In analyzing the case study evidence, the research will rely on pattern-matching (comparing an
empirically-based pattern with a predicted one) and explanation building (establishing a chain
of evidence and entertaining and ruling out rival explanations). The embedded-case design
offers the added advantage of examining propositions for the subunits delineated and relating
them / consolidating them into the analytic conclusions of the larger case, while the multiple
case design implies that the patterns or explanations for each single case can be compared across
cases, following a logic of comparison or replication.
As Campbell stipulates in the Foreword to the book Case Study Research(1994), the case study
epitomizes a research method for attempting valid inferences from events outside the laboratory,
while also retaining the goals of knowledge shared with laboratory science. "Rather than
presenting the evidence in the context-independent manner of positivistic confirmation, it is
presented instead in extended networks of implications that (while never complete) are
nonetheless crucial to scientific evaluation. It is on such bases that successful scientific
communities achieve effective consensus and cumulative achievements, without ever reaching
foundational proof" (Campbell, Foreword, in Yin 1994). Appendix D sheds more light on the
overall methodology of the research.
RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE
The significance of this study lies in the contribution it makes in two distinct areas: theoretical
and substantive. A theoretical contribution to the Public Administration field occurs through the
multi dimensional approach to administrative reforms. This approach to administrative reforms
is not limited to their technical dimension. Reforms are also explored from the perspective of
the socio-political dynamics of a system, trying to adjust by accommodating the demands of a
pluralistic society. It is hoped that by exploring the various aspects of administrative reforms,
this study could contribute to the future design of reforms that are less incongruent with ethnic
and confessional factors. The lessons of the Lebanese experience may also be relevant to the
course which administrative change may take in other nations beset by ethnic/religious conflict.
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The Lebanese experience with administrative reform is, indeed, by no means peculiar or wholly
unique. Lebanon shares with the rest of Southwest Asia the problem of defining the contours of
community and nation and the challenge of reforming the machinery of government in which
the various constituent units all have a stake. For example, the Lebanese multi-communal reality
and experience with administrative reforms is similar in some respects to that of Malaysia. But
while Malaysia has succeeded in containing its multi-ethnic problems and shaping a strong
administrative state, Lebanon has become a model to be avoided at all costs by other culturally
diverse countries of the developing world. Hence, "Lebanon provides an example of a dramatic
and acute manifestation of a dilemma that has far more general relevance than might appear at
first sight" (Bose, 1991, p.10!). The Lebanese case is thus both intrinsically interesting and
suggestive of the problems of managing administrative change under conditions of intense
politicization and ethnic conflict.
A second academic contribution occurs at the specific Lebanese governmental level. In this
respect, the research has revealed that there are few studies that comprehensively evaluate the
large number of reforms that were attempted in Lebanon, their outcomes, or more importantly
the underlying reasons as to why some have succeeded while others have failed. The
administrative reform literature seems to point to a number of institutional factors that condition
the course and fate of reform endeavors in any nation: namely the nature of the political system,
the nature of the administrative system, and the set of complex interactions between cultural,
political, and economic factors. A better understanding of those embedded institutional
variables will undoubtedly contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of administrative
reform in Lebanon.
Hence, the research undertaken in this thesis promises to have both theoretical and practical
benefits. Theoretically, the research is multi-dimensional and seeks to fill a common gap in the
administrative reform literature. In a pioneering book on reform, Caiden observed that work on
administrative reform has been patchy in appearance and variable in quality and underscored the
need for more research on the subject (Caiden, 1969). Apart from its theoretical contribution,
this research is also conducted for practical reasons. Lebanon shares with many developing
nations the goals of nation-building and socio-economic development and administrative reform
plays a central role in this process. Indeed, administrative reform is the sine qua non in the
implementation of programs of national development (Emmerich, 1961, p. 1). Administrative
reform is thus not only about improving administrative performance but also inducing and
guiding the interrelated processes of nation-building, economic growth and societal change.
THESIS STRUCTURE
Besides this introduction, the dissertation is organized into nine chapters:
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Chapter 2 reviews the administrative theories, explicit or implicit, that reformers have
generally used to organize their thoughts and the influence these have had on administrative
change. Specifically, the chapter examines three periods in the development of administrative
theories during this century (Traditional Public Administration, New Public Administration, and
New Public Management) followed by an assessment of each. The chapter then presents an
alternative paradigm, namely that of the 'New Institutionalism'. The chapter concludes with
some hypotheses and a hypothetical model that will be used to guide the rest of the research.
Chapter 3 reviews the theoretical literature on pluralism and diversity. In light of this review,
the chapter introduces the main religious communities in Lebanon and highlights the relevance
of one particular explanation —the interest-based explanation- in accounting for the continuing
importance of ethnic attachments in Lebanese society today.
Chapter 4 describes the genesis of ethnic politics in Lebanon by examining three phases that
have marked the historical development of the divisions in Lebanese society, namely the
Ottoman Period, the French Mandate, and the Independence Phase.
Chapter 5 starts setting the political scene by shedding light on the main pillars of Lebanese
consensual democracy, namely: 1) the Constitution of 1926; 2) the Census of 1932; and 3) the
National Pact of 1943. The chapter then briefly explores the causes of the Lebanese civil war
and the main actors and issues, leading to the accord, which finally brought this war to closure,
namely the Taif agreement of 1989. The chapter analyzes the Taif agreement comprehensively
given that it has marked a turning point in the history of Lebanon. The Taif accord has also
entailed some modifications in political power configurations, which have implications for post
war reform initiatives.
Chapter 6 diagnoses in greater detail the political context of administrative reforms in Lebanon
by exploring micro-political processes and macro political institutions before and after the war.
At the micro-level, the chapter examines the patron-client networks that have historically
developed in Lebanon and that remain the fundamental state-society linkage today. At the
macro level, the chapter examines the main institutional structures -Presidency, Parliament, and
Cabinet- before and after the war, and shows how these have come to formally reflect the
characteristic cleavages and realities of Lebanese society.
Chapter 7 examines the dynamics of administrative reform in Lebanon before and after the
war. The chapter highlights the influence of the turbulent regional environment on reform
initiatives in the pre-war period. It also underscores and analyzes the one reform experience that
has been judged as relatively successful before the war namely that of President Fuad Chehab
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(1958-1964). The chapter then analyzes the patterns of administrative reform in the post-war
period and the serious political and economic constraints that are working against the
government's half-hearted reform attempts.
Chapter 8 examines administrative reform policies and actions in the telecommunications
sector in the wake of the war. The chapter presents an overview of current global trends in
telecom reform. In light of this review, the chapter examines the Lebanese telecommunications
sector (current institutional framework, the fixed line segment, the cellular segment, the Internet
and data segment) and assesses its performance against international best practice. The chapter
also highlights the underlying dynamics of reform in Lebanon.
Chapter 9 examines the current status and institutional organization of the transport sector in
Lebanon and the specific reform policies that have been recently initiated (1990-present). While
an overview of the entire Lebanese transport sector is presented, the focus is primarily on land
transport reforms and policies. The chapter sheds light on land transport conditions and policies
and recent reform initiatives in this sector. It also highlights the underlying dynamics of reform
in Lebanon.
Chapter 10 presents the conclusions of the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: THEORETICAL TRENDS
INTRODUCTION
Administrative reform theory has always been polarized between a branch of political science
and managerial or organization studies. Theories of bureaucracy occupy a middle ground
between these two ways of studying the public service. This chapter reviews the administrative
theories, explicit or implicit, that reformers have generally used to organize their thoughts and
the influence these have had on administrative change. Specifically, the chapter examines three
periods in the development of administrative theories during this century, followed by an
assessment of each. The chapter then presents an alternative paradigm, namely that of the 'new
institutionalism'. The chapter concludes by presenting some fruitful hypotheses and a tentative
hypothetical model to be potentially explored in the context of Lebanon.
FIRST PERIOD: TRADITIONAL (CLASSIC) PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
The first period in administrative theory started well before 1900. In Britain, it can be traced
back to the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1856, and in the US to the Civil Service Act (the
Pendelton Act) of 1883. The traditional model of public administration that evolved during this
period can be characterized as an administration under the formal control of the political
leadership, based on a strictly hierarchical organization, staffed by neutral and permanent
officials involved in administering policies decided by politicians (Hughes, 1994). Its theoretical
foundations derive from writers in several countries: from the Northcote-Trevelyan Report in
the UK; Woodrow Wilson and Fredrick Taylor in the US; and the bureaucratic model associated
with the Germany of Max Weber.
Hence, the traditional theory of public administration began in the nineteenth century, became
formalized somewhere between 1900 and 1920, and lasted in most Western countries largely
unchanged until the middle of the twentieth century. The beginning of the traditional model is
often ascribed to mid-nineteenth century Britain. In 1854, the Northcote-Trevelyan Report
recommended that 'the public service should be carried out by the admission into its lower
ranks of a carefully selected body of young men', through the establishment of a proper system
of examinations. Specifically, the Northcote-Trevelyan Report, recommended:
IJ The abolition of patronage and the substitution of recruitment by open competitive
examinations under the supervision of a central examining board;
D Re-organization of office staffs of central departments in broad classes to deal with
intellectual and mechanical work respectively; and
D Filling higher posts by promotion from inside based on merit (Hughes, 1994).
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The Northcote-Trevelyan Report thus signals the start of merit-based appointments to the public
service and is often taken to represent a beginning to the traditional model of public
administration.
Around the same period, a sharp distinction was drawn in the United States between political
and bureaucratic roles and functions, expressed at the extreme limit by Woodrow Wilson's
contention that administration constituted an independent domain of sound scientific practice,
which would be equally relevant and responsible to any form of political leadership. "The broad
plans of govemmental action are not administrative; the detailed execution of such plans is
administrative" (Wilson, 1887, p. 209). Also, "the field of administration is a field of business.
It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics" (Wilson, 1887, p. 211).
The rationale of this system was of course to insulate public administration from political
favoritism and intervention. However, despite Wilson's words, the relationship during this
period did not evolve as simply one of political direction and administrative compliance. It was
soon realized that this simple division of labor was much harder to implement than to assert and
that the execution of public policies necessarily involves choices among policies. Hence, the
clean division of labor between politics and administration, although an appealing concept, was
unfortunately completely disconnected to reality. Instead, in many countries, a kind of bargain
was struck between political and bureaucratic roles, whereby each participant had a distinctive
realm of competence and authority (Self, 1997).
In this same period, the concepts of 'scientific management' emerged gradually as the dominant
paradigm of efficient administration. The title of 'Father of Scientific Management' is usually
bestowed on Frederick Taylor (1856-19 15), the engineer who wrote several papers on time and
motion study and their relationship to piece-rate wage systems. His most notable published
work was the Principles and Methods of Scientflc Management, in which he set out his
ambitious intentions:
FIRST: To point out, through a series of simple illustrations, the great loss which the
whole country is suffering through in-efficiency in almost all of our daily acts.
SECOND: To try to convince the reader that the remedy for this inefficiency lies in
systematic management, rather than in searching for some unusual or extraordinary man.
THIRD: To prove that the best management is a true science, resting upon clearly defined
laws, rules, and principles, as a foundation (Taylor, 1911, pp. 5-7).
Hence, Taylor's objective was to convince the reader that every single working act can be
reduced to a science. His main asset, however, was an articulate style, an evangelical fervor, and
a choice of themes that set sympathetic chords vibrating throughout America. 'Efficiency' soon
became an important gospel, and the principles of scientific management were applied with
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crusading zeal to many aspects of production, and almost every function of industrial
management (Dunsire, 1973). For Taylor and his associates, the term scientific management
implied the replacement of hunch by observation and measurement, and of traditional practices
by calculation and rational methods.
Indeed, there were two main points to Taylor's theory: standardizing work, which meant finding
the 'one best way of working' and 'controlling so extensively and intensively as to provide for
the maintenance of these standards' (Kakar, 1970, p. 3). Scientific management involved: i)
time and motion studies to decide a standard for working; ii) a wage incentive system that was a
modification of the piecework method already in existence. Taylor's system was thus perfectly
attuned to a formalized bureaucracy. The ideas of 'one best way' and systematic control were a
perfect fit with the rigid hierarchy, process and precedent. Standardization of tasks and fitting
workers to them was thus perfect for the traditional model of administration (Hughes, 1994).
Taylor's influence was dramatic. His theory of scientific management offered an adequate basis
for introducing systematic procedures in the practice of public administration.
Scientific management did not waste away in textbooks; it was highly influential in the
practice of public administration and in government research.. .The influence of public
administration reached its zenith as the faith in scientific management and the scientific
principles spread and established itself as the prevailing orthodoxy.. .Scientific
management dominated public administration from about 1910 to 1940 and helped
crystallize public administration as an academic field (Bozeman, 1979, pp. 33-4).
Taylor's influence on public administration lingers on today. Although particular points of his
theory could be disputed —his theory of personal motivation and his time-and motion studies-
the idea that management could be systematic remained important in the public sector and
clearly fitted well the traditional (classic) theory of bureaucracy. As Stillman argues: "It all fits
neatly together: a strong effective administrative system could flourish if politics was restricted
to its proper sphere, if scientific methods were applied, and if economy and efficiency were
societal goals" (Stillman, 1991, p. 110).
The concept of 'scientific administration' continued to evolve and received further
reinforcement by the publication by L. Gulick and F. Urwick of their Papers on the Science of
Administration (1937). These papers, containing eleven essays about public administration as a
science, reinforced the burgeoning confidence in the existence of common principles of
administration, which transcend frontiers, time, and purpose. Gulick, then member of President
Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management, suggested that administration can be
analyzed in terms of five components: foreseeing, organization, command, co-ordination, and
control, which prefigure the acronym that he assigned for the work of the chief executive,
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POSDCORB- Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, Budgeting
(Gulick and Urwick, 1937, P. 14).
The most important theoretical influence on the traditional model of administration, however,
came from the bureaucratic model associated with the Germany of Max Weber. There are some
arguments about the timing and the direct influence of the ideas of Max Weber as his work was
not translated to English until many years after it was written. There is unanimous agreement,
however, that Weber's theory of bureaucracy was a founding principle of the traditional model
of public administration. Indeed, throughout its long history, the traditional model followed
Weber's theory to the letter, either implicitly or explicitly (Hughes, 1994).
In setting out a basis for his theory, Weber postulated that there were three types of authority:
the Charismatic - relying on the personal appeal of an extraordinary leader-; the traditional -
relying on customs and traditions; and the legal-rational authority. The latter was perceived as
the most legitimate and efficient, and formed the basis of his theory of bureaucracy. Within the
meaning of legal-rational authority, Weber set out an ideal-type bureaucratic structure that is
routinized (tasks organized in an on-going pattern), specialized (tasks distributed according to
functions and expertise), hierarchical (tasks and positions arranged in ranks or levels of
authority), impersonal (office duties free from personal considerations), and documented (all
transactions constituting written records).
Within this bureaucratic structure, Weber envisioned the individual official as playing a key
role. His office holding is considered a vocation, following examinations and a rigorous course
of training. Entrance into an office was considered by Weber as an acceptance of a specific
obligation of faithful management in return for a secure existence. Part of the lifetime and full-
time career of the public servant was the principle of a fixed salary and the prospect for
advancement through the hierarchical structure. "The pure bureaucratic official is appointed by
a superior authority; normally, his position is held for life; and he receives the regular pecuniary
compensation of a normally fixed salary and the old age security provided by a pension"
(Albrow, 1970, pp. 44-45).
These two principles - the model of the ideal-type bureaucracy and the position of the official in
it- had specific purposes. The general aims were to provide for certainty, impartiality, and
efficiency. Hence, the principle of the specialization of functions is meant to increase
productivity; the hierarchy of authority and the system of rules make for certainty in decisions;
and the impersonality of the system implies impartiality and objectivity. The idea was thus to
create a system that was at the highest possible level of technical efficiency. As Weber argued:
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The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its
purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed
bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine
with non-mechanical modes of production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of
the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and
personal costs - these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic
organization (Weber, in Gerth and Mills, 1962, p. 214).
Weber's model was readily embraced in the public sector. It was precisely this model, combined
with the politics-administration dichotomy, and scientific management, which gave a form and
purpose, a self-confidence to both the practice and the study of administration in the 1 920s and
1930s. It was also a combination of these ideas, which formed the basis of the traditional model
of public administration. Although many aspects of this theory are now disputed, and the
traditional model is now attacked for being bureaucratic and technically inefficient, it is
nevertheless salutary to remember that it was itself an improvement over earlier traditional and
ascriptive forms of administration.
TRADITIONAL (CLASSIC) PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: SUBSEQUENT
DEVELOPMENTS
The traditional model of public administration was first undermined by the motivational
evidence of the human relations school and discovery of the relevance of informal networking
and adaptations. The new science of social psychology had been developing separately a set of
theories about human behavior in industrial and other settings. Their new approach began to
discredit the possibility of rationalizing, 'will-realizing' processes, and scientific management's
view of man as "an economic creature, limited in his pursuit of gain only by his physiological
capacities" (Silverman, 1970, p. 75).
The work, which ended this way of thinking about workers in industry, known as the
'Hawthorne experiment', began from a perfectly orthodox investigation of the effects in a
telephone manufacturing plant of variation in standards of illumination on output. What
emerged was the importance, for the understanding of the relationship between the individual
and his employing organization, of the intervening social grouping, the small face-to-face work
group. Such small groups generate their own codes of acceptable behavior and social norms,
and these become an additional set of variables to be taken into account for anyone investigating
the response of the individual/worker to his work environment.
The study of small groups as such, or group dynamics, took off largely from Hawthorne. But of
possibly more significance was the recognition that work, for the worker, was not merely an
economic necessity, but also a psychological one.
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The belief that money is the sole, or even the most important of several, motives for
work, is so foolish that anyone who seriously holds this opinion is thereby rendered
incapable of understanding either industry or the industrial worker (Brown, 1954, p.
188).
Although the human relations school had its roots in social psychology, it became a continuing
tradition in public administration. Some argue that its influence continues today in the debate
over new public management.
The significance of this work for managerialist ideologies today is that it established the
idea that informal relations within the organization are of considerable importance. It is
not only the formal organization chart, distribution of functions and systems of work
measurement which are important, but also the feelings, values, informal group norms,
and family and social backgrounds of workers which help determine organizational
performance. Subsequently, this general message has been developed in many and
various detailed applications - modern techniques of job enrichment, participative
management styles, and self-actualization are part of the intellectual heritage of the
human relations school (Pollitt, 1990, p. 17).
Certainly at the level of practical recommendation or industrial consultancy, the social
psychology school (of whom the leading American names in the generation following that of
Mayo are R. Likert, C. Argyris, and D. McGregor) has had enormous influence in achieving
currency for the idea that authoritarian or disciplinarian attitudes in management and
supervision do not pay off as well as do attitudes which allow employees to satisf' their needs
for social belonging and self-fulfillment at the same time as they work for organizational goals.
It was another air of the 1950s, which similarly destroyed the confidence of 'scientific
management'. Another group of scholars, of which the leading names in this regard are Herbert
Simon and Robert Dahl, had in common a much more rigorous notion of what constitutes
scientific method, out of which arose what came to be called the 'behaviouralist' attack on older
schools of political science and administrative theory. Simon for example retained a dichotomy
between statements of fact and statements of value or those aspects of decision-making that are
amenable to scientific reasoning, and are 'rational', and those which are not. Hence, although
efficiency was still important to Simon, he argued that one could not apply the notion of
efficiency to values, and hence the need to isolate those from the decision-making process.
Similarly, Dahl, in an article called 'The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems'
(1947), identified three problematic aspects of the traditional model. The first problem was the
assumption of the classical theorists that administration was a purely technical matter, value-
free, unconnected with ends or purposes. The second attacked the concept of an 'administrative
man' who would be purely rational. Dahl suggested that administrative theory must also
account for non-rational behavior and for influences inseparable from the particular
environment —democratic, capitalist, industrial, etc. The third problem pointed out the
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American-centered or Western-centered nature of classic theory, which is evident in its claim to
'universal principles'.
The scholarly death-blow to the simplistic formulation of the classic politics-administration
dichotomy came in Paul Appleby's Policy and Administration (1949). Appleby, who occupied
high positions in the US federal service throughout the Roosevelt era, pointed attention to the
reality that the level at which a decision is made (political Vs administrative) varies constantly
depending on the nature of the decision, and its accorded importance. "The level at which a
decision is to be made, therefore, may be shifted downward or upward as evaluations point to
more or less controversy, or to more or less importance" (Appleby, 1949, p. 12). Hence, little
progress can be made in a distinction between 'policy' and 'administration'. Politicians
administer on occasions, that is they decide questions, which have to do with the carrying out of
policy rather than its determination, and officials cannot avoid making policy decisions. "In the
perspective of an outside observer, policy and administration are treated together at every level"
(Appleby, 1949, p. 21).
TRADITIONAL (CLASSIC) PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
The traditional model of public administration was an outstanding success in its time, and was
widely emulated by governments worldwide. The model evolved through the mid-twentieth
century into a distinct paradigm: a school of thought based on firm theories and assumptions. As
both theory and practice, it had its good points. Compared to earlier forms of administration that
were rife with corruption, it was more efficient and professional. However, despite its years of
worthy service, there are major criticisms of the traditional model. Its theories and practices are
now considered obsolete, and no longer adequate for management in the public sector. "It was a
good model for a long time, but its time has passed" (Hughes, 1994, p. 42).
The first component of the model, the politics-administration dichotomy, advocated by Wilson
to counter the spoils system, was never realistic, and in its original home, was never really
followed. Relationships between politicians and bureaucrats are complex and fluid and hence do
not reflect the formal, linear logic of the Wilson model. In reality, the two are effectively "fused
with politicians performing administrative duties and administrators assuming political
responsibilities" (Caiden, 1982, p. 82). The attempt to be non-political implied a reluctance to
recognize the policy and political significance of public service work. The dichotomy therefore
came to be widely regarded as a myth, especially useful for the evasion of responsibility.
The principles of scientific management, the second component of the model, were undermined





of informal networking and adaptations. Taylor's attempt to equate motivation with pay
incentives was subsequently discredited as well as his view of the worker as an automaton
responsive only to financial incentives. His ideas of control and standardization were also
disputed as well as his popular 'one-best-way' theorizing. Scientific management's most critical
shortcoming was however attributed to its inability to acknowledge the complexities of
workplace norms and aspirations, or the equally complex issues of cognitive and motivational
biases in decision-making.
The third component of the model, the Weberian model of bureaucracy, came to be viewed as
old-fashioned and obsolete. Formal bureaucracy was argued to breed timeservers not
innovators, to encourage administrators to be risk-averse, rather than risk-taking and to waste
scarce resources instead of using them efficiently. Weberian bureaucracy was thus criticized for
producing inertia, lack of enterprise, red tape, mediocrity and inefficiency. It was rigid,
narrowly focused and pre-occupied with structure and process. Thus, it was simply difficult for
talent to flourish within the rationalistic/mechanistic principles of bureaucratic organizational
control. Bureaucracy is therefore no longer considered an efficient form of organization. Table 1
presents prevailing criticisms of the traditional model of public administration.
Table 1. Criticisms of the Traditional Model of Public Administration
The Tradilional Model of Public Administration: 	 Criticism(s)
Aspect or Component
Unrealistic; politics and administration are effectively
fusedlintertwined
Simplistic, prescriptive, do not acknowledge the
complexities of workplace norms, beliefs and aspirations
Rigid, rationalistic, mechanistic, narrowly-focused;
preoccupied with structure and control
A more important criticism in the context of this thesis is the traditional model's prescription of
universal principles / universal management tool kits to be exported across boundaries/frontiers.
This naive faith in universal scientific principles was exported to newly independent nations to
set them on the track to modernization. The assumption was that the problems of under-
development in the third world were amenable to simple and straightforward solutions by the
application of rational management techniques. Thus, in its early days, the traditional model of
public administration reflected the naïve optimism and ethnocentricity of modernization theory
and overlooked the tenacity of tradition and embedded contextual differences.
By 1955, however, problems were encountered in the context of developing countries, as the
principles of scientific administration -the pristine value orientation of American administration-
simply did not fit the immutable realities of most of the developing countries of the world. It
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was soon realized that the normative elements of scientific administration are predicated upon a
certain kind of political context, the kind of context, which is distinguished in its absence from
nearly every developing country in the world. There was also embedded in them an ideology - a
set of assumptions about certain basic values - values that did not necessarily fit the
circumstances to which they were being transferred.
Hence, by 1955, the instrumental mythos of American public administration had lost much of
its ascribed validity abroad. Ironically, the dominating eminence of Weber and Taylor was
eroding in the US among leaders of administrative thought. An international orthodoxy thus
gradually emerged that there were important differences between public administration across
countries, and it gradually increased in intensity in light of repeated failed interventions in the
context of the developing world. This in turn engendered a period of self-criticism, reflection
and uncertainty, which gradually acquired momentum and was reflected in the orientation of the
new public administration paradigm.
SECOND PERIOD: NEW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
The Minnowbrook conference of September 1968 at the site of Syracuse University indeed
epitomized this sense of self-criticism and uncertainty. The mostly young participants in the
conference were united by their disillusionment in the orthodox bureaucratic model and a sense
that public administration (both study and practice) was not responding in appropriate measure
to critical concerns and problems (Waldo, 1970). Although the conference raised important
issues (mainly themes of relevance, ethics, values, social equity, adaptation, and client focus),
the extent to which it reflected and helped catalyze a 'new' public administration remains a
disputed question.
The faith that there is a new public administration is held in different degrees even by
those widely credited with being a part of a new public administration. In some circles,
the Minnowbrook conference is considered an important - perhaps formative or critical-
chapter in the genesis of a new public administration. For the time being, I prefer to put
'newness' forth as a question, rather than an assertion or a celebration (Marini, 1971, p.
1).
Clearly, there was disagreement even among the participants in the conference, both as to the
present state of the discipline and probably as to the value of the Minnowbrook meeting. A
majority of participants, however, found the present field of public administration wanting, not
only a reliable set of techniques to guide the contemporary public administrator, but equally a
set of concepts and ideas to explain the modern world of administration (Marini, 1971, p. 14).
It is important to emphasize that the Minnowbrook conference took place in the context of
urban riots, long-term discrimination against racial minorities, and a failing and deadly war in
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South-east Asia. This turbulent context certainly had an influence on the choice of themes and
lines of inquiry. Hence, it should not be surprising that 'relevance' emerged as an extremely
popular word at Minnowbrook. Relevance simply implied that the discipline and profession of
public administration was out of keeping with the problems faced in society (La Porte, 1971).
The intractable character of many public problems such as urban poverty, unemployment,
disease, and ignorance coupled with rapid economic growth justified the common interest at the
conference in the theme of relevance.
The same issues also lead into the second major rubric of the Minnowbrook meeting: the
concept of social equity. The rationale for public administration has always been better (more
efficient or economical) management. New public administration adds social equity to the
classic objectives and rationale. Hence, conventional or classic public administration seeks to
answer either of these questions: 1) How can we offer more or better services with available
resources (efficiency)? And/or 2) How can we maintain the level of services while spending less
money (economy)? New public administration adds the question: Does this service enhance
social equity? (Frederickson, 1971).
A fundamental commitment to social equity implies that new public administration is actively
engaged in change. "Simply put, new public administration seeks to change those policies and
structures that systematically inhibit social equity" (Frederickson, 1971, p. 312). This implies a
break from the prevailing emphasis on value-free or value-neutral empirical research. Zimring,
for example, believes that new public administration necessitates that social scientists make
value judgments in their professional capacities and apply their talents for the improvement of
the human condition (Zimring, 1971). Although this belief did not meet with unanimous support
at Minnowbrook, it does underline the desire/commitment to make the academic study of public
administration directly concerned with questions of social justice.
The third major rubric of the conference was the attempt to find organizational forms, which
exhibit a capacity for continued flexibility and adaptability. This was, in part, a reaction to the
demonstrated inclination of traditional bureaucracy to routine and stability. Hence, new public
administration in its search for changeable structures advocated modified organizational forms.
"Decentralization, devolution, projects, contracts, sensitivity training, organization
development, responsibility, expansion, confrontation, and client involvement are all essentially
counter-bureaucratic notions that characterize new public administration" (Frederickson, 1971,
p. 311-313). These concepts were designed to enhance both bureaucratic and policy change, and
thus to increase the possibility of new public administration meeting its goals - good
management, efficiency, economy, and social equity.
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NEW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
The new public administration arose from the evident observation that there were fundamental
changes occurring in society, which have salient implications for both the study and practice of
public administration. Hence, the new public administration attempted to address issues of
relevance, social equity, and the need to advance new theories and organizational units capable
of adapting to rising environmental turbulence.
The emphasis of the new public administration on relevance contrasts sharply with the
universalistic zeal of the traditional model. New public administration realizes in this respect
that organizations are embedded in a dynamic social and political ecology and tries to address
the problem of reconciling organizational statics with social and political dynamics. The new
public administration's call for relevance implies responsiveness to the pressing issues of the
day - poverty and racial injustice. These same issues, however, were completely overlooked by
the traditional bureaucratic model.
The second and related emphasis of the new public administration is on social equity. In this
respect, the new public administration is concerned with humanistic and democratic
administration. For the new public administration, democratic government and issues of
majority rule/minority rights are central. Also essential is the commitment to the effective and
equitable provision of public services. The humanistic/social equity objectives of the new public
administration again contrast with the efficiency-oriented, narrowly focused bureaucratic model
of the previous generation.
The third emphasis of the new public administration is on the need for change and adaptation.
The new public administration conception of change is process oriented, involving new
flexible/malleable organizational forms. New public administration also advocates worker and
citizen participation in decision-making. In this respect, it presents a somehow elevated
conception of citizenship, a vision of the informed, active citizen participating in a range of
public activities. This perspective is like the "strong democracy" argument and is consistent
with new public administration's overall orientation.
Moreover, the new public administration calls for shifting the emphasis from managing the
insides of an organization to managing boundary relations with citizens, other government
agencies, and interest groups. It also places high value on better, more creative, and more
sensitive management. And although new public administration exhibits frustration with the
bureaucratic model, it recognizes that solutions to bureaucratic problems are often surprisingly
bureaucratic or organizational in character.
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The need for change is definitely the dominant theme in the new public administration
paradigm. However, it is a conception of change that is humanitarian, institutional, and
organizational. This rather conservative and humanitarian orientation to change, in turn
contrasts with that of the next paradigm, the new public management paradigm.
THIRD PERIOD: NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
The 1980s and early 1990s have seen the emergence of an alternative and somewhat
revolutionary paradigm in the public sector. This new paradigm is characterized by different
names: managerialism (Pollitt, 1990), new public management (Hood, 1991), or entrepreneurial
government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). These various names reflect different views and
approaches to change in the public sector. However, they all share a commitment to move away
from the traditional bureaucratic model in the direction of flexible organizations, customer-
focus and the achievement of results. Driving all these models are the virtuous three Es:
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness (Hughes, 1994).
The new public sector paradigm - which will be referred to here as new public management-
came about in response to a number of environmental forces which governments have had to
face in the past fifteen years. Wright (1994) summarizes the pressures for change as follows:
LI Internationalization of industrial and financial markets which is creating great problems of
international, transnational or cross-border administrative coordination.
LI Economic and financial pressures caused by problems of public debt and public deficits.
This is the greatest single pressure for reform, as confessed by several governments.
LI A general paradigm shift, with a strong ideological bias against the state, big government,
and bloated bureaucracies. This paradigm has been largely fed by neo-liberalist theories
like public choice theory and principal agent theory.
U Technological change or the explosion of the so-called convergent information
technologies (CIT) involving an increasingly intimate relationship between computer data
processing, telecommunications and office automation products.
U The democratic pressure, with its many and potentially conflicting strands and demands:
more and better yet cheaper services; greater effectiveness yet greater transparency and
access; quicker decisions yet more citizen participation; and greater representation.
U Generalized disgruntlement at the performance of the public sector. The public sector is
allegedly too powerful and too intrusive, or too weak and too ineffective.
LI The managerial revolution which has called into question traditional procedures and styles,
and which claims that efficiency lies in smaller, more decentralized, and more autonomous
managerial units, flattened hierarchies, and more participation of the lower echelons. Also
insufficient attention to goals, outputs and performance (Wright, 1994, pp. 104-107).
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The public sector, as the major agent of the state, has therefore been caught at the cross roads of
these multiple and conflicting pressures. Large and expensive public sectors were difficult to
maintain in a new environment of recession and global economic competition. Public debt
problems created pressures to cut programs andlor increase efficiency. These developments
coupled with the rise of information technology, more demanding consumers, and more
knowledgeable workers necessitated a shift in paradigm. The response generally evolved in the
form of new public management.
Hood (1991) considers the managerial program or 'new public management' as comprising
seven main elements:
0 Hands-on professional management. This means visible, discretionary control for
managers or letting mangers manage.
O Explicit standards and measures of performance. This requires goals to be defined and
performance targets to be set.
U Greater emphasis on output controls. This implies that resources are allocated to specific
areas and performance measured accordingly.
U A shfl to dis-aggregation of units. This involves the breaking-up of large entities into
corporate units organized around specific products.
U A shfl to greater competition. This involves a move to term contracts and public tendering
procedures.
0 A stress on private sector styles of management. This implies a move in the direction of
flexibility in hiring and rewards.
U A stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use. This involves cutting costs,
raising labor discipline, resisting union demands, and limiting compliance costs (Hood,
1991, pp. 4-5).
Wright (1994) summarizes the essence of new public management in the following way:
New public management is rooted in attention to substance and not process, in
constructing and assessing specific rather than general objectives and goals, in treating
people as customers, in encouraging competition between service providers, in
decentralizing decision-making, in improving financial management techniques, in
introducing efficiency indicators and corporate planning methods, and in exploiting
private human resource management practices and information services (Wright, 1994, p.
108).
In sum, there are four kinds of changes that constitute the new public management program:
first, changes to focus on outputs (specific objectives and performance measures); second,
alterations to administrative inputs, such as staff cuts, hiring by contracts, incentives and
performance appraisal; third, changes to the scope of government agencies (i.e. reducing
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government functions through privatization, contracting-out, tendering); and fourth, changing
accountability relationships with the political leadership and the public, as managers become
responsible for results (Hughes, 1994).
A powerful continuation/extension to the new public management paradigm came from two
writers, David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, whose book Reinventing Government: How the
Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector set sympathetic chords vibrating
throughout America. The authors mixed into their book a heady brew of the ideas of free market
economics, with the most popular of the current business motivational literature and dashed it
with their own journalistic style (Moe, 1994, p. 111). "The Osborne-Gaebler book launched a
flotilla of reformers at every level of American Government" (Nathan, 1995, p. 213).
In this book, Osborne and Gaebler emphasize the need for a paradigm shift to supplant the
traditional and obsolete bureaucratic model and hence change the basic style of governance.
The kind of governments that developed during the industrial era, with their sluggish,
centralized bureaucracies, their preoccupations with rules and regulations, and their
hierarchical chains of command, no longer work very well.. .bureaucracies designed in
the 1930s and 1940s simply do not function well in the rapidly changing.. .society and
economy of the 1990s (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, pp. 11-12).
Osborne and Gaebler contend that to change this outdated model, a new form of governance
must be created, one that is adaptable, responsive, efficient and effective. It must be able to
produce high quality goods and services, be responsive to customers, be led by persuasion and
incentives, empower clients, and above all —be entrepreneurial. Achievement of this dramatic
transformation is spelled out by means of ten principles, each of which constitutes a chapter of
the book: These are:
1. Governments should skillfully select alternatives to in-house delivery, such as contracting
out, entering into public-private partnerships, and utilizing such devices as vouchers,
volunteers, seed money, and quid pro quos.
2. Government officials should empower clients to participate in management by means of
governing councils and management teams.
3. Review of agency performance and fund allocation should be based not on program inputs
but policy outcomes.
4. Agencies should minimize the number of rules by which they operate and dedicate
themselves to a clear, one-niche mission.
5. Clients must be regarded as customers. This calls for giving them choices, surveying their
attitudes, making services convenient, training employees in customer contacts and
providing 800 numbers and suggestion forms.
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6. Government should not just deliver services to meet needs, but prevent needs from arising
in the first place. Examples are fire prevention, preventative maintenance and recycling.
7. Govemments should not just spend money, but earn it as well, for example from user fees,
shared savings, enterprise funds, loan pools, and internally competitive profit centers.
8. Centralized institutions should become decentralized, with hierarchical control giving way
to devolved authority, teamwork, participatory management, labor-management, quality
circles, and employee development programs.
9. Competition should be injected into the governing process by such methods as bidding for
tasks, internal rivalry among subunits, and competition among services for clients.
10. Government should not attempt to achieve its ends only by command and control, but also
by restructuring markets. Illustrations are subsidized health insurance and emissions trading
(Goodsell, 1993, p. 85).
Osborne and Gaebler's ten entrepreneurial principles entail the following public sector reforms:
1. Competition between service providers Competitive government
2. Empowering citizens ' Community-owned government
3. Focusing not on inputs but outcomes ' Results-oriented government
4. Driving by goals not by rules and regulations Mission-driven government
5. Redefining clients as customers Customer-driven government
6. Prevention of problems rather than treatment Anticipatory government
7. Earning money, not just spending it Enterprising government
8. Decentralizing authority	 Decentralized government
9. Catalyzing public, private, and voluntary sectors Catalytic government
10. Market mechanisms rather than bureaucratic mechanisms ' Market-oriented government
Hence, the title of their book Reinventing Government, in the sense that if the ten
entrepreneurial principles depicted here are fully implemented, they will result in a government
so changed as to merit the description of reinvented. They conclude their book with the
following message:
Our governments are in deep trouble today. In government after government and public
system after public system, reinvention is the only option left. But the lack of a vision —a
new paradigm- holds us back. We hope the vision we have laid out will unlock the
remaining gates - unleashing a paradigm shift throughout American government, from
the smallest hamlet to the largest federal bureaucracy. We hope our road map will
empower you to reinvent your government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p. 331)
(emphasis added).
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Reinventing government is an important part of the new public management paradigm. No
movement associated with the administrative aspects of modern American government has had
the visibility of reinventing government. "The phrase reinventing government has entered the
lexicon of government, and the constellation of ideas associated with it appears to have been
extremely influential in the practices of government management at all levels"(Frederickson,
1996, p. 263). Reinventing the federal government is thus the main theme of the National
Performance Review (NPR) presented by Vice President Al Gore to President Clinton in 1993.
The NPR report emphasizes the goal of changing the very culture of the federal government by
empowering both customers and employees and fostering excellence. This report is important
and influential, not so much for the actual written words and their recommendations as for the
unwritten theory and assumptions that constitute the real objectives of the report writers. Hence,
what is most important about this report is to be found in its theoretical intent and its unwritten
assumptions about the nature of government agencies, their legal missions, and their
professional culture (Moe, 1994).
NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
New public management signals a true paradigmatic change in the public sector and the
emergence of a post-bureaucratic culture based on responsiveness, trust, openness,
encouragement and support. The new movement underlines a strong commitment to market
approaches for the provision of public services and to mechanisms for individual choice.
Customer satisfaction is however, to all accounts, the highest value in this new paradigm. It thus
represents a dramatic move away from the traditional model and a clear-cut break with the
humanitarian/democratic ethos of the new public administration.
New public management as an alternative paradigm may well offer a revolutionary approach to
public sector reform. However, the trend toward new public management has not been without
controversy. Some view new public management as offering a new way of looking at and
carrying out functions within the public sector (Borins, 1995). Others, however, regard it as
simply an uncritical adoption of the worst features of private management while ignoring the
fundamental differences of the public sector environment. New public administration scholars
particularly view the new paradigm as against the most cherished traditions and values of the
public service.
The derivation of the new public management from a private business model is a first serious
source of criticism. The new public management philosophy is rooted in the conviction that
private sector management is superior to public service management because its methods and
practices have been refined in the heat of market competition (Elcock, 1995). Hence, there is a
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tendency to emulate in the public domain what is believed to be the best practice of
management in the private sector, with little regard or consideration to the distinctive features
and characteristics of the public sector.
The vocabulary of the new public management for example reveals the extent to which it
borrows from the private world of business -empowerment, service to clients, earn rather than
spend. However, it has been pointed out that there is a difference between citizens and
customers/clients. Clients are sovereign and can hold business accountable through their
behavior in a competitive market. Hence "the customer who dissatisfied with the product of one
firm shifts to that of another, uses the market to defend his welfare and to improve his position"
(Savoie, 1995, p. 116). Citizens on the other hand, hold their public servants to account, through
their elected representatives and ultimately through the ballot box (Elcock, 1995).
Stewart (1998) for example points out that the word customer cannot encompass the variety of
relationships between government and the public. For the private sector, the customer is
normally the individual purchaser of the goods or services. In the public domain, there are users
of the service who are not necessarily purchasers and there may be for some services collective
customers rather than individual customers. Hence, the series of words that have been used in
the past to describe the public in its relationship with government - patient, client, user,
applicant, defendant- recognizes the differentiation and diversity of relationships better than the
generality of the word customer (Stewart, 1998, p. 17).
More critically, the relationship with the public as citizens is ignored or distorted by the
emphasis on the customer. "To treat the citizen as customer is to place severe limits on
citizenship.. .To reduce the citizen to customer is to limit involvement in the process of
government" (Stewart, 1998, p. 17). In a similar argument, Elcock points out that the users of
the public services are not customers except in certain restricted contexts in the public services.
"Indeed, as citizens their rights extend further than those of customers because they have the
right to share in control over them. . . Citizens are also sometimes less than customers when they
are obliged to submit to coercion by the State" (Elcock, 1995, p. 46).
Beyond this specific contention, there is the overall issue that the new public management
philosophy is rooted in private management practices. Hence, Elcock argues that "those generic
management principles for which extensive claims have been made, have been developed in
business management, where the objective of the organization is ultimately clear and
unambiguous - to maximize its profit" (Elcok, 1995, p. 37). In the public domain, however, the
objectives, demands, and interests that have to be balanced are complex and there is no one
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overriding aim or objective. "Public-sector objectives are multiple, overlapping and frequently
nebulous" (Wright, 1994, p. 126).
The reality of the public domain involves pressures and protest, bargaining and
negotiation as well as choice and action... management in the public domain has to be
grounded in the distinctive purposes of the public domain which political theory would
suggest involve democracy, community, citizenship, equity and discourse (Stewart, 1998,
p. 23).
Another source of criticism is that change in the new public management - or more specifically
in reinventing government- tends to be articulated in dichotomoiis coup\ets succi as
O Steering rather than rowing
O Empowering rather than serving
O Earning rather than spending
O Preventing rather than curing
O Mission rather than rules
Some scholars have argued that these precepts provide little practical guidance because they
pose a series of choices (steer/row, prevention/cure, mission/rules) s noug 1r1 ney am opposed
to each other, while effective management requires finding the right ba)ance between those
opposing poles.
There is a tendency in organizational change to treat organizational characteristics as
absolutes to be pursued rather than as on dimensions drawn between opposing
characteristics, each of which has strengths and weaknesses. Thus decentralization may
be seen as desirable, but it should not be pursued without regard for central direction. The
problem is to achieve the right ba\ance eteer ce	 zcrn anti
While flexibility may be seen as an organizational asset, flexibility has to be set within
structure. Balance has to be achieved between continuity and change; standardization and
responsiveness; and the balance will vary between organizations and over time (Stewart,
1998, p. 18).
Other scholars find Osborne and Gaebler's entrepreneurial principles (recipes) lacking in
coherence and consistency.
Osborne and Gaebler's new paradigm looks like another case in public administration
where doctrinal tendency and counter-tendency are presented simultaneously.. .Osborne
and Gaebler's own set of alternatives to progressive public administration is a collection
of remedies which are more notable for their diversity, and even their internal
contradictions, than for any single coherent underlying theme.. .Given the force of mutual
repulsion which each of these recipes for good public management exerts against each
other, it seems inherently difficult for public management controls to settle down into a
stable hybrid form, at least for very long (Hood, 1995, pp. 107-111).
The contradictory/mutually-repulsive nature of the entrepreneurial model prescriptions have
also been nicely illustrated in a recent article Shouldn 't Row, Can 't Steer: What's a Government
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to do? In this article, Peters (1997b) expresses the view that while public sector organizations
are being told that they are not good at rowing, they are simultaneously cautioned, by some
critics, that they are equally inept at steering.
On the one hand, governments are being told that they are not very good at managing
operations and should stick to policy- in other words to steering. One of Osborne and
Gaebler's little homilies about governing is that governments should steer and not row.
On the other hand, however, governments are told that they are not very good at directing
society and should instead merely continue to run relatively routine public functions.
What role is there remaining for government in this view of the contemporary governing
process? (Peters, 1997b, p. 53).
Yet, while states are being told that they are not particularly good at either steering or rowing,
there appears to be an increasing set of demands made upon them for exercising some control
over society. Thus for example, despite market deregulation, there are many new pressures for
public regulation, including urgent environmental issues that states are being called upon to
attend to. "It now appears appropriate for governments to intervene rather forcefully for
purposes of environmental control" (Peters, 1997b, p. 54). Similarly under conditions of intense
competitiveness and globalization, citizens appear to be demanding some protection from
international economic forces. Hence, state withdrawal in one direction may trigger increased
state interventionism in another (Wright, 1994).
A continuation for the argument is provided by Painter, who suggests that the role of
government has, if anything become more critical/important in this day and age.
Indeed, given the high quality inputs that corporations rely upon in order to succeed in
today's super-competitive global market, the role of government as educator, trainer,
research funder and infrastructure operator, has, if anything, become even more
important. Seen from this perspective, the idea of the market and the state as
diametrically opposed systems of social organization is a false antithesis, the position
instead is often one of inter-dependence and complementarity (Painter, 1994, p. 249).
Another serious contention has to do with a potential fragmentation of governance resulting
from the prescriptions of new public management. The process of breaking-up large
organizations into disaggregated units through contracting-out and tendering may lead to
fragmented, user-hostile systems unable to cater holistically for the needs of individuals. "While
differentiation is required, the process has resulted in a structure of government in danger of
being a series of separate units each focused on a limited task, without sufficient capacity to
work across units" (Stewart, 1998, p. 19). "Empowerment and hiving off of activities into new
executive or special operating agencies will make it more difficult to promote coherence in
government policy and action" (Savoie, 1995, p. 119).
Stewart attributes the grnwth of fragmentation to lack of system overview and overall direction.
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The growth of fragmentation came about as the result of steps taken without necessary
regard to their cumulative effect.., each change is justified in its own right, without regard
to the overall impact on the system of governance. There is no capacity for overview of
the system and hence a lack of understanding of the cumulative effect of changes brought
about by the new public management. One change affects another and the implications
have to be understood and anticipated (Stewart, 1998, pp. 19-20).
In this sense, the continuous multiplication of quasi-autonomous agencies and of sub-
contracting agents, without overall purpose/direction, heightens an already acute problem of
politico-administrative coordination (Wrigl1t, 1994). The most significant modification in this
respect is to recognize the danger of fragmentation inherent in new public management
prescriptions and to insist on the advantages of holistic government.
Hence, the adaptations involved in the new public management have not been without
costs/problems. Contract management, for example, may lower costs and improve delivery
standards but it erodes the status and responsibility of central departments and raises questions
of confidentiality, accountability and legitimacy. Similarly, the multiplication of quasi-
autonomous agencies may promote competition, but it also heightens already existing problems
of politico-administrative coordination. Marketization increases efficiency and widens customer
choice, yet it further obscures an already blurred public-private boundary. Also, state
withdrawal in one direction tends to be compensated for or neutralized by state expansion in
another as with the creation of increasingly intrusive regulatory agencies.
In this sense, the new public management changes have invariably been rife with tensions. This
is especially true in view of their undermining of the remaining precepts of the traditional model
(hierarchical lines, detailed rules, anonymity and uniformity) and of the new public
administration ethos of equity, fairness and impartiality. Savoie (1995), for example,
commenting on the often criticized bureaucratic rigidity, writes that "we all too often forget that
one person's red tape is another's due process" (Savoie, 1995, p. 116). Similarly, Jordan (1994)
blames the Osborne and Gaebler's remedy for neglecting the fact that "traditional systems had
defects as a consequence of delivering virtues such as reliability, fairness and probity" (Jordan,
1994, p. 278). Frederickson writes,
Certainly rules prevent some abuse and result in greater fairness and are rational if less
abuse and fairness are called for. If efficiency and flexibility are preferred, then a
rationality of tossing out rules and substituting the superiority of mission is called for. It
is also likely that the results will be predictable - more efficient, innovative, and flexible
government, and government that is less fair and more open to abuse or corruption
(Frederickson, 1996, p. 266).
There have also been expressed concerns about problems of public service morale in the wake
of the new public management. For example, performance-related pay, although sometimes
desirable as a method of rewarding public sector managers, has a de-motivating effect on those
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who do not receive it. Moreover, performance evaluation in the public sector is an intrinsically
difficult exercise, given the collective nature of the work and the multiplicity of objectives.
Using crude performance measures may thus be counter-productive and has been said to be
symptomatic of a narrow 'neo-Taylorian' bias. More generally, the assumed superiority of
private sector practices has undermined the intrinsic value of public service work, which is
rooted in objectivity, regularity and predictability.
Accountability has been another contentious aspect of the new public management. Public
sector accountability is a means of ensuring that community wishes and desires are reflected in
the practices of government. In essence, political accountability means that politicians can be
called upon to account by the citizenry, mainly through the act of voting. Hence, if the public
servant is to be managerially accountable, this could be seen as detracting from the
accountability of a responsible politician. The bureaucracy is also presumed to be indirectly
accountable to the citizenry. The traditional model enforced accountability by relying on
hierarchical lines of authority. Accountability in the managerial model, however, is more fluid
and more political. This is seen as leading to an erosion and evasion of accountability under the
new public management (Hughes, 1994).
Of course, disagreement and counter-arguments are abundant. Hence, Borins (1995) argues that
the new public management is not slavishly following private sector ideas nor failing to
recognize the differences between the public and private sectors. "Rather, it acknowledges that
both the public and private sectors are confronting similar forces, and it is receptive to learning
about how the private sector has responded and, where appropriate, adapting private sector
learning to the public sector" (Borins, 1995, p. 124). Further, addressing the notion of
accountability, Borins clarifies that "the new public management has thought about the question
of accountability and argues that the two enemies of accountability are unclear objectives and
anonymity. By emphasizing clear objectives and written performance contracts, the new public
management increases rather than diminishes accountability" (Borins, 1995, p. 126).
Finally, the debate over the new public management raises the question of whether the
traditional model has been effectively supplanted. There is a systematic bashing of bureaucratic
principles in this new movement. This point, more than any other, has invited serious contention
and criticism.
The public sector, as the major instrument of the state, functions according to norms
deriving from many - often conflicting- rationalities: political, legal, institutional,
technical, social and economic, but a large part of its logic still demands some form of
Weberianism, with emphasis on uniformity, predictability, impartiality, anonymity, and
juridication. . .The public sector has always had to juggle with many conflicting sets of
values, including democracy (hence accountability), equity (involving uniformity) and
efficiency (minimizing costs). Too much current radical reform of the public sector is
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obsessed with efficiency, narrowly defined, and is based on a simplistic view of
bureaucracy, a naïve view of the market, an idealized view of the private sector, an
insensitivity to the hidden costs of reform, an over-optimism about outcomes, and
perhaps, more fundamentally, a misleading view of the state (Wright, 1994, pp. 128-
129).
Similarly, Self (1997) having comprehensively reviewed the new managerial changes writes,
Hence, it may be premature to announce the death of traditional bureaucracy. Doubtless,
the style of bureaucracy will continue to change, there will be less hierarchy, more
flexibility, and more delegation to operational units than in the past. There will be
changes of fashion as the inevitable dilemmas or conflicts of administrative systems
continue to be played out. But some of the features of modem bureaucracy as it came
into existence, a century or so ago remain as or more essential to good government today.
These include the possession of enough skills, status and independence to offer useful
advice about the implementation of distinctive public purposes and to apply those
purposes impartially and fearlessly.. .as Eva Etzioni-Halevy (1983) puts its, democracy
(still) needs bureaucracy (Self, 1997, p. 19).
In a recent discussion, Wright (1997) eloquently sums up the paradoxes, which have been
generated by recent processes of administrative modernization. The first such paradox is that the
most radical reform programs appear to have been introduced in those countries with the least
need. "Those countries with the greatest need, diplomacy forbids mentioning them here, have
either few reform ambitions or totally inadequate reform programs" (Wright, 1997, P. 9).
The second paradox is that much recent reform has been inspired by private management
theories, which are notorious for their fads and short life span. In this respect, he warns that "it
does seem time for specialists of public administration to turn a more critical eye on the
weaknesses and problems of private sector management, instead of limiting their analyses to the
problems of the transplant of an idealized and misunderstood model" (Wright, 1997, p. 10).
The third paradox is that whilst many of the reforms are designed to cut costs and improve
efficiency, the end result of some of them may be quite the opposite. "Take for example,
evaluation, a current craze which tends to ignore the manpower costs involved in the process"
(Wright, 1997, p. 10). In a similar way transforming citizens into clients or customers with
clearly defined rights may have the effect of improving quality, but it also creates pressures for
redress, often of a legal nature.
The related paradox of efficiency is such that while the current reform programs are intended to
sensitize officials to the value of efficiency, which in itself is a desirable and legitimate
objective, it is nonetheless obvious that such an exercise is politically loaded, since efficiency in
the delivery of public goods involves complex political and social externalities. "We are not
merely selling a disaggregated range of products like soap powder and potatoes. We are
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juggling with multiple, interlinked and often conflicting and nebulous requirements" (Wright,
1997, p. 11).
More importantly in terms of the efficiency paradox is the question of whether efficiency is
indeed likely to be maximized by systematically denigrating the ethos and ethics of the public
service, and demoralizing and de-motivating those who uphold the principles of the public
good. Thus if citizens are turned into customers, officials are also transformed into producers,
motivated primarily by the logic and rewards of the private market place. "In that sense, the
destruction of the public ethos is profoundly inefficient, even if the effects may take some time
to emerge" (Wright, 1997, p. 11).
The fourth paradox relates to clarity and transparency, which are translated in the new public
management into clear managerial goals/targets and combined with increasing managerial
autonomy. This is leading, however, to the obfuscation of political accountability.
"Managerialism is further blurring the lines of responsibility. It may be convenient for
politicians to hide behind the smoke-screen of managerial discretion and autonomy, but this
hardly adds to the democratic quality of decision-making" (Wright, 1997, p. 11).
A final paradox, according to Wright, is rooted in the reformers' ambition to reduce the role of
the state. Hence, observers now refer to 'the disintegrative state', 'the frugal state', 'the strategic
state', 'the enabling state', 'the evaluative state', 'the regulatory state', and 'the hybridized
state'. However, radical reform programs designed to produce state retreat require a strong state
to initiate and implement them. Moreover, state withdrawal in one direction may trigger
increased state interventionism in another as with the creation of increasingly intrusive
regulatory agencies.
These are the incoherencies, contradictions, and hidden costs of reform. The paradoxes outlined
here are in short the reflections of the dilemmas of public administration, which is caught in the
web of interactions between markets, state and society. They are also a reflection of some
naivety and misunderstanding of the true nature of public administration, and an idealized view
of the private sector and of the workings of the market.
If we compare an idealized view of the private sector and the workings of the market,
with a bilious perception of the public domain, it is scarcely surprising that demands for
reform should emerge. A more measured view of both would however lead us to
prudence (Wright, 1997, p 12).
As early as the 1950s, Herbert Kaufman wrote about the conflicting values of public
administration. At their roots, said Kaufman, government reforms involve calibrating values of
neutral competence, representation, and efficiency. There is no reform effort in which these
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values will be in perfect and permanent harmony. The work of reformers thus consists of
constant adjustments to re-balance those values in relation to new conditions, values, and
realities. In this sense, the design of government reform inevitably involves trade-offs and
choosing between different packages of costs and benefits. Finding the right balance and
calibrating different values has always been and is likely to remain the art and challenge of
administrative reform -- both in theory and practice.
A final, and in the context of this thesis, very relevant criticism of new public management, is
its tendency to prescribe simplistic universal principles, irrespective of national circumstances.
Osborne and Gaebler imply that some kind of remorseless logic is at work given wider
economic/social forces.
If the rise of the entrepreneurial government is an inevitable shift rather than a temporary
fad, as we argue, one would expect it to happen in other nations as well. And to a starting
degree, it has. A similar process of transformation is under way throughout the developed
world (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, p. 328).
This universalistic determinism is reminiscent of the traditional model's contention of universal
applicability. Despite Osborne and Gaebler's claim to be dealing with a global phenomenon, the
obstructive-ness of national values does raise the usual question of transferability.
Several writers (Hood 1995; Pollitt and Summa, 1997; Kriill, 1999; Maor and Jones, 1999;
Guyomarch, 1999; Premfors, 1998) have noted that the idea of international convergence has
been exaggerated in the new public management. Hood for example argues,
It is easy to be carried away by grand claims of historical inevitability and global
convergence on some new epoch-making paradigm, especially when they come from
such eminent writers. But the argument here is that such claims should be treated with
some skepticism. Certainly, there does seem to have been a movement away from the
doctrines of progressive-era public administration in several OECD states. And
undoubtedly the same managerial catch-words have such a wide currency that one can
speak of a new global vocabulary. But, it is less certain that the move is truly universal,
and the idea of a new 'global paradigm' seems to exaggerate the underlying uniformity
and coherence of current developments (Hood, 1995, p. 105).
Hood explains that establishing the partial retreat of traditional approaches to public
administration does not necessarily demonstrate that any single new style of public
administration will emerge, or even that the old style will everywhere disappear. "Speaking of a
global shift from one paradigm to another implies both that there is a single old paradigm and a
single exit route from it. Both of these implied premises are contestable" (Hood, 1995, p. 106).
Moreover, the idea of a new global paradigm ignores the different national political agendas to
which contemporary public management changes are responding. Thus, national public
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administration systems vary in ways that are likely to make substantial differences to the
motive/opportunity to adopt new public management reforms.
Hood cautions that even when similar changes appear to be happening, the underlying reasons
may be different, reflecting different political motives/agendas (Hood, 1995). In the way of
illustration, he provides the example of Sweden where managerial changes were undertaken as a
tactic of conservative change, while in the UK, they were intended as radical reforms. He
concludes,
It is true that the same management buzzwords tend to be very widely diffused, but that
on its own is a trivial level of convergence: the key question is whether what is
happening underneath is also uniform and that seems doubtful (Hood, 1995, p. 109).
Pollitt and Summa (1997) reach a similar conclusion based on their review of the trajectories of
reform in Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK. They argue,
It is fashionable to think there is a tide, or sequence of basically similar public
management changes sweeping through Western Europe, North America, and Australia,
and British ministers have proclaimed that the UK is an admired and copied leader in
public sector reforms. This article argues that a uniform one-track picture is not at all
accurate (Pollitt and Summa, 1997, p. 7).
Their comparison of reform trajectories in those four countries points to the powerful
explanatory power of the nature of the national political system in accounting for the observed
differences.
The most convincing explanations of the trajectories observed in our four countries
appear to rest not on economic performance or party doctrines at all, but rather, upon the
characteristics of the political and administrative systems already in place. It was these
systems characteristics, which most significantly influenced what was possible in terms
of the scope, process and speed of reform. In this sense, we suggest that institutional
explanations of public management changes are somewhat more powerful than either
party political or economic explanations (Pollitt and Summa, 1997, p. 15).
Maor and Jones (1999) also underline the importance of national systems/styles and institutional
factors in accounting for divergence in reforms in European administrative systems. "The
persistence of national systems and styles still seems strong, and more powerful than the
pressures for convergence from both the EU and NPM" (Maor and Jones, 1999, p. 50). They
also point out that new public management processes themselves may change under the impact
of national styles and their operations. They conclude,
Working against the process of 'becoming similar' is however the persistence of the
traditional central institutions of the state... despite attempts at fundamental reforms of
the manner in which policy is formulated the end result may be a mere tinkering with the
engine of government or other changes which do not constitute a radical overhaul (Maor
and Jones, 1999, p. 55).
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Knill's (1999) comparison of administrative reform in Britain and Germany leads him to
conclude that "the potential for reforming different administrative systems is basically
dependent on the general institutional context in which these systems are embedded" (Knill,
1999, p. 113). He argues that comparative studies tend to emphasize convergent trends and
similarities of reforms across national administrations rather than systematically accounting for
cross-national variations in administrative change and persistence (Knill, 1999, p. 114).
Similarly, Guyomarch (1999), analyzing recent administrative reforms in the French public
sector argues that there is in France clear evidence of widespread unwillingness to change many
of the basic institutional rules. He therefore concludes that, despite new public management
pressures for international convergence, the actual nature of the reforms in any individual state
depends on the national context or 'initial endowment' and on the nature of deeply embedded
institutional structures.
Also, Wright (1994) exploring the reform programs being pursued in West European countries
points to differences in the nature, style, timing and pace of reform. These differences may be
explained in terms of the opportunities afforded by the politico-institutional and cultural
environment in which they are being pursued (Wright, 1994, p. 102). "Differences between the
programs have clearly been determined by domestic political opportunity structures" (Wright,
1994, p. 119). He concludes, "Each West European country has a unique blend of factors which
explains persistent divergence in spite of clear evidence of convergence. In short, national
contexts matter" (Wright, 1994, p. 122).
Finally, Premfors (1998) analyzing the Swedish experience in public sector reform in a
comparative perspective argues that instead of a singular pattern of adaptation, there have been
several different reform trajectories in Western-style democracies, largely predicated on
historically determined patterns of state-society relations and significant variations in political
cultures. A detailed comparative analysis of the case of Sweden is used to illustrate the
prevalence of a pattern of structural pluralism and the fruitfulness of a historical-institutionalist
approach to the comparative study of administrative reform (Premfors, 1998, p. 141).
The evidence is massive and it is undisputable: national political cultures and institutions are
important determinants of the course of public sector reform in every country. There is often an
interactive relationship between the pattern of institutions and national political culture, between
national reform contexts and genuine change. This approach to public sector reform is also
consistent with recent new institutionalist writings on administrative reform. Thus we turn here
to a detailed exploration of this alternative paradigm.
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NEW INSTITUTLONALISM: AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM
Although the study of institutions has been central to political science since its inception, 'new
institutionalism' is a term that has just recently appeared with growing frequency in the social
sciences. There is still considerable confusion about what the 'new institutionalism' is and what
sort of promise it displays. Such ambiguity, however, can at least be partially dispelled by
recognizing that the 'new institutionalism' does not constitute a unified, coherent body of
thought. Instead, at least three different analytical approaches, each of which calls itself a 'new
institutionalism' can be identified: rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism,
and sociological institutionalism. All three approaches reflect a common commitment to the
significance of institutional arrangements in accounting for social, administrative and political
processes. However, beyond this core assumption, the 'new institutionalism' is characterized by
a great variety of positions, which are sometimes complementary and sometimes conflicting
(Lowndes, 1996).
Rational choice institutionalism was influenced by public choice and principal agent theories
but sought to go beyond them. In their institutional analyses, rational choice theorists adopt a
classic calculus approach that emphasizes instrumentality and strategic calculation. They
assume that individuals seek to maximize the attainment of a set of goals, and in doing so
behave strategically, which is to say that they canvass all possible options to select those
conferring maximum benefit. From their perspective, institutions affect behavior primarily by
providing information relevant to the behavior of others, and enforcement mechanisms for
agreement, penalties and defection (Hall and Taylor, 1996).
Rational choice institutionalists also drew fruitful analytical tools from the new economic
theories of organizations. They thus explain particular institutional forms and persistence with
reference to a universal economic logic, whereby institutions are viewed as efficient
organizational frameworks, which arise to solve problems of complex economic exchange. This
approach sees the main purpose and effect of institutions as economizing on transaction costs
(Lowndes, 1996). Hence, institutions are designed to stabilize exchange relationships, to induce
cooperative behavior among self-interested individuals, and to minimize transactions costs
(Koelbe, 1995).
Hall and Taylor (1996) emphasize three important features of rational choice institutionalism:
0 Rational choice institutionalists employ a characteristic set of behavioral assumptions. In
general, they post that the relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes, and
behave entirely instrumentally so as to maximize the attainment of these preferences. Their
approach presumes extensive instrumentality and calculation.
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D Rational choice institutionalists emphasize the role of strategic interaction in the
determination of political outcomes. Hence, while actors deploy extensive calculations,
political outcomes are the result of strategic interactions. Institutions in turn structure such
interactions, by providing strategically useful information and enforcement mechanisms.
U Rational choice institutionalists assume that actors voluntarily create institutions because of
the perceived gains of cooperation. If institutions are then subject to a process of
competitive selection, they survive because they provide more benefits to the relevant
actors than alternate institutional forms (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 944-945).
Hence, rational choice instiutionalists argue that individuals and their strategic calculations
ought to be the central concern of social science. They view institutions as created by utility-
maximizing individuals with clear intentions. Yet once institutions exist, they set parameters for
further action.
Historical institutionalism developed in response to the group of theories of politics and
structural-functionalism prominent in political science during the 1960s and 1970s. While
historical institutionalism borrowed from both approaches, it also sought to go beyond them.
Historical institutionalists do not deny that individuals attempt to calculate their interests, but
argue that outcomes are the product of the interaction among various groups, interests, ideas and
institutional structures. Human action is viewed as an attempt to 'satisfice' and fulfill
expectations which are context-specific and deeply embedded in cultural, socio-economic, and
political fields or structures (March and Olsen, 1989, pp. 9-19).
In contrast to the calculus approach of rational choice intitutionalists, historical institutionalists
resort to a cultural approach, which stresses that behavior is not fully strategic, but bounded by
an individual's worldview. Hence, without denying that human behavior is rational or
purposive, this perspective emphasizes the extent to which individuals turn to established
routines or familiar patterns of behavior to attain their purposes. It tends to view individuals as
'satisficers', rather than utility-maximizers, and to emphasize the degree to which the choice of
a course of action depends on the interpretation of a situation rather than on purely instrumental
calculation (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Institutions matter from this perspective because they
provide moral/cognitive templates for interpretationlaction.
In Rediscovering Institutions, March and Olsen attempt to show that individuals behave
according to a set of rules and procedures, which define the appropriateness of their actions
(March and Olsen, 1989, pp. 23-24). In their view, institutions matter because they shape, even
determine, human behavior. Institutions come about to give legitimacy to certain rules of
conduct. For the majority of decisions, rules and procedures (provided by institutions) are
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clearly established and individuals follow routines. They follow well-worn paths and do what
they think is expected of them. They 'satisfice' based on limited information and bounded
rationality (March and Olsen, 1989).
Hall and Taylor (1996) identify four features of historical institutionalism as particularly
distinctive:
U Historical institutionalists accord a central importance to institutions in their analyses. They
suggest that the strategies induced by a given institutional setting may ossifi over time into
worldviews, which are propagated by formal organizations and ultimately shape even the
self-images and basic preferences of the actors involved in them.
U Historical institutionalists are especially attentive to the way in which institutions distribute
power unevenly across groups. They assume a world in which institutions give some
groups disproportionate power and access to the decision-making process and explore the
role that such non-symmetrical relations of power play in shaping political processes.
U Historical institutionalists have been strong proponents of an image of social causation that
is path-dependent. Institutions are perceived as persistent features of the historical
landscape and a central factor pushing historical development along a set of paths.
U Historical institutionalists stress the unintended consequences and inefficiencies generated
by existing institutions in contrast to images of institutions as more purposive and efficient
(Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 940-942).
Although historical institutionalists draw attention to the role of institutions in political life, they
rarely insist that institutions are the only causal force in politics. They typically seek to locate
institutions in a causal chain that accommodates a role for other factors or elements, notably
political and socio-economic development and the diffusion of ideas. "They are especially
concerned to integrate institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors,
such as ideas, can make to political outcomes" (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 938).
Sociological institutionalism, in turn, arose primarily within the sub-field of organization theory
and in part as a reaction to the Weberian model of efficiency/rationality. Since Weber, many
sociologists had seen the bureaucratic structures that dominate the modern landscape as the
product of an intensive effort to devise ever more efficient structures for performing the tasks of
modem society. Against this view, new sociological institutionalists argue that modern
institutional forms were not adopted simply because they were more efficient and rational.
Instead many of these forms should be seen as culture-specific practices that are assimilated into
organizations, not necessarily to enhance their means-ends efficiency, but as result of more
general processes of cultural transmission.
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Sociological institutionalists call upon the notion of 'embeddedness' to buttress their arguments.
Cognitive and cultural embeddedness explains why most individuals often cannot conceive of
alternative institutional arrangements and prefer to stay with the tried and true. Individuals are
viewed as embedded in so many social, economic, and political relationships that are beyond
their control or even their cognition. Institutional change originates from this perspective at the
macro level and organizations tend to adapt in incremental, mimetic and homogeneous forms.
Powell and DiMaggio (1991), for example, use the concept of 'institutional isomorphism' to
explain institutional change in terms of coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphisms which
lead organizations and institutions to adopt surprisingly homogeneous forms (Powell and
DiMaggio, 1991, pp. 64-74).
The power of the 'institutional environment' lies in its capacity to confer legitimacy, which is
linked to organizations' survival prospects. By adapting to cultural expectations, organizations
are better able to recruit staff, gain funding, build alliances and market their products to
consumers. The power of 'institutional myths' is such that increasing homogenization (or
isomorphism) is evident among populations of organizations (Zucker, 1991). Organizational
change is thus driven by an increasing demand for similarity and homogeneity, rather than by
efficiency criteria (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, pp.63-66). Zucker calls this the 'contagion of
legitimacy' (Zucker, 1991, p. 105).
Sociological institutionalists also emphasize the highly interactive and mutually constitutive
character of the relationship between institutions and individual action. When individuals act as
a social convention specifies, they simultaneously reinforce the convention to which they are
adhering (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Individuals develop a sense of appropriate institutional
practices, which are then deployed and serve to reinforce existing institutional conventions.
Hall and Taylor (1996) point to three features of sociological institutionalism, which render it
relatively distinctive in the context of the other 'new institutionalisms':
U Sociological institutionalists tend to define institutions broadly to include not just formal
rules, procedures and norms, but also the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral
templates that provide the frames of meaning guiding human action. Such a definition
breaks down the conceptual divide between institutions and culture as the two come to
shade into each other.
U Sociological institutionalists also have a distinctive understanding of the relationship
between institutions and individual action. They emphasize the way in which institutions
influence behavior by providing the cognitive scripts and categories that are indispensable
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for action. It follows that institutions affect the self-images, identities, and preferences of
social actors.
IJ Sociological institutionalists also take a distinctive approach to explaining how institutional
practices originate and change. Organizations are seen as adopting specific institutional
practices because they are widely valued within a broader cultural environment and hence
enhance the social legitimacy of the organization (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 947-949).
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
The three varieties of 'new institutionalism' developed around the same time, but in relative
isolation from each other. Each approach offers a distinctive image of the political world and
each displays characteristic strengths and weaknesses. While all three approaches share a
concern for the role of institutions in social science, they diverge sharply on theory and method.
To rational choice institutionalists, institutions are an intervening variable, capable of affecting
an individual's choices and actions but not determining them. To historical institutionalists,
institutions play a determinant role since they shape the actions of individuals. To sociological
institutionalists, institutions are themselves dependent on larger macro level variables such as
society and culture (Koelbe, 1995).
The concept of rules and institutions is definitely central to all three new institutionalist
approaches. Proponents of rational choice institutionalism tend to stress formal institutional
arrangements (contracts, decision-making procedures, and budget mechanisms). Proponents of
historical institutionalism tend to focus on formal institutional arrangements as well as informal
norms and sanctions inside individual organizations. Proponents of sociological institutionalism
draw attention to the role of institutional templates in the wider environment- informal and
formal cultural elements (Lowndes, 1996).
On the dimension of stability and change, the three institutionalist approaches also differ.
Proponents of rational choice institutionalism argue that existing institutional arrangements will
persist only as long as they serve the interests of utility maximizing rational actors. Proponents
of historical institutionalism tend to emphasize stability, but argue that institutional
arrangements are never closed or complete, but always ambiguous and in flux. Proponents of
sociological institutionalism tend to focus on stability and continuity, noting the tendency of
dominant institutions to reproduce, through what Zucker calls the 'contagion of legitimacy'
(Lowndes, 1996).
On the dimension of rational strategic action, the three institutionalist approaches again differ.
Proponents of rational choice institutionalism see individual rationality and interests as prior
and more important than institutions. Proponents of historical institutionalism argue that
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individual action is norm-driven, following a logic of appropriateness rather than a logic of
consequentiality. Action is thus influenced by a sense of duty/obligation, rather than by
anticipation of consequences. Proponents of sociological institutionalism view strategic choices
as determined by templates within the wider societal and cultural environment (Lowndes, 1996).
In terms of strengths and weaknesses, rational choice institutionalism produces an elegant
account of institutional origins and persistence, based primarily on the functions these
institutions perform and the benefits they provide. Rational choice institutionalism is weak,
however, in accounting for institutional constraints upon actors imposed by structural realities.
It is also weak in explaining the many in-efficiencies that institutions display. And it tends to
emphasize purposive and voluntary agreements among relatively equal and independent actors
overlooking asymmetries of power.
Historical institutionalism, on the other hand is good at directing attention to power relations
existing in present institutions and how they shape political outcomes. Their approach embodies
a sense of realism. Historical institutionalism is weak, however, in accounting for how exactly
institutions affect behavior. It is also weak in offering a systematic theory about the general
processes involved in creation and change. Their view of change is rather conservative and
incremental and their model of the 'appropriate institution' seems better suited to explaining
continuity rather than change.
Sociological institutionalism is good at clarif'ing the ways in which institutions can affect the
underlying preferences and identities of actors. It emphasizes the way in which the existing
institutional world and cultural environment circumscribes the range of institutional creation.
Among other things, this approach goes a long way toward explaining the presence of many
apparent in-efficiencies in social and political institutions. Their argument that context and
'embeddedness' make a difference is also hard to dismiss. However, their model is also static,
emphasizing stability and continuity to the detriment of innovation and change.
This review makes clear that the 'new institutionalism' is not a single or coherent body of
thought. Confusion over terminology and levels of analysis is rife. Yet the varied positions -
sometimes conflicting and sometimes complementary, seem to reveal different and genuine
dimensions of human behavior and of the effects that institutions can have on behavior. None of
these new burgeoning literatures appears to be substantially untrue or illogical. However, each
seems to be providing a partial account of the forces at work in a given situation or capturing
different dimensions of the human action and institutional impact present there (Hall and
Taylor, 1996, p. 955).
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For the purposes of this thesis, the new institutionalism paradigm presents a number of fruitful
ideas. Specifically, rational choice institutionalism suggests for example that existing
institutions survive because they provide more benefits to relevant actors than alternate
institutional forms. Historical institutionalism stresses the notion of path-dependence and the
fact that behavior is invariably bounded, context-specific and conditioned by cultural, socio-
economic and political structures. Sociological institutionalism introduces more forcefully the
notion of embeddedness and the importance of wider cultural templates in accounting for
patterns of incremental change. These ideas are all relevant for a comprehensive account of
specific reform patterns/dynamics.
More important in the context of this thesis is the fact that while the debate among the three new
institutionalist approaches, each originating in a different branch of the social science, is still
heated and lively - with many conflicting views/assumptions - the one question that seems to
have been settled is that national political contexts and embedded institutional structures do
exert considerable influence on the scope and the dynamics of administrative reform.
Administrative reform is invariably bounded, context-specific and embedded, representing an
attempt to satisfice within the constraints of national environments. In this sense, attempts at
administrative reform are invariably shaped, conditioned and mitigated by national institutional
realities and the specific peculiarities of the home terrain in each country.
RELEVANT REMARKS & SUGGESTED HYPOTHESES
The chapter has so far examined the gradual ascendancy of four different paradigms relating to
public sector reform. Many of those ideas (currently NPM ideas) have achieved great currency
and become commonly invoked prescriptions for administrative reform around the world. The
chapter has nevertheless attempted to emphasize that there has not been a universal and uniform
response to any single paradigm. Rather, the direction of national reform and change is
ultimately determined by local contexts and embedded social, economic and political realities.
Evidence of reform convergence and diffusion can indeed be effectively counter-balanced by
evidence of divergence and variation. A cursory look around the globe confirms that there
remain considerable differences across countries in the mix, scope, and rate of reforms adopted.
The purpose of this section is thus to re-examine the administrative reform literature critically
and selectively to extrapolate the various factors/variables that have been advanced to account
for such persisting variation. It is hoped that these factors will also be relevant for accounting
for the specific reform trajectories observed in the Lebanese context.
In their comparative review of recent reform trajectories in four countries (Sweden, Finland,
New Zealand and the U}), Pollitt and Summa (1997) underline the importance of the national
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political system in accounting for observed differences. They thus contrast the consensual
nature of the Swedish and Finnish political systems, with the adversarial politics characteristic
of the UK and NZ, to conclude that the political systems of the UK and NZ lend themselves to
sharp, radical reform, whereas the political systems of Sweden and Finland do not. They thus
argue that the most convincing explanations of the different reform trajectories tend to rest upon
the characteristics of the political systems already in place rather than economic performance or
party doctrines (Table 2).
Table 2. Pollitt and Summa (1997) Proposed Typology




	 Limited Reform Capacity Sweden, Finland
Systems	 Confrontational
	
Radical Reform Capacity UK, NZ
Knill (1999) advances the concept of national administrative reform capacity to capture the
potential for administrative reforms across countries. He relates the national capacity for
administrative reform to the number of formal institutional veto points actors have at their
disposal in order to influence and resist political/societal reform initiatives. He argues that the
number of such veto points is affected by the specific macro-institutional realities, namely the
state tradition as well as the legal and political administrative systems prevalent. Knill further
operationalizes the concept of national administrative reform capacity into three analytical
categories: the general capacity for executive leadership, the institutional entrenchment of
administrative structures, and the influence of the bureaucracy on policy-making.
On the basis of these categories, Knill identifies two ideal constellations of low and high
administrative reform capacity, implying either an autonomous or an instrumental position of
the bureaucracy with respect to external pressures for reform. The position of a national
bureaucracy can be characterized as autonomous if weak executive leadership coincides with
high institutional entrenchment of administrative structures and procedures as well as a
powerful position of the administration with respect to the formulation and implementation of
political programs. An administration can be characterized as instrumental, by contrast, if it is
confronted with strong executive leadership, weak institutional entrenchment of administrative
structures, and a low level of independent bureaucratic influence on policy formulation and
implementation.
Each ideal type can be linked to certain expectations regarding the mode and scope of
administrative change. In the case of an autonomous administration, existing arrangements can
hardly be changed by deliberate political reform attempts. As a consequence administrative
change can be primarily expected in the form of self-adaptation to environmental challenges,
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within existing traditions and principles. Adjustments are generally incremental and patchy
rather than radical and comprehensive. By contrast, if the position of the bureaucracy is merely
instrumental, there is a high potential for deliberate transformation and fundamental and path-
breaking administrative changes are more likely. The scope and form of administrative change
is highly contingent in this case on the preferences and commitment of political leaders.
To illustrate his argument, Knill presents the patterns of administrative development in two
countries, Germany and Britain, whose capacities for administrative reform come close to the
ideal types identified above. Germany is characterized by a limited capacity for administrative
reform, determined by the multiplicity of institutional veto points, the consequent restricted
scope of executive leadership and the continuing tradition of decision-making by bargaining and
negotiations. Strong institutional entrenchment coupled with legalism and the strong influence
of administrators on policy-making and implementation also help account for the incremental
and patchy pattern of administrative reform in Germany. The higher potential for administrative
reform in Britain, by contrast, is determined in large measure by a strong and sufficiently
independent executive leadership and a dynamic instrumental bureaucracy (Table 3).
Table 3. Knill (1999) Proposed Typology
Nature ofAdministration Reform Capacity	 Examples
National Reform
	 Autonomous	 Limited Reform Capacity Germany
Capacity	
Instrumental	 Radical Reform Capacity England
Peters (1997a), uses a similar argument, by underscoring administrative culture as an important
variable in accounting for the persisting variation in the adoption of new public management
reforms across countries. He identifies four dominant state traditions in Western countries -
Anglo-American, Germanic, Napoleonic, and Scandinavian- and argues that the Anglo-
American culture is particularly receptive to the market-based reforms, whereas the Germanic
tradition is the most hostile. Peters further hypothesizes that these traditions reflect historic
practices and ideas about how government should be conducted, and that the Germanic tradition
is the strongest and most integrated intellectually and hence the most resistant to change.
Moon and Ingraham (1998) conceive of administrative reform as the product of an interactive
process between politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens who jointly compose what they call the
Political Nexus Triad (PNT) and maintain the governance structure in a nation. They perceive
the three PNT actors as involved in a process of continuous bargaining and negotiation in an
attempt to protect andlor increase their political and administrative power. Accordingly they
suggest three different patterns of administrative reform (AR): politician-driven reforms;
bureaucratic-driven reforms; and society-driven reforms. Each country thus develops its own
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configuration of reform mechanisms and PNT, reflecting in large measure the relative power of
the three actors in the society.
Using the theoretical framework of the Political Nexus Triad, Moon and Ingraham (1998)
examine the patterns of administrative reform in three Asian countries: China, Japan and Korea.
China, for example, is characterized by a politics-dominant PNT, where bureaucracy is
completely politicized and the influence of civil society is minimized. The course of Chinese
administrative reform is thus largely determined not by the bureaucracy, but rather by the
dominant Communist Party of China. The Japanese conventional reform pattern, on the other
hand, is a bureaucracy led PNT, where the Japanese bureaucracy maintains its own relative
autonomy from politics and provides competitive expertise on various policy agendas. Finally,
Korea is characterized as a President-led PNT, whereby the President enjoys strong executive
power and acts as the main formulator/initiator of AR (Table 4).
Table 4. Moon and Ingraham (1998) Proposed Typology
PNT Configuration	 Pattern of AR	 Examples
Political Nexus Triad	 Powerful Politicians 	 Politician-driven AR	 China, Korea
Powerful Bureaucracy	 Bureaucracy-driven AR Japan
Powerful Civil Society I Society-driven AR
From the preceding discussion, it becomes possible to synthesize a number of factors that serve
to mitigate the effects of administrative reform initiatives in specific national contexts, namely,
the nature of the political system (consensual vs. adversarial), the national reform capacity
which is dependent on the strength of executive leadership, institutional entrenchment, and
bureaucratic powers, and the specific configuration of the national political nexus triad, in turn
determined by the relative power of the politicians, bureaucrats, and civil society. Hence to the
first two typologies, the PNT concept adds the dimension of civil society, which can exercise
political power either through institutionalized (voting, NGOs, interest group intervention) or
non-institutionalized channels (e.g. political protests).
The above typologies present a number of hypotheses that could be tested in the Lebanese
context. From the first typology, it is possible to hypothesize that reform capacity in Lebanon
will be limited given the country's special brand of consensual politics (Hypothesis 1). Indeed,
since the early 1940s, a form of consociationalism has been institutionalized in Lebanon,
providing for grand coalition government, mutual veto and proportional representation. And
although such mechanisms provided distinctive opportunities for resolving political problems
based on compromise and negotiation, they also generally restricted the government's ability to
formulate and implement comprehensive political and administrative reform programs.
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The limited applicability of the second typology to the Lebanese context stems from its
dichotomization of the nature of administration variable. Lebanese administration is neither
autonomous nor instrumental. It can be more aptly characterized as a clientelist bureaucracy,
geared to the accommodation of patronage favors. Indeed, Lebanese bureaucracy has had to
compromise many of its autonomous powers to adjust to the clientelist culture prevailing in
Lebanon. Nevertheless, the Lebanese context displays some of the characteristics of
autonomous administration as described by Knill, namely weak executive leadership and strong
institutional entrenchment. It is thus also possible to hypothesize limited reform capacity in
Lebanon partially based on this typology (Hypothesis 2).
It is relevant to point out that similar to Kxiill (1999), Caiden and Bjur (1981) and Caiden (1991)
have aptly pointed out that not all administrations are instrumental bureaucracies in the
Weberian sense. They argue that many govemmental agencies are institutional bureaucracies in
the sense of having developed relative autonomy and become used to operating in certain ways,
independent of political and administrative reform efforts. They write:
When an organization created for instrumental purposes transcends that role and
develops an expressive value significance for both its membership and the community, it
passes from being a mere instrument to becoming an institution. Institutions are not
dispensable as are tools; they are valued as having an intrinsic worth, apart from their
instrumental utility. In their case, permanence of survival assumes greater importance
than economy or efficiency. When it comes to evaluating their performance or renovating
them, they must be treated differently from instrumental organizations (Caiden and Bjur,
inKhan, 1981).
Caiden and Bjur further argue that instrumental bureaucracies develop institutional autonomy
by building up symbiotic relationships with important client and support groups. They thus
become identified as having an exclusive functional responsibility in a given public arena for a
considerable time. Their permanence or survival spans several generations of political and
administrative leaders. They are supported as much by tradition and societal legitimacy as they
are by concurrently existing satellite bodies with which they interact. This explains how
institutional bureaucracies can often get their way and why they cannot be reformed according
to the instrumental thesis. Reforms that are applicable to instrumental bureaucracies are not
necessarily relevant for institutional bureaucracies.
Such a distinction between instrumental and institutional bureaucracies and the potential
implications for reform is interesting and potentially more relevant to the Lebanese context than
Knill' s typology. It is possible to argue that the Lebanese bureaucracy, although originally
created for instrumental goals, has gradually transcended that role and developed some value
significance for its members, politicians and the larger community. It has thus developed
institutional autonomy by building up symbiotic - mainly clientelistic—relationships with
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important politicians and sectarian groups. The Lebanese bureaucracy fulfills the function of
proportional representation and provides sectarian access to jobs and administrative services.
From the third typology, it is possible to hypothesize for Lebanon a pattern of politician-driven
administrative reform. More precisely, up till the war of 1975, Lebanon was characterized by a
pattern of President-driven administrative reform. The Lebanese political balance of power was,
however, slightly modified in the wake of the war, whereby many presidential powers were
curtailed and executive and parliamentary powers enhanced. The Lebanese pattern of
administrative reform in the 1990s is thus still hypothesized to be politician-driven, but less by
the President than by the Prime Minister and the Chamber of Deputies (Hypothesis 3). This is
especially true in light of the continuing minimalist influence of bureaucracy and civil society
on the course of AR in Lebanon.
PROPOSED HYPOTHETICAL MODEL
It seems reasonable to end this chapter with a tentative hypothetical model rather than a clear-
cut concluding statement. The main reason is that the review presented in this chapter clearly
shows that there is no single administrative reform framework with universal applicability.
Rather, the potential for reforming different administrative systems seems to be basically
dependent on the general institutional context in which these systems are embedded and on the
opportunities afforded by the politico-institutional and cultural environment. The challenge is
thus to identify those system-characteristics, which most significantly influence what is
possible in terms of the scope, process and speed of reform in any particular nationlcountry.
Several potentially relevant factors have been suggested in this review as for example the nature
of the political system, the nature of the administration and the nature of the political nexus
triad. In a recent book, Turner and Hulme (1997) have also identified a number of factors which
have consistently influenced policy choices/reform initiatives in developing countries, namely
economic factors (gross national product; structure of production; labor; domestic capital;
foreign exchange; foreign aid and debt; infrastructure; technology), cultural factors (ethnicity;
kinship; values and norms; history) and political factors (state-society relations; legitimacy;
regime type; ideology; elites and classes; policy concerns and capacity). Their review primarily
underlines the importance of political considerations in administrative analysis and practice.
It is also possible to derive other factors from the literature about obstacles to administrative
reform and policy implementation. Caiden (1991), for example, has identified several factors
that may affect reform undertakings, namely geography (isolation, size of country, debilitating
climate, low mobility); history (colonial legacy, biculturalism, traditionalism, inertia, past
reform failures); culture (diversity, linguistic barriers, indiscipline, tribalism, religious
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fundamentalism, corruption, immobilism); economy (scarcity, monopoly, low savings and
investments, lack of incentives, poor labor-management relations, low managerial skills) and
politics (lack of consensus, rigid constitutional arrangements, weak and divided governments,
entrenched bureaucracies, high turnover and personality clashes). Caiden suggests that of all
these obstacles, the political factor appears to be the most significant.
While all the factors mentioned are important, their relative significance undoubtedly varies
from context to context. Thus, I will attempt to emphasize those factors, which in my opinion,
embody the most explanatory potential in the Lebanese context and propose a hypothetical
model that will guide me through the rest of the research accordingly. Cultural/societal factors
(sectarian and ethnic divisions) are very salient in the Lebanese context and must be explicitly
accounted for in any comprehensive analysis of reform endeavors. Cu\ura\ factors p\ace 1ñmts
on what policy-makers can actually achieve and indicate the acceptable directions for policy and
reform. Cultural factors also provide specific moral/cognitive templates and justification for
specific exchange patterns (e.g. clientelism). Finally, cultural diversity affects micro-political
interactions and macro-political processes. This is especially true in the case of Lebanon's
unique brand of consensual democracy.
A second important factor for understanding reform action or non-action in Lebanon is the
nature of the political system. More than any other, this factor has been recognized as being
salient, given the close relationships between administrative and political sub-systems. Political
power configurations set limits both on the types of changes that can be promoted in the public
sector and on the speed of change. Both micro and macro political processes are central
concerns in the practice and analysis of administrative reform, as policy choices are often
determined by political dynamics rather than technical managerial principles. Many authors
have underscored the need to understand the political landscape in which organizations attempt
to operate and to map out power and authority relationships as an essential aid to careful
analysis (Turner and Hulme, 1997; Pollitt and Summa, 1997; Caiden, 1991; Khan, 1981).
Economic factors must also be accounted for in analyzing reform action or non-action. Scarcity
of financial resources and trained personnel may pose serious handicaps to the
planning/implementation of administrative reform. The UNDP (1992), for example, has
identified lack of finance as 'the most crippling constraint facing developing nations'. Scarcity
of capital and foreign debt problems often reflect in making planning extremely difficult and
impose special coping mechanisms/management techniques. For example, the level of debt in
Lebanon in the wake of the war has become so high that a large slice of the government's
budget and an even larger portion of foreign exchange is now going into servicing that debt
rather than into urgent economic and reform initiatives. The economic environment thus often
presents specific opportunities and constraints in the pursuit of reform goals.
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A brief mention should also be made here of the potential influence of the external environment
(regional and international) on country-specific planned programs of change. in the Lebanese
case, for example, the regional environment was particularly turbulent during the early
independence years (1943-1970). Reform efforts have thus frequently been overshadowed by
the regional crises of the day. While the regional environment has been relatively stabilized in
the 1990s, the influence of the international environment is expected to assume greater
significance through offers of aid flinding and threats of aid conditionality imposed by such
international organizations as the World Bank, or IMF.
The factors identified here are potentially of universal importance, but the peculiarities of the
home terrain make them particularly relevant to the specific Lebanese context. While their
respective influence and significance may vary across periods and situations, cultural and
political variables are expected to be continuously salient in Lebanon, interacting and even
shaping at times other relevant factors. The key to understanding reform action or non-action in
Lebanon thus lies in understanding the complex interactions of these factors across time and
situations. I therefore hypothesize that the inter-relationships of these factors and their specific
constellations in specific periods will help account for the reform patterns observed in Lebanon.











Figure 1. Research Hypothetical Model
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It should be pointed out that while the modeling language belongs to the standard vocabulary of
social discourse and provides a practical intellectual tool for addressing the theoretical concerns
of social scientists, it is nevertheless not devoid of limitations / methodological problems.
Various concerns have been raised in this regard; particularly important is the fact that the
language of modeling introduces observational biases into investigatory practice (Cortes et al.,
1974) and lacks the sophistication needed for the task of making causal inferences (Blalock,
1964). The use of models also presents dilemmas and paradoxes relating for example to
simplicity vs. complexity and idealism vs. realism (van Gigch, 1974).
To start with, the description of reality/social processes in terms of models immediately
produces a particular observational bias: the set of factors that interact, the pattern of their
arrangement, and the manner of transformation become the foci of observation when a
description is couched in terms of systems models (Cortes et al., 1974). Such restricted focus
becomes even more problematic when one is studying a system that is not effectively isolated,
so that large numbers of outside influences are operating. The difficulty of ruling out many of
these variables through randomization necessitates making simp1if'ing assumptions about such
disturbing influences, assumptions that remain un-testable and whose correctness can not be
demonstrated (Blalock, 1964).
Thus a basic difficulty is frequently encountered when using systems models: there seems to be
no systematic way of knowing for sure whether one has located all of the relevant variables. Nor
do we have any foolproof procedure for deciding which variables to use. Moreover, the greater
the departure from completely isolated systems, the larger the number of variables that must be
explicitly brought into the causal model. And the larger the number of such variables, the
simpler our assumptions must be about how they fit together. The challenge is thus to evolve
theoretical models that are simple enough to facilitate analysis, yet are also sufficiently realistic
that the simplifications required do not lead to predictions that are highly inaccurate.
Such dilemmas of potential observational bias, the need for simplifying assumptions or
simplicity vs. complexity / idealism vs. realism are all in turn related to the more fundamental
problem of making causal inferences when using a modeling approach. This latter limitation,
however, is not restricted to the use of models per Se, but is rather inherent in social science
research, which lacks as yet the measurement techniques, control over extraneous variables, and
theoretical tools necessary for the task of establishing causation (Blalock, 1964). The problem
of causality is indeed part of the much larger question of the nature of social science research
and in particular, the problem of the relationship between theory and research (Blalock, 1964).
57
Numerous authors have noted the gap between the languages of theory and research, which can
not be bridged in a completely satisfactory way. "Science contains two distinct languages,
which will be referred to simply as the theoretical and operational languages. There appears to
be no purely logical way of bridging the gap between the two" (Blalock, 1964, p. 6). The
theoretical language of systems, forces and properties has indeed partly evolved in response to
this limitation whereby the social scientist thinks in terms of systems, which are acted upon and
respond in certain ways. The use of such abstract systems models in turn allows making certain
predictions about what is expected to occur under given conditions, which are then assessed
against reality.
Causal laws are in this sense working assumptions or tools of the social scientist (Frank, 1961).
They are purely if-then hypothetical statements which can never be tested empirically in the
strictest sense of the word. When they appear to be violated, they are reformulated so as to
better account for existing facts. The validity of the causal principle itself, however, can not be
demonstrated. The fact that causal thinking belongs on the theoretical level and that causal laws
can never be demonstrated empirically does not mean, however, that it is not helpful to think
causally and to develop causal models that have implications that are indirectly testable
(Blalock, 1964). This is precisely the logic behind the research hypothetical model presented in
Figure 1.
The research hypothetical model was thus deemed helpful for practical reasons, despite the
limitations outlined above and the difficulties associated with operationalization and
establishing direct causation. Such difficulties are, however, by no means unique to this
research, but rather generally arise when measuring attributes in the domain of the social
sciences. Causal laws are really only applicable in the physical sciences and to completely
isolated systems. However, "the fact that causal inferences are made in the social sciences with
considerable risk of error does not mean that they should not be made at all. For it is difficult to
imagine the development and testing of social science theory without such inferences" (Blalock,
1964, p. 5).
Therefore, while acknowledging the difficulties of establishing causation and isolating the
impact of particular variables, the research model was evolved to focus attention on some
important contextual factors, which are hypothesized to condition the fate of reform initiatives
in Lebanon. It thus advocates a 'context-based' approach to administrative reform and invites
consideration and analysis of the cultural and political values and circuits of power, which link
society and state. Consistent with this orientation, chapters 3-6 explore the peculiarities of the
Lebanese social and political landscape to allow a better appreciation of specific opportunities
and threats presented by the Lebanese environment in the pursuit of reform goals.
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The hypothetical model derived here is consistent with most recent writings about
administrative reform (Khan, 1981; Caiden, 1991; Wright, 1994; Hood, 1995; Pollitt and
Summa, 1997; Peters, 1997; Turner and Hulme, 1997; Premfors, 1998; Knill, 1999; Maor and
Jones, 1999; Guyomarch, 1999). It is also consistent with the 'new institutionalist' literature,
which emphasizes that national political contexts and embedded institutional structures exert
considerable influence on the scope and the dynamics of administrative reform (March and
Olsen, 1989; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). This makes it imperative to turn attention to the
socio-historical-political context within which Lebanese reforms are designed and implemented.
This is precisely the task that will be undertaken in the following four chapters.
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CHAPTER 3
PLURALISM, ETHNICITY, AND DIVERSITY
INTRODUCTION
Pluralism and heterogeneity are the most distinguishing characteristics of Lebanese society.
Indeed, the realities of pluralism and communal coexistence have shaped the democratic
institutions of the Lebanese republic and affected virtually every aspect of its political and
administrative systems. It is therefore imperative, before engaging in an analysis of
administrative reforms in Lebanon, to review the theoretical literature on pluralism and diversity
and to present the leading theories explaining the endurance and resilience of ethnic and
religious identifications across the world. In light of this review, the chapter introduces the main
religious communities in Lebanon and highlights the relevance of one particular explanation -
the interest-based explanation- in accounting for the continuing importance of ethnic
attachments in Lebanese society today.
THE ENDURING CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY
"In most of the developing world, identity patterns derived from shared religion, ethnicity,
culture, language or caste have been important, if not crucial determinants of political
alignments and conflict. The power of the communal factor in politics was seriously
underestimated at the time of independence, both by scholars and statesmen. Only gradually did
this dimension of political development begin to receive the attention its evident importance
merited. As studies began to accumulate and political leaders experimented with various
formulas for coping with this challenge, awareness has slowly grown of its enormous
complexity" (Young, 1976, p. 5).
Indeed, the flow of history in recent years lends indisputable confirmation to the enduring
importance of ethnic and cultural cleavages. Recent political developments around the world
have placed ethnicity in the center of public cognition of political struggle and attested to the
continuation and endurance of ethnic consciousness and solidarity. Examples abound: the
Blacks and Indians in the United States, the French in Canada, the Indians in some Latin
American Countries, the Catholics in Northern Ireland, the Basques in Spain, and the Turks in
Cyprus to say nothing of the many groups in South Africa.
The renewal of ethnic outbreaks throughout the world seems to suggest that ethnic identification
is not withering away, and that it will continue to be a potent force in shaping human social
history. It also seems to suggest that negotiable, socially constructed identities and cultural
diversity - difference, heterogeneity, pluralism- are somewhat "the fate of the modern world"
(Jenkins, 1997, p.30). Today, the notion of cultural and political homogeneity is no longer the
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social norm. One rather speaks of fragmented, segmented, plural societies, and heterogeneous,
ethnically hybrid polities. As Jenkins puts it, "the reality of monoism - of a social world which
is, or was, an archipelago of discrete, bounded, culturally distinctive and homogeneous units -
is no more plausible" (Jenkins, 1997, p.30). Stable culturally unified societies are being
progressively replaced by a shifting culturally plural modernity.
THE PLURAL SOCIETY
Plurality and diversity are therefore the realities of the modern world. Throughout human
history, plural societies have occurred most often involuntarily, as a result of imperial conquest;
"they have largely been the outcome of the imperial partition of the globe during the age of
European expansion" (Young, 1976, p. 97). In the process of de-colonization, colonial
boundaries were often drawn arbitrarily, taking little account of pre-colonial cultural and
political conditions. After independence, most new states retained their colonial boundaries,
which enclosed many differentlsegmented entities.
Demographic pluralism is partly the consequence of imperial politics, borders having
been drawn to suit the convenience of colonial powers and to avoid conflict among them,
with little or no regard for historic or demographic boundaries. These colonial boundaries
have, however, enjoyed remarkable stability in the wake of political independence. The
inheritors of the colonial states have shown little inclination to revise boundaries to make
them more compatible with demographic realities (Esman and Rabinovich, 1988, p. 274).
But the term plural society is not simply synonymous for colonial societies and some of their
successor states, though pluralism may find extreme expression in these societies. Rather, "it
denotes societies characterized by certain conditions of cultural diversity and social cleavage, in
whatever way these conditions of social and cultural pluralism arise from the contact of
different peoples and cultures within a single society" (Kuper, 1969, p. 7).
The streamed or plural society thus implies the incorporation of different etlmic groups or
collectivities into one societal or state system. Indeed, the basic components of plurality are the
existence of two or more socially and politically significant aggregates, differentiated by
cultural or other criteria who compete and interact within sharply demarcated boundaries —the
sovereign territorial state. Moreover, the basis of their solidarity groupings are affinities of
ethnicity, religion, language, race, caste, assumed blood tie, custom, andlor territory (Young,
1976).
By the mid 1960s, the plural society or the multi-communal state, a state embracing different
peoples/affinities, was no longer the exception in the international community of nations, but
the rule (Hanf, 1993). "The transformation of the Western Colonial system into the Third World
of today only served to concentrate problem situations within the geopolitical confines of
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smaller nation states, none of which can claim to be socio-culturally homogeneous" (Rhoodie,
1978, P. 2). Indeed, the societies in nine out of the ten states that newly achieved independence
were not culturally homogenous, and experienced various rivalries and conflicts over hegemony
(Hanf, 1993). For most of these states the primary concern became that of regulating the
coexistence of the different communities within the confines of the colonial boundaries.
CULTURAL PLURALISM
Cultural pluralism thus denotes societies composed of separate culturally defined collectivities
(Young, 1976). The early advancement of cultural pluralism as an ideological approach to
ethnic diversity has its roots in the United States. As Milton Gordon notes, the damage done to
bewildered immigrants "by those forces which impelled rapid Americanization" contributed to
ethnic alienation, family disorganization, and other forms of disorientation (Gordon, 1978,
p.197). Hence, the term cultural pluralism was advanced by various immigrant scholars to
challenge the normative validity of the melting pot and assimilation models.
One influential early assessment of cultural pluralism was an article published in 1915, by
Horace Kallen, entitled "Democracy Versus the Melting Pot" (Kallen, 1970). Kallen, like
subsequent advocates of cultural pluralism was gravely concerned about the severity of the
Americanization process, which compelled compliance and self-denial in the interests of the
melting pot. He argued that the melting pot theory was an expectation, not a fact, and that the
loss of a group's identity was neither completely possible nor desirable.
Kallen further argued that no human being can cut himself/herself from socio-historical
circumstances that shaped him/her. "Behind him in time, and tremendously in him in quality are
his ancestors". Moreover, "around him in space are his relatives and kin, carrying in common
with him the inherited organic set from a remoter ancestry" (Kallen, 1970, p.94). Kallen
concludes that there is a need, not for a program of coerced unity, but rather for a confederation
of cultures and a democratic system which protects the rights/identity/values of the different
ethnic communities.
Hence, as Gordon points out the doctrine of cultural pluralism was advanced "to oppose the
assumptions and demands of the Americanization of Anglo conformity view point and in the
process was to reject, also, the more kindly intended blueprint of the melting pot enthusiasts"
(Gordon, 1978, p.160). Given this focus, the goal of cultural pluralism projected:
• .A society where ethnic groups would be encouraged to maintain their own community,
social structure, and identity and preserve certain values and behavior patterns which are
not in conflict with broader values, patterns, and legal norms common to the entire
society (Gordon, 1978, p.160).
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Subsequent definitions and projected goals of cultural pluralism have concurred with these
original concerns. An example of this focus is the definition of cultural pluralism by Antonio
Pantoja el al. They point out that:
The cultural pluralism movement, has, at its core, the aspiration and value to create a new
society, where culturally different groups that exist within one country can fully
experience both the positive and distinctive attributes of their given and ascribed
differences without penalties of loss of status, or educational, social, or political
disenfranchisement (Pantoja et al, 1976, p. 126).
Viewed from such a perspective, cultural pluralism is a humane and attractive aspiration. But
even such an understanding of the concept is not without problems. As Jenkins explains:
Since cultural diversity is increasingly, the fate of the modem world, and ethnic
absolutism a regressive feature of late modernity, the greatest danger now arises from
forms of national and cultural identity - new or old - that attempt to secure their identity
by adopting closed versions of culture or community, and by the refusal to engage with
the difficult problems that arise from trying to live with difference (Jenkins, 1997, p.29).
TYPES OF CULTURAL DIFFERENTIATION
In the modern world, the sources of diversity and cultural differentiation are many and varied.
But the major markers of difference have been identified as those of ethnicity, religion, race,
caste and region (Young, 1976; Govers and Vermeulen, 1997). The fact that these cultural
markers embody a great potency for fragmentation and segmentation is well recognized.
"Divisions based upon race, ethnicity, religion, and caste evoke the most sensitive and cherished
anxieties regarding self-definition and survival" (Young, 1976, p.142). For the purposes of this
thesis, the two markers of ethnicity and religion will be emphasized as they have always been
the most salient sources of diversity and cleavage in the context of the Lebanese society.
THE CONCEPT OF ETHNICITY
In the English-speaking world, the concept of 'ethnicity' has now become prevalent. But it was
not until the late l960s that the concept became familiar in the social sciences. "Though the
adjective 'ethnic' and the notion of 'ethnic group' were commonly used, the noun ethnicity was
all but unknown" (Govers and Vermeulen, 1997, p.3). The late 1960s and early 1970s have
witnessed a new scholarly look at the phenomenon of ethnicity. Such increasing popularity of
the notion of ethnicity in the early seventies was related to broader developments in the social
sciences, in particular the growing disillusionment with theories of modernization, development,
assimilation, and nation-building.
In modernization theory, ethnic bonds were conceived as primordial, parochial ties, as "pre-
modern phenomena predestined for extinction" (Hanf, 1993, p.11). The assumption was that
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modernization was a powerful and irreversible historical process that will engulf the world and
that parochial ties would lose much of their saliency as a result of modernization. From a
developmental perspective, ethnic loyalties were regarded as obstacles to development, to be
overcome, fought andlor eradicated. Assimilation theories predicted a gradual, linear, and
unproblematic assimilation of ethnic minorities to the dominant, modern, majority culture.
Finally, ethnicity tended to be viewed by another group of theorists as a destabilizing,
potentially revolutionary force that threatened to disrupt the natural process of nation building.
In this sense, political science was dominated from the late 1950s to the early 1970s by the
modernization paradigm, in which ethnicity was depicted as a remnant of tradition, inevitably
declining in significance as cultural rationality and national integration developed. Ethnicity
was routinely denounced as retrogressive and shameful, a 'cultural ghost', a 'residue deriving
from the distant past' and an unwelcome interruption in the pursuit of modernity. The belief was
thus in the universality of the Western model of development, in the inevitability of
modernization, assimilation, nation building and integration, and in the transient nature of ethnic
loyalties and affiliations. Crawford Young writes:
The widespread conviction that triumphant anti-colonial nationalism would eclipse
cultural pluralism derived powerful reinforcement from the dominant paradigm of
assimilation in the industrial world. Theories of political development and modernization
which appeared in the 1950s virtually all rested on the premises, if only implicit, that the
universe of industrial nation states was a model of the future of the underdeveloped world
(Young, 1976, p.7).
However, by the late 1960s, the viability of this paradigm came under growing attack as
evidence increasingly "confirmed that the integration of the modem state could not be an article
of faith" (Young, 1976, p.8). Indeed, many of the normative assumptions and convictions,
which pervaded the social sciences were seriously challenged by the events of the late 1960s.
"A revolution in social science paradigms in the sixties and early seventies was influenced, if
not instigated, by the anti-colonial struggles and ethnic movements of the early post-war period"
(Govers and Vermeulen, 1997, p.4). Numerous new states were racked by civil war and in many
parts of the world ethnic conflict acquired a new virulence. The resurgence of ethnic conflict
even in the economically most developed states increasingly undermined the convictions of the
previous era. Social scientists were now faced with an enormous task, namely to account for the
continuing importance of ethnic attachments and explore the processes of ethnic revival and
survival in many parts of the world.
ETHNIC REVIVAL EXPLAINED (COMPETING EXPLANATIONS ADVANCED)
Various theories have been suggested to explain the unexpected resurgence of ethnic
identification within existing, internationally recognized political entities, both developing and
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developed. One set of writings emphasizes the continuing power of primordial attachments -
attachments that are so overpowering and coercive because they stem from immediate kin
connection, or from being born into a particular religious community, or speaking a particular
language andlor following particular social practices. Such loyalties are primordial, that is, are
primeval or original, and are assumed to have a lasting influence on the behavior of people.
"Rooted in history, passed on by upbringing, and often embedded in a particular environment,
primordial bonds are permanent realities. Even if sublimated and seldom conspicuous, given the
opportunity, they resurface" (Hanf, 1993, p. 15).
Such perspective on the roots of ethnic attachments is persuasive, even if not entirely adequate.
Its inadequacy lies in its inability to explain why common origins, religious beliefs or language
create group solidarity in some cases but not in others. Origins are of paramount significance in
South Africa for example, but far less so in Brazil. In Northern Ireland, religious affiliation still
plays an enormous role; this was formerly the case in the Netherlands too, though no longer.
Language groups are far more relevant in Belgium and Canada than in Switzerland. Given this
shortcoming, some writers have started to downplay the biological aspect of the concept of
'primordial attachments' in favor of its cultural dimension or connotation.
The cultural explanation thus emphasizes that ethnicity is not simply a matter of ascription and
social organization, but rather a complex matter of consciousness, ideology, and imagination.
Such new emphasis implies a definition of ethnicity in terms of 'subjective states'. It differs
from definitions, which only include 'objective features' like sharing the same language,
religion, territory or history. This is not to deny the relevance of such supposedly objective
criteria but rather to underscore the importance of self-perception, self-identification,
categorization and consciousness in motivating and mobilizing collective action. Indeed,
ethnicity tends to become salient only when the parties involved become conscious of their
differences. "A society may have multifarious cultural segments, but this segmentation will
have no political consequences until self-awareness develops" (Hanf 1993, p.20).
A second line of argument finds close parallels between the resurgence of ethnic identification
and the spread of processes of modernization and social transformation, primarily those of
urbanization, communication, and education. From this perspective, rapid urbanization has
brought people into more intensive interaction with others. The potential for irritation and
dislike has thus increased under conditions of close proximity and constant contact (Hanf,
1993). Moreover, the manifold increase in the scope and intensity of communications has
greatly affected the process of spreading communal awareness and enlarged message flows
which are shaped by communal solidarity (Young, 1976). The expanded educational system and
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the spread of literacy have also helped accentuate cultural differences as better educated people
can better articulate their communal interests and demands.
In short, the processes of change and modernization have profoundly altered the environment
within which cultural pluralism occurred and enlarged the social capacity for solidarity patterns
and networks (Young, 1976). Instead of eroding traditional, primordial, parochial loyalties,
modemization processes have helped enhance ethnic solidarity and intensify communal conflict.
Communication, urbanization, and education frequently do not help to reduce cleavages,
but rather work to emphasize and intensif ' them. Not infrequently, it is precisely the
process of modernization that gives cultural markers their relevance, mobilizes group
consciousness, and politicizes (Hanf, 1993, p.l'7).
The argument that an intensifying process of segmentation and social competition accompanies
the overall process of modernization leads us to a third, and in my judgement, very powerful
interpretation of the resurgence of ethnic identification, namely the "interest-based" explanation.
It is argued from this perspective that economic development converts ethnic groups into
competitors for economic resources and contestants for political advantage. As the role of
government expands with modernization, ethnic structures become the most available
instruments of collective mobilization. Through these structures, competitive claims for
resource allocation can be promoted. The competition generated by modernization thus
politicizes ethnic pluralism and makes it even more salient than in earlier periods.
The "interest-based" explanation is especially relevant in the context of developing countries,
where struggles over limited resources and the allocation of benefits tend to be particularly
intense. It is precisely under such conditions of intense competition that an interest-based ethnic
movement comes to be perceived as the best instrument for improving the material well being
of the group and enhancing its chances for attaining collective upward mobility. The interest-
based ethnic movement may be used either to gain advantage by acquiring new economic and
political resources or to defensively protect the established cultural, economic and political
privileges of the group.
Interest based ethnic movements are also likely to develop because of real or perceived
inequality or status inconsistency. The pursuit of economic and political interests by means of
ethnic associations is indeed most commonly precipitated by the emergence of a collective and
ethnically defined sense of absolute or relative deprivation compared with the position of
significant others (Esman and Rabinovich, 1988). In such situations, the ethnic group movement
is likely to gain saliency; "awareness of group identity can easily be enlarged and mobilized and
a sense of relative disadvantage can be generalized to galvanize the social energies of the entire
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collectivity" (Young, 1976, p.1 00). Ethnic-based mobilization hence frequently occurs when
disparities become salient and a threat to permanent disadvantage looms (Young, 1976).
Interest-based ethnic movements do not develop only because of competition or inequality
among groups. They also tend to appear when cultural communities collectively perceive
serious threats to their identity groups as collectivities and "attempt to ensure their own security
under conditions of anarchy" (Byman, 1997b, p. 48). The concept of anarchy is here used to
refer to the existence of a weak central government whereby ethnic groups are forced to rely on
themselves to ensure their own survival. Interest-based ethnic movements are also likely to
develop when loyalty to the state is weak and alienation is pervasive "an interest-based ethnic
movement gains salience because at least some of its members find within it a feeling of
community in a setting that seems threatening and chaotic" (Yinger, 1994, p.48). "Fear, anxiety,
and insecurity at the individual level can be reduced within the womb of the ethnic collectivity;
at the same time, threats to the security of the group provide a mobilizing imperative for its
members" (Young, 1976, p.20).
Hence, from this perspective ethnicity provides individuals and groups with their most
important political resource in the competition for the scarce goods of modernity. Demarcation
of ethnic differences takes on political importance to the degree it is relevant in legitimating
claims to rights and resources and in providing individuals with both meaning and organized
channels for pursuing culturally-defined interests (Berman, 1998). Ethnic identities in such
contexts can be consciously manipulated and invested in economic and political competition.
Indeed, the interest-based explanation emphasizes that the most important and salient aspect of
ethnic group relations is the competition and conflict over differential access to resources.
An implicit assumption in this perspective is that ethnic identities do not only derive from
intrinsic features but emerge from, and are reasserted in encounters, transactions, and
oppositions between groups. It thus underlines the importance of the situational context and the
attractiveness of a particular form of group affiliation under conditions of insecurity and threat.
Ethnicity thus becomes particularly attractive as a basis for political affiliation because it fulfills
two paramount criteria: emotional security and interest satisfaction. The ethnic group comes to
be perceived by its members as a pseudo-kinship group, which promises to provide emotional
security, practical support, and a powerful instrument for utilization in political competition
(Brown, 1989).
But the ethnic group is of course not always a real kinship group; it is a fictive one. Here the
interest-based explanation allows for a more comprehensive understanding of ethnicity as
historically grounded and socially constructed. Hence, before ethnicity is the basis for political
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mobilization and action, it must be a work of intellectual construction, an imagining or re-
construction of a common history, religion, or culture. "Here we encounter the distinctive
duality of ethnicity as a cultural identity and consciousness-laden with possibilities for political
mobilization and as a discourse which arranges collective memory as a basis for political
action" (Berman, 1998, p. 312).
In this respect, the historical cultural attributes of a society provide the limiting framework
within which ethnic identities develop. "The kind of communal rivalries which develop, and the
choice by these groups of the myths and symbols of ethnicity will depend upon the kind of
threats to their emotional security and to the practical interests with which they are confronted
in their political environments" (Brown, 1989, p. 8). Hence, a comprehensive understanding of
interest-based ethnic movements must begin by an exploration of the historical patterns of
security, threats and interest options, which develop in society.
In this sense, a focus on the historical development of ethnic groups within the confines of the
state promises to be a fruitful orientation and a necessary complement to the interest-based
explanation. There is today some recognition of the extent to which Third World states exhibit a
'mono-ethnic tendency'. Weiner (1988) notes that "in country after country, a single ethnic
group has taken control over the state and used its powers to exercise control over others"
(Weiner, 1988, p. 36). The central question regarding the state may thus be restated in terms of
the degree of its ethnic neutrality or the extent to which it has allowed a dominant cultural group
in the society to enhance or preserve its dominance through the instrument of state power
(Brown, 1989).
The behavior of ethnic groups in a particular society is thus likely to be influenced by options
made available by the state for political participation. Variations in such options are likely to
influence the intensity, form and political salience of ethnic consciousness. Hence, rigid
institutional arrangements that foster the dominance of one cultural group are typical precursors
of ethnic conflict. When faced with limited options and with security threats to their existence,
ethnic groups are likely to mobilize and take the form of interest-based ethnic movements. Fears
of extinction andlor exclusion become real particularly for vulnerable minority groups living
with memories of persecution and massacre.
The various explanations explored here regarding the persistence of ethnicity are not mutually
exclusive. The analytic distinction among them is still important, however, because their
comparative weight varies from setting to setting (Yinger, 1994). In the Lebanese context, all
four explanations presented are relevant, but the interest-based interpretation will be emphasized
as it will help explain most adequately the continued saliency of ethnic identities in the
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Lebanese society. The interest-based explanation has indeed been widely adopted by recent
writers on ethnic politics because it combines the deeply affective and emotional nature of
ethnicity, with its contingent, situational, and circumstantial character.
THE PHENOMENON OF ETHNIC POLITICS
Hence, at the present state of the art, there is no unified theory that can comprehensively explain
the genesis and the dynamics of contemporary ethnic conflict. Instead, as we have seen, there
are a variety of often competing and partial theories. Fortunately, however, there is some
consensus and agreement amongst scholars on some of the basic issues, namely:
1. That ethnic and religious conflict is primarily a political problem;
2. That the relevant contemporary context is the territorial state;
3. That what is to be explained are the relationships and terms of coexistence among two or
more solidarity groups and between them and the agencies of the state; and
4. That at stake are such fundamental values as relative power, wealth, security, equity, and
status (Esman and Rabinovich, 1988).
The term ethnic-politics has come to be used to refer to such complex political interaction of
different collective identity groups within the boundaries of the sovereign territorial state. As
Ben Dor explains:
Politicized ethnicity, ethno-politics, etimo-nationalism, ethno-regionalism, ethno-
secessionism, and so on, are all terms used in analyzing what happens when such entities
bring their social, cultural, and economic interests, grievances, claims, anxieties, and
aspirations into the political area- the intrastate and or the interstate arena (Ben Dor,
1988, p. 72).
The state then becomes the arena for ethnic conflict or ethnic politics. It is the institutional
framework for the promotion or defense of ethnic group interests. One of the main functions of
governments, therefore, is to manage the disputes that occur among groups within their
territorial jurisdiction and between such groups and the state. Conceptually, and broadly
speaking, two kinds of strategies are available for governments in their attempts to regulate
ethnic conflict. The first is to eliminate pluralism, the second is to legitimize and manage it.
Unilateral strategies may include any one of an array of extreme and coercive policies- for
example genocide, enslavement, expulsion, repression, compulsory assimilation, other forms of
acculturation, divide and rule-like manipulations, discrimination, exclusion and belittlement of
'backward' ethnic cultures. However, as Crawford Young notes in his comprehensive study on
pluralism, "coerced assimilation and cultural oppression are policies likely to incur high costs
and yield minimal benefits" (Young, 1976, p. 524).
69
The alternative to eliminating pluralism is thus to manage it. In order to contain ethnic conflict
within tolerable limits, and to diffuse its potential volatility, leaders of the state as well as those
of various ethnic groups might find it useful to adopt one or more of various available
regulatory political mechanisms. The ability to deal successfully with these conflict-containing
techniques is a most important trait of political elite in multiethnic societies. A range of such
mechanisms is available, including:
1. The deliberate de-politicization of issues that could, if they were activated and politicized,
take on an ethnically divisive cutting edge;
2. Constitutional or institutional arrangements designed to keep potentially disruptive or
divisive ethnic issues off the central government's political agenda and resolve them at
other decision-making levels;
3. A form of consociationalism where advance agreement is reached by the several ethnic
leaderships to persist within coalition governments regardless of the outcome of elections or
oscillation of public moods;
4. The mutual veto, which assures that the leaders of important - even if relatively small-
ethnic groups will not be relegated to political impotence. They are issued a right to veto
policies genuinely perceived to be endangering the vital interests of their groups;
5. Proportional representation is another mechanism, which is similarly intended to assuage
the anxieties of leaders of smaller, weaker, or subordinate ethnic groups and politically
integrate them into the state's macro-system (Ben Dor, 1988, p. 76).
Managing ethnic conflict is thus a most critical and delicate task. Success depends, to a large
extent, on the capacity to institutionalize some regulatory techniques and procedures of the
variety explored here. A number of such mechanisms were successfully institutionalized in
Lebanon, prior to 1975. Indeed, "for three decades —since the country's independence in 1943-
Lebanon was held to be an example of successful, peaceful and democratic coexistence, as one
of the few viable cases of consociation outside Europe". But the Lebanese model of
consociational politics was soon to collapse into bloody warfare between conflicting
confessional communities; "in the following decade and a half it became the proverbial case of
a country torn apart by bloody and internecine warfare" (Hanf, 1993, p.40).
ETHNICITY IN RELATION TO LEBANON
In this thesis, the term ethnicity will be used to refer to an identity distinguished from other
social identities by a belief in a common origin, descent, history, and culture. It is a "self-
perceived inclusion of those who hold in common a set of traditions not shared by others with
whom they interact" (De Vos, 1996, p.18). Such traditions typically include attributes such as
language, a sense of historical continuity, and common ancestry or place of origin. Although
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religion is also customarily treated as an important marker of ethnic difference, in this thesis it
will be considered separately, to emphasize its prime significance as a distinct line of
segmentation in Lebanese society.
Religion offers a durable and all embracing social identity (Young, 1976). As an element in
cultural pluralism, religion is however limited to the great world religions - Islam, Christianity,
Buddhism, Hinduism, and Judaism. "The older folk religions, although aspects of them are
incorporated in the universal religions which supplanted them in most parts of the world, lack
the minimum requirements for becoming meaningful cultural segments in modem politics"
(Young, 1976, p.52). In Lebanon, it is particularly Islam and Christianity that have been
translated into generalized identity systems and become especially meaningful elements of
ethnic group loyalty and identification.
Islam has frequently operated in the guise of an intensely political religion. It is an all-
encompassing social system that admits of no distinctions between politics and religion. The
consequence is invariably the politicization of religious identity in the fabric of Islamic society.
Moreover, from its century beginnings, Islam has periodically contributed to state formation,
starting with the first caliphate, and continuing in subsequent political creations such as the
Ottoman Empire, the Mughal Empire in India, the Fulani State in West Africa, and most
recently, the creation of Pakistan, as the political homeland for Muslims on the Indian
subcontinent. "As a religion of revelation, Islam readily becomes an expansive missionary faith,
and by that fact may often be interpreted by other religious communities as a threat, thus
contributing toward a dialectic of communal conflict" (Young, 1976, p.54).
Although frequently perceived as a threat, Islam is in reality far from a united political
grouping. The major cleavage between Shi'ite and Sunni interpretations, dating back to an early
dispute over succession to the Prophet, is one important example. Islam is also fractured by its
relationship with both folk religion and contemporary secular ideologies. There is often a sharp
distinction between those whose membership in the community of Islam is only nominal and
those who devoutly pursue Orthodox Islam and are active in their faith. Moreover, in many
parts of the Arab world, much political fragmentation has been caused by the difficult task of
reconciling Islam with secular trends and ideologies.
Christianity has been an operative political identity almost wholly through its subgroups -
Catholics, Greek Orthodox, diverse Protestant sects, Armenians and others. Often its political
role has been in symbiosis with the affirmation of a nationality. One outstanding manifestation
of Christianity in the Middle East is the strong coincidence of ethnicity with the faith. This has
been, in part, attributed to a historical tight control by Christian communal leaders. "This pattern
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of strong and continuous communal leadership played a major role in preserving the religious-
ethnic integrity of these groups, and their sense of unique identity" (Karpat, 1988, p.42).
Religious identities tend to carry a high potential for political mobilization. The highly
developed ritual and ceremonial practices associated with religious observance serve as a
constant reaffirmation of identity; they constantly reinforce the sense of membership in a
particular community. There are also, in every religion, various obligations and sanctions
making it imperative to rally in the defense of the faith when it is presumed to be in danger.
Moreover, there exists in all major religions, in varying degrees, a specialized, institutionalized
clergy, or religious leaders whose claims as spokesmen command general assent.
The combination of divinely ordained solidarity imperatives and the structural and
communications capability to transmit the message in times of crisis give a formidable
political mobilization potential to communal attachments (Young, 1976, p.52).
Religious identities also tend to be relatively stable and durable; "they frequently have a limpet
like persistence and may possess a vigor and tenacity which can virtually equal those which are
rooted in our genetic constitution" (Govers and Vermeulen, 1997, p.19). Some have argued that
this relates to the nature of the religions involved. Enloe maintains, for example, that ethnic
boundaries are least porous and inter-ethnic relations most tense "when two ethnic groups
confess different religions, each religion is theologically and organizationally elaborate and
explicit" (Enloe, 1980, p.352).
Indeed, a religious definition of communal solidarity guarantees the persistence and salience of
pluralism and lends an especially intractable character to the expression of ethnic politics.
Religiously defined solidarities, when politically mobilized, can produce rigid
boundaries, persistent and bitter hostility, and maximal claims that are especially resistant
to the normal arts of political diplomacy or to erosion by social change. They are more
intractable than divisions based on language or common origin.. .unless religiously-based
pluralism can be successfully de-politicized, it will continue to generate more intense,
persistent, and violent conflict than pluralism based on other lines of cleavage (Esman
and Rabinovich, 1988, pp. 286, 287).
Recent decades have shown the persistence of ethnic/religious pluralism in Lebanon, and in
many societies around the world. Indeed, an objective look at contemporary political processes
permits no other conclusion than a candid recognition that ethnic pluralism is an enduring
reality in the modern world. Moreover, ethnic pluralism is not likely to wither away or be easily
eradicated. A more realistic approach is to view it as a phenomenon to be recognized and
accommodated. This is especially true in view of the fact that many modem territorial states
have not achieved their desired degree of homogenization and have been forced to come to
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terms with the realities of social pluralism. As Esman concludes in his comprehensive review of
contemporary issues in ethnic politics and pluralism:
• . . Ethnically defined collectivities must be accepted and accounted for on their own
terms as legitimate political actors. They are not the manifestations of deeper realities
such as class. Nor are they destined necessarily to dissolve into individualism or to wither
away in the inexorable processes of modernization and nation building. Though their
contours, their tactics, and even their boundaries may change, ethnic solidarities are
likely to be around for a very long time in many parts of the world, to influence and in
many cases to determine the course of events (Esman and Rabinovich, 1988, p. 24).
THE INTEREST-BASED EXPLANATION IN THE CONTEXT OF LEBANON
Lebanon has provided a refuge for a host of beleaguered and persecuted etimo-religious
minorities fleeing hardships and persecution. Their early historical encounters and entrenched
doctrinal beliefs provided ample room for mutual suspicion and hostility. The Christians felt
marginalized and relegated to second-class status under the millet system of the Ottoman
Empire. Similarly, the Muslims felt the winds of exclusion under the French mandate.
Existential fears and insecurities were reinforced upon independence. While the formula
adopted —the National Pact of 1943- sought to promote confessional power-sharing among the
various communities, the exchange remained asymmetrical perpetuating the hegemonic posture
of the Maronite community.
With time, the dynamics of inter-communal conflict in Lebanon evolved from religious rivalries
to political struggles and competition. Indeed, since independence, the main issue of contention
has been the nature of the political community. Demarcation of religious differences took on
political importance to the degree that it was relevant in legitimating differential claims and
access to resources. Given the sectarian-based formula adopted at independence, religious and
ethnic identities were consciously manipulated and re-asserted as powerful instruments for
utilization in the ensuing political competition. The behavior of religious communities in
Lebanon was thus largely influenced by the confessional formula adopted by the state as the
basis for political participation.
Following is thus a review of the historical development of the main religious communities in
Lebanon. The review lends support to the interest-based explanation explored at the beginning
of the chapter. It also confirms that ethnicity is indeed the product of a continuing historical
process, always simultaneously old and new, grounded in the past and perpetually in creation.
While the emotional and affective character of ethnicity is no doubt important, the
circumstantial, situational and contingent use of ethnic identification in the pursuit of material
advantage cannot be underestimated. Ethnic collective action in Lebanon is thus essentially a
process of strategic political interaction between self-interested communities with divergent and
mutually exclusive interests.
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THE MAIN RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN LEBANON
Lebanon is a nation of communities. As one author argues:
There can be few countries, which can claim to be so deeply and intrinsically composed
of minorities as Lebanon - especially one so small that it could fit into one quarter of
Switzerland. There is not a single resident in Lebanon who can, in one sense or another,
truthfully claim not to belong to a minority. It is the conflicting aspirations and fears of
these different components of Lebanese society, confined in a small and rapidly
urbanizing area, which lie at the heart of the continuing crisis in Lebanon today
(McDowall, 1982, p. 7).
The Lebanese communities are commonly divided into two religious categories: Christian and
Muslim. However, cleavages in Lebanese society far exceed the traditional Christian-Muslim
divide as there are several complex sub-divisions within these two general classifications.
The history of Lebanon has been viewed in a prism of dualism; in the nineteenth century,
the Druze-Maronite schism was the norm, and in the twentieth century, the Christian-
Muslim schism became the norm. Such a view neglected other major demographic
components of Lebanese population, and under-estimated the degree of sectarian frictions
between sects of the same faith (As'ad, 1988, p.36).
Lebanese society comprises seventeen different religious sects, six of which can be considered
politically salient. A sect is defined as "a group of people united by a common opinion or
doctrine that distinguishes them from other groups of people in society" (As'ad, 1988, p. 29).
The criterion for regarding a sect or community as politically salient requires "that the cleavage
in question be sufficiently intense and durable to give members of the respective groups a
distinctive and persistent outlook or cultural orientation that is different from that of other
segments in society" (As'ad, 1988, p. 123). The roots of the divisions between the main
religious sects in Lebanon are different religious convictions or cultural orientation andlor
disputes over the legitimacy of religious leadership.
The Maronite Community
The Maronites-followers of the 5th century Monk Maron-are the dominant group among
Lebanon's Christians. Their monolithic doctrine put them in conflict with the Byzantine Church
from its foundation in the 5th century onwards. As a result of persecution at Byzantine hands, the
Maronite community retreated from northern Syria into the northern mountains of Lebanon
between the 7th and I 1th centuries. "It was from one group of Christians from Syria seeking
sanctuary on the mountain that the Maronites emerged to politically and economically dominate
modern Lebanon" (Mackey, 1989, p. 84).
Alienation from Arab (Byzantine) culture and religion was thus a characteristic feature of
Maronite ethnicity from . its very inception. "Maronite sectarian ethnicity is derived from
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feelings of separateness in a larger Muslim and Arab world, and from the fear of persecution
and extinction" (As'ad, 1988, p.96). The Maronites simultaneously developed a growing sense
of affinity with Christian Europe. Their contact with Europe was initiated during the Crusades
and continued intermittently until they formally entered into union with Rome in 1736
(McDowall, 1982). Such Western affinity was deliberately fed by France, who, starting in the
1 7hI century, openly assumed protective responsibility for Maronite interests in Lebanon.
Despite their French protectors, the Maronites fearfully clung to the mountainous slopes,
jealously guarding their separate identity. Their worst anxieties materialized during the war of
1860 between them and the Druze.
The events of 1860 became the touchstone of Maronite psychology, and when the
question of security from the Muslim threat arose in Maroniles' minds, as it did
increasingly with the rise of nationalism throughout the Arab world, 1860 became a
potent symbol of what could not be allowed to happen again (McDowall, 1982, p. 9).
The most enduring result of the conflict, however, was the incurable trauma it inflicted on the
Maronites of Lebanon. They became consumed in fear, even paranoia over their survival.
Maronites fear persecution, inequality, and absorption into an expanded Arab nation. But they
mostly fear losing the political and economic prerogatives which they have managed to acquire
under French rule. "Though accused by other Lebanese of believing they are a bit more than
first among equals, the Maronites' basic fear is that stripping them from their economic and
political prerogatives is the prelude to driving them from Lebanon" (Mackey, 1989, p.45).
Indeed, Maronites view Lebanon as the only place in the Arab World where Christians can be
genuinely free and where they can aspire to the highest social, political, and economic status.
They insist that while the Muslims among them are to be treated as equal citizens, the reins of
power must remain in their own hands. Their chief objection to living under Islamic rule is that
in the Islamic community, state and church are identified as one. Therefore, yielding power to
the Muslims is perceived by the Maronites as a serious threat both to their
social/economic/political status and to the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon.
The demands of the Maronites have mainly centered on maintaining their long cherished
privileges, despite the fact that they no longer constitute a numerical majority in Lebanon. Such
privileges most notably include the presidency of the republic as well as a number of key
administrative posts (the command of the army, the directorates of military intelligence and
state security, the governor-ship of the Central Bank, and the chairmanship of the State Council)
which had been regarded, since the French mandate, as the traditional preserves of the Maronite
community. As in the dispute over the Presidency, Maronites claim that their privileges serve as
necessary guarantees for the Christians in Lebanon (Hanf, 1993).
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The demands of the Maronite community were thus mainly political, stemming from their
existential fears and insecurities as a small minority trapped in a sea of Islam. It is therefore no
coincidence that the Maronite community was the first to mobilize in the war of 1975. A
burgeoning Arab nationalism coupled with the proliferation of a Palestinian resistance
movement in Lebanon during the early 1960s and 1970s were perceived by the Maronites as a
serious threat to their security and hegemony. Their response to these threats evolved in terms of
an early communal mobilization, which swiftly translated with subsequent developments, into
collective violence and hostility.
The Greek Orthodox Community
The Greek Orthodox is the second largest Christian group in Lebanon. They are the descendants
of the established church of the Byzantine Empire, and have faithfully adhered to its theology.
The Greek Orthodox living in Syria and Lebanon fall under the Patriarch of Antioch in Syria.
"As part of the far wider church, the Orthodox have always felt loyalty to their Patriarchate and
the Syrian Christian community in its broadest sense" (McDowall, 1982, p.'7). Hence, though
Christians, the Greek Orthodox see themselves as an integral part of the Arab world and feel the
least threatened by Lebanon's and other Muslims.
Lebanon's Greek Orthodox Church always stayed centered in geography and theology in
Syria with its patriarch, and its members accepted themselves as Arabs. As a result,
today's Greek Orthodox relate to the Muslims and adopt ideologies of the Arab world
and pan-Arab ism itself more readily than either the Maronites or the Melkites (Mackey,
1989, p. 38).
From its inception, Greek Orthodox sectarian ethnicity was relatively independent of religious
affiliation. Indeed, Greek Orthodox ideologues commonly postulated that the people living in
the geographical area of Syria and Lebanon constituted an ethnic unity that had existed since
pre-history, one that was independent of racial origin or religion. Hence, they sought to recreate
this unity through the political realization of greater Syria. "The central theme of the Syrian
state was that it would be based not on the religious solidarity of Islam, but rather on the idea of
a distinct historical, cultural, and geographical entity" (Mackey, 1989, p. 38).
The idea of a larger Syrian nation particularly appealed to the Greek Orthodox of Lebanon
because it promised the possibility of creating a state larger and stronger than Lebanon. More
importantly, it promised the possibility of creating a state, which was free of the strong hold and
hegemony of the Maronites. Indeed, in the decades following independence, there was a
growing resentment among members of the Greek Orthodox community of the Maronite
monopoly of power in Lebanon, as it excluded them from the powerful offices of the state.
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Within a decade of independence, most Greek Orthodox had ended their quest for a union with
Syria. But they remained the least committed of the Christians to an independent Lebanese state.
Hence, Greek Orthodox and Maronites in Lebanon differ in the extent of their commitment to a
sovereign Lebanese state. They also differ markedly in their Arab cultural orientation. "While
the Maronites conceptualized Lebanon as a country in but not of the Middle East, the Greek
Orthodox accepted themselves as an Arab people living in an Arab state" (Mackey, 1989, p.38).
The Greek Catholic Community
The Greek Catholic community is a splinter from the Orthodox community, which as a result of
painstaking work by Catholic missionaries came into union with Rome in the 1 8t} century.
While recognizing Papal supremacy, Greek Catholics have nevertheless retained their oriental
customs and rituals.
Catholic missionaries attempted with painstaking patience to separate the Orthodox from
their Eastern roots. The effort was partially successful. In 1717 a segment of the Greek
Orthodox surrendered, assuming the name Greek Catholics or Melkites. Today's
Melkites, like the Maronites, are of the Roman Church, yet apart from it. While
classifying themselves as Roman Catholics and professing allegiance to the Pope in
Rome, the Melkites have retained their oriental rites and rituals (Mackey, 1989, p. 36).
As the evolution of their loyalty to Rome implies, the Greek Catholics look West as well as East
in cultural and political matters. In this sense, they can be seen as the bridge between the
Maronites, the Lebanese Christians most closely tied to the West, and the Greek Orthodox who
lean more toward the Arab world in culture and political orientation.
The three Lebanese Christian groups large enough to be politically relevant -the
Maronites, Greek Orthodox, and Melkites- differ in the degree of Arab cultural identity
they accept. The Maronites reject inclusion in the Arab world outright; the Greek
Orthodox accept their status as part of that world; and the Melkites vacillate between the
two attitudes. However, all Lebanese Christians perceive as imperiled their survival as a
religious minority trapped in a sea of Islam (Mackey, 1989, p.30).
The non-Maronite Christian communities turned out to be the political victims of the Lebanese
war. The erosion of their political power was such that the various pre-Taif attempts at
reconciliation were conducted in their total absence. Unable to conceive of any alternative and
feeling insecure and isolated many Greek Orthodox and Catholics joined the Masonite
mainstream during the war. The war thus served to enhance the standing of the Maronite
community, so much that many local commentators dropped the old confessional classification
(three Christian communities and three Muslim ones), in favor of another one: Christians,
Sunni, Shiites, and Druze (Salame, 1986).
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In the same way as Lebanese Christians do not constitute a monolith but a collection of
distinctive groups possessing marked diversities, Muslims in Lebanon also divide into three
major sects or communities: the Sunnis, the Shiites, and the Druze.
The Sunni Community
The Sunni Muslims are the orthodox adherents of the Sunna, or the body of traditional Islamic
laws based on the words and deeds of Muhammad and his immediate successors. "The Sunnis_
are the mainstream within Islam. To be Sunni means to follow the path or the way of the
Prophet. In general terms, it means to accept the Prophet's original teachings unadorned by
heavy cultural variations" (Mackey, 1989, p. 57). Hence, Sunnis regard the Quran,
supplemented by the traditions of the Prophet, as the sole and sufficient repository of the faith.
Sunni Islam has traditionally been the confession of government in the Middle East and, under
the Ottomans, this gave the Sunni community in Syria and Lebanon an implicitly superior status
to their co-religionists and members of other faiths. However, with the creation of the modern
state of Lebanon, the Sunnis' political status was vastly diminished. "Sunni sectarian ethnicity is
the product of the creation of Greater Lebanon, an event that brought the decline of Sunni
sectarian status from a majority in the Ottoman Empire to a mere minority in the Republic of
Lebanon" (As'ad, 1988, p. 112).
A major outlet of Sunni sectarian ethnicity has been Pan-Arabism - the idea of a shared Arab
identity, which can be expressed in some type of political unity. Indeed, the Sunnis in Lebanon
have repeatedly underlined their commitment to Pan-Arabism as a goal, and as a threat in the
event their political demands were not met. This orientation was meant to offset the Maronites'
attachment and identification with the Christian West. "The Arab orientation of Sunni political
inclinations helped to balance Maronite reliance on Western support" (As'ad, 1988, p. 113).
Given their Arab credentials, the Sunnis succeeded in breaking into the Lebanese power
structure upon independence. Their opposition to the Lebanese political system remained
centered, however, around the relationship between the President and the Prime Minister. The
arrangement set up by the Constitution was considered to be too presidential, and too biased to
the advantage of the Maronites. Their demands for political parity with the Maronites thus grew
louder in the years following independence.
The expression of Sunni political opposition, however, remained moderate and non-
revolutionary. Indeed, while a process of radicalization may have occurred among the Sunni
masses in the 1950s-60s in response to Nasserism and other forms of Arab nationalism, the
Sunni establishment remined inextricably tied to the status-quo. This is because Sunni elite and
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politicians shrewdly realized that they can continue to wield political power in Lebanon only by
preserving the sectarian formula and abiding by the rules of the Lebanese political game.
Indeed, the Sunnis of Lebanon were often accused of sacrificing Muslim interests in order to
safeguard their position as the privileged partners of the Maronites.
During the war years, the Lebanese Sunnis were in a most precarious predicament. Their
dispersal throughout the country's large cities (Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon) precluded a strong
geographic nucleus (Salame, 1986). Moreover, the multiplicity of competing locally
circumscribed patron-client networks in the Sunni community has had the effect of eroding their
influence over the evolving course of events (Khalaf, 1991). In the absence of effective political
organization, the Sunnis found their community largely fragmented throughout the war. This in
turn affected both their capability and their will to form a separate militia of their own.
The Shiite Community
The Shiites, the largest Muslim community and the largest confession in Lebanon today, derive
their collective name from the word 'sect' or 'party' of Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet
Muhammad. Shiism rose out of the great schism that befell Islam within fifty years of the
Prophet's death. The division resulted from a rancorous dispute over who would succeed to the
leadership of the faith after the Prophet himself. The Shiite insisted that the supreme authority
should be a descendant of the Prophet. The majority of other Muslims, however, did not endorse
this view and called themselves the Sunnis as opposed to Shiites.
The Shiiles had been the opponents of the Sunnis in the succession struggle, being
partisans of the Prophet's son-in-law, Au. Although they lost the struggle, they clung to
the Alid cause with fervent devotion, intensified by the persecution they suffered from
time to time (McDowall, 1982, p. 9).
With the exception of Lebanon, Shiism resides at the eastern edge of the Muslim Middle East
and most prominently in Iran. Iran is indeed the only country in which the Shiite religion
commands the overwhelming majority of the population. "Mainstream Shiism has for centuries
been the established faith of Iran, and explains the particular interest many Lebanese Shiites
have for the Iranian Revolution and the person of Ayatollah Khomeini" (McDowall, 1982, p.9).
Like other persecuted minorities who fled the Arab hinterland to seek refuge in Lebanon, the
Shiites sought to preserve their doctrine and to achieve independence from Sunni hegemony.
Shiite sectarian ethnicity in Lebanon is the product of a long history of persecution by
successive Sunni governments of the Shiite doctrine. It is also a function of the inferior social,
economic, and political status that the Shiites have occupied ever since Lebanon was created.
"In the rural areas, the Shiites, in character with centuries of persecution and suffering, have
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remained the poorest and most exploited, politically the least represented, and socially the least
educated group in Lebanon" (McDowall, 1982, p.9). Rejected as heretics, downtrodden by
economic/political policies imposed by the dominant Sunnis, the Shiites of Lebanon were
relegated to the bottom of the social order.
Increasingly, Lebanon's Shiites grew angry not only over their economic status, but because
they were derided by Christians and Muslims alike. Hence, key to the evolution of Shiite
sectarian ethnicity was the growing sense of injustice and inequality and the perceived
insensitivity on the part of other Lebanese towards their grievances.
While the concept of equal partnership as a demand for modif'ing the distribution of
political power and the relationship between the president and the prime minister
dominated the ideology of Sunni sectarian ethnicity, insistent calls for justice and
equality have shaped the ideological movement of Shiite sectarian ethnicity in its various
political stages (As'ad, 1988, p. 109).
The different ideological contents of the Sunni and Shiite political movements reinforced the
separate agenda of Shiite sectarian ethnicity, which could not be reconciled with the reformist
aspirations of Sunni politicians. Indeed, the rise of Shiite sectarian consciousness in the 1970s
started to manifest itself in a radical sectarian agenda among some members of the community.
The espoused goals were to overthrow the Maronite-Sunni establishment, which perpetuated
Shiite deprivation and to establish an independent Shiite political entity. Some have even
suggested that such an entity would eventually forge an alliance with the Republic of Iran.
By the beginning of the war, the Shiite community experienced a full-fledged coming of age.
Their heightened self-consciousness crystallized and coincided with the rise of Imam Musa a!
Sadr, a charismatic figure, who took on the task of organizing a Shiite populist confessional
movement. The movement first set out institutional objectives and requested the creation of an
autonomous Higher Shiite Council in the South. However, with the mobilization of other
Lebanese sects, the movement evolved into a separate militia known as Amal (Hope) whose
leader, Nabih Bern, replaced the charismatic Imam upon his disappearance in Libya in 1978.
Following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Shiite political activism took on another
military component, with the birth of Hezbollah (Party of God) militia. The movement was
originally funded and inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, but gradually gained appeal in
the Shiite community because of its open confrontation with Israel. More importantly,
Hezbollah provided the Lebanese Shiites an assortment of social, educational and medical
services designed to redress their material grievances and their self-image as the most deprived
of all Lebanese communities.
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The Druze Community
The third main pillar of the Muslim community in Lebanon are the Druze. The Druze sect
emerged from another dispute over leadership within Islam. In the 8th century, the Shiites, who
already had divided over the issue of the Prophet's successor, split again over the question of
the rightful successor to the six Shiite Imam. "The Druze are a splinter group of Shiism who
broke away from mainstream Shiism in the 8th century over succession to the Imamate"
(McDowall, 1982, p. 8). The name Druze is derived from al-Darazi, a follower of the 10th
century Egyptian Caliph al-Hakim, who taught that he was the ultimate incarnation of God in
human history.
Historically, the Druze spring from the claim of the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt, al-Hakim
(996-1 O2OAD), to be the emanation of God in his unity. This teaching was brutally
suppressed in Egypt on al-Hakim's disappearance in 1020 but some of his disciples
escaped to the hill country of Lebanon where the doctrine was propounded amongst
Shiite inhabitants. They founded a sect named after an early follower of al-Hakim, al-
Darazi (McDowall, 1982, p. 8).
The esoteric beliefs of this community have historically led to its persecution by other Muslims.
While theoretically a part of Islam, the Druze shun orthodox conformity to the five pillars of
Muslim faith. They believe in God as composed of several principles, which proceeded from
one another, each becoming incarnate in man. They also believe in supernatural hierarchies and
in the transmigration of souls. It is precisely the belief in reincarnation that most causes
mainstream Muslims to consign the Druze to the status of heretics. "While they classify
themselves as Muslims, the Druze are rejected as heretics at best and nonbelievers at worst by
most other Muslims" (Mackey, 1989, p. 59).
Given their history of religious persecution, the Druze have evolved into a very secretive sect.
"It is the secretiveness of the Druze faith that is perhaps its most distinguishing characteristic"
(Mackey, 1989, p. 61). Religiously speaking, the Druze are divided into two distinct groups.
The initiated are those who master the secrets of the faith and who respect its dictates in their
daily lives. Through these men, knowledge of the faith is passed on and perpetuated. The other
90 percent of the community, the non-initiates, are expected to lead a moral life, but are relieved
of the obligation of observing the rites of their religion.
Most of the Druzes have always been almost as ignorant as outsiders as to the nature of
their faith, which has remained in the custodianship of those few Druzes who follow the
steps of initiation into the levels of truth within a religious hierarchy (McDowall, 1982, p.
8).
The Druze sect is also renowned for its cohesiveness and its strong bonds of solidarity.
81
It is this cohesiveness of the Druze and their success in remaining closely united over a
thousand years of turbulent Levantine history that distinguishes them among Lebanon's
minorities. Because of the strict code of moral conduct for which they are renowned, the
Druze have maintained a degree of social solidarity that few others can match and a
reputation as extremely formidable adversaries (Mackey, 1989, p. 61).
Given their esoteric beliefs, their secrecy, and cohesiveness, the Druze engender suspicion, and
sometimes hostility among other Lebanese minority groups. It is precisely such attitudes which
have helped reinforce Druze sectarian ethnicity and their strong feelings of solidarity. "Druze
sectarian ethnicity is primarily derived from the historical persecution that Druze were subjected
to and from the history of Maronite-Druze conflicts and tension in Mount Lebanon prior to the
creation of Greater Lebanon" (As'ad, 1988, p.101).
Survival has thus become the prime concern of the Druze community. "Survival defines Druze
politics. For the Druze, loyalty to the community exceeds allegiance to either economic
ideology or ethnic nationalism. In the interest of survival, the Druze will identif' with any
arrangement that promises to safeguard their community interest" (Mackey, 1989, p. 62). Over
the years, they have fought fiercely for an independent Lebanon in which some communal
consensus will guarantee Druze survival and interests.
Although they never constituted more than seven percent of the population of Lebanon, the
Druze community and its notables have played a prominent role in Lebanese history and
politics. However, their political role was vastly diminished with independence. During the war,
the Druze community regained its prominent role under the leadership of its feudal leader
Kamal Jumblatt. And although Jumblatt was assassinated in 1977, his leftist organization, the
Progressive Socialist Party continued to ally itself with the other Muslims in their struggle for
political reform and more equitable representation. Table 5 presents summary characteristics of
main religious communities in Lebanon.
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Table 5. Summary Characteristics of Main Lebanese Religious Communities, Adapted from Deegan, (1993)
Religious Community	 Summary Characteristics
Maronites	 A formerly Aramaic speaking Christian people, native to the Syrian area, who
settled in Mount Lebanon to escape persecution during the tenth century.
Entered into communion with the Roman See in 1736, retaining own rites,
ceremonies, canon law and bishops, but recognizing the Pope's Supremacy.
Greek Orthodox	 The Arabic-speaking followers of the Eastern Church.
Greek Catholics 	 A splinter group from the Greek Orthodox Church who have entered into
communion with Rome as a Uniate Church, also known as Melkites.
Sunni	 The mainstream school of thought in Islam.
Shiite	 A branch of Islam, which split from the Sunni over the question of succession
to the Prophet Muhammad.
Druze	 A secretive sect adhering to the mystical teachings of Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim
_____________________ (996-1021 AD), often considered as non-Muslim by many Muslims.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Until recently, social science theorists had paid little attention to the enduring saliency of ethnic
or cultural identification. Ethnic loyalties were commonly perceived as pre-modern phenomena
pre-destined for extinction with the processes of modernization, assimilation, nation-building,
and integration. However, recent political events and developments have seriously challenged
such convictions and attested to the continuation and endurance of ethnic identification. Social
scientists were now faced with a new task, namely to explore the processes of ethnic revival and
account for the continuing importance of ethnic attachments.
Various explanations have been advanced to explain the continuing endurance of ethnic
identification. One line of reasoning stresses the coercive-ness of primordial attachments-
attachments that stem from the givens of social existence: immediate kin connection or from
being born into a particular religious community, or speaking a particular language, and or
following particular social practices. Such affinities of blood, speech, and custom are assumed
to have an overpowering coercive-ness and the loyalties they evoke are said to have a lasting
influence on the behavior of individuals.
Another explanation emphasizes the importance of subjective states like consciousness,
ideology, or imagination in evoking loyalty sentiments and mobilizing collective action. It
differs from the earlier perspective, which stresses only objective features like sharing the same
language, religion, territory, or history. The point is not to deny the relevance of such
supposedly objective criteria but rather to underscore the importance of self-perception, self-
identification, imagination, categorization, and consciousness in motivating individuals and
mobilizing collective action.
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The processes of modernization have also been argued to activate ethnic attachments and
intensify the potential for conflict. The processes of urbanization, communications and
education for example have greatly enlarged the possibility of spreading communal awareness
and helped accentuate cultural differences by providing people with the means to articulate their
communal concerns and demands. So instead of reducing cleavages and eroding traditional
parochial ties, modernization processes have helped enhance ethnic solidarity and intensify
communal conflict.
A final explanation, the interest-based explanation suggests that modernization intensifies inter-
group competition and converts ethnic groups into fierce competitors for economic and political
advantage. This view implies that ethnic solidarity might have a good deal in common with the
phenomenon of political mobilization. Modernization mobilizes men along familiar solidarity
lines and intensifies struggles over limited resources. Increased competition and rising
expectations in turn convert ethnic structures into readily available instruments for collective
mobilization. From this perspective, ethnic identities are readily manipulated and reasserted as
powerful instruments for utilization in the competition for the scarce goods of modernity.
All these explanations are relevant to explain the continued salience of ethnic loyalties in
Lebanon. But the interest-based explanation seems most promising given the specific dynamics
of access to resources in Lebanon and the lingering importance of ethnic structures in promoting
competitive advantage and mobilizing collective action. The review in this chapter indeed
makes clear that rigid religious demarcations took on political importance in Lebanon to the
extent that they were relevant in legitimating differential claims and access to resources.
Ethnicity thus provided individuals and groups in Lebanon with their most important political
resource in the competition for the scarce goods of modernity.
Although trying to account for the resilience of ethnic attachments in Lebanese society is by no
means an easy task, it was nevertheless an important undertaking to shed more light on the first
- and most important- component of the research hypothetical model (cultural/societal factors).
The ethnic and sectarian cleavages of Lebanese society indeed remain the key to understanding
the whole picture. As the analysis in the following chapters will make clear, the realities of
pluralism and diversity have shaped the democratic order, permeated policy circles, and dictated
peculiar political power configurations and administrative styles. It is to a more detailed account
of the historical evolution of these cultural cleavages that we shall now turn.
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CHAPTER 4
THE GENESIS OF ETHNIC POLITICS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND IN LEBANON
THE GENESIS OF ETHNIC POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Ethnic pluralism has been an important dimension of politics in the Middle East during most of
the twentieth century. As Esman explains, "the manifestations and expressions of etlmic politics
in the Middle East are in most respects similar to those that have been observed throughout the
Third World. The principal exception is the greater prominence and salience of the religious
definition of communal solidarity in the Middle East" (Esman and Rabinovich, 1988, p. 271).
This can be traced to the Islamic and Ottoman legacies that defined communities and peoples
primarily in religious terms. Despite secularization, urbanization, and modernization, religiously
defined loyalties have not been de-politicized in the contemporary Middle East; instead they
have acquired new virulence/saliency and become important motivators on the political scene.
The Ottoman ethnic and confessional legacy in the Middle East dates back to the fifteenth
century, when the inclusion in the Ottoman state of large non-Turk and non-Muslim groups
necessitated the promotion of the religious community as the main unit of social organization.
The millet system evolved over the second half of the fifteenth century during which the
Christian Orthodox millet, the Armenian millet, and the Jewish millet were successively
established. The institutionalization of the existing religious communities, with formal
recognition of their legal status, marked the transformation of the early Ottoman state into an
imperial entity in which groups of different religious persuasions were the main divisions
(Karpat, 1988).
The predominantly Muslim Ottoman state carried out its mandate to provide a place for non-
Muslims with a high degree of sophistication. It concentrated its organizational efforts on the
three broad categories of non-Muslim religious faith but it did not try to eliminate all the
interfaith divisions stemming from the different ethnic characteristics of various sects, so long
as those ethnic characteristics were useful in consolidating the community and especially the
state. The government's reliance on the religious communal organizations of the various ethnic
groups helped maintain cohesion within these groups; "the idea of etlmic identity based on
language, religion or modes of life were considered objective factors useful for achieving
communal cohesion, and treated as such for administrative purposes" (Young, 1976, p. 31).
Karpat notes that "the Ottoman approach was realistic and in many ways modem for its time"
(Karpat, 1988, p. 36). Instead of tampering with the sense of group identity and solidarity based
on community of faith that prevailed in the Middle Eastern society, the Ottoman rulers
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maintained and bolstered this loose system, giving the religious communities organization and
an avenue for political expression that had not previously existed. The Ottoman government
thus managed to preserve the integrity of the ethnic religious community by making it the
foundation of political organization. This conscious use of an existing social-religious structure
as the constitutional foundation of a state political system was unique. It helped materialize the
Ottoman ideal of the synthesis of ethnicity, religion, and community, which had been the main
legacy of the Ottomans in the Middle East.
Today, religiously defined groups in the Middle East expect their boundaries to be respected
and insist on exercising the internal autonomy to which they have become accustomed during
centuries of Ottoman rule. "The heritage of centuries of experience with the Ottoman millets has
endowed religious communities with a proto-national character that reinforces religious
solidarity and undermines other claimants to political authority, especially the secular territorial
state" (Esman and Rabinovich, 1988, p.284). Moreover, there is little evidence that religiously
defined loyalties are losing their salience in the Middle East so that religion might be eventually
de-politicized. Thus the religious definition of much of the pluralism in the Middle East
guarantees the persistence and salience of pluralism and lends an especially intractable
character/harsh tone to the expression of ethnic politics.
THE GENESIS OF ETHNIC POLITICS IN LEBANON
Lebanon is located along the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean (Figure 2) extending about
225 kms. and an average width of 48 kms. The country is divided into six administrative
districts (Muhafazahs), which are further divided into counties known as Cazas (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Lebanon Administrative Subdivisions
Lebanon is primarily a religio-ethnic society. In the words of Albert Hourani,
The primary divisions inside the Near East are religious: whether a man is Moslem,
Christian, or Jew, and which branch of the Moslem, Christian or Jewish community he
belongs to. The secondary division is into ethnic groups, that is to say, communities of
which the members have a common historical experience to give them a significant
degree of identity (Hourani, 1961, p.72).
Nowhere is this statement more valid than in the case of Lebanon. In fact, Lebanon today
comprises a variety of religious and ethnic groups. The primary division in Lebanese society is
between Muslims and Christians, which are in turn subdivided into six major sects: Sunni, Shia,
Druze, Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholic, respectively. The secondary division is
along ethnic lines whereby Lebanon is a unique mosaic of Arabs, Persians, Assyrians,
Armenians, and Kurds. The history of Lebanon is indeed the history of the difficult and often
uneasy coexistence of these different minorities, who settled progressively on this land, often
fleeing hardships and persecutions.
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Characteristics peculiar to Lebanon helped attract these minorities and determine the ultimate
ethnic/religious composition of its population, namely, geography and topography. By virtue of
its central position in the Eastern Mediterranean, Lebanon has always been a gateway to East
and West, and been historically and continually involved in the great power struggles of the
region. Indeed, Lebanon has been caught in the middle of countless struggles for power between
Abassids and Fatimids, Crusaders and defenders of the faith, Mamlukes and Turks. The
different Lebanese minorities are in this sense descendants of the various invaders, such as the
Egyptians, the Persians, the Romans, the Arabs, and the Turks.
Topography has also exerted an important influence on Lebanon's history. The ruggedness and
inaccessibility of Lebanon's mountains has made it an ideal "home for lost causes" (Hitti, 1957,
p.6). Minorities of many beliefs and persuasions have sought refuge behind the natural
fortifications of Lebanon's mountains. "But if this terrain with its steep slopes, few passes, and
isolated valleys provided security for the persecuted, it also rendered communication difficult
and contact infrequent" (Nelson, 1976, p.66). Indeed, for centuries the people of this area lived
in close proximity, yet in separate geographic locates with little contact or exchange. Divisions
and cleavages were thus left to perpetuate in isolation, and identity patterns were gradually
polarized and localized.
Hence, in order to understand present-day Lebanon, with all its cleavages, its social structure,
and its political and administrative styles, it is necessary to examine the historical development
of the divisions in Lebanese society. The historical dimension is indeed very important as the
present can only be comprehended properly in terms of the past. Moreover, the present
Lebanese system is the by-product of historical continuity and cumulative historical
developments. "The elements which make up the Lebanon of today did not always exist or stand
to each other in their present relationship. It was only gradually and by a piecemeal process that
there appeared the shape of the Lebanon we know" (Hourani, 1966, p.14).
The Ottoman Period
The basic ingredients of modern Lebanese politics were fixed by Ottoman times. This does not
mean, however, that Lebanon's more ancient history exerts no impact. For example, the
ideological repercussions of Lebanon's Phoenician legacy, which dates back to the third
millennium BC, continue to be of significance today. Some Lebanese have sought to mold from
this heritage a non-Arab, secularized national identity for Lebanon. But the structural
/institutional/ political consequences of earlier historical events are limited, in the sense that it
was primarily during the period of Ottoman rule that communal identification and cleavages
became salient, politicized, and institutionalized.
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Hence, it is important to begin with the period of Ottoman rule (1516-1918) in order to
understand how the existing religious cleavages originated and evolved. The early history of
Ottoman rule can be divided into three main stages: the Feudal Period (1516-1840), the
Kaymakamiyah Period (1841-1861), and the Mutassarifiyah Period (1861-World War I).
The Feudal System (151 6-1840)
During the Ottoman period, Lebanon was essentially understood to be Mount Lebanon and its
environs. The Ottoman Sultan Selim I assumed control over this territory in 1516 A.D en-route
to destroying Mameluke power in Egypt. This initial change in ruler-ship recorded no large-
scale impact on Lebanon as the Sultan confirmed the existing feudal order. The feudal lords of
the mountain were left in their places of authority conditional upon forwarding to the Ottoman
government a stipulated annual tribute and maintaining order among the people of the territory
under their jurisdiction. Hence, the main concerns of the Ottoman government were with the
collection of taxes, the maintenance of a minimal degree of law and order, in addition to the
protection and expansion of Islam.
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Sunni Muslim subjects, so long as it capably performed this function. With respect to the other
minorities, the Ottoman government drew upon the principles of the Islamic theological concept
of dhimrni. This concept involves the recognition of Jews and Christians as "Peoples of the
Book" who should be protected and exempted from forceful conversion to Islam given that they
shared Islam's monotheism and its prophetic tradition. In accordance with this doctrine, Jews
and Christians were granted relative autonomy under traditional Islamic rule.
Such special position of non-Muslim minority groups, commanded by the doctrine of dhimmi,
was later institutionalized under the Ottoman Empire in the form of the millet system. The millet
system organized all non-Muslim groups into separate entities, each under its religious heads,
who were held responsible for the governance of their community in accordance with the
traditions of their own sects. Accordingly, the religious leaders of the various communities
administered the laws pertaining to divorce, marriage, inheritance, adoption, and other aspects
of personal status. They also supervised religious education and religious foundations (Ofeish,
1996). The tolerance and relative autonomy promoted by this system were intended to
compensate for the absence of political rights and equal status. From its onset, however, the
system had the potential of allowing non-Muslim communities to develop differently and
separately from their Muslim counterparts. Indeed, the millet system gradually increased the
isolation of different sects, even within the same religion, and intensified 'in-group' feelings.
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While the Ottoman LLi system had the virtue of allowing religious groups relative
autonomy, and left them free to practice the religion of their forefathers without
interference, it simultaneously made differences between confessions more conspicuous,
reinforced inward-looking propensities, and restricted social communications between
groups (Neslon, 1976, p. 71).
The growing sense of religious consciousness and distinctiveness between the communities
gradually turned into suspicion and dislike.
By the early fifteenth century, the feudal structure of Mount Lebanon had solidified enough to
evolve into the Jmarah system or Princedom, a central unifying institution under the leadership
of a prominent feudal lord (1590-1842). The Imarali of Mount Lebanon emerged in part due to
the increasing weakness of central Ottoman government control. But it was also made possible
due to the ability and ambitions of certain feudal lords, particularly Amir Fakhereddine El-
Maani who ruled from 1590 to 1635 and Amir Bashir El-Shehabi whose rule lasted from 1788
to 1840. Both Amirs were proclaimed leaders of all feudal lords in the country under the
nominal control of the Sultan. They enjoyed authority and legitimacy and managed to retain
relative independence from the Ottoman government.
The internal strength and viability of the Imarah of Mount Lebanon depended primarily on the
solidarity and cohesiveness of its feudal elite. Indeed, the Imarah system was successful in
fostering a close and enduring union between a number of separate and independent feudal
lords. The leaders of various factions (Druze, Christians, and Shia) were also attracted to the
hnarah by its policy of religious tolerance, as all had a common desire to maintain the
maximum possible freedom from Sunni (Ottoman) domination. In this sense, the Imarah system
served essentially as a symbol of unity and a focus of leadership for cooperative endeavors. It
gave the region of Lebanon some temporary semblance of political coherence.
The relevance of the Imarah today stems not only from the continuing influence of its feudal
remnant, but also from the way scholars and politicians alike interpret its memory. The efforts
of Fakhereddine and Bashir to consolidate their power and secure the autonomy of Lebanon
from Ottoman control are held up as evidence of long standing sentiments of Lebanese
nationalism and sense of political community. Hence, to Christian and Druze historical memory,
the I,narah stands for Lebanese independence. To the Sunnis, however, the Imarah represents
nothing more than an unimportant phase of Ottoman rule.
Many factors of both internal and external origin led to the downfall of the Imara/z system in the
days of Bashir 11(1788-1840). Internally, Bashir's reign witnessed the ascendancy of the
Maronite Church as a potent economic and political confessional force. The Maronite Patriarchy
and Clergy drawn from the peasantry and inspired by Rome were able to develop a centralized
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organization, which gradually asserted its independence from the Lordly families. The
increasing involvement of this organization in the social and political activities of its followers,
and its infusion of a new communal consciousness among them served to erode the legitimacy
of the feudal order leading eventually to the collapse of the feudal system in 1861.
The Maronite Church acting upon the contradictions and weaknesses inherent in the
feudal system dealt to it the final blow. Through a series of internal reforms, the Maronite
Church developed a modern bureaucracy that was able to mobilize the peasantry, enrich
itself economically and spread an ideology inimical to the feudal system. The peasant
revolts of 1820, 1821, and 1859, coupled with the emergence of a mercantilist middle
class which enjoyed the support of the Church and the European powers, led to the
downfall of the Imarah system in 1842, and the abolishing of the feudal system in 1861
(Baaklini, 1976, p.57).
Externally, Bashir allied himself with the ruler of Egypt, Mohammad Au, in an attempt to
overthrow Ottoman rule. For this purpose, he began to rely more heavily on the Maronites and
pitted them against the Druze. At one point, Amir Bashir even armed the Maronites and used
them to put down a Druze revolt. This action greatly increased tensions and distrust between the
two sects. Meanwhile, the growing educational and political advantage of Maronites seriously
offended conservative Muslims and politicized their religious identification. The consequence
was the downfall of the Imarah system, the decline of the feudal order, and the subsequent rise
of communalismlsectarianism as new sources of identification and legitimacy. With the
downfall of the Irnarah system,
The historical Druze-Maronite feudal coalition which had assured Lebanon relative
freedom-independence was irreparably shattered. The old order of authority and mode of
conflict resolution, the tradition of a secular authority extending over the whole mountain
was destroyed. The only focus of identity and source of protection that remained for the
people to fall back upon was the confessional group (Nelson, 1976, p.79).
The recognition of the reality of this social situation was soon institutionalized in the form of a
new system or governance structure - the two-district system or the dual Kaymakmiyah.
The Two-District System or The Kaymakamniyah Period (1841-1861)
Hence, the year 1842 ushered the end of the Imarah system of Mount Lebanon, and along with
it the decline of feudal-based rule. After a period of deliberations between the Ottoman
government and the major European powers, an agreement was reached on a new governing
arrangement for Lebanon. The new system involved dividing Mount Lebanon into two
administrative districts (or Kavmakamivah): a southern district (predominantly Druze) to be
headed by a Druze, and a northern district (predominantly Maronite) to be ruled by a Maronite.
This was to be the first, but not the last institutionalization of communalism and sectarianism as
formally recognized elements of government in Lebanon.
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The two Kaymakams were held to be the supreme governors in their regions. They were
assisted in each district, by a regional administrative council, consisting of twelve members,
recruited in equal numbers from all the major sectarian communities (Maronite, Druze, Sunnis,
Shiite, Greek Orthodox, and Catholic). Moreover, there were to be two Wakils (peoples'
representatives), one Christian and one Druze, in mixed districts. Each Wakil had authority over
his co-religionists, and mixed cases or disputes involving Christians and Druzes were to be
adjudicated jointly by the two representatives.
This delicately assigned territorial division did not, however, contribute to long-lasting social
and political stability. Hence, in 1858, a Maronite peasant revolt against their feudal lords in the
northern district was easily converted into confessional strife, especially as the revolt was
allowed to spread southward into the Druze proctorship. The social upheaval gradually turned
into an inter-communal conflict, culminating in the famous massacre of 1860. Though the
Druze were fewer in number, they were better organized and managed to inflict heavy losses on
their antagonists. It is estimated that somewhere in the vicinity of 15,000 Christians lost their
lives in the sectarian turmoil of 1860.
The five European powers in the Concert of Europe- Britain, France, Russia, Prussia and
Austria- would not let the incident of 1860 pass without overseeing a general settlement of their
own. Already each European state had attempted to establish durable ties with the different
religious communities: France with the Maronites, Russia with the Greek Orthodox, Austria
with the Greek Catholics, and Britain with the Druze. Hence, the sectarian massacres of 1860
brought a forceful European intervention and a new governance structure for Mount Lebanon,
the Mutassarifiyah system, formally established in June 1861.
The Mutassarzfiyah System (1861- World War I)
The new system was engineered by the representatives of five major European powers (France,
England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia) in cooperation with the Ottomans. It reunited the
mountain into a single autonomous governorate, the mutassarifIyah, headed by an Ottoman/Non
Lebanese Christian Governor (Mutassarif). An integral part of the new system was a new
constitutional document, known as the Organic Law, which provided Lebanon with a significant
degree of independence in managing its national administration and internal affairs. The new
Mutassarifivah system gave official sanction to the principle of proportional sectarian
representation, by allowing for a central administrative council to assist the Mutassarif, whose
members were to be elected in equal numbers from the six major sectarian communities.
Under this new system, Lebanon was divided into seven administrative districts, called Caza s,
which were in turn subdivided into counties. Each district or Caza was to be administered by a
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Kaymakam, appointed by the Mutassarif to whom he was directly responsible. The district
administrator was to have the same religious affiliation as that of the dominant sect in his
region. Many feudal lords were also integrated into the power structure of the new system
through admissions to the council and appointments to leading governmental offices. Thus,
while by 1861, the feudal system had been formally abolished, the power of the feudal lords had
not been completely eliminated; many of them were absorbed into the new system and
continued to play an important role in Lebanon's politics. With its delicate balancing of political
forces, greater centralization of authority, international guarantees, and local representation, the
Mutassarrijivah system was able to provide Lebanon with relative autonomy, tranquillity, and
prosperity until the outbreak of World War I.
The French Mandate
World War I is usually considered a landmark event in Middle Eastern history in general, and
Lebanese history in particular. After the War, Lebanon was put under the mandate of the
French. The substitution of the Turkish rule by the French mandate in the aftermath of the war
evoked mixed reactions from the different sects. The French were viewed as the traditional
protectors of the Christian Maronites, and hence were welcomed by a sizeable portion of this
community. Sunni Muslims, on the other hand, were unanimously opposed to French rule as the
worst of all conceivable alternatives. Thus, for the Christians in general, French intervention
was equated with security and prosperity; for the Muslims, however, it meant subservience and
humiliation. Devoid, however, of the necessary means to resist, the Sunnis could do little more
than refuse to participate in the operation of the political system.
Perhaps the most important act performed by the French under the authority of the mandate was
to expand the borders of the MutassarIyah of Mount Lebanon in 1920 to form The State of
Greater Lebanon. The annexation of the predominantly Muslim inhabited coastal provinces of
Tyre, Sidon, Tripoli, and Beirut to the area of Mount Lebanon caused a major disruption to the
traditional sectarian composition of the population and "restated the problem of Lebanon all
over again" (Hourani, 1966, p.24). Given that the added territories were mainly inhabited by
Muslims, the Christians were no longer a comfortable majority, and the sectarian equilibrium
was disturbed. The new challenge facing Lebanon was to restore the equilibrium and reshape
the balance of power among the various sects now forming the State of Greater Lebanon.
The creation of the State of Greater Lebanon had far-reaching consequences for the country,
perhaps extending to the present. While it certainly had the advantage of making Lebanon a
more economically viable entity, "it established a polity with artificial boundaries, no coherent
majority, no shared historical experience, enormous socio-religious heterogeneity, and sizeable
groupings who refused to accept the legitimacy of the political community" (Nelson, 1976,
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p.86). Hence, "what the country gained in area, it lost in cohesion. It lost its internal
equilibrium, though geographically and economically, it became more viable" (Hourani, 1966,
p.22-25).
Soon after the initiation of Greater Lebanon, the French advanced the political position of their
Maronite allies through elections of the first Representative Council in 1922. Ten of the thirty
seats of the Council were allocated to Maronite representatives, even though they constituted
less than one third of the population of Greater Lebanon (Ofeish, 1996). Such increasing
advancement of Maronite interests served to alienate the Muslim community and increase their
anxiety over Western and Christian Imperialism. It also intensified their calls for an annexation
of Lebanon to Arab (and largely Muslim) Syria.
In 1925, a Druze revolt, which broke out in Syria, soon turned into a national revolt against the
French, spreading to Lebanon as well. This accelerated French efforts towards framing a new
constitution for Lebanon, approved by the Council on May 23, 1926, and transforming the State
of Greater Lebanon into The Lebanese Republic. But within the provisions for the erection of
the Republic, the French High Commissioner retained the power to veto legislation, dismiss the
legislature, and remove the President, as well as handle external affairs. Indeed, over the short
period of remaining French rule, the constitution was suspended twice, and French cultural
supremacy was vigorously protected.
In the end, the French, by their autocratic attempt to prevent the Lebanese from obtaining their
independence, did provide the one unifying historical experience, which brought Muslim and
Christians into closed ranks. In November of 1943, the newly elected Council or Parliament,
under the leadership of President El-Khoury and Premier El-Solh amended the Constitution and
ended the French Mandate over Lebanon. The French reacted by arresting the President and
most of his cabinet members. "The arbitrary arrest and confinement of Lebanon's President, and
all but two of his cabinet members by the French in November, 1943, rallied all sectors of the
Lebanese political spectrum to the nation's right to unrestricted independence" (Nelson, 1976,
p. 91). Under pressure from the United States, Britain, and the Arab Countries, France released
the prisoners and recognized the independence of the Republic of Lebanon.
The Independence Period
Lebanon embarked on its independence with all its historical, political, social, ethnic and
religious cleavages intact, and with a fragmented political process characterized by "the lack of
national solidarity, devotion to sectarian or personal ends, the ceaseless squabble for place and
power, the interventions of political dignitaries into the political fray, and the difficulty of
purging waste, abuse, and corruption" (Iskandar, 1964, pp.22-23).
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If the long era of Ottoman sovereignty over Lebanon left a heritage of fragmentation,
religious autonomy, suspicion of government, foreign interference, corruption, and
Christian fear of Muslim dominance, the twenty odd years of French supremacy did
nothing to reduce any of these imperfections and indeed reinforced most of them, while
adding new negative legacies (Nelson, 1976, p.91).
The 1943 National Pact
An essential building block of independent Lebanon was a compromise agreement between
Muslim and Christian leaders on the internal distribution of power and the conduct of
Lebanon's Arab and foreign policies. This informal, unwritten agreement, which came to be
known as the National Pact established the foundation upon which Lebanese Politics had been
grounded from 1943 until the present. Essentially, the National Pact was the product of an
understanding between Muslim and Christian leaders in which Christians agreed to renounce
their Western orientations, and Muslims agreed to renounce their Arab or Syrian orientations.
Both parties acknowledged simultaneously Lebanon's Arab character and special identity.
Also implied was an agreement on an equitable sectarian representation and distribution of
offices within the political system. Hence, it was informally agreed that Lebanon's President
was to be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the head of Parliament
a Shia Muslim. Moreover, a ration of six Christians to five Muslims was to be preserved in the
composition of parliament. The Pact thus embodied a conventional balance of power between
the communities and an institutionalization of sectarian representation. This compromise
arrangement was, in many respects, an essential prerequisite for the erection and continuation of
an independent Lebanese State.
To some critics, however, the National Pact (which is a symbol of ideological symbiosis) has
only succeeded in perpetuating the balance of power between the ethno-religious communities.
According to such critics, the Pact has failed to build a sound and enduring basis of national
identity for all Lebanese. Instead, it helped maintain the various conflicting ideologies and
helped preserve the parochial, sectarian loyalties and identifications (Koury, 1972).
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN LEBANON UNDER
OTTOMAN AND FRENCH RULE
From the standpoint of the administration, the four hundred years of Ottoman rule represent a
period in which Lebanon first acquired some of its present administrative and governmental
characteristics and procedures.
Within that time, taxation procedures were fixed, land titles and rights were recorded, and
principles of local government and administration took on the respect and permanency of
several centuries' existence. Heavy Turkish influence remains today in the courtesies,
customs, and traditions of Lebanese government offices, and in the patterns of local
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government, which a Turkish Law of 1857 recognized and established (Grassmuk and
Salibi, 1955, p.3).
It is specifically during the Kavmakamivah and Mutassariflvah periods of Ottoman rule that
Lebanon saw the genesis of administrative developments and reforms. During this period, the
country was divided into separate administrative districts or Caza s, which were in turn
subdivided into smaller counties. Such system of local administration has continued, although
with minor modifications, during the French mandate and up to the present. Moreover, under
the Ottomans, a new judicial system was established, laying down a hierarchy of courts to
handle civil and criminal matters and disputes.
Under the authority of the French mandate, the administrative apparatus was further expanded
and rationalized. Administrative reforms during this period mainly took place in the fields of
public finance, personnel, and judicial administration. In the field of public finance, the
Ottoman tax practices were discontinued and a new system of direct taxation was established.
Moreover, a new currency was introduced, and the administration of customs was improved. In
the field of personnel administration, the French promulgated two laws, which regulated many
aspects of personnel administration (appointments, promotions, discipline, and discharge) and
established the foundations of a modem civil service. In the field of justice, new judicial codes
were issued, new courts were established, and the judicial system was re-organized.
However, "the French, borrowing on their own experience, also left a heritage of over-
centralization and stultifying legalism" (Neslon, 1976, p. 91). This was manifested by the many
exhausting restrictions and governmental controls as well as an over-emphasis on legalistic
qualifications for high governmental administrative offices. Moreover, throughout the French
mandate, the administration found it utterly impractical to follow strictly the guidelines of
proportional representation without simultaneously suffering in efficiency because of political
sectarianism, political clientele, favoritism, and nepotism (Namani, 1984). The sacrificing of
efficiency for other latent socio-political objectives is a practice that lingers on today.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The history of Lebanon is the history of a pluralistic society, characterized by serious ethnic,
religious, and sectarian cleavages. Three main stages have marked the historical development of
this fragmented entity, namely the Ottoman, the French, and the Independence periods.
Under the Ottoman millet system, the religious community was promoted as the main unit of
social organization. Although this practice contributed to stability, it also made the differences
between the religious communities more conspicuous and reinforced communal separateness
and distinctiveness. During the Imarah system, Lebanon acquired the semblance of political
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stability and coherence, but this system was soon shattered by the ascendancy of the Maronite
Church and the growing sense of political/communal consciousness among its members. This
necessitated the replacement of the feudal system by new systems based on communal-
confessional identifications, the Kavmakmivah and Mutassarflvah systems.
The new Kavmakivah system of 1845 divided the country into two administrative districts, one
predominantly Christian to the North, and the other predominantly Druze to the South. It also
created a Central Administrative Council which represented the various religious communities.
Moreover, the new system established a sectarian balance of power between the two Wakils (or
people's representative) in the mixed districts. The MutassarifIvah system of 1861 embodied
similar changes. The country was however reunited into a single political unit/structure, which
was subdivided in turn into seven administrative districts (Cazas). Hence, Lebanon witnessed
the first formal institutionalization of communalismlsectarianism under Ottoman rule. It also
acquired its main administrative and governmental features during this period.
Under the French Mandate, new provinces - predominantly Muslim- were added to Mount
Lebanon. This caused a major disruption to the traditional sectarian composition of the
population and "restated the problem of Lebanon all over again". The problem was no longer
one of Christians versus Druzes, or Christians versus Moslems; rather it became one of
reshaping the balance of power among the various sects - Maronite, Sunni, Druze, Shia, Greek
Orthodox, Greek Catholic and others. It is exactly this problem that is still manifesting itself
today and impacting all aspects of Lebanese politics. Hence, the period of French rule was
characterized by an increasing polarization among the religious groups, in addition to some
administrative reforms, particularly in the areas of public finance and personnel administration.
Lebanon embarked on its independence with all its historical, political, social, ethnic and
religious cleavages intact. The reality of this situation necessitated the enactment of a new
compromise agreement between Muslims and Christians, the National Pact of 1943. The
National Pact was a re-confirmation of the need to institutionalize communalism, and to
preserve a delicate sectarian balance of power between the many ethno-religious communities.
It is precisely this Pact which has established the foundation upon which Lebanese politics had
been grounded from 1943 until the present.
Hence, Lebanon's history, recent and medieval, shows a chronicle of conflict between religious
sects, rival feudal families, central authorities and rebellious locals. This conflict coupled with
the Islamic heritage of the Ottomans and the Western heritage of the French has led to a
politicization of religious identities and an exacerbation of sectarian hostilities. Indeed, ethnic
and religious cleavages have become deeply rooted in Lebanese society, and identity clearly
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grounded in religious affiliations. These cleavages represent the 'givens' of Lebanon, 'givens'
that will continue to impact and influence Lebanon's political and administrative processes.
Although this chapter is mainly grounded in history, it was nevertheless perceived to be
important to shed more light on the historical forces which have shaped the evolution of the
sectarian divisions of Lebanese society. Indeed, a historical approach provides a better starting
point for understanding present day Lebanon with all its cleavages, social structure and peculiar
political and administrative styles. It also promotes a more in-depth understanding of the
cultural/societal factors which were hypothesized as salient in the research hypothetical model.
The next chapter will examine how those cultural cleavages and divisions -the givens of
Lebanon- have shaped in turn the democratic order of the Lebanese Republic.
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CHAPTER 5
SECTARIAN DEMOCRACY, THE LEBANESE WAR
AND THE TAIF AGREEMENT
INTRODUCTION
As the previous chapter makes clear, sectarianism was first introduced to the system of
government in Lebanon under Ottoman rule (1516-1914). The notion of distributing offices on a
sectarian basis was gradually solidified in the Greater Lebanon system under the French
Mandate (1920-1943). Sectarianism was then formally adopted by the Lebanese government
upon independence as the only means to foster a democratic process in a deeply divided society.
Understanding the peculiarities of the Lebanese sectarian system becomes essential, given that
national political styles have been hypothesized in chapter 2 to exert a considerable influence on
reform dynamics and trajectories.
Many scholars have considered the system of sectarian democracy which has evolved in
Lebanon as a successful form of consociationalism. Hanf (1993) for example writes, "for three
decades —since the country's independence in 1943- Lebanon was held to be an example of
successful, peaceful and democratic coexistence, as one of the few viable cases of consociation
outside Europe". But the Lebanese model of consociational politics was soon to collapse into
bloody warfare between conflicting confessional communities; "in the following decade and a
half Lebanon became the proverbial case of a country torn apart by bloody and internecine
warfare" (Hanf 1993, p.40).
How did the Lebanese consociational model function in the pre-war period? Why did it
breakdown? This chapter is partly an attempt at answering those questions. The chapter will
thus begin by shedding light on the main pillars of the Lebanese consociational model, namely:
1) the Constitution of 1926; 2) the Census of 1932; and 3) the National Pact of 1943. The
chapter will then briefly explore the causes of the Lebanese civil war and the main actors and
issues, leading to the accord, which finally brought this war to closure, namely the Taif
agreement of 1989. The chapter concludes by a critical examination of the prospects for
Lebanon after Taif, as well as the potential implications of the Lebanese system of
consociational politics for administrative reform.
SECTARIAN DEMOCRACY IN LEBANON
Lebanese democracy has become an oddity not only in the Arab world where representative
government has almost vanished, but among the world's democracies. This is so precisely
because a unique democratic order has evolved in Lebanon in response to the imperatives of
historical development and sectarian coexistence. "The development of Lebanon's democratic
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order is inextricably linked to the confessional structure of society and to the tradition of
communal coexistence and pluralism that existed in Mount Lebanon and was later introduced in
the state's modem institutions" (El-Khazen, 1987, p. 282).
Indeed, to contend with the segmentation of its plural society, Lebanon adopted a unique
democratic tradition known as sectarian democracy. This term is commonly used in Lebanon to
describe the institutionalization of religious representation into the rules of government. It is in
this sense a special political arrangement aimed at stabilizing the Lebanese political system by
balancing/representing its basic social units. "Con fessionalism is a political arrangement
whereby different ethnic and religious groups (confessions) are balanced to perpetuate the
status-quo" (Koury, 1975, p.!).
Con f'essionalism is the institutional means by which the system's sub-national groups are
permitted legitimate representation in the state's political, governmental, and
administrative structures in relative proportion to their numbers based on the sectarian
breakdown as revealed in the official census of 1932 (Entelis, 1974, p.6).
Sectarian democracy or con fessionalism was in this sense Lebanon's unique response to the
dilemma of democratic representation in a plural society. This political arrangement takes into
account the prerequisites of both individual freedom and political cohesion and seeks to
generate unity within diversity by enabling the diverse communities to participate in the system
freely, while preserving their political rights and their social identities. Sectarian democracy was
thus "Lebanon's home-grown approach to overcome the birth defects of society" (El-Khazen,
1987, p. 84).
Sectarian democracy in Lebanon has three main pillars or foundations: 1) the constitution of
1926; 2) the census of 1932; and 3) the national pact of 1943.
The Constitution of 1926
The Lebanese constitution was initially promulgated in 1926 with the creation of the Republic
of Lebanon. The 1943 regime (regime of independence) re-confirmed the 1926 constitution,
after simply deleting all the clauses relating to the French mandate. A close examination of this
document reveals that the renowned Lebanese sectarian system has very weak constitutional
grounds. Indeed, a single clause in the constitution (article 95) addresses the notion of sectarian
quotas. This article states:
Article 95: As a provisional measure and for the sake of justice and amity, the sects shall
be equitably2 represented in public employment and in the composition of the Ministries,
provided such measures will not harm the general welfare of the state.
2	 Equitably in fact means proportionally to the numerical size of each community.
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The significance of this article resides in its expression of a Lebanese political consensus
regarding the establishment of a sectarian quota system as the basis of the political system.
However, article 95 directly contradicts article 12 of the same constitution, which states that the
right to occupy public office among Lebanese is based on merit and competence.
Article 12. Every Lebanese shall have the right to hold public office, no preference being
made except on the basis of merit and competence, according to the conditions
established by Law.
Article 95 also contradicts article 7 of the constitution, which stipulates unequivocally that all
Lebanese citizens are equal before the Law.
Article 7: All Lebanese shall be equal before the Law. They shall equally enjoy civil and
political rights and shall equally be bound by public obligations and duties without any
distinctions.
The constitution includes two other articles recognizing the sectarian-affiliated concerns of
communities and individuals, but not addressing the issue of sectarian quotas per se. Article 10
allows religious communities the right to maintain their parochial schools. And Article 9
protects the rights of individuals to have their personal status regulated by the religious
authorities of their sects. Those few articles contradict the overall secular spirit of the
constitution and emphasize sects as fundamental clusters of Lebanese society.
Other major provisions of the sectarian system were not covered in the constitution, including
the allocation of the three highest positions along confessional lines, and the distribution of
parliamentary seats on a sectarian basis. Hence "excluding article 95, the primary tenets of the
sectarian system were left without any constitutional foundations" (Ofeish, 1996, p. 300). The
fact that article 95 emphasizes temporality may account for its continued survival.
Article 95 of the constitution survived the social and political changes, because no time
limit was attached to its applicability. By using the term provisional measure, the
constitution satisfied both those who wished to maintain the sectarian distribution of
political/administrative posts and benefits, and those who wished either to re-arrange the
distribution or to abolish the arrangement altogether (As'ad, 1988, p.46).
The absence of other major sectarian provisions from the constitution of 1943 strongly suggests
its founders' interest in keeping the entire sectarian system extra-legal and perhaps temporary. It
may have been realized that the sectarian structure presents a direct contradiction to the concept
of equality before the law, and could therefore upset the legitimacy of the state if legalized
constitutionally. Moreover, a vague postulation of sectarianism leaves ample flexibility for
adjustment and accommodation if and when deemed necessary. "The article also suited the





political leaders to enact minor modifications in the quota system at times of major crises"
(As'ad, 1988, p. 46).
The Census of 1932
Proportional political/governmental representation as per Article 95 of the constitution has been,
since its formalization in 1926, a major source of friction between rival sects in Lebanon. The
decision of a Sunni Muslim to stand for the Presidency in 1932 was met by strong opposition in
Maronite circles. Under the cloud of this political dispute, the French conducted the census of
1932. It was the last formal census ever to be conducted in the country. "Although it is over 50
years since Lebanon gained its independence, it must be one of the few countries in the world
never to have attempted a census as a self-governing-state" (Moore, 1997, p. 13).
The census of 1932 confirmed that Christians were slightly more numerous in Lebanon than
Muslims. The slight Christian numerical edge was also increased if non-resident Lebanese were
included (Table 6). The issue of non-residents has since then become politicized in Lebanon and
has practically precluded a census in the past half century.

































Since 1932, there have been endless debates on how to define Lebanese. The crucial
issue is the Lebanese abroad. The most extreme Muslim view is to ignore them
completely, the Christian counterpart is to count all as Lebanese emigrants. The inability
to reach agreement on this question has precluded a census in the past half century. The
debate has evolved into a ritual. Muslim politicians or institutions demand a census,
Christian politicians or institutions agree, provided that all Lebanese abroad are included.
So long as a census is not held, each of the confessional blocs can maintain that it is in
the majority and make corresponding demands with respect to the distribution of power
in the state (Hanf, 1993, p. 90).
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The resident census itself was surrounded with controversy. Muslim leaders accused the French
of tampering with the data in order to legitimize the existing sectarian formula. They also
argued that many Muslims did not take part in the census either for ideological reasons
(participation was equated with an official recognition of the mandate and of the newly created
republic) or because of widespread illiteracy. Finally, the census of 1932 was conducted amid
wide rumors about French intentions to recruit Lebanese for its army. It was thus argued that
Muslim fear of conscription was a major factor behind their boycott of the census, and hence
behind their low numerical counts.
But even had the proportions of the 1932 census been accurate, the assumption that they would
indefinitely remain static was simply untenable. Indeed, Lebanon experienced a high population
increase from the late forties onwards, and this increase was characterized by higher birth rates
amongst Muslim (mostly Shiite) communities than amongst others.
A clear trend between the 1920s and the 1980s was the speed with which the Muslim
share of the total population expanded relative to the Christians'. Estimates published in
1984 by the Lebanese Association for Family Planning found that the Shiite community
was growing at an annual average of 3.6 per cent, with the Sunni expanding by 2.8 per
cent per year and the Maronites and other Christian sectors of the population increasing
by a relatively modest 2.1 per cent annually (Moore, 1997, p. 14).
In most states, such a demographic shift might have scant political relevance. But in Lebanon, it
had serious implications as it challenged the myth that supported the intricate governmental
structure. Hence, the myth conferred legitimacy on the political structure based on the principle
of proportional representation. But, when it became clear that the Muslims had surpassed the
numerical size of the Christians, it was no more possible to claim that the confessional
distribution of political power was based on a numerical count. Hence, the legitimacy conferred
by the myth was seriously questioned.
By the mid-sixties most Lebanese recognized that the fine confessional balance in politics
was based on a myth. It was inevitable that those who felt disadvantaged by the myth
should begin to ask for a fairer slice of the cake, though the political establishment was
reluctant to listen (McDowall, 1982, p.11).
To accommodate new demographic realities, two rhetorical stances have usually been invoked.
The Muslims have traditionally called for political secularization with the anticipated
consequence of dismantling Maronite political dominance. The Christian leadership has usually
countered by an insistence on total secularization in Lebanon, claiming that secularization can
only be achieved if confessionalism is abolished at the social and political levels
simultaneously. This option, however, has invariably been unacceptable to Muslims for whom
matters of personal status ought to be handled by their own religious courts, subject to the
interpretation of the Islamic canon law (or Sharia).
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Thus in Lebanon, an essentially confessional bid for political secularism came to be
countered by an equally confessional bid for total secularism, the political motives behind
each of the two bids being highly cynical and devious, known to all but the most innocent
and gullible (Salibi, 1988, p. 197).
The National Pact of 1943
Lebanon's confessional politics were finally legitimized and rationalized in the National Pact of
1943 (also referred to as the Covenant of 1943), an unwritten agreement between Christian and
Muslim leaders to promote the independence of Lebanon while preserving its system of
sectarian politics. Indeed, the Pact formalized the practice of allocating the top political offices
on a sectarian basis (Maronite President, Sunni Prime Minister, and Shiite Chamber Speaker). It
also assigned parliamentary seats and key administrative positions on a sectarian basis (6:5
ratio). In this sense, the National Pact formally inaugurated the sectarian system of the
independent state.
The Pact also inaugurated a new Maronite-Sunni partnership in the state. The evolving
dominant Sunni role in the independence period was less a reflection of the numerical size of
the community than an explicit recognition of Sunni Arab credentials/qualifications. Sunni
involvement indeed symbolized Lebanon's admission in Arab political circles. "The Sunni
community's partnership in the state and the National Pact gave Christian Lebanon the stamp of
Arab/Muslim legitimacy. Hence, the Sunni community became the de-facto rival/partner of the
Maronite community in any national agreement in Greater Lebanon" (El-Khazen, 1987, p.353).
But any viable agreement between Maronites and Sunnis necessarily needed to address the
thorny issues of Lebanon's identity and foreign policy. Hence, the most ingenuous aspect of the
Pact came about through a compromise formulation on those two issues. In this respect, it was
agreed that Lebanon would be neither Eastern nor Western, but an independent country in its
own right. It would retain its cultural and spiritual links with the West, but also collaborate
closely with all Arab states. Lebanon was thus defined as a country with an Arab face, Arab
features and Arabic tongue, as a part of the Arab world, but with a special, independent
character (Hanf, 1993).
The Pact therefore constituted an agreement between two ideological proponents, creating for
the Lebanese state a new national identity based on the peaceful coexistence of the religious
sects. It essentially meant that the Christian and Muslim communities would henceforth temper
their ideological excesses, and operate under an internal system of loyalty to an independent,
sovereign Lebanese state.
The National Pact was not only a settlement between two religious sects. Rather, it was
the fusion of two ideologies, one that called for the dissolution of Lebanon into another
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country (Syria), while the other called for its retention under foreign protection (French).
The Pact removed by mutual understanding and agreement, these two conflicting
movements, and replaced them with one national Lebanese faith (Namani, 1984, p.118).
Despite the fact that the National Pact endured for more than a quarter of a century (1943-1975),
there are some who still regard it as a simple expedient contract among a few politicians
(Binder, 1966), and who attribute to it many of the country's frailties (e.g. immobilism,
perpetuation of confessional identification and hindrance of organized non-sectarian political
parties/organizations). Although it certainly had its drawbacks, it should be emphasized that the
National Pact provided a pragmatic instrument for accommodating the realities of a state whose
origins had been contested, whose borders had been carved rather arbitrarily, and whose
pluralistic political culture was nourished simultaneously by universal religions and local,
sectarian loyalties.
The National Pact of 1943 was certainly far from perfect. Its most obvious shortcoming was that
it provided more leverage to the Maronites and the Sunnis, while paying inadequate attention to
other social groups who often felt the cold winds of exclusion (Bose, 1991). The legitimacy of
this unique contract thus risked being eroded by an insufficient broadening of political
participation (Hudson, 1985).
The Maronite-Sunni partnership in the formulation of the Covenant gave rise to a
situation where the leaders of the two communities at the highest levels and with few
exceptions, looked at the entire Lebanese scene through a bi-sectarian prism. This prism
tended not only to relegate to irrelevance the concerns and interests of the other sects, but
also to cause the Sunni and Maronite leaders at the highest levels to become obsessively
involved with one another (Khalidi, 1991, p. 37).
The evolving Maronite-Sunni partnership was itself asymmetrical with the Maronites
monopolizing the presidency and key positions in the ministries, the army and the courts. Yet,
as Khalidi (1991) emphasizes, the Pact was essentially based on the principle of reciprocity - a
reciprocity that was not always symmetrical to be sure- but one that did exist grosso modo in the
totality of the package (Khalidi, 1991). The fact that this covenant managed to hold such a
volatile society together for over three decades is a tribute to its architects, the so-called fathers
of independence (Khalaf, 1991). It is essential to emphasize in this respect that the Taif
agreement, which brought closure to the Lebanese civil war, was essentially a re-
formulation/extension of the National Pact of 1943.
THE NATIONAL PACT AND CHANGING REGIONAL EVENTS
While the National Pact represented a major breakthrough in 1943 and promised an opportunity
for political compromise and greater national integration, these positive expectations were soon
to fade away as the events of the Middle East began to unfold after World War II. The first
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event to challenge the essence of the Pact and provoke serious rift in Lebanese public opinion
was the rise of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser who, starting in the 1950s, lent eloquence and
voice to Arab unity. His concept of Arab nationalism strongly appealed to Lebanese Muslims
(primarily the Sunni masses) who pressed for Lebanon's alignment with Nasserite policies.
The second event was the massive influx of Palestinian refugees to Lebanon and their ascending
revolutionary aspirations on Lebanese land. Palestinians arrived in Lebanon in successive
waves, beginning in 1948 and 1967 as a result of the Arab-Israeli wars and then again in 1970
as a result of the crushing of the Palestinian armed movement in Jordan. "Jordan and Syria had
both driven the Palestinians out of their respective territories by the end of 1971, which left
Lebanon, with its proximity to Israel, as the natural magnet for Palestinian armed forces in the
Middle East" (Moore, 1997, p. 5).
The Lebanese government accepted the Palestinians, albeit reluctantly, and attempted to
regulate their presence and activities through the signing (under Egyptian patronage) of the
Cairo Agreement of 1969. This agreement gave the Palestinians the right to establish and arm
units in the border zone between Lebanon and Israel. Not surprisingly, such agreement was
bound to deepen splits between rival Lebanese factions. "What to the Muslims was natural
solidarity with other Arabs was to the Christians further proof of the Muslims' double standards
of loyalty. Lebanon's conflict of identity was clearer than ever" (Hanf, 1993, p. 555).
The Christians thus claimed to have genuinely adhered to the spirit of the National Pact, and
accused their Muslim counterparts of violating it by allowing their organic affiliation to the
Arab world to supersede affiliation to the Lebanese entity. Their basic contention was that the
Cairo Agreement constituted an encroachment on Lebanese sovereignty, in the sense that there
was an inherent incompatibility between the requirements of effective government in the
country and the implications of inevitable Palestinian military presence (Sirriyeh, 1989).
Hence, ascending Palestinian militancy in Lebanon helped drive a further wedge between
Lebanese and seriously challenged the essence of the National Pact of 1943: "In addition to
established rivalries, including Nasserism, Baathism, and Communism, the Palestinian
revolutionary movement accelerated ideological divisions at both the elite and mass levels.
Certainly, the National Pact had neither the institutional capabilities nor the ideological
flexibility to handle the high rate of Arab ideological production" (El-Khazen, 1987, p. 338).
In many respects, the Palestinian military presence in Lebanon made the country a fertile
breeding ground for revolution and contributed to its destabilization. Internally, it activated the
political consciousness of the Muslim masses, exhausted Christian tolerance of Muslim
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inclinations, incited Lebanese Muslim and Christian factions to arm, and changed the balance of
power- both between Muslims and Christians and within the Muslim community. Regionally, it
provoked massive Israeli retaliatory measures against Lebanese territory.
By 1975 all the elements of confrontation were present, waiting for a simple spark to ignite:
military pressure from a regional neighbor (Israel) demanding action, a large number of armed
and unrestrained Lebanese and Palestinian actors on alert, a divided leadership, a weak central
authority, a heightened sense of insecurity among all factions, increasing discontent and
displacement of the Southern Shiites in the wake of Israeli blows, and a precarious parity of
forces, which instead of strengthening mutual, calculated deterrence, induced the temptation to
fight (Sirriyeh, 1989).
Moreover, by the early 1 970s, a number of internal inadequacies had become blatantly obvious
and very disconcerting to some Lebanese minorities. First, an unbalanced pattern of economic
development and rising economic disparities across communities and regions left the Muslim
(mostly Shiite) segments of the population particularly disadvantaged. Shiite dis-satisfaction
was further compounded by new demographic realities and their realization that their status as
the largest community was not adequately reflected in the power structure of the Lebanese state.
The potential for conflict was thus implicit in the domestic structural situation as well.
Hence, the thorny issue of Palestinian militarism, coupled with existing frustrations and
insecurities polarized the Lebanese communities along sectarian lines, and set Lebanon on the
course of protracted violence. By 1975, the cleavages and contradictions of the region as a
whole had become centered in Lebanon and closely entangled with local domestic problems.
Neither the weak Lebanese state nor the National Pact of 1943 proved capable of withstanding
the pressure. The Lebanese scene thus erupted in 1975 into internecine warfare and violence.
As this brief overview makes clear, there is considerable legitimacy to the claims made by a
growing number of observers that the destabilization of Lebanon, at least at that critical
juncture, was more the outcome of broader regional tensions, particularly the Palestinian-Israeli
struggle, and ideological rivalries in adjacent Arab regimes, than internal disparities andlor
deeply-rooted communal hostilities (Khalaf, 1991). There is no doubt that a number of domestic
factors hastened the erosion of the National Pact formula, but it was the external environment
which, starting in the 1960s, impinged with increasing devastation on the system and dealt it
repeated massive blows (Khalidi, 1991).
Regional politics in the 1950s and 1960s contributed to the intensity of the war and
influenced both its direction and its duration. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian
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situation, Israeli incursion into Lebanon, and inter-Arab discord all had a strong impact
on the war (Abul-Husn, 1998, P. 59).
The impact of regional and international events on inter-communal relations in Lebanon merits
a separate investigation that is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, external pressure and
outside influence on Lebanon's domestic politics are hardly new, and history shows continuity
in political patterns there. The Lebanese situation has always been and continues to the present
day to be linked in significant ways to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Today, Lebanon has come to be
viewed as a strategic buffer and vital zone of influence for Syria in its process of reconciliation
with Israel. Specifically, the South of Lebanon has become a magnet for regional powers
(Syrian/Iranian) intent on engaging Israel without jeopardizing their borders.
There is no mistaking of the fact that, the appearance of Israeli-Lebanese bilateral
discussions not withstanding, the fate of southern Lebanon remains hostage of the game
of move and countermove between Damascus and Tel Aviv.. .Thus the Lebanese
discovered, once again, that their situation was deeply enmeshed in the geopolitics of the
region, and particularly the relationship between Syria and Israel.. .The risk, in this
moment of peace-process euphoria, is that Lebanon will be the last frontier in the Arab-
Israeli conflict, in effect, the hold box for those problems that are too tough to solve
(Norton and Shcwedler, 1993, p. 77).
THE LEBANESE WAR (1 975-1 989): THE MAIN CAUSES, ACTORS, AND ISSUES
The preceding discussion is not meant to imply that the roots of the Lebanese conflict lay in the
regional environment. The root causes were rather inherent in the historical evolution of a
fragmented social and political culture that encouraged suspicion and hostility. There is no
doubt, however, that foreign --regional-- intervention played a decisive role in the evolution and
direction of the war. To say the least, regional events played a catalytic role in igniting the
Lebanese war and contributed directly to its intensification and prolongation. This tendency in
turn, reinforced and reinvigorated a process of fragmentation in the social and political culture.
Indeed, the conventional literature on the Lebanese conflict has been dominated by three
hypotheses. The first argues that the basic source of the conflict was a malfunctioning
sociopolitical and economic structure. The second suggests that the conflict was a function of
the inter-play among Lebanon's domestic, regional, and international environments. And the
third contends that the conflict was determined solely by the intervention of foreign powers. The
second hypothesis displays the most promise in accounting for the war in Lebanon.
The Lebanese conflict was in fact triggered by myriad factors, both internal and external. On the
domestic level, there were social and economic problems and raging disputes over communal
entitlements. The Muslims (specifically the Shiites and the Druze) felt marginalized in the
politics of Lebanon and relegated to an inferior status in a Christian-dominated state. By 1975,
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the divergent communal interests, and the lack of serious remedial action on the part of the
establishment, had become a major threat to national cooperation and accommodation.
Regional politics in the 1950s and 1960s added turbulence to an already strained social
structure. Although Lebanon refrained from taking a direct military part in the Arab-Israeli
wars, it was clear by the early 1960s that no Arab state could stay aloof from Arab regional
issues. The Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon and the inability of the Lebanese
government to contain it spelled inevitable confrontation between Muslims and Maronites. Fear
of loss of control led to an early mobilization on the part of the Maronite community, and the
emergence of Maronite militancy.
The Maronites perceived the Palestinians in Lebanon, both as a community and as an
independent armed resistance movement, as a threat to the delicate sectarian balance and the
sovereignty of the state. The failure of the Lebanese government to control their activity
prompted the Lebanese National Front (mostly Maronite) to claim for itself the responsibility of
curtailing their rising power. Besides their concern with territorial integrity, the Maronites were
also anxious over the distribution of political power within Lebanon, realizing that the presence
of 400,000 Palestinians, 95 percent of whom were Sunni Muslims, could tip the balance of
power in favor of the Muslims.
The Ain-al-Rummani incident that sparked the war occurred on the 13th of April, 1975:
Maronite gunmen ambushed a bus and killed twenty-seven of its predominantly Palestinian
passengers. This incident engendered heavy fighting between Maronite Phalangists and the
Palestinian resistance movement in Lebanon. The Palestinian armed movement at that point
aligned itself with the Muslim bloc. The fighting gradually developed into inter-communal
clashes, spread like shock waves through Beirut, and gradually engulfed the whole country.
A detailed account of the war is beyond the scope of this thesis (for such an account please see
Hanf, 1993; Picard, 1996; Winslow, 1996). Suffice it to say that the Lebanon during the war
split into two diametrically opposed factions: the status-quo coalition including the Lebanese
Front and the Christian establishment and the reformist camp consisting of the Lebanese
National Movement, the Muslim establishment and the Palestinian resistance movement. The
first coalition was concerned with the territorial integrity of Lebanon and the maintenance of the
existing communal balance of power. The second coalition sought extensive political reforms to
ensure a more equitable distribution of power and resources. Moreover, the two main domestic
camps were certainly not the only actors in the protracted conflict. There were also a number of
external participants, including Syria, Palestine, Israel, and Iraq.
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It is important to point out in this respect that Syria played a major role in almost every stage of
the conflict. Due to both its own security concerns, and its historical ties to Lebanon, Syria came
to be directly involved in the Lebanese conflict. A complete historical account of Syria's
involvement in Lebanese affairs is again beyond the scope of this thesis, but the details of its
intervention especially during the war years and up to the present need to be discussed, given
their implications for current Lebanese political developments and events.
Syria's activities in the Lebanese war progressed from early mediation, to interference by proxy,
to direct military and political intervention. With each new development, Syria found itself
plunging deeper and deeper and deeper into the Lebanese quagmire, whether by accident or
design. Syria's motivations for involvement in the Lebanese crisis are complex, but they
primarily stem for its own security concerns, given its geographical proximity to Lebanon. As
revealed by President Asad himself, the main reason for Syria's involvement was to thwart the
establishment in Lebanon of a radicalized regime, that might have a destabilizing effect on
Syria, or draw it into conflict with Israel (Hafez al-Asad, speech, 1976).
Not surprisingly, the Lebanese factions assessed the Syrian intervention from the perspective of
their own interests. While the status-quo coalition initially invited and welcomed it, the
reformist camp opposed it vehemently. Later, these positions were reversed. For most of the
war, Syria backed the reformist camp but restrained it from administering a crushing defeat to
the status-quo coalition by holding back military assistance. The reasons for this reversal in
Syrian policy remain obscure, but it has been strongly suggested that it was not in Syria's best
interest to tip the balance in favor of a Christian victory and to risk the establishment in
Lebanon of a strong and independent Christian government that is by definition more prone to
normalize/strengthen its relationships with Israel.
By mid-October 1976, Syrian involvement in Lebanon was endorsed by a full Arab Summit in
Cairo. One of the main resolutions of that conference was to create an Arab Deterrent Force
(ADF) to supervise a ceasefire and oversee the disbanding of the militias in Lebanon.
Representatives agreed that the ADF should be composed of 30,000 troops drawn from several
Arab countries. Syria initially contributed half of the number, but as the other Arab forces
pulled out of the ADF, it came to be dominated entirely by Syria (Abul-Husn, 1998).
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 only reinforced Syria's resolve and intentions. On
June 6, 1982, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon from the south and advanced northwards towards
the capital. Within a week, they laid siege to west Beirut, the Chouf Mountains, and part of the
Beq'a valley. Israel's basic aims were to destroy the PLO in Lebanon, to resurrect a Maronite-
110
dominated central government that would eventually sign a peace agreement with it, and to oust
the Syrian forces from the country (AbuI-Husn, 1998).
In reality, the Israeli invasion achieved only one of its three declared objectives: it weakened the
military and political infrastructure of the PLO in Lebanon. However, it ultimately failed in its
attempt to place in power an Israeli-influenced Maronite regime. And although Israel pushed the
Syrian army out of Beirut and eclipsed the Syrian role in the Lebanese crisis temporarily, Syria
regained its prominence as the most important actor in the domestic conflict, once Israel
withdrew from Beirut in 1983 under pressure from the US government.
From 1983 to 1989, the Lebanese conflict continued unabated. Political confrontation between
the two camps escalated, leading to a total immobilization of government functions. In
September, 1988 the Presidency of Lebanon was rendered vacant 3 . A military government,
headed by the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Michel Awn, was appointed
by the outgoing President to fill the vacuum. The existing government headed by Sunni Muslim
Prime Minister, Salim-al Hoss, declared the newly appointed interim government illegal.
For the next two years, Lebanon had two governments, but no President. This was one of the
worst periods of the war. The Muslim-led government represented the reformist camp and was
fully supported by Syria, the Arab countries, and the world community. The rival military
government could not extend its authority beyond the Maronite enclave in East Beirut. With the
presence of two rival governments East and West, each claiming authority and legitimacy, the
conflict escalated to unprecedented levels of violence and fears of partition loomed large.
General Michel Awn first attempted to impose his authority over the other militias in his owi
enclave and then extend it to the rest of Lebanon. The clashes had a devastating effect on the
Maronite community and on East Beirut in particular. Failing to achieve decisive victory on that
end, he shifted his attention from the co-religionist Lebanese Forces to the Syrians and launched
his famous 'war of liberation' against the Syrians. Devastating clashes with the Syrian troops in
Lebanon ensued. And instead of curtailing the Syrian presence in Lebanon, the 'war of
liberation' actually enhanced it by necessitating a new inflow of Syrian troops into the country.
It should be pointed out that this re-expansion in Syrian troops and their ultimate ousting of
Awn was with Arab and Western acquiescence. This regional and international acquiescence
Two attempts to fill the Presidency by a pro-Syrian candidate were foiled by Syria's Maronite
opponents, who prevented Maronite deputies from attending parliamentary sessions, thus denying a
quorum.
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was partly to curry Syrian favor and cooperation in the evolving Gulf crisis and to avoid
derailing the Arab-Israeli peace process4.
As a reaction to the devastation of the 'war of liberation' and the intra-confessional battles,
public intolerance for the continuation of the war and support for a quick and effective
settlement grew sharply. The marginalization of the militias and the rebuilding of the state were
viewed as the only rational way out. There was also a general acceptance that none of the
warring factions could decisively win the war, and that there was no alternative to a new
compromise settlement to ensure the continuity of the country. Internal changes hence coincided
with developments on the regional and international levels that also favored a political
settlement in Lebanon.
This constellation of favorable domestic and regional/international events explains why the Taif
agreement succeeded at bringing closure to the war, when many previous attempts had failed.
Indeed, the Taif accord was born in the wake of at least four serious attempts to resolve the
conflict over the past fifteen years, namely the Constitutional Document of 1976, the National
Entente Program of 1980, the National Dialogue Conference of 1983 and 1984 which took place
in Geneva and Lausanne respectively, and the Tripartite Agreement of 1985. And although none
of these stylized proposals produced a lasting solution to the conflict, many of earlier agreed
upon issues found their way into the Taif Agreement of 1989.
THE PROCESS LEADING TO THE TAIF AGREEMENT
The escalation of the war and the constellation of domestic, regional and international events
placed new pressures on mediators to renew their attempts to resolve the Lebanese conflict. The
League of Arab states took the initiative and appointed a six-member ministerial committee
(chaired by Kuwait and including the foreign ministers of Algeria, Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia, and
the United Arab Emirates) to hold exploratory discussions with leaders of the various factions
and report its findings back to the League. The committee spent three months listening to the
two prime ministers of the rival governments, leaders of the warring factions, and heads of
religious denominations.
As soon as the report of the committee was completed, King Hassan II of Morocco initiated an
Arab League Summit in Casablanca in May 1989 to discuss its contents and devise a strategy to
resolve the conflict. A Tripartite Committee was then appointed to mediate the conflict, which
included King Fand of Saudi Arabia, King Hassan II of Morocco, and President Benjedid of
The Gulf crisis of 1990/91 shifted allegiances in the Middle East. In exchange for nominal Syrian
participation in the war against Iraq, Damascus was given the 'green light' it had long sought in
Lebanon.
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Algeria. The Tripartite Committee had two goals: 1) to achieve an immediate cease-fire and 2)
to initiate peace deliberations between warring factions under the auspices of the Arab League.
Failing to achieve its first objective, the Tripartite Committee called on sixty two Lebanese
deputies (those still alive of the ninety-nine originally elected in 1972 - 31 Christians and 31
Muslims) to meet in the city of Taif, Saudi Arabia, to discuss a national reconciliation document
that had been already prepared by the Tripartite Committee, after much consultation with Syria,
the United States, other Arab states, the PLO, and various Lebanese leaders. As per the
invitation, the Lebanese parliamentarians met on September 30, 1989. After long and heated
deliberations for twenty two days, the deputies reached agreement on October 22, 1989 and
endorsed, with minor modifications, the 'Document of National Reconciliation', which came to
be known as the Taif Accord.
The 1989 Taif accord is considered a turning point in the civil war, and maybe even in the
political history of Lebanon. It was a formal agreement endorsed by a formal institution -
indeed the only remaining legitimate institution in the country. It was not a tacit/unofficial
agreement like the National Pact of 1943 nor was it an agreement between militia leaders. The
choice of parliamentarians was based on the assumption that they represented all the different
factions, were legitimately nominated as their representatives, and could therefore engage in
authoritative discussions on their behalf. "The 1989 Taif accord was unique in one significant
respect: It was the product of the elected officials, who were not, in most cases, belligerents in
the war" (Norton, 1991, p. 461).
Following the signing of the document, the Tripartite Committee called on the Lebanese
parliament to meet as early as November to ratif' it and elect a new President. The parliament
met on November 5, 1989 in the northern town of Qlaiat rather than Beirut, in order to avoid
intimidation by General Awn, who had dissolved the parliament a few days earlier. The
legislators elected one of their colleagues, Rene Muawad, as President, and unanimously
endorsed the Taif accord. President Muawad, however, was soon assassinated in a car bomb in
Beirut on November 22. Two days later, the parliament met again, outside the capital, to elect
deputy Elias Hrawi as his successor.
General Awn condemned and vehemently rejected the Taif Accord for failing to include a
provision on a scheduled withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. He regarded the new
accord as nothing but a subtle submission to Syria's will and control. Others, however, saw the
agreement as a satisfactory compromise and as the only rational exit to the war. General Awn
escalated his opposition to the accord and mounted a campaign of terror against the Christian
deputies in his jurisdiction. His intransigence prevented the parliament from mustering a
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quorum to pass the new amendments into law. The parliament finally managed to meet in
August 1990, signed the amendments to the constitution, and declared the birth of Lebanon's
Second Republic.
Despite his almost complete domestic and international isolation, Awn remained adamantly
opposed to all efforts at reconciliation. He refused the new government's call for him to
reconsider his position, relinquish his hold of the army, and join the cabinet or go into
opposition within the system. Finally, on October 13, 1990, the Lebanese army, under its new
commander in chief, and with assistance of Syrian troops and air force, forced Awn out of his
presidential palace in Baabda. He managed to escape to the nearby French Embassy, where he
sought and was granted political asylum. All government institutions on either side of the green
line were subsequently reunited.
THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE TAIF AGREEMENT
The 'Document of National Reconciliation' addressed the basic issues in the conflict and
prescribed workable solutions to them. To recapitulate, the three main issues around which the
conflict revolved were: 1) reforms of the political order implying an amendment to the power
sharing arrangement of the National Pact; 2) the question of national identity; and 3) the
sovereignty of the state and the presence of foreign troops on Lebanese soil entailing settling on
a view of the country's relations with the Arab world, particularly Syria.
On the issue of political reform, the new document provided for the balancing of communal
interests and the redistribution of power/authority in Lebanon. To this end, the accord endorsed
the transfer of many executive powers from the President to the Cabinet, which would continue
to be divided equally between the two confessional blocs. The Council of Ministers would
henceforth be the real custodian of executive authority in Lebanon. Moreover, the nomination of
the Prime Minister by the President would be based on binding parliamentary consultations. The
accord also extended the term of office of the Speaker of the House, a post customarily reserved
to Shiites, from one to four years. Table 7 shows the new equilibrium in the Lebanese system
resulting from Taif.
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108 seats divided equally: Christian-
Muslim parity
Enhanced political role for the Shiite
Speaker: 4-year term
Chamber is given sole power to cast
no- confidence votes and dismiss
ministers
PM appointed by the President based
on binding parliamentary consultation
PM forms a government based on non-
binding parliamentary consultation
PM presides over the Council of
Ministers as has ultimate executive
The President has no vote in the
Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers has ultimate
authority over the Lebanese Armed
Forces
The President may not block legislation
by refusing to promulgate laws
Pre-Taf
Li	 99 seats divided according to a 6:5
ratio in favor of Christians
O	 Shiite Speaker served a one-year term
and was subordinate to PM and
President
U	 Chamber shares with the President the
authority to dismiss ministers
U	 President selects the PM after non-
binding parliamentary consultation
Li PM and President shared the task of
forming a government
o	 President presided over Council of
Ministers and retained ultimate
authority
0	 The President presided and ruled over
the Council of Ministers
Li	 The President possessed ultimate
authority over the Lebanese Armed
Forces
0	 The President exercised a tacit veto by
simnlv refusin g to nromulate laws
With regard to the distribution of parliamentary seats, the principle of Christian-Muslim parity
was adopted (to replace the previous 6:5 ratio). The total number of seats in the Chamber was
thus increased from 99 to 108 to be filled equally by the two confessional blocs. Hence, nine
new Muslim seats were to be added to the Chamber of Deputies, creating a 54-54 seat balance.
The accord provided for the new government to make appointments (on a one-time exceptional
basis) to the new seats as well as those that had been vacated throughout the war. Table 8 shows
the new confessional division of the Lebanese Parliament in comparison to that of 1972.


































































In theory, the accord also proposed to phase out the confessional system and abolish the
requirements of sectarian qualifications for appointment in the lower ranks of government
positions, the army, judiciary and public enterprises (though it retained the qualifications for the
higher ranks). To this end, it called for the establishment of a national committee under the
direction of the President to devise policies for unificationldeconfessionalization. Yet, although
deconfessionalisation was stated as an explicit goal in the agreement, no specific deadline or
time table was provided for its actualization. Hence, as Norton puts it: "The accord effectively
concedes the futility of any serious attempt to expunge political sectarianism in Lebanon, at
least for the foreseeable future" (Norton, 1991, p. 461).
With respect to political reforms, it could be said that the accord has effectively enhanced the
powers of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers as a collegial body. It has also
elevated the status and powers of the Chamber of Deputies vis a vis the President, and resulted,
in theory at least, in a political system that is more parliamentary than it is presidential. Overall,
The collective status of the Muslim communities was enhanced by the increase in their
share of political power. The authority status of the Christians, particularly the Maronites,
was generally diminished arid diffused throughout the state hierarchy. The release of the
high governmental and administrative positions from the fetters of confessionalism
would necessarily loosen the Christian grip on the ranks of the state hierarchy and allow
other communities to gain legitimate authority in the central institutions of the state (Abul
Husn, 1998, p. 116).
The Taif accord was very explicit on the question of the identity of Lebanon. Article I states that
"Lebanon is Arab in its affiliation and identity". On dealing with the question of sovereignty,
the Israeli occupation of part of southern Lebanon was the prime focus. The document referred
to the Israeli occupation as a flagrant breach of the country's sovereignty, and stressed the need
to implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 of March 1978, which calls
for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from South Lebanon. The document also stipulated a
security plan by which the government would disband all militias within six months of the
election of a new President.
The one question that was not firmly addressed pertained to the Syrian presence in Lebanon.
Many of the deputies meeting in Taif refused to equate the Syrian presence in the country with
the Israeli occupation of the South, claiming that the Syrian troops were in the country at the
invitation of the Lebanese authorities (Abul Husn, 1998). According to the accord, the Syrian
troops in Lebanon would continue to assist the government in maintaining law and order for two
years after the ratification of the reforms. At the end of this period, the governments of Lebanon
and Syria could re-deploy the Syrian troops to the Beq'a Valley in Eastern Lebanon. Both
governments would be involved in deciding the size of forces and the period of their stay.
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Hence, although the Taif accord required the phased withdrawal of Syrian troops from Beirut
and its suburbs within two years of the ratification of the political reforms, it failed nonetheless
to make a firm commitment to the timing of their withdrawal from Lebanese territory.
Furthermore, relations between Lebanon and Syria were portrayed in the document as
distinctive, acquiring their strength from kinship, history and common strategic interests. These
relations would be nurtured in cooperation and coordination between the two countries, within
the context of mutual respect for the sovereignty, unity and security of each. The full text of the
Taif agreement is attached in Appendix A.
PROSPECTS FOR LEBANON AFTER TAIF
The Taif agreement constitutes another peculiar compromise agreement among Lebanese. It
tackled many important points pertaining to the structure of the political system and to the
sovereignty of the Lebanese state. More importantly, it terminated the immediate hostilities and
restored a modicum of political tranquility to a war-weary community. However, the agreement
itself leaves much to be desired in terms of the prospects for long-term stability and integration
in Lebanon. It is strongly doubtful whether the agreement as it stands today can be the
foundation for a modern, democratic, and stable political system in Lebanon.
To start with the Document of National Understanding or Taif agreement hardly represents a
radical departure from previous attempts to reform the Lebanese system. The political reforms,
although effectuating a minor re-distribution of power among the communities, did not
fundamentally alter the Lebanese political structure, which is still largely predicated on
sectarianism. And although the agreement explicitly calls for the elimination of sectarianism, it
has retained much of the transitional language that was characteristic of previous reform
attempts, most notably the Constitution of 1926 and the National Pact of 1943.
Indeed, there are many who argue that the agreement signed in Taif is not radically different
from the National Pact of 1943. In many ways, "the main hallmarks of pre-war Lebanon have
been retained in a milder and more palatable form" (Mallat, 1990, p. 17). With minor
modifications, it could be said that the National Pact has been transformed from a kind of
common law into a formal constitutional document. Indeed, the philosophy of confessional
representation and reconciliation has remained the same. In this respect, "the Taif agreement
implicitly ratifies the National Pact with its emphasis upon confessional compromise and inter-
communal cooperation" (Norton, 1991, p. 461).
Moreover, inter-communal allocations have not been fundamentally adjusted with the new
accord. And although the collective status of the Muslim communities was relatively enhanced,
while that of the Maronite was generally diminished or diffused, the agreement has not granted
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the Druze any substantial change of status (although their share of power was increased slightly
within the general increase of Muslim authority). Nor did the agreement adequately address
Shiite grievances and concerns. More importantly the agreement failed to provide for future
mechanisms to accommodate new demographic changes and realities.
Another optimistic assumption of the agreement is that it has officially settled the issue of
Lebanon's national identity. However, while this matter has been settled on paper, it is doubtful
whether affiliations, which are shaped over centuries of socialization/indoctrination have been
effectively transformed. To the Muslims, and the Sunnis in particular, affiliation with other
Arab countries is not unnatural. And although the issue of Pan-Arabism has lost much of its
salience today because of the changing realities of the Arab world, one cannot expect the
tendency of the Muslims to relate to this world to be forever transformed. The issue of identity
cannot be under-estimated given that it has been central to the conflict since the 1920s.
Another area of considerable importance, which was omitted from the accord altogether has to
do with Lebanese-Palestinian relations. Although the issue of Lebanese-Palestinian relations
was central to the conflict in its early stages - with the Palestinian resistance movement
virtually igniting the war-- its influence and importance has gradually receded, especially after
the massive Israeli blow to the PLO in 1982. The Taif accord only included the Palestinians in
its provision for the disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in the country, failing to
address the future of thousands of Palestinian refugees still living in Lebanon.
Another issue that was not adequately addressed in the Taif accord, and which could be a
serious source of friction on the long run, has to do with the continued Syrian presence in the
country. The Syrian presence was tacitly linked in Taif to future developments in the Syrian-
Israeli peace process. Today, Syria, largely under this pretext, continues to enjoy a heavy
presence in the country. This has recently invited critics to refer to Assad as the 'godfather of
Lebanese politics', and to Lebanon as a 'fictitious state under Syrian captivity' (The Editors,
The New Republic, 1 996a). Yasir Arafat has on one occasion referred to the 'government of
Lebanon and its President Assad' (The Editors, The New Republic, 1996b).
These accusations are not totally devoid of merit. Indeed, the special relations with Syria
mentioned in the Taif accord have recently been formalized in the signing of the Treaty of
Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination between Syria and Lebanon in May, 1991
(Appendix B). This agreement has called for cooperation and coordination between the two
states on all political, economic and security issues. However, considering the imbalance in the
political and military power of the two states, as well as the continued presence of 35,000 Syrian
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troops in Lebanon, there are those who claim that the Treaty has in fact turned Lebanon into a
Syrian protectorate.
One poignant expression of this view is found in a recent book, Between Damascus and Israel:
Lebanon and the Middle East Peace (1997). In it, the author argues that following the 1989 Taif
accord, Lebanon has been gradually absorbed by Syria in a way that virtually amounts to
occupation or annexation. He writes:
At a time when dictatorships and their captive nations are on the decline around the
world, Lebanon finds itself being forced to march against the tide of history; Lebanon's
satellite status with respect to Syria is one of the Middle East's most arresting
anachronisms. No matter how the current situation and the near term are assessed, it is
not in Washington's long-term interests for Lebanon to remain subjugated by Syria.
There can be no real or lasting Middle East Peace with the perpetuation of such
circumstances of occupation (Malik, 1997, p. xv).
Finally, the Taif agreement failed to settle the future of one key area of Lebanon namely the
South, which remains, until the present, beyond the authority of the central Lebanese
government5 . Here the Israeli-supported South Lebanon Army (SLA) and the Iranian-Financed
and Syrian-Guided Muslim militia -Hizballah- continue to vie for control in an anarchic no
man's land. In a recent article, Hirst (1999, p. 5) portrays the low-grade war being waged in
South Lebanon's 'security zone', "the last hot spot of the Arab-Israeli conflict". He writes:
This little corner of a little country is strategically critical; for it is here that, with treaties
between Israel and Syria and Lebanon, the Middle East peace process may achieve its
final breakthrough or collapse altogether. Meanwhile, like some strange survivor from a
bygone era, it remains the last military active frontier of the Arab-Israeli struggle (Hirst,
1999, p. 6).
Many argue that it has been in Syria's best interest to keep Hizballah on the loose as a way of
engaging Israel without jeopardizing its borders and that the fate of Southern Lebanon remains
hostage of the game of move and countermove between Damascus and Tel Aviv (Norton and
Shcwedler, 1993). But so long as the fate of this little strip of land —10% of Lebanon's
territory—remains undecided, there is a realistic basis for concern that the anarchy of Southern
Lebanon might spread north once again and that the era of 'dialogue by the gun' may not be
completely over.
Since its inception by Israel in 1974, the 'security zone' has been a magnet for violence in Lebanon.
For a brief moment in the recent history of this unfortunate region, it seemed that Lebanon and
Israel might liquidate the zone and jointly impose a security regime. But the agreement of May 17'
1983, a product of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, was eventually renounced by the
government of Lebanon as a result of Syrian pressure.
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LEBANESE SECTARIAN POLITICS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
Up till 1975, the Lebanese political order was largely built on the principles of consociational
democracy as outlined by Arend Liphart. Since the early 1960s, Liphart presented
consociationalism as a viable alternative to majoritarian democracy and as a particularly suitable
model for deeply divided societies. Consociationalism in a pluralist society is characterized by a
grand coalition of all component communities, mutual veto in communal decision-making,
proportional representation and segmental autonomy (Liphart, 1967). These various instruments
are designed to turn a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.
Lebanon's attempt to institutionalize these devises into its political structure met initially with
relative success. The Constitution of 1926 and the National Pact of 1943 tried to introduce a
power-sharing formula that allowed the various communities to play a meaningful role in the
political life of their society. The National Pact indeed incorporated all the characteristic
components of Liphart' s model in an attempt to accommodate diversity and diffuse potential
communal conflict. But while the National Pact acted as a successful conflict regulation
mechanism in the early years, bestowing upon Lebanon the label of a successful consociational
democracy, it was soon to collapse under a myriad of domestic and regional factors.
On the domestic level, the dynamics of modernization started taking effect in Lebanon, exerting
considerable pressure on the social and political structure. Socio-economic inequities had been
allowed to fester, and take on an increasingly sectarian flavor. The neglect of South Lebanon
and the Biqa' as well as the slum belt around Beirut (all mainly dominated by Shiites)
unquestionably facilitated the disintegration of the fragile national consensus. The state's
inability to rectif' Shiite or more generally Muslim perceptions of relative deprivation was also
exacerbated by new demographic realities that were deliberately ignored and not reflected in the
state's representative structures.
The Middle Eastern unsettled regional environment during the 1960s and 1970s also contributed
to Lebanon's vulnerability and eventual collapse at that critical juncture. The Palestinian influx
into the country following the creation of Israel and the inability of the government to
effectively regulate Palestinian military activity in the South of Lebanon led to a process of
intensifying polarization along sectarian lines. Growing Palestinian militarism on Lebanese land
and their creation of a 'state within a state' exhausted Christian tolerance, who finally decided to
take matters in their own hands. Regional politics of the 1950s and 1960s thus added turbulence
to an already strained social structure.
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The consequence was a violent war that raged in Lebanon for nearly fifteen years, defying the
best efforts at peace-making and negotiation. During the period of the war, countless proposals
to resolve the conflict in Lebanon were advanced, including federalism, politico-administrative
decentralization, and even secession, but none proved viable or satisfactory. Ironically, the exit
to the war came through a revival of the National Pact and its consociational principles, while
introducing minor changes to the power-sharing formula to reflect new communal realities. The
Taif Accord thus culminated in the restoration of the principles of consociationalism to the
Lebanese democratic order.
The Taif Accord, which has been adopted as the new constitution of the second Lebanese
Republic, has marked a turning point in the history of Lebanon. It terminated the hostilities and
restored a modicum of tranquility to a war-weary community. More importantly, the Taif
Accord provided a powerful re-confirmation that the continued survival of the country
depended first and foremost on communal coexistence and mutual accommodation. Indeed, the
significance of this agreement lies in its expression of a widespread national consensus on the
need to restore to Lebanon the politics of accommodation.
What are the implications of consociational politics or the politics of accommodation for
administrative reform? While consociational devices undoubtedly provide distinctive
opportunities for promoting communal coexistence and diffusing conflict, they also generally
restrict the government's ability to formulate comprehensive political and administrative reform
programs. Administrative adjustments have to take place within existing consociational
principles. Such traditions, with their emphasis on bargaining and compromise are likely to
constrain the possibility of path-breaking/fundamental transformations, encouraging instead
patchy/incremental change.
The influence of the Lebanese system of sectarian democracy and consensual politics on reform
endeavors will be re-visited in chapters 7, 8 and 9. Meanwhile, this chapter has sought to shed
some light on the democratic and political power configurations which have evolved in Lebanon
as a first step towards mapping out the political scene and the peculiarities of the Lebanese
political landscape (i.e. the political factors which have been highlighted as salient in the
research hypothetical model). By probing the micro and macro politics of Lebanon in more
detail, the next chapter proceeds with an exploration of the peculiarities of the Lebanese
political context as a prelude to analyzing administrative reform in the remaining chapters.
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CHAPTER 6
POLITICS IN LEBANON: MICRO POLITICS AND
MACRO POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Consistent with the overall orientation discussed in chapter 2 and the potential salience of the
political factor in any account of administrative reforms, this chapter probes the micro and
macro politics of Lebanon. At the micro-level, the chapter examines the patron-client networks
that have historically developed in Lebanon and that remain the fundamental state-society
linkage today. The traditional and sectarian character of Lebanese politics helps account for the
survival of those networks. At the macro level, the chapter examines the main institutional
structures -Presidency, Parliament, and Cabinet- before and after the war- and shows how these
have come to formally reflect the characteristic cleavages and realities of Lebanese society.
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
Political clientelism constitutes a familiar and enduring reality of Lebanese politics. In Lebanon,
as in other developing countries, this phenomenon is largely a legacy of the colonial days. The
Ottomans, for example, have long practiced a form of indirect rule in Lebanon through local
chiefs and village headmen. The essence of this relationship has largely been unchanged. And
although the days of colonialism and feudalism are over, clientelism in Lebanon has simply
evolved and grown stronger by diversif'ing its instruments, modalities, and areas of
intervention (Picard, 1996).
A number of conditions peculiar to Lebanon help account for the vitality and survival of its
brand of political patronage throughout the centuries. Examples are persistent wealth disparities
and the realities of isolated/closely-knit communities and factional/partisan rivalries. More
important, however, is the fact that patronage is cemented in Lebanon by ties of kinship and
ethnicity, which make it all the more resilient and ubiquitous. Indeed, patronage is largely
sustained in Lebanon by highly personalized networks of reciprocal obligations and primordial
(confessional) loyalties (Khalaf, 1987).
In circumstances of fragmentation and instability, kinship and ethnicity ties have provided for
Lebanese networks of mutual support and trust. Patrons, in this respect, have consistently met
the moral obligations of reciprocity to both kin and other members of the community. In time,
the vertical relations of patrons and clients involving mutual obligations of support and
assistance extended into the wider structures of politics. Networks of patronage have come to be
legitimate and organized channels for pursuing community interests and providing access to the
resources of modernity.
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Various institutional factors have also helped reinforce the patronage phenomenon in Lebanon
and infuse it with more vigor and tenacity. Most important in this respect is the electoral law of
1926, which has come to be viewed as "the tool par excellence for institutionalizing Lebanon's
political clientelism" (Picard, 1996, p. 51). The 1926 law, which has undergone only minor
modifications, distributed seats in parliament according to a two-fold proportionality, regional
and communal. The intent was to mitigate sectarian tensions by prohibiting the clash of
candidates of different sects. However, these same constitutional safeguards have served to
enhance the power of the Zuama.
The safeguards or constitutional peculiarities of the Lebanese electoral system may have
done much to promote harmony, justice, and balance among the various communities,
but they accomplished little in curtailing the power of the Zuama. If anything, the
division of the country into small electoral units gives the Zuama a freer hand to assert
their influence and perpetuate their power over local communities. Each of the Zuama
reigns supreme in his district and runs virtually unchallenged electoral contests (Khalaf,
1987, pp. 92-93).
Evidently, the survival of patronage networks (enhanced in large measure by peculiarities of the
electoral system) has had serious implications for political relationships at the micro level and
for macro-institutional processes more generally. Most importantly, political clientelism has
undermined the chances of secular and ideological parties to have a real impact on the system. It
has also crippled the role of the cabinet and legislature and eroded the powers of the state.
Needless to say, political clientelism has also fostered corruption and has undermined efforts at
reform and change.
The drawbacks of a patronage culture are well documented in the literature. Kurer (1996), for
example, has identified a number of institutional characteristics that tend to be associated with a
political culture where patronage behavior is prevalent, namely: factionalism, politicization, a
high level of administrative corruption, and a low degree of legitimacy and state autonomy
(Kurer, 1996). Hence, the more a political culture resembles the ideal-type of clientelism, the
more likely it will exhibit those structural features, which have been associated with it (Kurer,
1996, p. 647).
Moreover, Kurer (1996) maintains that a clientelist culture precludes the existence of a
developmental state. A developmental state is characterized by a commitment to economic
development, a high degree of state autonomy, and a powerful, competent and insulated
bureaucracy. He writes,
In a clientelist world, on the other hand, considerations of maintaining political power
take precedence over commitments to economic growth, the bureaucracy is incompetent
and ineffective, economic growth is slow and legitimacy is weak. Thus a clientelist state
is the antithesis of a developmental state (Kurer, 1996, p. 648).
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Other scholars have reached the same conclusion. Berman (1998), for example, writing about
patronage in the context of the African states, argues that patron-client networks tend to
penetrate institutions of civil society and liberal democracy, undermining programs of socio-
economic and political reform (Berman, 1998, p. 305). He writes,
Not only does ethnic and patronage politics inhibit the development of a coherent
national dominant class with a project of social transformation, but also the fragmentation
and privatization of state power undermines its ability to act as the agent of such a project
of national development (Berman, 1998, p. 339).
In the end, the pattern of state and society, etlmic construction and patronage politics
created in colonial Africa had a fundamental contradictory relationship with the
foundations of modernity, capitalism, and the secular nation-state (Berman, 1998, p.
332).
Both authors further argue that political clientelism has a tendency to penetrate all sectors of
society, particularly the bureaucracy. "Clientelism suggests that bureaucracies grow because it
suits the interests of those in power" (Kurer, 1996, p. 651). "The administration thus becomes
penetrated by clientage networks originating in the political world" (Kurer, 1996, p. 656). "Civil
service departments constitute virtually bottomless financial reservoirs for those who manage
them and for the political authorities which head them" (Berman, 1998, p. 334). Hence,
clientelism is likely to foster the growth of government administration as one of the most
coveted benefits for patronage has proved to be positions in the public administration.
Against this background, it is now possible to probe the micro and macro politics of Lebanon in
a more meaningful and contextual way.
MICRO POLITICS IN LEBANON: ZUAMA AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS
Traditional Political Leaders or Zuama
A Zthi, in the specifically Lebanese sense, is "a political leader who possesses the support of a
locally circumscribed community and who retains this support by fostering the interests of as
many as possible from amongst his clientele" (Hottinger, 1966, p. 85). He is thus the
unquestioned leader of a tightly knit community rooted in family, religion, or confession. His
relationship to his constituency is one of clientelism, whereby welfare services of various kinds
are exchanged for political and electoral support. Clientelist relationships of this sort are indeed
a pervasive feature of Lebanese socio-political relations and culture.
Two themes tend to dominate the description of clientelist structures in Lebanon. The first is the
provision of services and favors to the in-group. "The persisting influence of patrons stems from
their ability to provide services, goods, and values that no other group has so far been able to
provide as effectively" (Khalaf, 1987, p.100). The second theme is the mediation role that the
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ZcLut plays between his constituency and the outside world, including the central government.
"The key function of Zaim-ship is to mediate between his supporters and the authorities, and to
represent his confession in the struggle for advantage and balance in Lebanon" (Nelson, 1976,
p.115).
Such mediation role indeed serves as a two-way communication channel. The Zcthzi at once
interprets the government to his clientele and services their demands before the government.
"Thus he serves to channel whatever favors are available to himself and to his group. For the
government, he is necessary to reach the people and to obtain commitments from the group via
his person" (Hottinger, 1966, p.9l). This monopoly on mediation persisted despite repeated
modernizing or rationalizing attempts from central governments. Hence, "the Zuiiii still
mediates between his community and the alien world, whether this was the reformist regime of
the 1 9tI century Ottoman Empire, the modernizing regime of the French mandate, or the
democratic structures of independent Lebanon" (Preisler, 1988, p.1 55).
Note that besides mediation, the ZJrn serves important social, economic, and political
functions. He serves the interests of his clients through dispensing political favors, finding jobs,
facilitating the resolution of conflicts with the bureaucracy, mediating inter-group disputes,
helping out those in need, voicing expressed needs, and in general, making sure that his people
get their fair share of the pie. Moreover, the military function of the feudal ZcIni has not entirely
disappeared. Part of the Zai,n 's power is his ability to put armed men in the field during times of
unrest, thus contributing to the protection of his group as well as his confession (Nelson, 1976).
"Since the institution fulfills such important functions, it is not surprising that Zaim-ship
prospered even after feudalism was abolished. Not only are some old families able to keep their
positions, but new families also grow into the established pattern" (Hottinger, 1966, p. 91).
Indeed, in addition to members of politically important families entrenched in Lebanon's feudal
past, there are today patriotic leaders, urban Zuama, lawyers, businessmen, bankers, and
politicians who retain a sufficient amount of the attributes of aqjto be classified as such.
Indeed, four types of Zaims have been repeatedly discerned in Lebanon's political life. First are
the Land-Based Zaims who are most closely tied to the feudal order and whose power dates
back to the days of the Ottoman Empire. Examples are the Jumblat, Frangieh, Khazin and
Arslan. The second type are the Traditional Zaims - lawyers and trained administrators- who
arose to power from the social disturbances of the 1840-1860 period, fulfilling the desire of
their respective communities for replacing the feudal Zuarna with more useful administrators.
Examples are families such as the Khourys and the Solhs, secretaries and administrators during
the Ottoman government (Koury, 1972).
125
The third type of Zaims are the Business Zaims consisting primarily of rich businessmen who
made fortunes through their own effort and private enterprise and were able to use their
possessions to influence the political system. They differ from the Land-Based Zaims in that the
basis of their wealth has not been inherited. An example of this category would be Emile
Bustani, an Engineer who after greatly expanding his engineering company and fortune,
managed to become the parliamentary deputy of his village Dair-Al Qamar. The fourth type of
Zaims are the Big City Zaims who are mostly radical urban politicians with a value-
oriented/ideological style. "They are the Zuama of the masses, the representatives of those
people who seem to have been left behind" (Koury, 1972, p. 185).
From the preceding discussion, it becomes clear that the most distinguishing characteristics or
outstanding features of Lebanese Zaim-ship are the following: land and/or family prestige,
special skills under special circumstances, wealth, ideological appeal, and ability to dispense
favors and services. More importantly, in Lebanon, there appears to be one paramount pre-
condition for preserving the important loyalty of the people, namely religion. "In order to win
and hold the confidence of his client group, the ZJiii had to be, and still is, of the same religious
community as the people over whom he rules and for whom he speaks and takes action"
(Hottinger, 1966, p. 89).
Indeed, several theories have been advanced to explain the perpetuationlpersistence of
Lebanon's Zuaina. Prominent among them are the policies of the Ottomans and the French, who
for reasons of efficiency, expense, and/or divide and rule found it expedient to co-opt the
existing community leadership. The monopolistic provision of goods and services has also been
cited as key to the continued viability of these feudal leaders. But perhaps the most important
factor in perpetuating traditional leadership has been the continuing predominance of kinship
loyalties and ethnic! confessional identification over other cleavages in Lebanon.
The continuing influence of Lebanon's Zuama becomes apparent just by accounting for their
near monopoly of the high offices of the state. "Even a cursory look at the membership of
parliaments and cabinets of independent Lebanon indicates the dominance of this traditional
class of Zuaina in the nation's politics, while a more sophisticated investigation would reveal
the penetration of the apparatus of government by their clientele and proteges" (Nelson, 1976, p.
115). Office holding, however, is often a consequence of Zaini power, not its basis. This is true
because whether or not the Zaini holds an official position he remains the mediator between his
constituency and the government (Preisler, 1988).
Given the personalized, localized nature of Lebanese politics, many Zuama thus manage to hold
office despite their lack of a clear ideology or commitment to the public good. Unlike their
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Western counterparts, Lebanese leaders establish their political base by inheriting or less
frequently building up a personal entourage of clients and followers. Seldom do they experience
the need to articulate a program or take a stand on a specific problem. "As creatures of Arab
culture rather than of Western institutions, they (Zuama) were not expected to grasp and
articulate public issues and problems. They existed to deal in personal favors, not ideology and
public policy" (Mackey, 1989, p. 97).
Even the younger aspirants for public leadership, with rare exceptions, also seek to establish
their political base, not by articulating a program or identif'ing critical issues or specific
problems requiring reform, but by building up a personal entourage of clients and followers.
Much like the Zuama, the bulk of their time is devoted to interceding with public officials on
behalf of their clients. Both the personal interests of clients and the political careers of patrons
are served by such a system of patronage. This, more than any other feature, accounts for the
relatively small part played by Lebanese politicians in formulating broad policy issues of
national significance (Khalaf, 1987).
Since a Zaim 's power ultimately depends on the level of patronage he could deliver, patronage
became a potent and permanent phenomenon in the Lebanese political system. "Zuama ran
Lebanon like a private club, swapping cabinet offices, government contracts, positions in the
bureaucracy, and favors in the private sector as spoils of the privileged" (Mackey, 1989, p. 101).
Their monopoly over patronage has also eroded the power of any alternate avenue to privilege
or opportunity. "The few political parties that did exist were so closely associated with sectarian
groups that they collapsed upon themselves when they failed to deliver on the patronage at the
fingerprints of the Zuama" (Mackey, 1989, p. 97).
Invariably, the abiding concern of Lebanese Zuama once in power is to enlarge the scope of
their patronage fiefdoms. Hence, the erosion of legislative and executive powers and the
reduction of the entire political process to one of squabbles over patronage rights and
boundaries.
Accordingly politics, like practically everything else in a society sustained by the
reciprocal exchange of favors, becomes a delicate art of distributing and managing
patronage. Squabbles, over civil service appointments, jurisdictional competition,
allocation of public funds —all essentially patronage squabbles—assume more
prominence over controversies involving substantive issues of national and public policy
(Khalaf, 1987, p. 95).
Lebanon's political structure has thus become deeply absorbed with parochial and personal
rivalries over benefits/privilege that it was incapable of mobilizing the population to grapple
with the broader aims of society. "Behind every public debate were the personalized pragmatic
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politics of patronage, transaction relations, and changing factional alliances in which the prize to
be won was not victory for one set of values over another, but the achievement of high political
office and personal gain" (Mackey, 1989, p.98). Important issues (e.g. administrative reforms)
thus tend to become obscured and the reputation of politicians and the political system in
general is consequently impaired.
Religious Leaders
The Zaim-ship however is not the only traditional institution with which the individual
identifies himself in Lebanon. The ecclesiastical leaders, be they Christian, Moslem, or Druze
are also important. Indeed, as long as Lebanon is the composite of minority communes, men of
religion will continue to perform essential social, economic, and political functions. "It is not
surprising to find in a religiously plural society like Lebanon, where much of the content of
politics revolves around securing the position of various sects, that the men of the cloth should
continue to play a prominent role as shepherds to their respective flocks" (Nelson, 1976, p.
120).
Visible signs of the political importance of the clergy, especially the Maronite Patriarch and the
Sunni Mufti, are everywhere apparent. The press gives widespread coverage to their public
pronunciations, which are as frequently political as religious. A constant stream of prominent
politicians seeks their counsel and blessings in the midst of every crisis. Moreover, they are
"often consulted by legislators and executive officials when it comes to cabinet formation,
appointment to higher civil service jobs, and general legislation" (Baaklini, 1976, p.299). It is
their position in a religiously divided and delicately balanced republic that consigns the clergy
of Lebanon to a built-in political mission.
Religious institutions, especially those of the Maronites, are well organized and serve as an
effective means for disseminating ideas and information. Indeed, the hierarchical organization
and corporate identity of the Maronite Church conferred upon its community an organizational
advantage over other sects in Lebanon. "Politicized, organized, and reinforced by strong
external supports, the Maronite Church gave the Maronite community an organizational
advantage over other sects in the struggle for political supremacy" (Nelson, 1976, p. 121). The
Patriarchy consequently became one of the most powerful institutions in Lebanon exercising a
significant political leverage for the Maronites.
Similarly, the office of the Mufti of the Republic of Lebanon has evolved into a powerful
institution involved in articulating and promoting Sunni interests and demands. The office was
established in 1955 at the urging of prominent Sunnis who maintained that they desired to have
the independence of their sect formalized. However, "the suspicion remains firm that the true
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motivation for the creation of the Mufti's office was the desire to have an institutionalized Sunni
spokesman with stature commensurate with the Maronite Patriarch" (Nelson, 1976, p. 123).
Given all the peculiarities of Lebanon and the fact that religious identity continues to be valued
as a source of persona! security and political action, it is thus not surprising nor unusual that
religious leaders and institutions continue to play a prominent role in Lebanon's political life.
Religion continues to exert a strong hold over the minds and identities of men in
Lebanon. As long as one's political self is largely defined in terms of one's religious
community, those who occupy important institutional positions within their religion and
who can claim with some authority to speak for their sect will continue to have real clout
in the political system (Nelson, 1976, p. 120).
By representing/interceding on the behalf of their community, religious leaders can be viewed
as a subtle extension of the Lebanese patronage network. Indeed, religious clusters in Lebanon
retain many of the classic attributes of clientelism namely, intimate interactions, relationships of
mutual support and trust, voluntary exchange, and obligations of reciprocity. Moreover,
coalitions between religious and political leaders are not uncommon, allowing both parties to
effectively enhance their scope of influence and hence exert more impact on political outcomes.
Clientelism is thus also sustained in Lebanon by the persistence of religious ties of deference.
Khalaf (1987) argues that much like confessionalism, patronage has become institutionalized
into the Lebanese body politic. Further, he suggests that patronage networks are likely to persist
as long as the primordial kinship and confessional sentiments remain firmly rooted in the
Lebanese culture. Not only are the traditional loyalties rooted in culture, some have long been
legitimized by the political system. He warns that any attempt to tamper with the clientelist
system and with the sovereignty of the Zuama 'spells political suicide', as the crux of the
Lebanese patronage system is the organization and regulation of exchanges and resources
between the various communities (Khalaf, 1987).
Khalaf further points that political clientelism in Lebanon has positive integrative aspects in the
sense that it has brought the different communities into an adaptive equilibrium.
Among other things, it has offered a relatively viable form of political action that allows
individuals and groups a greater measure of leverage in securing benefits, services, and a
more equitable distribution of resources. In this sense, patronage in Lebanon is one of the
most accessible and effective strategies for coping with vulnerability and relative
deprivation (Khalaf, 1987, p. 101).
Yet he also recognizes that political clientelism has grievous drawbacks and shortcomings,
including corruption, fragmentation, politicization, and a low degree of legitimacy/state
autonomy.
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The shortcomings and abuses of patronage are many and grievous and have been
variously underscored by several observers: endemic corruption, nepotism, favoritism,
the erosion of legislative and executive powers, the reduction of the entire political
process to one of squabbles over patronage rights and boundaries, the absence of any
serious concern for formulating broad policy issues of national and civil significance and
the consequent sacrifice of long-range planning for short term expediency (Khalaf, 1987,
p. 100).
Hence,
Lebanon, as it were, is gripped by the horns of a nagging predicament: the very forces
that enable the Lebanese at the micro and communal level and from which they derive
much of their social and psychic supports, disable them at the macro and national level
by eroding their civic consciousness and symbols of national identity (Khalaf, 1987,
Preface).
MACRO POLITICS: THE PRESIDENCY, THE PARLIAMENT AND THE CABINET
As might be expected, confessional-patronage networks have also permeated the institutional
structures of the Lebanese decision-making body rendering them fragmented and ineffective.
This was largely the case before the war where the occupant of the Presidency was often called
upon to arbitrate between various factions to diffuse tensions and where the Parliament
exhibited much hesitation and impotence. The Taif agreement has arguably ushered a new era in
Lebanese democracy. Hence, this section provides an account of macro-level processes before
the war and attempts to compare those with current institutional practices in Lebanon.
The Presidency before Taif
In constitutional theory, Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy with a freely elected and
sovereign parliament. In practice, however, Lebanon has for long operated as a presidential
regime governed by one powerful head of state. Indeed, in pre-war Lebanon, the President of
the Republic enjoyed extensive political influence due to considerable constitutional powers
granted him, his pivotal position in the balancing process, and the factionalism, which seriously
weakened potential rival institutions like the Cabinet and the Chamber of Deputies.
To start with, the constitutional prerogatives of the President were indeed considerable. He
designated the Prime Minister (article 53), appointed and dismissed ministers (article 53),
proposed laws (article 18), requested reconsideration of approved legislation (article 57),
presided over the Council of Ministers and called it for extraordinary sessions when deemed
necessary (article 53), negotiated and ratified inter-nation treaties (article 52), and appointed top
officials in collaboration with the Council of Ministers (article 53).
Moreover, the Constitution of 1926 empowered the President with the right to dissolve
Parliament. Indeed, the President could, in cooperation with the Cabinet, decide to dissolve
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Parliament before the expiration of its term (article 55). The Constitution also provided the
President with the power to act if the Parliament did not do so. Thus, if Parliament failed to act
within forty days, on a bill declared by the President as urgent, the bill was automatically
promulgated into law (article 56). It is precisely through this mechanism, which was intended to
expedite legislation, that the President came to dominate the legislature.
However, even prior to the Taif constitutional amendments, Presidential powers in Lebanon
were by no means unlimited. Indeed, the lack of genuinely effective political organizations left
all the Presidents of independent Lebanon without a stable power base from which to govern.
Most Presidents were thus reduced to manipulating the factional rivalries amongst political
notables in order to maintain control. Unfortunately, such coalitions were normally based on
interest and were usually too ephemeral to provide the basis for prolonged/decisive action.
Consequently, even the most well-intentioned Lebanese Presidents were frequently frustrated in
their desire to effectuate change.
Another impediment to forward planning and change was the consumption of the President in
balancing communal interests and ensuring that each faction received its due share. The
President acted in this respect as the trustee, or arbitrator, adjudicating disputed claims and
carrying out incremental confessional allocations to satisfy the demands of various communities
as articulated by their leaders. Hence, one of the main functions of a Lebanese President was to
regulate inter-confessional disputes and to maintain the delicate confessional balance of power
upon which Lebanese politics was based (Kerr, 1966).
It is precisely this function of arbitration and adjudication, which has invited some critics to
refer to the Presidency as the most distinguished of patronage institutions. The President came
to be viewed as the ultimate patron, enjoying virtual monopoly and authority over vital services
and entitlements.
In short, he becomes the supreme patron, manipulating or coordinating the unscrupulous
and skillful machinations of lesser patrons and their own clients, who, ad infinitum, are
the patrons of yet other clients, all seeking a greater share of the spoils and the privileges
of office (Khalaf, 1987, p. 96).
Hence, in prewar Lebanon the President of the Republic was clearly the main locus of power
and the ultimate executive authority in the country. Besides his formal constitutional
prerogatives, the President also enjoyed a formidable amount of unofficial powers that he could
easily muster and mobilize. All the powers vested in his office allowed him to effectively motor
the system, but also put him in an ideal position to demand compliance from those around him.
Exaggerated Presidential powers were thus a source of much contention in pre-war Lebanon and
one of the immediate concerns that the Taif agreement needed to handle/address.
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The Presidency after Taif
The Taif agreement has effectively reduced the powers of the Presidency and spread authority
between Parliament and the Council of Ministers according to the principle of checks and
balances. Hence, the President of the Second Lebanese Republic appoints his Prime Minister
after binding parliamentary consultations. He may also attend the meetings of the Council of
Ministers but not vote. The President can no longer block legislation by refusing to promulgate
laws. Some critics have argued that the new constitutional amendments have reduced the
Presidency to a mere symbolic and ceremonial function (Norton, 1991).
President Elias Hrawi was elected as the first President of the Second Republic on November
22, 1989. And although the Lebanese constitution expressly forbids a President succeeding
himself in office, Hrawi's term was extended in 1995 due to 'extenuating circumstances in the
country'. The real reason behind this breach of the Lebanese constitution was Syria's desire to
maintain the status quo in Lebanon and avoid rocking the ship of state. Malik (1997) writes,
In the fall of 1995, the summer-long speculation about Lebanon's presidential elections
was suddenly put to an end in the most contemptuous manner when the government, with
the appropriate nod from Damascus, amended Article 49 of the constitution - which
limits the President's term in office- to extend the term from six years to nine years.
Then, in similar mechanical fashion, the Lebanese Parliament convened to approve the
amendment and voted to extend the tenure of current pro-Syrian President Elias Hrawi by
three years. This cynical blow to what was left of Lebanese sovereignty resulted from
Syria's desire to freeze the status quo and put everything in Lebanon on hold pending
further developments in the stalled peace negotiations with Israel (Malik, 1997, p. 29).
Norton (1997), comments on this unusual presidential term extension in a similar way:
Thus, despite the constitutional prohibition, the Parliament voted on October 19, 1995, to
extend Hrawi's term of office for three years. Syria subtly signaled its preference, but
Lebanese politicians strain hard to read Syrian signals and are willing, as in this case, to
contort and even ignore Lebanese laws to please their Syrian brothers (Norton, 1997, p.
9).
Hence, not only did the President lose much of his executive powers after Taif, the Presidency
itself lost much of its legitimacy and credibility due to the open secret of Syrian influence and
hegemony.
Under the Fax Syriana, nothing -- including the constitution -- is sacrosanct any longer in
Lebanon. Taif effectively castrated the Lebanese Presidency, rendering the occupant a
pathetic figurehead; With the amendment of Article 49, nothing less than the cancellation
of the Lebanese state - or what was left of it - occurred amidst an atmosphere of tangible
intimidation (Malik, 1997, p. 29).
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The Chamber of Deputies before Taif
Prior to the war, the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies consisted of 99 members (54 Christians and
45 Muslims) directly elected in 26 electoral districts across the nation. Each region was
traditionally allocated a number of districts and seats proportionate to its population and to its
confession (Table 9 and Table 10). The allocation of seats on a confessional basis was intended
to moderate sectarian tensions through prohibiting the direct clash of candidates of different
sects. In this way, the Lebanese electoral system mitigated against sectarian competition.
Table 9. Distribution of Parliamentary Seats by Sect (1947-1972) (Baaklini, 1976)
Sect	 1947	 1953	 1957	 196O72*
Christians	 Maronite	 18	 13	 20	 30
Greek Orthodox	 6	 6	 7	 11
Greek Catholic	 3	 3	 4	 6
Armenian	 2	 2	 3	 4
Minorities	 1	 1	 2	 3
Muslims	 Sunni	 11	 9	 14	 20
Shia	 10	 8	 12	 19
Druze	 4	 3	 4	 6
Total	 55	 44	 66	 99
* Since 1960, there have been three elections - in 1964, 1968, 1972. The sectarian distribution
remained the same as in 1960.
Table 10. Distribution of Electoral Seats and Districts by Region (1947-1972) (Baaklini, 1976)
1947	 1951	 1953	 1957	 196O72*
Region	
D
Beirut	 9	 1	 13	 1	 7	 5	 11	 2	 16	 3
Mount Lebanon	 17	 1	 23	 3	 14	 9	 20	 6	 30	 6
North Lebanon	 12	 1	 16	 3	 9	 8	 14	 7	 20	 7
South Lebanon	 10	 1	 14	 1	 8	 7	 11	 7	 18	 7
Biqa	 7	 1	 11	 1	 6	 4	 20	 3	 15	 3
Total	 55	 5	 77	 9	 44	 33	 66	 25	 99	 26
S Seats. D= Districts
* The number of electoral districts in 1964, 1968, and 1972 remained the same as in 1960.
The same electoral system, however, undermined the process of national competition. Indeed,
no party or grand coalition ever contested even a majority of the seats in Parliament. The
election process also lacked serious issue-discussion (e.g. economy, development, social
policy). Campaigning rather centered on what the candidate can contribute to his district/area.
"The style of campaigning and the absence of debate on the issues confirmed once again the
parochialism of Lebanese elections" (Nelson, 1976, p. 208).
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Such parochialism and localism naturally enhanced the influence of traditional leaders. Indeed,
since independence, membership in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies had been almost the
exclusive monopoly of local Zuama, especially those with inherited traditional rank and
authority. "Almost a quarter of the 1960 Chamber, for example, was composed of deputies who
had inherited their parliamentary seats; people who are heirs of a long political tradition"
(Koury, 1972, p. 270). Table 11 reveals the almost inherited political power of some of
Lebanon's most prominent extended families.
Table 11. The Inherited Political Power of Some Lebanese Families

























































Besides the traditional political heirs, the system allowed parliamentary access to a number of
lawyers, businessmen, and professionals (Nelson, 1976). The resulting composition of the
Chamber, although homogeneous in socio-economic terms, had destabilizing effects given its
non-representation of other classes. Such restricted composition often translated into a visible
reluctance on the part of deputies to initiate major changes andlor reforms. "On the whole, the
Lebanese national assembly is conservatively oriented with too great a stake in the existing
system to countenance radical change" (Nelson, 1976, p. 213).
Moreover, the rivalries/factionalism of the myriad groups found in the Lebanese Chamber
rendered the creation of a working majority extremely difficult and never permanent. Indeed,
temporary parliamentary coalitions had become the accepted norm for political maneuvering
and negotiation (Koury, 1972). The Chamber of Deputies was also hindered in the pursuit of its
tasks by the paucity of its infrastructure. Deputies had no offices and were devoid of legislative
assistance. Committees had no expert staff and were rarely allocated tasks in a systematic
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fashion. The parliamentary library was poorly equipped and organized. Hence the Lebanese
Chamber lacked the tools and the skills to effectively legislate even its was not plagued with the
ills specified above (Nelson, 1976).
The net effect was a "legislative power, which was congenially mediocre and fragile" (Rondot,
1966, p. 133). This accounts for the fact that the Lebanese Chamber found it imperative to
periodically abrogate its legislative function to the executive. Indeed, some of the most
important policies in Lebanon were enacted through decree laws by the executive rather than
through legislative acts of parliament. "It is a sad fact that 80 percent of Lebanon's most
important social and economic laws have been promulgated under decree powers granted to the
Cabinet by the Chamber of Deputies under article fifty-eight of the Lebanese Constitution"
(Nelson, 1976, p. 215).
Besides recurrent abrogation of legislative power, the Chamber was also notorious for its
subservience to the executive. This subservience is traditionally explained by the dependence of
members of Parliament on the President and his ministers for patronage benefits as well as their
ever-present ambition to become Cabinet ministers themselves. Consequently, parliamentary
members were often reluctant to form and impose an independent policy consensus of their own
in accordance with the substantial powers granted them (Kerr, 1966). Dekmejian contends in
this respect that political aspirants in Lebanon regard Parliament mainly as a major pathway or
stepping-stone into the Cabinet (Dekmejian, 1975, p. 34).
To be sure, the performance of the Lebanese Chamber was weak when compared to its formal
constitutional powers. Indeed, the Lebanese Chamber could, in theory, impeach the President
and his ministers, amend the constitution, and determine the general policies of the state.
"However, if one considers that Lebanese electors primarily send their deputies to Beirut to
protect their interests, redress grievances, and bring home a fair share of the spoils, then
judgment on how well the Lebanese assembly performs and what might be expected of it might
perhaps become more reasonable" (Nelson, 1976, p. 213).
Moreover, the Lebanese Chamber latently performed some functions which were vital to the
well-being of the political system. Most important in this respect was its role in reconciliation,
mediation, and communication. "Parliament, despite acknowledged corruption, distortions in
representation, and immobilism is still the one place that provides a forum for the diverse sects
to engage in a dialogue and to maintain contact, even as disputes rage" (Nelson, 1976, p. 222).
"The assembly of Lebanon is both a place of political meeting and an agent of inter-
confessional union" (Rondot, 1966, p. 133).
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Overall, the Lebanese legislature of pre-war Lebanon operated more as a representative body
than as an effective law-making institution (El-Khazen, 1994). Lebanese deputies have indeed
acted more as spokesmen of their communities, defending and promoting their entitlements and
interests. "Deputies emerge more as political brokers concerned with the parochial and often
petty interests of their local constituencies than with formulating and articulating broad policy
issues of national significance" (Khalaf, 1987, p.123). Besides representation, parliamentary
access is also important as it provides a competitive advantage in the clientelistic race of
Lebanese politics. "Apart from personal prestige, many deputies regard parliamentary
representation as an economic investment, given the clientelistic nature of Lebanese politics"
(Khashan, 1997, p. 43).
The Chamber of Deputies after Taif
The Taif agreement has theoretically strengthened the role of Parliament and redressed the
balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. The preamble to the new
constitution clearly states that 'Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic'. The term of the
Speaker was extended from one to four years to coincide with the term of the Chamber and the
selection of the Prime Minister was made subject to binding consultations with the Speaker and
members of Parliament. Moreover, an explicit provision was made in the new constitutional
document prohibiting laws to be promulgated without the prior approval of Parliament.
Upon the endorsement of the new constitutional document in 1990, the government proceeded
with the task of making appointments to vacated posts in Parliament as well as the nine new
seats added. Many Lebanese were distressed that the process of appointment had been chosen to
fill the parliamentary seats, rather than elections. And although the justification provided was
acceptable —mainly that it was excessively ambitious to envisage general elections at that
juncture- the practice constituted a clear break with Lebanon's democratic practices in the past.
In adjusting the proportional representation of Christians and Muslims in Parliament to
conform to a 50-50 ratio, Taif increased the number of representatives beyond the
traditional ninety-nine and called for the appointment of new members to the Chamber to
replace deceased ones and reach the required number. The dangerous precedent of
appointing rather than electing supposed representatives of the people violates the
essence of parliamentary democracy and departs radically from Lebanese political norms
(Malik, 1997, p. 26).
Lebanon's first war parliamentary elections were then held in the Summer of 1992. The 1992
election was distinctive because it was the first to be held since the outbreak of the war. Indeed,
throughout the war, three Presidents were elected in 1976, 1982, and 1989. The Presidential
elections were undertaken to avoid a constitutional vacuum. Parliamentary elections, however,
were postponed because, constitutionally, Parliament could extend its terms indefinitely as long
as political and security conditions precluded legislative elections (El-Khazen, 1994).
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The Parliamentary elections of 1992 were held amidst a strong wave of opposition protesting
the timing of such elections and insisting on international supervision. And although overall
attitudes towards the awaited elections varied between enthusiasm and support, hesitation and
fluctuation, skepticism, or outright rejection, the opposition was strong and real and centered
mainly in the Maronite districts. The Maronite Patriarch's opposition to what he termed the
'imposed elections' gave this position its best expression. Gradually opposing positions
crystallized in the Maronite enclave, gathering political momentum in favor of a boycott (El-
Khazen, 1994).
Nevertheless, the Lebanese government proceeded with the elections as planned, despite the
massive abstention of opposition candidates and voters. The main issue of contention was the
electoral law. Although Taif had stipulated the use of the Muhafazah as the basis for
subdividing electoral districts, the 1992 electoral law required candidates in two areas - South
Lebanon and Mount Lebanon—to compete in sub-districts rather than stand for election at the
Muhafazah level. The justification given was that exceptional conditions existed in those
particular governorates, security conditions in the South, and large numbers of displaced people
in Mount Lebanon.
Critics argued that the real reason for the electoral law was to allow regime mainstays (e.g.
Jumblatt, Hubayka, El-Murr) to bring their strength to smaller districts and to undermine the
chances of real opposition anti-Syrian candidates. Many did not hold back that this
manipulation of electoral tactics was meant to accommodate Damascus' concern that no
mainstream Christian opposition candidates would find their way into the newly elected
Lebanese Chamber. "Thus the 1992 electoral law not only perverted the Taif principle of large
electoral districts, it produced a political landscape tailor-made to guarantee an outcome
favorable to Syrian wishes" (Malik, 1997, p. 27).
Although competition between candidates did take place in most governorates, the situation in
Mount Lebanon, where candidate and voter abstention were almost total, made it very difficult
for the government to claim that due process had been achieved there. In Kisirwan, for
example, the election had to be suspended due to lack of candidates and re-run in October after
the elections in other governorates had proven the irreversibility of the process. Table 12 shows
the distribution of parliamentary seats by sect and constituency in 1992. Table 13 shows the
1992 seat distribution by sect as compared to previous (pre-war) parliamentary seat
distributions.
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Table 12. Distribution of Parliamentary Seats by Sect and Constituency, 1992 (El-Khazen, 1993)
Total Seals	 MA *	 GO GC Other S SH D	 A
Beirut	 (19)	 1	 2	 1	 6	 6	 2	 1	 0
Mount Lebanon	 (35)	 19	 4	 1	 1	 2	 3	 5	 0
North Lebanon	 (28)	 9	 6	 0	 0	 11	 0	 0	 2
South Lebanon	 (23)	 2	 1	 2	 0	 3	 14	 1	 0
Biqa	 (23)	 3	 2	 3	 1	 5	 8	 1	 0
Total	 128	 34	 15	 7	 8	 27	 27	 8	 2
* MA = Maronite; GO = Greek Orthodox; GC = Greek Catholic; Other = Armenians, Protestants + other
minorities; S = Sunni; SH = Shiite; DDruze; A = Alawite
Table 13. Distribution of Parliamentary Seats by Sect, 1943-1992 (El-Khazen, 1993)
1943-1947	 1951	 1953'	 1957	 1960-1972 1992
	
Change
Maronite	 18	 23	 13	 20	 30	 34
	
+4
Greek Catholic 	 6	 8	 5	 7	 11	 15
	
+4
Greek Orthodox	 3	 5	 3	 4	 6	 7
	
+1
Others	 3	 6	 3	 5	 7	 8
	
+1
Sunni	 11	 16	 9	 14	 20	 27
	
+7
Shiite	 10	 14	 8	 12	 19	 27
	
+8
Druze	 4	 5	 3	 4	 6	 8
	
+2
Alawi	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 2
	
+2
Total	 55	 77	 44	 66	 99	 128
	
+29
Overall, the 1992 elections provoked a sort of sectarian polarization that the country had only
seen during the war. "The 1992 elections violated the principles of representative democracy,
deepened communal polarization, coalesced the political alienation of the Christians, and
eliminated any remaining chances of engaging in a semblance of normal politics in Lebanon"
(Malik, 1997, p.28). "With tight security assured, the elections results in 1990 reflected power
realities achieved by force. This time, Syria was the prevailing foreign power and called the
shots" (Hank, 1998, pp. 162-163). "The empowerment of members of the executive and
legislative branches in 1992 left a lot to be desired as far as due democratic process was
concerned" (Hank, 1998, p. 158).
Unfortunately, a similar story repeated itself in the parliamentary elections of 1996. The only
difference was greater Christian turnabout attributed mainly to fear of further marginalization
and an acquiescence to Syrian preponderance in Lebanon. "This turnabout came as a result of
awareness that Syria's preeminent role in Lebanese affairs seemed secure, at least in the
foreseeable future" (Khashan, 1997, p. 25). Many Christians thus came to perceive abstention as
self-defeating. Christian participation in the 1996 elections gave the process an aura of
legitimacy through the appearance of open and competitive elections. The government managed
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to get away with re-issuing the 1992 electoral law, by unveiling it only weeks before the
beginning of the first round of elections.
However, by failing to conform to the provisions of the Taif agreement pertaining to electoral
districts and procedures, the parliamentary elections of 1992 and 1996 paved the way for a trend
of marginalization of the Constitution- the highest law of the land.
In addition to the many irregularities associated with them, the two anomalous elections
of 1992 and 1996 paved the way for further assaults on the sanctity of a critical document
in Lebanese politics: the constitution. From its inception in 1926, the Lebanese
constitution has been amended eight times. Never before Taif, however, was it done so
callously and cavalierly. Taif opened up a Pandora's Box of notorious precedents, and
the country has been descending down the slippery slope of constitutional tinkering ever
since (Malik, 1997, p. 29).
The two parliamentary elections of 1992 and 1996 were also a reminder of Lebanon's
worsening plight where democratization was concerned (Hank, 1998). Both elections were
characterized by blatant violations of citizens' rights and due process. Infractions of electoral
law, fraudulent additions and subtractions of voter names from electoral rolls, rigging of ballot
returns, harassment of campaign workers, manipulation of recently naturalized citizens, and use
of money, intimidation and coercion, these and other irregularities have been reported
(Khashan, 1997; Norton, 1997; Hank, 1998). While there is no way to prove the validity of
these accusations, circumstantial evidence is abundant.
Moreover, both elections witnessed a serious lack of debate on fundamental issues. Most
electoral campaigns amounted to nothing more than moral preaching or pep talk (Khashan,
1997). Common slogans focused on 'moderation vs radicalism', 'bravery and integrity' or 'the
conscience of the people' to the neglect of more pressing and fundamental concerns such as the
implementation of the Taif Accord, Lebanon's participation in the Arab-Israeli peace talks, or
mounting economic problems. This has invited some press observers of Lebanese elections to
announce "the absence of ideas in Lebanon's current elections" (Khashan, 1997, p. 46).
The 1992 and 1996 elections have also undermined the prospects of an effective opposition
from within the political system. By excluding many of the vocal Lebanese Christians, the
system has further subdued to Syrian influence and hegemony.
Whatever the imperfections of Lebanon's pre-war democratic political system, Lebanon
was one of those few developing countries where opposition politics made a difference
and had a decisive impact on the political process.. .None of the vigor and assertiveness
of prewar opposition politics are present in postwar Lebanon. Both government and
opposition are stalled... Both government and opposition seem to have an undeclared
quota of political maneuvering they can not surpass...An opposition that does not abide
by the pre-set rules of the game has no place on the political map of post (violated) Taif
politics (El-Khazen, 1993 p. 135).
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Moreover, both the 1992 and 1996 elections have deepened the internal sectarian divide on the
one hand and the divide between state and society on the other. The elections were held against
the wish of many Christians and there is no indication that Muslims were more content with the
process. However, the latter failed to express their desire or take a clear stand. Moreover, many
citizens now feel even greater alienation from the system, as reflected in their indifference to the
details of election campaigning and their relatively low turnabout at the polls (voter tumabouts
were 30.34 percent in 1992, and around 40 per cent in 1996 as compared to 50-53 per cent in
pre-war Lebanon).
No doubt, Lebanese parliamentary elections of 1992 and 1996 left a lot to be desired in terms of
democratic procedures and have caused a further retreat from the liberalism/democratic
semblance that prevailed before 1975. "The main concern at the present is that these setbacks
would become acceptable to most Lebanese by official institutionalization and political re-
socialization" (Khashan, 1997, p. 47). Hank concludes,
The post-war establishment's legislative renewal means another four years of 'sisterly
cooperation with Syria'.. .Given the flaws in Lebanon's brand of democracy as well as
the predicament it still faces with its neighbors, the principal question now is not how and
when democracy might eventually come about, but whether the concept of
democratization, implying citizen empowerment, has any real meaning at all, in regard to
Lebanon's experience and future trajectory (Hank, 1998, p. 180).
The Council of Ministers before Taif
Lebanese Cabinets have since 1943 been meticulously balanced along confessional lines (Table
14). This delicate balancing, plus the need to ensure a minimal policy consensus among
members rendered the process of cabinet formation a most complicated task. The complication
was further exacerbated by the need to enlist the leaders of the important political factions, their
personal antagonisms and irritations, and/or by their insistence on particular portfolios.
Accordingly, Cabinet formation became a long drawn out process of negotiation, consultation,
bargaining, balancing, and accommodation.



























































































The right composition of a Cabinet was however essential to ensure its continuity/survival. This
factor was important in view of the fact that Cabinets were notoriously short-lived in Lebanon.
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Indeed, in twenty eight years of constitutional government (from 1926 to February 1964),
Lebanon lived under some forty-six Cabinets or an average of less than eight months per
Cabinet (Kerr, 1966). Fortunately, the rapid turnover of Lebanese Cabinets was mitigated by the
tendency toward carry-over membership and by the stable character of eligible ministers within
Parliament. "From 1926 through 1963 a total of 333 ministerial posts were occupied by only
134 individuals" (Kerr, 1966, p. 192).
Frequent Cabinet change was commonly used as an indicator of political instability in Lebanon.
This was partly true. Indeed, rapid Cabinet change to the extent that it prohibited long-range
planning, interfered with ministers learning their jobs, obscured accountability, and hindered
decision-making undeniably contributed to instability and weak political performance.
Nevertheless, Cabinet change may have also been politically functional in times of crisis, as its
served to divert attention from the issue at hand to the more immediate problem of forming a
government. Hence, "the need for a government to deal with the problem preceded the problem
itself" (Nelson, 1976, p. 231).
It is important to note in this respect that Lebanese Cabinets seldom changed by virtue of an
adverse vote in parliament. Indeed, since independence, not a single Cabinet had fallen for this
reason. Rather, Lebanese cabinets most often fell as a result of internal quarrels and disputes
and a consequent breakdown in confidence between ministers themselves. More saddening is
the fact that Cabinet controversies rarely involved prospective decisions on substantive policy
issues, but rather tended to revolve around questions of patronage and jurisdictional competition
(Kerr, 1966, p. 193).
Cabinet controversies were often exacerbated by publicity or unauthorized public statements
made by ministers seeking to appeal to some segment of public opinion. The principle of
collective ministerial responsibility was thus frequently violatedlignored by ministers who had
fences of their own to mend (Kerr, 1966, p. 196). Individual ministerial responsibility was also
scarcely respected as few ministers could be assured in practice of the full measure of control to
which the law entitled them, "for the web of interests involved in the affairs of a given ministry
insured the exercise of pressures from many quarters" (Kerr, 1966, p. 193).
Here the fundamental tension of the entire system of Lebanese Cabinet-making arises
again: men of sharp partisan views are brought into the Cabinet in order to leash them
with responsibility, but as they can not afford to pay the full political price that
responsibility entails, they strike a compromise by becoming in effect only half ministers,
keeping silent only half the time, and lending to the Cabinet only half the cohesion





























The drawbacks of Cabinet government in Lebanon were thus painfully obvious. In essence, the
Cabinet served as a political battleground and was thereby hindered from effectively performing
its task. Yet, it should be noted that the Cabinet, like the Chamber, provided a measure of
political integration and a modicum of cooperation in an otherwise fractured social structure. By
ensuring equitable sectarian representation and allowing all viewpoints to be heard and
explored, the Lebanese Cabinet provided a channel of communication and an opportunity to
balance/harmonize conflicting sectarian interests and demands.
The Council of Ministers after Taif
The constitutional changes of 1990 clearly entrust executive authority to the Council of
Ministers. Article 65 of the new constitution precisely states that 'executive authority shall be
vested in the Council of Ministers'. The Council of Ministers is made responsible for setting the
general policy of the government, drafting laws and decrees, deciding on the implementation of
legislative acts, and supervising the activities of all administrative branches and institutions.
Moreover, the new Council of Ministers is empowered to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies
before the expiration of its term.
Since the Taif agreement of 1989, Lebanon witnessed the formation of seven cabinets or an
average of 18 months per cabinet. All were delicately balanced along confessional lines. Table
15 shows the sectarian breakdown of successive Lebanese cabinets from 1989 to the present.

































Greek Orthodox	 2	 4
Greek Catholic	 1	 3
Armenian	 1	 2
* Information collected by author from various Lebanese Newspapers
Post-Taif Lebanese politics have been dominated by the prominent figure of Prime Minister
Rafic Hariri, who formed 3 successive cabinets in 1992, 1995 and 1996. Hariri came to power
in the wake of a deepening economic crisis in Lebanon, whereby the inflation rate had reached
an unprecedented 120 percent and the Lebanese pound had dropped from 1,150 to the dollar to
2,830. Hariri's background as a successful business entrepreneur who had made his way in the
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world of the Saudi economy provided renewed optimism regarding the eminence of economic
development and change.
That Hariri was seen as the one and only savior was due in large measure to the
perception of him as a Lebanese 'merchant prince' who had both the personal resources
and the international –especially Gulf—connections that could be mobilized to shore up
the pound and the country more generally (Denoeux and Springborg, 1998, pp. 159-160).
In this respect, Hariri openly expressed his desire to turn Lebanon into the 'Singapore of the
Middle East' and to restore the country to its previous role as the financial and commercial
center of the region. For this purpose, Hariri and his cabinet focused on introducing macro-
economic stabilization measures and rebuilding a new central business district for Beirut. While
this new approach initially instilled enthusiasm and optimism, a sense of general disillusionment
had already set in by the time Hariri formed his second cabinet in May 1995.
There were many reasons for this change in public mood. By 1995, many Lebanese found their
situation essentially unchanged if not worsened: slow economic growth (a modest 6 percent in
1995), increasing indebted-ness of the state (estimated at $7.3 billion in 1995), soaring
unemployment (32 percent in 1995), spreading poverty (28 percent of Lebanese live below the
poverty line), and rampant corruption all set in a deepening sense of malaise among the public.
Moreover, to finance its reconstruction, the Hariri government sought to increase state revenues
from exorbitant indirect taxes such as higher gasoline prices, steeper customs duties and
skyrocketing car registration fees.
Furthermore, Hariri and his government had focused their attention on a few showcase projects
such as a new sports stadium and convention center, the enlargement of Beirut airport, and the
upgrading of the Beirut-Damascus highway, while neglecting badly needed improvements in the
infrastructure (e.g. electricity, telephones, sewage, drainage, and roads) as well as urgently
needed areas of attention such as population dislocations resulting from the war and worsening
environmental degradation. "From the vantage point of the people, talk of economic recovery
and reconstruction offers little solace in the face of everyday hardships" (Malik, 1997, p. 57).
The economic problems were also compounded by an increasing repression on the part of the
government, reflected in a gradual stifling of freedoms and erosion of civil rights. For example,
the General Union of Lebanese Workers called a general strike in July 1995 to protest the
soaring unemployment, the increased prices, and the general official indifference to the welfare
of laborers. Lebanese security forces (with the help of Syrian intelligence agents) quickly
disrupted the rally and prohibited further demonstrations. Renewed labor unrest re-ignited in
March 1996, and government took hard-line measures again and outlawed public
demonstrations.
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Moreover, in September 1996, the government decided to reduce the number of authorized
television stations. On the face of it, the decision seemed sensible, since a quilt of stations had
emerged during the war, most associated with one militia or another (Norton, 1997). The details,
however, revealed a different story as the four authorized stations were owned by the Prime
Minister, the Speaker, the Interior Minister, and a wealthy businessman. "Even observers who
had acknowledged the need to put some order back into Lebanese airwaves were quick to
interpret the government's licensing process as an effort to muzzle freedom of expression"
(Denoeux and Springborg, 1998, p 163).
This incident brings up another contentious aspect of the post-Taif government policies, namely
the division of major sources of wealth among the key players in the country's political
economy. Indeed, the post-war Lebanese political system has been transformed into an
oligarchy, controlled from the top by the Prime Minister and his close associates. Key Hariri
associates have been put in charge of critical institutions such as the Council for Development
and Reconstruction, the Central Bank, and the Ministry of Finance. The remaining financial
agencies were distributed among the traditional political leaders. Examples are the Fund for
Displaced people controlled by Druze leader Walid Jumblat, and the fund for the Council of the
South, controlled by Shiite Speaker Nabih Bern. It is no secret that considerable financial abuse
goes on in these agencies.
Indeed, one project in which Hariri failed to show any interest was modernizing the Lebanese
state and/or weakening the entrenched powers of the Zuama. Instead, he decided to leave the
existing state as is and to proceed with his reconstruction strategy by mobilizing his own team
that he managed to super-impose on the existing administrative structure. Meanwhile, he
allowed prominent families and wartime leaders to retain their strong presence and benefits,
through what Denoeux and Springborg have referred to as the 'residual state'. They write,
What might be called as the residual state, that huge entity not controlled by the Prime
Minister and his clients, serves as a counterbalance to Hariri. And because Haniri is
unable to fully dominate the state, he continues to avoid it as much as he can, permitting
it to dole out public resources, through the confession-based networks that wind through
the bureaucracy (Denoeux and Springborg, 1998, p. 163).
It is as if Hariri had decided to strike a compromise with the Zuama, allowing them to use a
segment of the state for patronage benefits, while he would assume primary and uncontested
responsibility for his ambitious reconstruction plan.
In short, the implied division of labor was the following: Hariri would rebuild the
country, while the government would neither be overhauled nor modernized, but would
continue to dole out patronage and thereby underpin the confessional leadership roles of
the incumbent politicians (Denoeux and Springborg, 1998, p. 171).
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There is growing evidence to suggest, however, that this novel assignment of responsibilities is
not viable and that the state cannot continue to operate as an arena for rivalries among sectarian
leaders seeking to expand the boundaries of their fiefdoms. It is clear that Lebanon in this
context will not be able to meet the challenges that lie ahead.
If there were infinite resources, the two-sided Lebanese state, one portion of which is
dominated by Hariri and another controlled by the traditional and war-time political
elites, might be sustainable. Alas, resources have begun to dry up, for the demands of
physical reconstruction, profits for the prime minister, and patronage for the politicians
cannot all be accommodated (Denoeux and Springborg, 1998, P. 163).
The Lebanese state antiquated, controlled from the outside by Syria and riddled on the
inside with divisions among sectarian leaders feuding over turf and patronage - is unable
to make up public policy in an effective manner. This state is not dedicated to the
provision of public goods and services. It is not geared toward enabling Lebanon to meet
the daunting developmental challenges that still lie ahead. Instead, its primary function
remains the allocation of patronage along confessional lines (Denoeux and Springborg,
1998, p. 171).
In a similar way Norton (1997) alerts the reader to the shortsighted-ness of the post-Taif
government policies and the futility of political reform in the context of patronage and sectarian
fiefdoms.
While some restructuring of the political system has occurred, there is little prospect for
comprehensive political reforms while power remains in the grip of a coterie of
politicians on good terms with Damascus. Instead, the government operates like a giant
patronage machine, enabling newly entrenched political bosses to create networks of
clients and grow richer on sweetheart deals (Norton, 1997, p. 9).
The post-war government and political elite have therefore proved incapable of breaking out of
the narrow confessional-patronage pattern of politics. This is most graphically illustrated by
continuous infighting over spoils and turf between the three key posts referred to
euphemistically in Lebanon as the troika: Maronite President Elias Hrawi, Sunni Prime Minister
Rafic Hariri, and the Shiite Speaker Nabih Berry (Rigby, 2000, p. 177). And while,
disagreements and rivalries between them are still raging, the resulting immobilism and
deadlock have prevented the Lebanese government from turning its attention to much needed
reforms that could mitigate the rising tensions in the country.
Finally, sectarian-based clientele networks have also penetrated the Lebanese administration.
Thousands of bureaucrats have been put on the payroll through various means used to
circumvent civil service regulations in order to service patronage networks. Bribes, and Wasta
(or intermediary connection) are commonplace, and the public is exhibiting increasing
frustration and contempt. "The Lebanese bureaucratic labyrinth, with its multitudinous and
overlapping authorities, provides the perfect camouflage for illicit activities. It also creates the
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means by which honest citizens can be cheated by corrupt officials" (Deneoux and Springborg,
1998, p. 167).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has basically ended where it started. Confessional loyalties and clientelism
effectively interact in Lebanon, undermining all efforts at modernization and change. Hardly
any dimension of Lebanese politics seems immune from the contamination of confessional-
patronage networks. Post-war political elite have also proved incapable of breaking out of the
narrow confessional-patronage politics game. The result is a deepening dissatisfaction felt by
large numbers of Lebanese.
Writing in 1997, Karim Pakradoni paints a grim picture of the Lebanese post-war experience:
The Lebanese can feel the essence of the social contract gradually slipping away day by
day, as the electoral system becomes an appointments system, the liberal economy
becomes a network of monopolies, and the democratic order turns into a police state
(Pakradoni, 1997, p.22).
Pakradoni predicted that if these trends were left un-addressed, then the country would be
driven into a political impasse that could potentially deteriorate into sectarian conflict. He
characterized these anti-democratic trends as the 'Arabization' of Lebanese politics. Rigby
(2000) suggests that perhaps a more apt description would be the 'Syrianization' of Lebanon.
He writes,
With 35-40,000 troops in Lebanon, in addition to its ubiquitous intelligence personnel,
Syria continued to manipulate Lebanon's divisions to suit its own interests and to
legitimate its presence as the necessary arbiter between the sparring sects. But sectarian
politics also suited the interests of the old members of the Lebanese political cartel and
former warlords, and that in turn was reinforced by the social fabric of traditional patron-
client networks, clan and sectarian loyalties that still permeate many dimensions of
Lebanese life. It is a mutually reinforcing set of relationships (Rigby, 2000, p. 178).
Indeed, a new reality has now been added to the sectarian and clientelistic predicament of
Lebanon, namely that of Syrian hegemony and dictatorship. This is clearly reflected by Syrian
heavy-handed manipulation and tampering in every facet of Lebanese political life. Syria is
increasingly referred to as the 'invisible hand in Lebanese politics', the 'real power broker in
Lebanon', or 'Lebanon's overlord', while Lebanon is now 'the hostage', or 'the fictitious state
under Syrian captivity'. Syrian tightening stranglehold over Lebanon is with international
acquiescence, as it needs to be continuously coalesced to the negotiating table with Israel.
The subordination of Lebanese politics to Syrian interests is now a fact. Lebanon's
independence is held hostage to the Middle East Peace Process. Whether the hostage will
be released at the end of that process remains a central question (Norton, 1997, p. 12).
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Indeed, Syria's stranglehold over Lebanon serves an instrumental purpose, namely increasing its
value as a negotiating partner in the peace process. And in the evolving context of Israeli-Syrian
negotiations, Lebanon is seen almost exclusively as a security issue and the idea that it is indeed
expendable for the sake of achieving a Syrian-Israeli peace deal is gaining acceptance. Indeed,
Washington's tacit approval of Syria's defacto domination over Lebanon implies a willingness
to recognize and legitimize it as part of a formal peace process. "A peace deal leading to dejure
acceptance of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon would amount to the final nail in the coffin of
Lebanese sovereignty" (Malik, 1997, p. 95).
Whether Syria's influence over Lebanon and Lebanese politics will lessen also depends to a
large extent on the behavior of Lebanese elite. So far the country's senior politicians have
shown no enthusiasm for instilling needed changes or staking out an independent path and have
simply resigned themselves to following the Syrian lead. Most Lebanese politicians are now
viewed as 'the puppets of Syria' or its 'allies and local proxies'. "As long as more than a
handful of Lebanese politicians seek to strengthen their individual position through Syrian
support rather than trying to build domestic policy coalitions, it will be very difficult for any
government to widen the margins of Lebanese independence" (Perthes, 1996, p. 33).
Lebanese politicians, however, seem to be absorbed striking bargains and compromises in their
traditional effort to promote their best interest and that of their respective communities. The
review in this chapter has indeed underlined the prevalence of the politics of accommodation - the
politics of balancing, representation and mutual accommodation in micro and macro political
dynamics and interactions. These characteristics have indeed become the hallmarks of Lebanese
political processes. Hence, their potential influence on administrative reform initiatives / dynamics
will be of central importance in the remaining chapters.
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CHAPTER 7
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN LEBANON
INTRODUCTION
Administrative reform refers to deliberate attempts at changing bureaucratic structures and
behaviors to promote the achievement of national development goals. Chapter 2 has clearly
established the importance of national social and political realities in accounting for reform
trajectories. Therefore, the isolated treatment of administrative reform in any country is virtually
impossible and needs to be inextricably linked to a variety of factors, cultural, political and
economic. Moreover, programs of planned change may be affected by regional and international
influences and developments. This is especially true in Lebanon, which has been receptive to
such influences in view of its geographic location and the unique composition of its population.
Hence, this chapter seeks to examine the various attempts at administrative reform in Lebanon
before and after the war. Although the main focus will be on the specific reform initiatives and
their impact, a conscious attempt will be made to keep the discussion in its context and to
highlight relevant social and political realities. The independence era in Lebanon coincided with
an intensification of attempts at reform in view of the expanding role of government in the
social and economic fields. By all accounts, only one experience with administrative reform in
pre-war Lebanon was somehow successful, namely that of President Fuad Chehab (Winslow,
1996; Hanf, 1993; Hudson, 1985; Bashir, 1970; Binder, 1966). The research will attempt to
explore what was distinctive about this reform attempt and how to account for its success.
The chapter will also examine the specific reforms that were undertaken in Lebanon in the post-
war period. It will be shown that while most attempts at reform in pre-war Lebanon were led by
the incumbent President, administrative reform in the post-war period has been mostly initiated
by the Council of Ministers in cooperation with Parliament. This is perhaps to be expected in
view of the curtailment of Presidential powers resulting from Taif, and the concomitant increase
in the respective powers of the Cabinet and Chamber of Deputies. It is interesting to note that
both institutions have shown resolution to fully invoke and exercise their new constitutional
powers, causing some friction and delays in the implementation of much needed reforms in
Lebanon in the wake of the war.
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN PRE-WAR LEBANON
The Regime of Beshara El Khoury: 1943-1952
Lebanon acquired some of its first administrative and governmental practices and procedures
during the long years of Ottoman and French rule. Upon independence in 1943, the Lebanese
govemment inherited an administrative structure, which was over-centralized and concentrated,
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legalistic in orientation, and limited in scope to essential functions. In the first post-
independence administration, there were nine ministries, in addition to the Office of the Prime
Minister: 1) Justice; 2) Interior; 3) Finance; 4) Public Works; 5) Education and Fine Arts; 6)
Agriculture; 7) Health and Public Assistance; 8) Post and Telegraph; and 9) National Economy.
Evidence suggests that in the pre-war period, all executive and administrative power centered in
the President and in the Cabinet he appointed (Kerr, 1966; Rondot, 1966; Hudson, 1985;
Winslow, 1996). Led by a Sunni Premier, the Cabinet consisted of the various ministers, each
put in charge of a specific administrative department. Parliamentary powers during this period
were seriously curtailed, as the Parliament was simply entrusted with the task of electing the
President, passing the annual budget and approving all administrative laws deemed necessary by
the executive. To do more was to bring opposition from the President and his Cabinet, and to
shake the fine balance of power upon which Lebanese politics was based.
Little attention was accorded to administrative reform during the early years of independence.
This was partly understandable in view of the preoccupation of the new political leadership with
a variety of fundamental problems, relating to the consolidation of the newly won
independence, constitutional amendments, economic relationships with Syria, withdrawal of
French troops and the joining of the Arab League. The President Beshara El-Khoury and his
Prime Minister Riad El-Solh, the founders of independence, were evenly matched and governed
the country in tandem, proving to skeptics how well the Lebanese ship of state can sail if the
men at the helm collaborate in trust and confidence (Hanf 1993).
This early tranquility however was not to last for long. Starting in 1946, there were frequent
accusations of government corruption. The President, and his brother Selim were accused of
resorting to patronage and using the administration as a means to extend favors to clients and
supporters. The situation became further complicated in 1947 as the President was also accused
of resorting to fraud and electoral manipulation to ensure a broad majority in the parliamentary
elections. His plan was to make sure that enough government supporters were returned to the
Chamber to amend the Constitution and allow him to be chosen for a second term.
The election for the Chamber of Deputies, which was held on June 3, 1947 received unstinting
denunciation for the amount of fraud and manipulation employed by the regime. The majority
bloc of government supporters won by 80 percent, hardly allowing Middle East observers to
classify the election as truly democratic (Winslow, 1996). Riad El Solh was named Prime
Minister of a new government whose main goal was to amend the Constitution so that the
President could continue in office. Indeed, only 7 votes were cast in parliament against the
constitutional amendment allowing President Khoury to succeed himself. Hence, the two main
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founders of the state, and the architects of the National Pact, managed to return to power, but
lost in the process much of their credibility.
President El-Khoury thus managed to arrange his coveted second term, but at the expense of not
being able to govern the country. The government used its powers under the state of emergency
- proclaimed because of the first Israeli-Palestinian war - to cow opposition politicians and
prohibit anti-government newspapers. Indeed, the uproar over external matters lasted long
enough to give the regime a grace period of nearly four years. Although charges of corruption
increased, the economy improved —in part as a result of Arab boycott of Israel, which turned
Lebanon into the major entrepot for the Eastern Mediterranean- allowing the regime to partly
offset the fermenting distresses.
While president Khoury mainly alternated between Riad and Sami El-Solh for the premiership,
his use of cabinet politics was masterly. Khoury shrewdly manipulated the process of cabinet
formation as a means of balancing traditional rivalries and maintaining a state of equilibrium.
Hudson (1985) refers to his skillful maneuvers as the game of musical chairs by which
portfolios were regularly re-distributed in an effort to give the many deserving notables a taste
of power (Hudson, 1985, p. 266). While the game of musical chairs may have been useful in
giving traditional power holders a stake in the system, the resulting discontinuity often
undermined the executive capacity of the cabinet.
Even prime ministers under Khoury enjoyed limited independence, authority and tenure. Sami
El-Solh for example, complains in his Memoirs that every President under whom he served
relied primarily on the advice not of his prime minister, but an unofficial sultan, namely, Selim
El-Khoury for Beshara El-Khoury and Emile Bustani for Camille Chamoun. Every sultan, he
adds, had "an entourage and a group of followers, relatives, in-laws, and middlemen. It is they
who govern and who direct, plan and execute policies, while we are only the instruments which
they set up before the eyes of the public to bear responsibility for their errors and misdeeds"
(Sami El-Solh, 1960 Memoirs, quoted in Kerr, 1966, p. 204).
This quote from a highly influential and respected Lebanese figure is indeed very indicative of
the nature of politics and executive leadership during this period. It aptly suggests the corrupt
nature of Lebanese politics and the monopolization of decision-making by the President and a
coterie of relatives/friends. It also suggests the narrow limits on executive leadership dictated by
Lebanese peculiar political traditions and maneuvers. These observations in turn lend support to
the hypotheses presented in chapter 2, in particular the hypothesis derived from Knill, which
suggests a limited reform capacity in the face of weak/divided executive leadership.
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It is helpful to describe a typical case of cabinet change under Khoury to provide more evidence
in support of these hypotheses. These dynamics are fully described in Hudson (1985) but a brief
attempt will be made here to highlight the main issues. The cabinet of Sami El-Solh was
beginning to disintegrate at the end of March, 1946. The disintegration had been precipitated by
rivalries within the Lebanese delegation in Paris negotiating the terms of the French troop
withdrawal. One of the delegates was the popular Riad El-Solh, anxious to use his role in
negotiating the agreement to return to power. Another delegate was the minister of interior,
Yussef Salem (Greek Catholic), a close friend and co-lister of Riad El-Solh.
The Paris delegates agreed that Salem would quit his cabinet post upon returning to Beirut,
ostensibly on the grounds that his plans for reform were being frustrated, and that Frangieh
(minister of foreign affairs) would follow suit. The two resignations were exçected to create a
serious cabinet crisis. The Sami El-Solh cabinet was already facing problems, as the two major
opposition factions were dissatisfied with their cabinet representation. The Destourians (or
constitutionalists) wanted to renew their alliance with Riad El-Solh, whereas the Independents,
while not happy with the existing cabinet, were determined to keep Riad out of office, as they
were suspicious of his foreign policy strategy.
Upon receiving the resignations, Sami El-Solh began to look for alternative nominees to fill the
vacant positions. At that point, traditional sectarian and regional representation factors came
into play. Solh needed to find a Maronite notable from North Lebanon to replace Frangieh and a
Greek Catholic from the Biqaa to replace Salem. The two most prominent candidates were P.
Taqla (Greek Catholic) and Y. Istaphan (Maronite). Taqla, however, would not join a cabinet
unless his Destour colleague, M. Arslan (Druze) was also made a minister. But S.Solh could not
include Arslan without displacing the incumbent Druze, J. Talhouk, which would upset the
Druze followers of Kamal Jumblat.
Meanwhile, Kamal Jumblat was on the verge of throwing his support to the Karami led
Independents, if that faction would promise to stand behind a strong reform program.
Furthermore, because Gabriel Murr, the Greek Orthodox Minister of Public Works, was also in
sympathy with the Jumblat group, to replace Talhouk would be to risk Murr' s resignation.
There was also opposition to Istaphan from the Karami faction, which could thus retaliate by
pulling out the Justice Minister, S. Munla. On April 9, however, S. Solh's cabinet was reprieved
when P. Taqla agreed to join as the Greek Orthodox representative without insisting on a
portfolio for M. Arslan.
However, the repairs only postponed the crisis for a few weeks. The government's handling of
the domestic situation was under attack from a disorganized but growing opposition of notables.
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In a clever maneuver, Karami changed the name of his group from the Independents to the
Reform Bloc. He thus managed to get the support of a number of powerful leaders who were
known for their reformist ideas. The Reform Bloc then presented Khoury with a reform petition
requesting, among other things, a reduction of administrative expenditures, the creation of a
trained administrative cadre, an office for auditing administrative accounts, a new electoral law
and modern social legislation.
On May 9, a new crisis was precipitated, when M. Arslan, a prominent Druze leader and a close
ally of Khoury made a violent attack on the Reform Bloc's petition. This act prodded his
traditional Druze rival, Kamal Jumblat into retorting that Arslan was a traitor. A duel was
narrowly averted. A week later, the campaign against Sami El-Solh's cabinet reached its climax.
Although the opposition was still divided between the Destourians, supporters of Riad El-Solh,
and the reformist coalition led by Karami, the dissatisfaction was genuine and growing. On May
17, the three ministerial allies of Karami submitted their resignations causing the Sami El-Solh
cabinet to collapse.
President Khoury was expecting/awaiting the fall of the government. His task was now to use
his powers positively to put a new cabinet together. This tedious task was made easier by the
fact that the opposition was chronically divided, and that individual notables could usually be
persuaded to forgo their affiliations in return for a portfolio. President Khoury approached his
National Pact ally Riad El-Solh for the post of Minister of State, but Riad insisted on the
appointment of a number of his Destour friends. Riad's candidacy was also unacceptable for the
Reform coalition. The Reform Bloc, on the other hand, could not agree on a candidate for Prime
Minister from among its ranks.
The deadlock gave the President considerable leverage. Khoury used it with his customary skill
to form a cabinet that effectively blunted the formidable offensive of the reformists. For the
office of Prime Minister, he suggested S. Munla, who was the not the strongest leader in the
reformist faction. Khoury then put together a cabinet containing three associates of the
reformists (S. Munla, Y. Hrawi, and S. Salam), but excluding such major reform figures as
Karami, Pharaon, and Jumblat. Moreover, he neutralized the three reformists by also including
four allies of Riad El-Solh and the Destour Bloc, namely, E. Lahhoud, P. Taqla, M. Arslan and
A. Husseini.
President Khoury thus managed to deflect the reformist thrust, by creating a weak cabinet.
When this cabinet fell apart seven months later, the domestic situation had become
disorganizedlagitated. Although after the collapse of the Munla Cabinet, the President managed
with consummate skill to put together yet a new and stronger combination under the
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premiership of Riad El-Solh, the reformist aspirations of many of the notables had been
effectively stifled by then. President Khoury had thus skillfully maneuvered the classic game of
cabinet politics or the game of musical chairs to halt all reform initiatives that could potentially
undermine his patronage power base.
This selective account of cabinet maneuvers under President El-Khoury clearly illustrates the
nature of political rivalries and factional peddling in Lebanese politics and the delicate attempts
at maintaining balance and representation. More importantly, it illustrates the patterns of
executive discontinuity, which are typically justified in Lebanon by the need to coalesce the
leaders of the major political factions through frequent rotation of cabinet portfolios. Such
skillful maneuvers, while useful for purposes of accommodating divergent political interests,
tend to undermine executive capacity by depriving the executive branch of the needed support
and continuity to engage in serious programs of change.
These observations in turn lend support to the hypotheses presented in chapter 2, namely that
reform capacity in Lebanon will be limited given the country's special brand of consensual
politics. They also lend support to the hypothesis derived from Knill, which suggests a limited
reform capacity in the face of weak executive leadership. Governments in Lebanon come and
go, coalitions form and disintegrate, alliances are based on interest and are typically short-lived;
the resulting immobilism and discontinuity are generally detrimental to reform efforts and
programs of change.
The two events that dealt the Khoury regime its final blow were the parliamentary elections of
1951 and the assassination of premier R. El-Solh while on a diplomatic mission to Amman. The
elections of June 1951 were somewhat more competitive allowing government supporters only
60 percent of the votes and opening door for the emergence of a popular opposition, which
included Kamal Jumblat and Camille Chamoun. The second event - the assassination of El-Solh
- was even more damaging to the incumbent President. It implied the loss of a founding Muslim
pillar of the regime, one that was successful in maintaining relative credibility in the Arab-
Islamic circles of Lebanon.
In an attempt to negotiate his way out of the mess, President Khoury launched a belated attempt
at administrative reform, including the establishment in 1951 of a Bureau of Accounts, a central
post-audit agency responsible for examining and scrutinizing financial transactions throughout
the administration. However, it was too little coming a bit too late. It was crystal clear that the
reform program was hastily improvised to deal with the emerging crisis. Sami El-Solh soon
resigned his post as prime minister after delivering in parliament an explicit indictment of the
regime's corruption (Hudson, 1985).
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Events thereafter deteriorated in a spiraling fashion. The fledgling opposition staged a series of
demonstrations, rallies, and strikes throughout the country. These were followed by boycotts of
electricity tax payments, power shutdowns, strikes by newspapers and taxi drivers, which all
added to the snowballing movement. The general strike completely paralyzed the country and a
group of top officials visited the President formally demanding his resignation. President El-
Kboury finally resigned on September 18, 1952 and five days later, the Chamber voted for
Camille Chamoun to become the second President of Independent Lebanon.
Although the 1952 crisis ended with little bloodshed, and came to be referred to as the
'Rosewater Revolution' it nevertheless exposed the underlying weaknesses of the newly
independent republic. The process of presidential succession failed its first test; the so called
founders of independence failed to provide strong and responsible leadership; the parliamentary
and presidential electoral processes enjoyed limited legitimacy because formal channels were
obstructed by clique politics; corruption and inefficiency flourished; and most importantly, in
the context of this thesis, the executive apparatus failed to institute administrative reform
policies to cope with mounting national problems and mitigate the rising tensions in the country.
In the administrative sphere, the government established during this period the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed
responsibility for managing the administration and the evolving negotiations over the Common
Interests (customs and concessionaiy companies), which had been commonly shared between
Lebanon and Syria throughout the mandate. Negotiations culminated in the end of the customs
union on 13 March 1950. The Ministry of Defense, on the other hand, practically assumed its
full powers and responsibilities after France retracted its last 5000 troops from Lebanon in 1946.
Finally, in 1951, the government created the Bureau of Accounts, which acquired the status of
an auditing body within the administration.
The Regime of Camille Chamoun: 1952-1958
Upon his election to office in 1952, President Chamoun stressed the need for public sector
reform to promote overall economic efficiency and development in Lebanon. After going
through the traditional factional peddling, Chamoun succeeded in convincing Khaled Chehab, a
veteran of mandate politics, to assume the premiership. Chehab formed a Cabinet of four, which
managed to secure from the Chamber full powers over a six-month period to put through a
complete program of administrative reform. The Cabinet proceeded to draft laws for the
reorganization of the administration, the reform of the electoral system, and the revision of
judicial procedures. In all, 90 decrees were issued, giving Lebanon an independent judiciary,
increasing the number of voting districts, defining the administrative duties of civil servants,
liberalizing the press law; and extending voting rights to women (Winslow, 1996).
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Nicknamed 'the government of the decree laws' the cabinet of Khaled Chehab was indeed
vigorous in intent, if not in execution. Although the reform resulted in some administrative
streamlining and rationalization, it necessitated the reshuffling of employees and general
directors, and hence undermined some of the traditional political-bureaucratic ties. The
traditional notables were thus less than satisfied. The extreme left on the other hand, found the
reform insufficiently comprehensive. A parliamentary interpolation on the government's
administrative policy in February 1953 was critical of the reform effort, yet parliament decided
to grant the Chehab cabinet another vote of confidence.
By the end of February, however, the notables, traditional and reformist, who had been
excluded from power were "hovering like vultures over the Khaled Chehab government,
plotting in classic fashion the composition of its successor" (Hudson, 1985, p. 279). Khalid
Chehab resigned on April 29, fourteen days after the expiration of his cabinet's emergency
powers. The President then turned to an experienced Sunnite leader, Seab Salam, to form the
next cabinet. The struggle of traditional rivals and progressive factions resumed again: Destour
against Reform Bloc, Arab nationalist against Lebanese conservatives, and Druze against Druze.
Indeed, in the cabinet crises of the 1950s, popular reform, socialism, Arab nationalism, relations
with the West, and sectarian strife figured to an extent unknown during Khoury' s regime
(Hudson, 1985). One crude indicator of President Chamoun 's difficulties is the fact that
governments during his tenure averaged only six months in duration, compared with a figure of
nine months for cabinets during the previous regime. President Chamoun, in fact, had to face a
rising tide of Arab nationalism in response to the charismatic figure of Nasser of Egypt;
Internationally, he was accidentally caught in the middle of the cold war entanglements between
the US and the USSR.
Indeed, Chamoun found himself facing an awkward dilemma in the evolving Suez crisis of
1956, and the joint French and British attack on Egypt. At an Arab summit meeting held in
Beirut shortly after the crisis, Chamoun was the only leader to refuse to break off relations with
France and Britain. His lukewarm support for Cairo aroused visible discontent among Lebanese
Sunnites and Arab nationalists. Moreover, in March 1957, Chamoun decided to embrace the
Eisenhower doctrine, which consisted of US economic aid and military help for countries in the
Middle East threatened by Soviet Communism. By so doing, he openly risked confrontation
with Nasser, at a time when the Egyptian President was a hero throughout the Arab world, and
among the Lebanese Muslims too.
Muslim frustration with the conduct of the regime's foreign policy, which they perceived to be
in glaring violation with the neutrality provision of the National Pact of 1943, coincided with
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their rising discontent over domestic issues as well. In fact, during this period, a polemic
'Muslim Lebanon Today' posed the first serious challenge to the status quo in Lebanon. It
alleged that a census would establish that Christians were no longer in the majority; that all
power was virtually concentrated in the hands of the Maronite President; that Christian parts of
the country and Christian schools were subsidized, while Muslim parts and Muslim schools
were neglected; and that Muslims were under-represented in the army, the judiciary and the
civil service (Hanf 1993).
The polemic was a mixture of genuine grievances and imputations. But it revealed that Muslim
grievances concerned not only issues of foreign policy but also the division of political and
economic power among the communities. Those grievances were not totally devoid of merit.
Indeed, a cursory look at the sectarian composition of the Lebanese administration during this
period reveals that it was virtually monopolized by Christians (Maronites), especially in the top
echelons (Table 16 and Table 17). The pattern of unbalanced recruitment was then modified in
1958, in an attempt to harmonize the rising demands for equity in public employment, but did
not come into effect until 1974.
Table 16. Top Civil Service Posts, by Community (%) (Hanf, 1993)
Religion	 1946	 1955	 1958
Maronites	 39	 40	 38
Greek Orthodox	 19	 12	 12
Greek Catholics	 3	 9	 11
Sunnites	 29	 27	 26
Shiites	 I	 3	 I	 4	 I	 6
Druze	 I	 6	 I	 7	 6
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Table 17. Sectarian Distribution of Class I Civil Service Posts (Ambassadors and Directors General)
(Ofeish, 1996)
Religion	 1946 1962	 1972	 1974
Maronite	 12	 18	 28	 39
Greek Orthodox	 6	 11	 10	 14
Greek Catholic 	 1	 7	 9	 8
Christian Minorities 	 0	 2	 2	 9
Christian Subtotal	 19	 38	 49	 70
Percentage Christian (%)	 61	 54	 52	 50
Sunni	 9	 24	 23	 31
Shiite	 1	 2	 15	 29
Druze	 2	 6	 7	 10
Muslim Subtotal 	 12	 32	 45	 70
Percentage Muslim (%) 	 39	 46	 48	 50
Sectarian frustrations were thus latently fermenting just beneath the surface, when the
announcement in 1958 of the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) between Egypt and
Syria finally brought tensions to breaking point. Chamoun and the Christians in general
received the news of the UAR with trepidation while Muslims found the event an occasion for
cheerful celebration. Open rebellion finally broke out in May 1958, and by July, the violence
took on a distinct sectarian coloration. While the opposition and especially the Druze militia
appealed to the UAR for supportlarmament, Chamoun appealed to the USA to intervene
militarily and protect the independence of Lebanon.
On July 15, 1958, 15,000 American troops landed on Lebanese soil. Although the American
government was called upon to intervene since early May, the Eisenhower administration was
initially reluctant to crusade in Lebanon on behalf of Camille Chamoun. However, for the US,
the Lebanese crisis took on a new turn on July 14, when a revolution overthrew the monarchy in
Iraq, which was the first Arab state to embrace the Eisenhower doctrine. It was a stunning blow
for Western interests. Alarmed at the possibility of Soviet gains in the Middle Eastern turbulent
environment, the US decided to go through with a full fledged military intervention in Lebanon.
The objective of the US military intervention in Lebanon in 1958 was to support/protect that
part of the political status quo, which was friendly to the West and to oversee an end to the
raging conflict. Upon landing on Lebanese soil, the US government discovered that there was
'no realistic military objective for the operation' and ordered its troops to refrain from
involvement in the civil war. Instead the US decided to intensify efforts at third party mediation.
US special emissary, Robert Murphy, led the process of mediation and a compromise was
finally arranged on the basis of 'no victor-no vanquished' formula. As neither side could gain
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the upper hand militarily, the parties agreed on the election of Chehab, commander in chief of
the army, to become Lebanon's President.
The 1958 crisis illustrates Lebanon's persistent problems of parochialism and foreign
entanglement. The sectarian divisions in Lebanese political culture inevitably retard the
development of dynamic policy-making. They also make the state highly vulnerable to foreign
manipulation. The President, acting on behalf the Christians, opted for an openly pro-Western
foreign policy and finally invited direct American intervention. The Muslims on the other hand
were open to ideologies of Arab nationalism and to the exciting new developments in the Arab
world. Upon feeling threatened, they accepted armament and support from neighboring Arab
countries. The religious communities thus opted for sectarian alignment as a substitute for
reaching positive national consensus.
The years 1952-1958 also highlight Lebanon's persistent dilemma with administrative reform.
With every intention or attempt at administrative reform, sectarian and political issues come to
the fore. Administrative reform becomes relegated to secondary importance, inevitably
overshadowed by the political events and crises of the day. For example, although a second
reform initiative was attempted under Premier El-Solh in 1954, it ultimately met with failure in
view of the mounting divisions and political complications. Hence, in Lebanon reform policies
are not made and the resultant immobility is most pronounced, not so much because of a lack of
desire by the participants, as it is lack of opportunity given the sectarian and volatile nature of
Lebanese politics.
The Chamoun experience with administrative reform thus highlights two basic observations. It
first illustrates the continuing tradition in Lebanon of factional politics and executive
discontinuity. These traditions generally restrict the government's capacity to formulate,
implement, and follow through on change programs. The Chamoun experience also suggests the
potential influence of the regional and international environments on country-specific programs
of planned change. Lebanon was particularly receptive to regional and international turbulence
during this period, which served to stimulate and aggravate traditional cleavages. As political
complications increased, the regime's ability to carry out reform programs generally declined.
Administrative reform capacity during the Chamoun period was thus undermined by a specific
constellation of cultural/political, regional and international factors. In addition to traditional
sectarian rivalries and factional politics, Lebanon was exposed during this period to mounting
regional turbulence and the infiltration of cold war entanglements into the Arab world. The
political institutions of the state were thus put to the test during this period and the surprising
fact is that they contained the forces of crisis until the last four months, despite a series of
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tactical errors on the part of the President. Much energy was wasted, however, on coping with
the emerging crises/problems and balancing factions, to the detriment of programs of change.
The influence of the international environment was also felt during this period on a different
level, namely with respect to foreign technical assistance. As outlined in chapter 2,
administrative theorizing during this period embodied naïve optimism and faith in the
application of rational scientific principles across boundaries and frontiers. There were thus
massive efforts to export administrative tools to developing countries to tackle problems of
underdevelopment and foster modernization, based on the thesis of 'administration as neutral
technology'. Evidence suggests that Lebanon did not escape the optimism/euphoria
characteristic of this period, as there were several attempts to transfer to the country Western
administrative tools to improve the central machinery of government.
Indeed, a number of foreign experts visited Lebanon in the 1 940s-60s, including representatives
of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies, representatives of the Ford Foundation and
a number of independently recruited experts. Many of the studies and recommendations were
not acted upon in view of the political complications and priorities of the time. There was,
however, an infiltration of some of these ideas for change especially in the Chehabi reform
program of 1958. It is useful to highlight here, albeit briefly, relevant technical assistance
projects to gain familiarity with their diagnosis and recommendations and assess the extent to
which they did indeed influence the direction of change and reform in Lebanon.
Representatives of the United Nations included F. Arro, P. Le Saux, T.C. Young and P.
Senechal. F. Arro and P. Le Saux's study was specifically concerned with the operations of
postal administration. Some of their findings highlight, however, the problems encountered in
the Lebanese administration at large. Upon completing their two-year mission to Lebanon in
1956, the two experts presented a report highlighting the complicated procedures of the
Ministry, the lack of clarity among public officials about duties and responsibilities, and the
lack of training and qualified personnel. They attributed some of the personnel problems to the
influence of patronage. They recommended regular in-training sessions and the automation of
some postal activities/operations.
T.C. Young was an expert in statistical organization and was assigned by the United Nations in
1958 to advise the Lebanese government on statistical planning. His report, entitled 'Proposals
for the Improvement of the Statistics of Lebanon' highlights the poor quality of most of the
records from which statistics are derived and the lack of coordination among government
departments that are involved in the process, such as the civil and criminal courts, the internal
security office, the taxation and municipality bureaus and the Ministry of Public Works. T.C.
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Young suggested a project law for the establishment of a central statistical organization, which
served under Chehab as the basis for the establishment of a Central Statistics Directorate within
the Ministry of General Planning.
P. Senechal was a counselor to the Court of Accounts in the French government. He was
recruited in 1960 for a six-month period to provide advice and assistance to the Lebanese
Bureau of Accounts. Senechal's report highlights the overlapping and lack of coordination
between the Ministry of Finance and the Bureau of Accounts in Lebanon. The pre-occupation of
the Bureau of Accounts with pre-auditing was causing friction and duplication between the two
institutions, as pre-auditing was in essence an administrative function and hence the prerogative
of the Finance Ministry. P. Senechal recommended the strengthening of the post-audit function
of the Bureau, in addition to improving accounting procedures. He also recommended a system
of employee training in post-auditing.
The most important representative of the Ford Foundation was Robert Culbertson, who was
recruited in 1954 to conduct a general study of the Lebanese administration. Mr. Culbertson
conducted a comprehensive survey of Lebanese Administration between October 1954 and
January 1955 and presented a report entitled 'Program of Public Administration Improvement in
Lebanon'. With respect to administrative organization and procedures, Mr. Culbertson reported
long and complicated procedures, over centralization of routine administrative matters, and the
concentration of almost all public authority in the city of Beirut. Consequently, he advised that
the opportunity for reform in these areas lied in the simplification of procedures and
administrative decentralization.
With respect to financial administration, R. Culbertson noted that the budgeting system does not
seem to be sufficiently related to program planning; that the Finance Ministry and the Bureau of
Accounts appear to be performing similar functions and exercising unusually detailed and
possibly unnecessary controls over day-to-day expenditures; and that the hand methods of
accounting in use are no longer adequate to the needs of a modern state. He thus recommended
a detailed and thorough study of fiscal management in Lebanon and investment in modern
mechanized accounting systems.
With respect to personnel administration and employee training, R. Culbertson observed the
lack of a forceful program of technical training for civil servants and the absence of a central
personnel agency in Lebanon. He also noted low public salaries and the absence of employee
incentive systems, and the inability of the present system to promote motivation and better
performance. R. Culbertson recommended in this regard the creation of a national civil service
commission to be responsible for carrying out a positive government-wide personnel program.
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Although the recommendations of R. Culbertson were general and did not dive into the
sectarian and political constraints of the Lebanese environment, they nevertheless serve to
highlight the nature of the administrative problems prevailing during this period. Some of
Culbertson' suggestions were later acted upon during the Chehabist reform of 1958-1964, as
evidenced by the creation of the Civil Service Commission and the National Institute of Public
Administration in 1959. This study was also one of the few to accord some attention to
problems of public service attitudes and motivation.
Besides the programs of foreign technical assistance conducted under the auspices of such
agencies as the United Nations and the Ford Foundation, the Lebanese government has, on
several occasions, concluded direct contracts with individual experts for the purpose of
providing technical assistance in the area of public administration. Most notable in this respect
is the work of William Robson, who recommended as early as 1949, the substitution of the
patronage system of recruitment by open competitive examinations, the introduction of training,
and the strengthening of mechanisms of control in the Lebanese administration.
Also worth mentioning is a study by a French expert, Jacke Rattier, entitled 'Avant-Projet de
Decret Relatif a l'Institut National D'Administration Publique', which recommended the
establishment of a National Institute of Public Administration along the pattern of the French
National School of Administration. This report along with its appendices were literally
translated into Arabic and then adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1959, through the
issuance of executive decree No. 4800 of 25 July 1959, establishing the Lebanese National
Institute of Public Administration. Another French expert, P. Escoube, presented a study
outlining the organization of an Inspection Commission, which was also used in 1959 as the
basis for the establishment of the Central Inspection Commission6.
In summary, foreign technical assistance contributed substantially to the subsequent
development of the organizational structure of the Lebanese administration. This was especially
true under President Fuad Chehab (1958-1964), where the internal drive for reform coincided
with the ideas of these foreign experts. It should be noted, however, that most of the technical
assistance projects and the reforms initiated under Chehab accorded attention to formal
organizational structures, to the neglect of informal processes and problems of attitudes and
behavior. This is consistent with the thesis of 'administration as neutral technology' dominant
during this period, but structural changes remain of little help if the human factor in
administration is not suitably tackled.
6	 For a full description of foreign technical assistance projects, please see Bashir (1970).
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It should also be noted that mechanistic views of organizations focusing on technical expertise
and purposive objectivity have been discredited in recent years. It has been realized that the
normative elements of technical assistance are normally predicated upon a certain kind of socio-
political context, the kind of context, which is distinguished in its absence from nearly every
developing country in the world. There was also embedded in them an ideology -a set of
assumptions about certain basic values- values that did not necessarily fit the circumstances to
which they were being transferred. This explains the general decline in technical assistance
efforts in recent years, following a long period of failed prescriptions and interventions in the
context of many developing countries.
The Regime of Fuad Chehab: 1958-1964
By all accounts, the years 195 8-1964 were the best years of the republic. This can be
undoubtedly attributed to the person, who more than anyone else gave leadership to the new era:
Fuad Chehab. Chehab was renowned for his patriotism and honesty. Commander in chief of the
army since 1943, he was well aware of the plural chaos that had to be managed for Lebanon to
continue to function. The new President shrewdly realized that Lebanon's problems were not
only due to divergent sectarian ideologies but also to the unequal division of power among the
communities. He was thus intent to remedy what he perceived as the underlying causes of
Lebanese dissidence.
Fuad Chehab revealed his good intentions by appointing Prime Ministers with strong backing in
the Sunni community. Moreover as early as 1958 he proclaimed the principle of strict
confessional parity in civil service appointments. He also initiated a series of development
programs, targeting mainly the deprived —Muslim-- regions of the country. His most impressive
achievements in this respect were the initiation of the Litani Project -- a hydroelectric and
irrigation scheme, developing a social security program, extending roads and electricity to rural
areas, and administering the Green Project, whereby farmers received new seed strains and
agricultural assistance (Winslow, 1996).
President Chehab was also intent on reforming and modernizing the Lebanese administration as
a concomitant step for addressing the country's social and economic problems. He thus initiated
an ambitious reform program, within three months of taking office. The Rashid Karami cabinet
secured from parliament legislative decree powers for a six-months period (December 1958-
June 1959), thus initiating the first phase of the reform. Executive decree No. 193 of December
1958 spelled out the objectives of the reform plan as follows:
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U	 In the Area of Duties and Responsibilities:
> To define the duties and responsibilities of each job and administrative unit;
> To reallocate work and re-assign authority in order to reduce duplicationloverlapping;
To deconcentrate authority in order to relieve top officials of simple and routine tasks.
0 In the Area of Operations (Work Methods and Procedures):
To simplify methods and procedures;
) To establish schedules for completion of work transactions;
To improve filing and archiving systems.
0 In the Area of Executive Control:
To establish and insure continuous inspection on all phases of execution;
) To apply effective means of control over independent boards and agencies;
To strengthen inspection in all governmental agencies.
U In the Area of Personnel:
To reduce political and other pressures on civil servants;
> To establish a central personnel agency: the Civil Service Commission;
To establish a central training institute: the National Institute of Public Administration.
In light of those objectives, the Council of Ministers created in December 1958 a Central
Committee to be responsible for directing and overseeing all the research and studies relating to
the reform program. The Central Committee was composed of senior civil servants and
professionals and was attached to the office of the Prime Minister. The Committee then
subdivided its work along functional lines, resulting in the creation of seven preparatory
committees with specific organizational concerns. Task forces were also established in each
ministry to gather information about existing conditions and make recommendations specific to
that agency (Bashir, 1970).
In this sense, the Chehabi reform program was an improvement over previous attempts at
reform in at least two ways: the reform objectives were clearly specified and a reasonable
machinery was set up to oversee the process consisting of a) the Council of Ministers; b) the
Central Committee; c) the Preparatory Committees; and d) the Task Forces. This phase of the
reform program culminated in the issuance of 162 legislative decrees, dealing with almost every
aspect of government organization and policy. The decrees were designed to facilitate
decentralization, define duties and responsibilities more precisely, cut red tape in working
procedures, and improve mechanisms of central control.
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The majority of these legislative decrees replaced those introduced between 1952 and 1955. A
few of them, however, resulted in the creation of new organizational structures, namely, Decree
Law 114 of June 12, 1959, which provided for a Central Civil Service Council (CSC) and a
National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA). Also, Decree Law 115 of June 1959
provided for the creation of a Central Inspection Commission (CIC), including a Directorate of
Research and Guidance (DRG). The creation of these organizations was recommended by a
handful of technical experts to regularize personnel administration and decrease spoils politics
in processes of recruitment and promotion.
The second phase of the Chehabi reform began in December 1959 and continued with
intermittent intensity until the expiration of the President's term in September 1964. This phase
mainly revolved around the implementation of the reform decrees. A Central Committee for the
Implementation of Administrative Reform was created for this purpose on July 13 1959. "It was
given three months to accomplish this Herculean task; two years later, entangled in politics, it
was not finished" (Hudson, 1985, p. 316). This prompted the appointment in June 1963, an
the first time in Lebanon, of a minister for administrative reform to assume responsibility for
reform implementation.
The earliest evaluations of the reforms were hihy critical. The ewsaper, L' Orient, which. had.
traditionally been a strong supporter of the regime, remarked for example in 1960 "Never have
public services been more disorganized and bureaucracy more sluggish than since the famous
decree laws of 1959; Never have public officials taken less initiative" (L'Orient, May 16, 1960).
Two experts in public administration criticized the reform for failing to decentralize thoroughly
and for being rushed through too quickly as a 'bootstrap' operation (Crow and Iskandar, 1961).
With the perspective of four years, two other experts made the following assessment:
In practice the operation was not as well coordinated as in theory and in plan. The reform
proposals, which did come to the Central Committee, were often the products of pressure
rather than of measured, coordinated thinking; and they have embodied the earlier
convictions, if not the interests, of those who were ensconced in the public service
(Grassumk and Salibi, 1964, p 22).
Supporters of the regime appeared to share this view. The minister of state for administrative
reform thought, for example, that the reform had been rather effective at the higher levels, but
had failed to have much impact at the lower levels of administration, where the general public
has most of its contact with the bureaucracy (Khatchik Babikian, quoted in Hudson, 1985, p.
317). There had also been some duplication in the efforts of the Central Committee, the
Implementation Committee and the newly created Ministry of Administrative Reform. There
was a general feeling, not altogether unfounded, that the reform was only beginning to take
effect when President's Chehab term expired in 1964 (Hudson, 1985).
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Despite some failings in terms of its ambitious goals, the Chehabi reform still made several
advances. Through the creation of the Civil Service Council (CSC) and its Nationa' Institute of
Public Administration (NIPA), the reform laid the basis for rationalizing the recruitment process
and improving the quality of personnel. The creation of the Central Inspection Commission
(CIC) also extended central control over administrative programs and allocations. Although
these agencies ran into predictable difficulties with other rival governmental departments and
traditional politicians, they nevertheless filled an important institutional gap in the rudimentary
administrative skeleton in existence.
The Chehab regime also scored spectacular gains through its comprehensive projects of social
and economic development. Much of the appeal of Chehabism was due to the expansion of
electrical, water and road services to areas that had previously been deprived of these services.
By 1964, there were seventy-one independent authorities in operation, the most important of
which were the Railway and Transport Authority, the National Litani River Authority, the
National Reconstruction Authority, the Beirut Water Electricity and the Office of Social
Development. The latter had become the specialized institution for distributing public assistance
to the poorest —Shiite- rural areas.
Of course, not everyone approved of Chehab' s policies. Christians accused the President of
going too far in his policy of 'positive discrimination' towards the Muslims. Some of the
traditional Zuama were also dissatisfied with the newly created autonomous departments as they
seriously curtailed their potential for maneuvering and patronage. Chehab was however known
for his disdain for clique politics. But rather than overtly challenging the traditional leadership,
he tried to sidestep it, relying instead on his own circle of technocratic advisers, and the
Deuxieme Bureau (the office of Lebanese military intelligence) to make sure that government
edicts were carried out.
Moreover, to please the notables, the Chehabist regime decided to raise the number of seats in
Parliament from sixty-six to ninety-nine. The Cabinet was also enlarged to enable as many
parliamentary blocs as possible to have a presence. In this sense, the President was wise enough
to integrate as many of the traditional leaders into the political system and maintain a 'coalition
of oppositions', which could contain those tendencies that went too far in opposing the system.
By sustaining such 'mix and match coalitions' in the composition of the Chamber and the
Cabinet, Chehab was able to govern largely undisturbed for the rest of his term.
Indeed, cabinets averaged 10 men under Chehab -compared with 8 men under Chamoun and 6
men under Khoury- allowing greater scope for personal, sectarian and regional rivalries to
flourish harmlessly. The. Chehabist cabinets also enjoyed, on average, a longer tenure (10
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months). The record for longevity in the history of Lebanese cabinets was indeed set by the
cabinet of Rashid Karami, which took office in November 1961 and resigned in February 1964.
Rashid Karami, who was renowned for his reformist ideas, was Chehab's favorite prime
minister, alternating with Saeb Salam in times of crisis. Government under Chehab thus
operated more smoothly, allowing room for some continuity in executive action.
This is not meant to imply that Chehab did not have to deal with the same factional peddling
that had troubled his predecessors. Even under Chehab, there were instances of sectarian
rivalries, which had the usual disruptive effect on cabinet solidarity and efficiency. An
illuminating example is a dispute over a high bureaucratic appointment between Kamal Jumblat,
the prominent Druze leader, and the then Prime Minister Saeb Salam. The Prime Minister's
objection to the appointment of a follower of Jumblatt prompted the latter to launch an attack
against the premier, condemning his government for everything from encouraging tobacco
smuggling to refusing to recognize Communist China. The President refused to interfere and the
cabinet collapsed of its own weight in late October 1961.
Another example is a dispute that arose under premier Rashid Karami in November-December,
1962 over the proposal of the Minister of Interior, Kamal Jumblat, to shift a number of
Kaymakams from one district to another. Although the decision is administrative in nature and
should have been made by the Interior Minister alone, there were a number of political
considerations at play in view of the upcoming parliamentary elections. The Kaymakams- the
representatives of the central administration in the Cazas- exercise considerable responsibility
for administrative and security arrangements in the parliamentary elections in their districts.
This meant that the decision to transfer them at that critical juncture had serious political costs
and implications.
Expectedly, a number of deputies and ministers objected to the timing and nature of the
proposal. They contended that Jumblat had intentionally proposed to undertake a partial
movement in order to be able to keep the Kaymakam of his region in his post. The issue evolved
into a latent crisis that practically paralyzed the cabinet for nearly three months (November-
January). M. Arslan, Jumblat's traditional Druze rival and Minister of National Defense,
threatened to resign from the Karami cabinet if the transfers take place in their present form.
The President finally had to intervene and insist on the necessity of a general movement to
avoid any association of the permutations with partisan considerations and personal vengeance.
A statement by the Minister of Public Works, Pierre Gemayel, to L'Orient, is indicative of the
nature of the crisis and the issues involved. He declared:
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In my opinion, there is no urgency at present in carrying out a permutation of
Kaymakams. There are much more urgent measures to be taken, which we are holding in
suspense, in order to avoid useless repercussions and arguments. I could understand
proceeding with a plan of permutations if it were not simply a matter of replacing one
Kaymakam with another. But to proceed with a simple plan of permutations is to give
free play to the petty village politics that has done so much harm in Lebanon. Besides,
the Chehab regime has been striving for four years to cure Lebanon of this ill; it has
succeeded to a great extent; but the country is still convalescent in this domain, and it
behooves us to spare it unnecessary shocks (Gemayel, 1962, quoted in Kerr, 1966, p.
195).
These examples clearly illustrate that the classic political games were at full play during this
period, but were circumvented by a presidential leadership of an exceptional caliber. Chehab
managed to stand above partisan politics to preserve the precarious institutions of the Lebanese
state. This was once again illustrated in a dispute that arose in 1960 over Minister Gemayel's
suggestion to the press that Syrian public opinion did not really support President Nasser and
the UAR. Minister Jumblat immediately countered in his editorial for Al-Anba that Lebanon's
'own mountains and valleys' would welcome a visit from the Egyptian President with
resounding enthusiasm. The issue was only settled when the President explicitly disclaimed any
Nasserite designs for Lebanese mountains and valleys.
In this respect, President Chehab was equally sensible and diplomatic in the conduct of the
country's foreign policy. In March 1959, he met with Nasser at the Syrian-Lebanese frontier.
Chehab assured Nasser that Lebanon would adopt a policy of strict solidarity with the Arab
world. Nasser, in turn, recognized the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon. By
officially renouncing any project for union with the UAR, Chehab was able to assuage the fears
of Lebanese Christians and reduce the tensions between the communities. During his term,
Lebanon did nothing that might offend the UAR and regained much needed calm and stability.
Chehab was nevertheless not spared the criticism of promoting a military style of government.
Indeed, by the end of his term, two offices had become powerful centers of coordination: the
Office of Presidential Secretariat and the Deuxieme Bureau. Chehab consistently relied on those
two departments to oversee the establishment of an orderly administration. This has invited
some liberal Lebanese to complain about his authoritative style of government and express fears
that Lebanon was gradually sliding into military dictatorship. But as one author puts it,
These fears were certainly exaggerated. Neither Chehab nor his chief assistants exhibited
dictatorial tendencies, only a more acute perception of the dangers to Lebanon and the
conviction that a stronger state was necessary to meet them than the minimal state the
Lebanese middle class thought sufficient (Hanf, 1993, p. 120).
On balance, the Chehab Presidency was impressive. He was able to restore peace after a civil
war. During his term Lebanon enjoyed six years of security and financial stability. Chehab also

































































responsibility in everyday politics. Most importantly, Chehab attempted to address social
grievances and assumed direct responsibility for a program of social development that he hoped
would rectify the economic imbalances between the communities.
Indeed, a comparison of budget apportionment amongst ministries for 1955 and 1963 indicates
the expanded role of the administration and the regime's overall orientation and priorities (Table
18). The largest funds were allocated to the Ministries of Planning, Information, Public Works,
Social Affairs, and Education, respectively. The emphasis on general planning, public works
and education highlight the Chehabist serious endeavors in the way of balanced social and
economic development.
Table 18. Increase from 1955 to 1963 of Annual Allotment to each Agency (Grassmuk and Salibi, 1964)
Agency
Presidency of the Republic
Chamber of Deputies
Office of the Prime Minister
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of National Defense
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Social Affairs
Ministry of Information
Ministry of Public Works
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of National Economy
Ministry of Post and Telegraph




* 3 LL was equivalent to about 1 USD at that time
Because of the scant literature available on Lebanese administration, it is difficult to account
precisely for the dates of creation of all ministries. Besides the original nine ministries and the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defense created upon independence, it is possible to
establish precisely that the Ministry of General Planning was created in 1954 to serve as a
coordination and implementation unit for major development schemes. In 1977, the Ministry was
abolished and replaced by the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), which was
assigned the same functions.
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The Chehabist Presidency thus involved a genuine attempt to engage in comprehensive
planning and to give the state an active role in social and economic development. The enormous
expansion in public works projects was the most noticeable. The budget of the Ministry of
Public Works increased 6 times between 1955 and 1957, far exceeding that of other major
ministries both in absolute size and relative gains. Massive road building and development
projects were undertaken during this period. "For the first time, the Presidency became the
source of a national political philosophy and the term Chehabism entered the political lexicon.
Chehabism - Lebanon's equivalent of the New Deal - was basically a moderate welfare
ideology tailored to the Lebanese situation" (Hudson, 1985, p. 297).
In terms of the hypotheses derived in Chapter 2, the relative success of the Chehabist reform
may be attributed to: a) the ability of the President to stand above partisan politics and
circumvent Lebanon's traditional political stagnation and immobility; b) the ability of the
President to strengthen executive leadership as evidenced by the longer tenure of Cabinets
during his term and the enlarged powers and budget of the Office of the Prime Minister (all
agencies of central control were also attached to the Office of the Prime Minister); and c) the
ability of the President to insulate Lebanon from the turbulence of the Middle East environment
by adopting a neutral/diplomatic stand in foreign policy.
President Chehab was indeed ingenious and original in his approach to administrative reform.
His awareness of the complexity of the Lebanese social and political landscapes encouraged him
a) to forge a course of autonomous leadership to circumvent the country's traditional
immobility; and b) to approach administrative reform with sensitivity to perceptions of relative
deprivation and inequity among Lebanese communities. His reform program was thus guided by
principles of equity and justice and the administration was systematically enlarged during his
term to serve the interests of the poorest (mostly Shiite) segments of the population.
The end of the Chehabist term brought about the first peaceful presidential succession in
Lebanon. Although he was pressured by many sides to stay in office, Chehab was reluctant to
press for a constitutional amendment and hence undermine the very principles of constitutional
democracy that he had sought to uphold. There are many who speculate that with another six
years of stability and effective leadership under Chehab, Lebanon could have weathered the
tremendous strains of the 1970s and acquired the ways of democratic politics and republican
government. The story, however, took on a different turn when Charles Helou was elected to the
presidential office in 1964.
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The Regime of Charles Helou: 1964-1970
Chehab's successor and protégé, Charles Helou, was anything but a military man. He was rather
a man of letters, the most educated of Lebanese Presidents. Charles Helou was perceived as the
best compromise candidate to succeed Chehab. He had no following or political apparatus of his
own, was a holder of several portfolios in previous Cabinets, and had traditionally been a
floating member of several political groups. He was considered as the ideal (i.e. not very strong)
candidate by the traditional Zuama, many of whom expressed concern and dissatisfaction with
what they perceived as the growing encroachments of the Deuxieme Bureau under Chehab.
Taking office in September 1964, the new President expressed his commitment to continue
along the lines of his predecessor. Indeed, during the early years of his term, Helou continued
the trend of investing in public works and announced the building of new schools in 633
Lebanese villages. In the area of the administration, his reform program revolved around the
problem of corruption and limited accountability in the Lebanese civil service. Several measures
were adopted in the way of promoting adherence to statutory requirements of appropriate
conduct and minimizing abuses and irregularities throughout the administration, namely:
0 The consolidation of a number of existing disciplinary systems into one General
Disciplinary Council, a semi-judicial body, responsible for the prosecution and punishment
of offending employees. The creation of a Central Disciplinary Body for the entire civil
service provided for consistency in disciplinary trials and promoted principles of justice
and equity. It also provided a higher Council, to which violations could be reported, and a
mechanism for initiating legal deterrent action against offending employees.
0 The initiation of a purge movement in 1965 to eliminate incompetent employees. A special
committee was established for this purpose consisting of members of the Civil Service
Council and the Central Inspection Commission. The committee was granted exceptional
powers from Parliament to review the personal files of civil servants and recommend for
their dismissal for reasons of incompetence or corruption. The committee then forwarded
its decisions to the Council of Ministers for approval.
Although the creation of the General Disciplinary Council was a step forward in strengthening
mechanisms of control and disciplinary action, the concomitant purge movement was less than
successful and came to be regarded as one of the low points of administrative reform in
Lebanon (Iskandar, 1993). The fact that the principles of due process were not respected (civil
servants were not informed of the reasons for their termination and were not entitled to any form
of appeal) led to a feeling that the procedure was rather arbitrary. Moreover, the initiative had
limited impact on the problem of corruption in the Lebanese administration, as the purge of 250
civil servants was hardly an effective deterrent against a culture of patronage and abuse.
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While President Charles Helou was still grappling with issues of corruption and limited
accountability in the Lebanese civil service, and working on weakening the institution of the
Deuxieme Bureau to please the Zuama, his foreign policy legacy became increasingly
complicated. The Helou regime had to deal with the problem of Palestinian refugees and their
increasing militancy on Lebanese land. Indeed, Palestinian nationalism had increased
dramatically in the wake of the stunning defeat of the Arab states in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
Palestinians wanted to control their destiny by launching military operations from Arab states
bordering Israel. While Jordan managed to drive the PLO out of its territory in 1970, Lebanon
became gradually entangled between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
More than any other event, the issue of Palestinian militancy helped drive a further wedge
between Muslims and Christian and risked once again destabilizing the country's delicate
communal balance. Muslims were generally sympathetic with the Palestinian cause and
expressed willingness to accommodate the guerillas; Christians were uneasy with the
compromised sovereignty that such accommodation would entail. Moreover, by 1969, the
Lebanese primary enforcement agency - the Deuxieme Bureau- that had so far kept the
Palestinians in check was seriously weakened. Without the Deuxieme Bureau, the government
could only call on the army for policing the Palestinian camps. By October 1969, there were
serious clashes between the Lebanese Army and Palestinian troops.
Under the burden of escalating tensions and splits over appropriate policies vis a vis the
Palestinians, Prime Minister Karami announced his resignation. The country was without a
government for months. The 1969 Cairo Accord evolved in the wake of this crisis. It was
negotiated between the Lebanese Army Chief of Staff and Yasser Arafat under the mediation of
President Nasser. The Accord conceded authority inside the camps to the various Palestinian
Organizations in return for their refrain from involvement in Lebanese domestic affairs. The
signing of this accord signaled an inevitable increase in sectarian polarization and the first
sliding step into civil war and anarchy.
Indeed, fighting between the Palestinian militias and the Lebanese army continued in spite of
the Cairo agreement. By the summer of 1970, there were not only sporadic demonstrations on
behalf of the many communal persuasions but also the emergence of a serious refugee problem
in Lebanon. By July, it was estimated that nearly 25,000 Shiite villagers had evacuated their
homes in the South, heading north in search for calm and security. Many ended up settling in
the peripheral slums of Beirut. The government did not anticipate the serious implications of the
Cairo agreement as attention was primarily focused on domestic power politics and the
presidential elections of 1970.
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By the time President Helou's term came to an end, major groups in the country were
dissatisfied (mainly Shiites and Christians) and were ready to take out their guns in view of the
inability of the government to effectively control the Palestinians and Israeli reprisals on the
South. Not only did the Chehabist development programs and administrative reform come to a
halt, but security conditions in Lebanon had seriously deteriorated in the aftermath of the 1967
Arab-Israeli war. An alliance of traditional leaders had also formed in Parliament. Although
members of this alliance were divided on the basic issues, they were nevertheless intent on
opposing a new Chehabist presidential candidate.
In this sense, the same constellation of factors that undermined the Chamoun reform attempt
served to cripple the initiatives of Charles Helou. Despite his qualifications and good intentions,
President Helou was the prisoner of a situation that imposed narrow limits on executive action.
The escalating turbulence of the regional environment aggravated sectarian cleavages, rendering
it almost impossible to govern the country. "In light of these persistent problems, it was hardly
surprising that President's Helou's administrative reform quickly lost momentum, and his
political stance became defensive rather than innovative" (Hudson, 1985, p. 328).
More than just a passing episode, regional turbulence exerted a consistently divisive influence
on communal coexistence in the pre-war period and was generally detrimental to reform
endeavors. It should be reiterated, however, that Lebanon's vulnerability to such turbulence was
aggravated by its cultural/political complexion. The cultural cleavages of Lebanese society have
indeed facilitated its repeated embroilment in Arab-Israeli rivalries/conflicts, which in turn
increased domestic tensions and complications. These were mutually reinforcing forces which
undermined pre-war reform attempts generally and the Chamoun and IIelou attempts more
specifically.
The Regime of Suleiman Franjieh: 1970-1976
The Presidency of Suleiman Franjieh saw a gradual escalation of the conflict and a polarization
of communities along sectarian lines. Franjieh failed to find an exit to the Palestinian problem.
Franjieh was also the prototype of the traditional Zaim. He had no inhibitions about sharing the
advantages of power with his friends and supporters. He appointed a fellow northerner and
personal friend as Army Chief of Staff, and his son Tony as Minister of Posts and Telegraphs
(Hanf, 1993). During his term, traditional patronage flourished again, coordinated development
policies were abandoned, and the autonomous departments of the Chehabist regime lost much of
their influence and legitimacy.
Although the President began his term by appointing a youth cabinet of reform-minded
technocrats, one after another of the regime's spirited reformers found it necessary to resign
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from the government as they clashed with the Zuama. All development and reform initiatives
subsequently came to a halt. Indeed, not a single reform project was initiated, funded or
implemented during the Franjieh term (Winslow, 1996). Frustration over the regime's social
and economic policies combined with latent sectarian grievances and tensions leading to a
gradual increase in hostility, violence and anarchy.
Subsequent years indeed witnessed an escalation of the conflict and a dramatic increase in
violence. Attention naturally shifted during this period away from issues of development and
reform to the more pressing concerns of ending the hostilities and restoring peace and
tranquility. Given that reform was accorded low priority throughout the war, it seems logical to
turn here to a brief examination of how the Lebanese administration had evolved by that time
before proceeding with an analysis of post-war reform attempts.
THE EVOLVING STRUCTURE OF THE LEBANESE ADMINISTRATION
By the beginning of the war in 1975, Lebanon had a reasonably well-developed administrative
structure. The Lebanese administrative structure comprised three main types of institutions:
1. Institutions of the central government and its field units
2. Institutions of the local government
3. Institutions of independent services and public utilities
Institutions of the Central Government and its Field Units
By 1975, the administrative institutions of the central government at the headquarters level
consisted of: a) the Directorate General of the Presidency of the Republic, b) the Directorate
General of the Prime Ministry, to which were attached the following central control agencies:
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Central Inspection Commission (CIC), the Bureau of
Accounts (BOA), the General Disciplinary Council (GDC), and c) fourteen ministries: Justice;
Foreign Affairs; National Defense; Interior; Finance; Public Works; Public Health; National
Education; Social Affairs; Information; Agriculture; National Economy; Post and Telegraph;
and General Planning, all located in Beirut, with some of them having field offices in the
various sections of the country.
Ministries comprise the major units of the central government. They carry out the traditional
functions of the government. All ministries and public agencies in Lebanon are organized along
a similar pattern, with the Directorate General as the basic administrative unit. The Directorate
General (headed by a Grade I civil servant) is then divided into Directorates and/or Services
(headed by a Grade II civil servant). The Directorates and Services are subdivided into Bureaus
(headed by a chief of Bureau classified in Grade III), which are further subdivided into sections
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(headed by a chief of section, also of Grade III). Subordinate to this hierarchy are two more
echelons: one consists of clerical and technical positions which are classified in Grade IV and
the other consists of manual positions who are classified in Grade V (Figure 4).
The grade system of the Lebanese bureaucracy is based in theory at least on academic
attainment. In principle, Grade I covers professional and administrative work for which
university graduation is pre-requisite. Grade II positions are essentially office-management
posts requiring at least secondary school graduation, and they are usually filled by advancement
from junior services. Grade III jobs require secondary school graduation and cover a wide range
of clerical, sub-professional, and technical occupations. Grade IV are blue-collar positions and
the relatively unskilled office jobs requiring usually only grammar school education. These
occupations are usually hard to distinguish from the manual group category of Grade V.
Ministry or Public Agency, Headed
by a Political Appointee
(The Minister)
Directorate (s) General, Headed by a
Director General
(Grade I)
Directorate(s), Headed	 Service(s), Headed by a	 Directorates and/or
by a Director	 Chief of Service	 Services
(Grade II)	 (Grade II)
Bureaus, Headed by a Chief of a Bureau
(Grade III)
Sections, Headed by a Chief of a Section
(Grade III)
Clerical and certain Technical Posts
(Grade N)
JJ
Manual Posts, such as Janitors, Porters, and Drivers
(Grade V)
Figure 4. Organizational Pattern and Grade System of the Lebanese Bureaucracy (Bashir, 1970)
This is in brief the organizational pattern followed in structuring ministries and public agencies
of the central government in the Lebanese bureaucracy. Certain ministries and public agencies
may consist of more than a single Directorate General depending on the diversity of functions
and the size of the individual institution. There are, however, certain variations to be noted in
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the technical cadres of the Army (Ministry of Defense), Public and Internal Security Forces
(Ministry of Interior), Diplomatic Corps (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and the Judicial Corps
(Ministry of Justice). The differences between the technical cadres and the general
administrative cadre lie mainly in the use of different titles for the same grade, different salary
scales, and certain special personnel regulations.
Moving to the organization of the field units of the central government, Lebanon was divided
into five administrative regions or Muhafazah (now six). These are Beirut, Mount Lebanon,
North Lebanon, South Lebanon, and the Biqa. Each Muhafazah is in turn, subdivided into
separate districts or Cazas. Muhafazats and Cazas constitute the layers of the field units of the
Central Government Administration. The administrative structures established thereby are
extensions of their headquarters and are therefore organized along the same pattern discussed
above, i.e. Directorate General and its subdivisions.
The Muhafazah does not enjoy any legal personality or independent authority. It is a geographic
administrative subdivision, formed by the central government and headed by a grade I civil
servant (the Muhafiz) appointed by the Council of Ministers upon recommendation of the
Minister of Interior. The duties of the Muhafiz are primarily administrative and involve the local
implementation of central government policies. His functions include implementing laws and
regulations, and inspecting and controlling all bureaus and civil servants in his region. Located
at the seat of each Muhafazah are field units corresponding to the following Ministries: Interior;
Justice; Finance; Health; Agriculture; Social Affairs; Labor; Public Works; National Education;
Post and Telegraph; and National Defense.
The 5 Muhafazats (with the exception of Beirut) are in turn subdivided into 24 administrative
districts or Cazas. Of the 24 Cazas, 5 are administered directly by the Muhafiz, because they are
considered capitals of their respective regions 8. The remaining Cazas are administered by a
Kaymakam, a Grade II civil servant appointed by the Council of Ministers upon
recommendation of the Minister of Interior. The Kaymakam represents the central government
administration in the Caza and is directly responsible to the Muhafiz of the region. He thus
performs in the Caza functions similar in nature to those of the Muhafiz. At the base of each
Caza, the central government has further field units, belonging to the following Ministries:
Interior, Justice, Health, and Agriculture. Figure 5 illustrates the overall structure of the central
government administration and its field units in Lebanon.
These are Tripoli, Ba'bda, Zahle, Sidon, and Nabatiyyeh.
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Justice; Foreign Affairs; National Defense; Interior; Finance; Public
Works; Public Health; National Education; Social Affairs;
Information; Agriculture; National Economy; Post and Telegraph,
and Ministry of General Planning.
5 Muhafazahs: Beirut, North Lebanon, Mount Lebanon, Biqa, South Lebanon (and now add Nabattiyeh)
Field units of the Central Government at each Muhafazah belonging to the following ministries:




Tripoli, Akkar, Zgharta, Bshari, Kura, and Batrun —*(Muhafazah of North Lebanon)
Ba'abda, Math, Kisirwan, Shuf, Jbeil, and Aley —(Muhafazah of Mount Lebanon)
Zahie, Ba'albeck, Rashayyah, West Biqa', and Hirmil —>(Muhafazah of Biqa')
Sidon, Nabatiyyah, lyre, Marjiyyun, Bint Jubail, Jizzin, and Hasbayyah —(Muhafazah of South
Lebanon)
Field units of the central government at each Caza belonging to the following Ministries: Interior; Justice;
Public Health; and Agriculture.
Figure 5. Structure of the Central Government Administration and Its Field Units (Bashir, 1970)
Institutions of the Local Government
As for local government in Lebanon, authority is entrusted to two locally elected bodies, al-
Baladiyyah (Municipality) and al-Mukhtariyyah (Council of Elders). The municipality is a
public agency with a legal personality. It can be established by a decree issued by the Minister
of Interior for communities satisf'ing the requirements for attaining a municipal status, namely
a minimum population of 300 persons and revenues in excess of the equivalent of $3000. Each
municipality is governed by a municipal council elected by general suffrage. The number of
councilors varies from 8 to 24 proportionate to the size of the community. The council elects its
chairman, the Mayor, who heads its administration and directs its activities. Figure 6 illustrates
the structure of a Lebanese Municipality.
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(Tutelage Line of Authority)
Municipal Council Elected by the Communities Granted Municipal
Status with a Size Varying from 8-24 Councilors.
(Hierarchical Line of Authority)
Chairman of the Municipal Council, the Mayor, Elected by the Council from its
Members
(Hierarchical Line of Authority)
The Administrative Units of the Municipalities (Directorates General and their Subdivisions) and their
Personnel Cadres.
Figure 6. Structure of a Municipality (Bashir, 1970)
The other locally elected body is the Mukhtari)zyah. Every village or section of a town or city
which has a population of over 50 persons is entitled to have an elected official or M'uiM tar, and
a Majlis al-Ikhtiariyyah (Council of Elders), the size of which varies from two to six members
depending on the size of the community. The Mukh tar and his council are representatives of the
local community as is the Council of the Municipality, but their jurisdictions differ. The
Mukh tar renders a certain number of services to the inhabitants of the community as well as to
the central government and field unit authorities. He provides, for example, statements of birth,
death, personal identification, property (land records), and inheritance. His work is somewhat
controlled by the Council of Elders through their countersignatures on the documents issued or
approved by the Mukhtar.
Institutions of Independent Services and Public Utilities
The Lebanese administration has also developed over the independence yeas a number of semi-
autonomous services and public utilities. All are usually attached to the ministries of the central
government, but enjoy a certain degree of administrative and financial autonomy. Each
independent agency or public enterprise is placed under the tutelage of a specific ministry and
run by a governing board, consisting of five to nine members, all appointed by the Council of
Ministers. Examples include the National Social Security Fund, the Executive Council of Major
Projects, the Water Authority of Beirut, the Electricity of Lebanon, the Litani River Authority,
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the Railways and Public Transportation, the Port of Beirut, the National Archives, the National
Council of Research, the National Employment Agency, and OGERO9.
The main reason for the proliferation of semi-autonomous agencies in Lebanon, as in other
developing countries, was to mitigate the rigors of normal financial, procurement, and personnel
controls for activities which require energy, innovation, and dynamism and must respond
quickly to changing situations, the assumption being of course that government and its ordinary
procedures are slow, legalistic and cumbersome. However, the government has attempted to
retain control over these corporations by selecting some key officials for these agencies from
inside the civil services and placing government representatives (always including one from the
Treasury and one from the responsible ministry) on the board of directors of each corporation.
Figure 7 illustrates the structure of an independent service or public utility in Lebanon.
This was a brief overview of the structure of the Lebanese administration as it had evolved by
the beginning of the war in 1975. This structure has undergone only minor modifications in the
post-war period (apart from the creation of a significant number of new ministries in 1993).
Although the main focus of the thesis is on the central government administration, this general
overview is important in clarifying the basic institutional structures and their inter-relationships.
This section will be most useful and will be referred to subsequently in our examination of the
Telecommunications and Transportation sectors in Lebanon, which often comprise a central
ministry working in coordination (theoretically at least) with other municipalities and/or
independent agencies. Appendix C highlights the organizational structure of selected ministries
and public authorities in Lebanon.
The trend toward the creation of semi-autonomous agencies in Lebanon started under President
Chamoun (1952-1958) and continued unabated throughout the independence years.
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Tutelage Ministry	 I
Governing Board, Size Varies from
5-9 Members, Including the
Government Commissioner
Directorate General, or Directorate
Headed by a Director General or a
Director, Respectively
(Grades I & II Respectively)
Directorate, Headed by	 Service, Headed by a	 Directorate and/or
a Director	 Chief of Service	 Service
(Grade II)	 (Grade II)	 __________________________
Bureaus, Headed by Chiefs of Bureaus
(Grade III)
Sections, Headed by Chiefs of Sections
(Grade III)
Positions of Grade IV	 I
Positions of Grade V	 I
Figure 7. Structure of an Independent Service or Public Utility (Bashir, 1970)
RECRUITMENT, SOCIALIZATION AND TRAINING
Recruitment to the Lebanese administration was, until 1959, the prerogative of individual
ministries. The creation of the Civil Service Council in 1959 signaled the first attempt at
standardizing personnel policies. The Council provided for recruitment on the basis of
competitive examinations to all grades and civil service positions, except those in Grade I,
which were reserved for political appointments. Candidates for Grades III, VI, and V have to sit
for civil service examinations administered by the CSC. Appointments to Grade II, however, are
made solely from within the administration again on the basis of competitive examinations.
Appointments for daily and contractual workers require no examination, but the approval of the
CSC is still mandatory.
This brief description provides a theoretical account of the recruitment process in Lebanon.
Actual practice, however, is known to be much different. Indeed, there is a clear contradiction
between the concept of competitive examinations and Article 95 of the Lebanese Constitution,
which provides for the equitable representation of sects in public employment. Adherence to the
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principle of sectarian balance implies that the selection of candidates is not based solely on
performance in civil service examinations. The frequent subordination of the merit principle to
sectarian considerations has had an adverse effect on getting the best talents into the Lebanese
public service, as inferior candidates are on many occasions given priority over more qualified
elements in order to meet confessional demands (Bashir, 1970).
E1-Khazen comments, for example, that "in Lebanon, the quota system in government
employment is the only available institutional mechanism to contain communal grievances. A
merit-based system in government bureaucracy (meritocracy) will generate communal
polarization and political crises" (El-Khazen, 1987, p. 362). He adds, "the selection to
government office is not solely based on performance in entrance exams, for appointees have to
be drawn from the various communities regardless of their test scores in order to preserve
sectarian balance. Obviously, this is conducive to inefficiency and corruption, but that is the
only second-best arrangement available for a country like Lebanon" (El-Khazen, 1987, p. 363).
Evidence suggests that the continuing adherence to the principle of sectarian balance in civil
service appointments reflects not only on administrative efficiency but also on employee
attitudes/behavior. Most bureaucrats still feel that their loyalties and responsibilities lie mainly
with their patrons and their sects and not with the state as a whole. When approached for
assistance in administrative matters by members of their reference group, civil servants find
themselves obliged to expedite unofficial requests, to the detriment of other more important
responsibilities. "A civil servant finds nothing wrong in providing a service to a fellow sect
member even at the expense of the law and the public interest" (Iskandar, 1964, p. 33).
Crow (1966) for example reports that higher civil servants are frequently approached for
assistance in administrative matters, not because they are directly concerned, but because they
belong to the same reference group and thus are assumed to have the same group
responsibilities and obligations.
It is almost axiomatic that when a Lebanese citizen must approach the administration for
a purpose beyond the most elementary and routine, he first seeks out someone in
government whom he knows, that is someone with whom he shares one or more primary
relationships, and therefore someone upon whom he can call for assistance on the basis
of this ascriptive relationship. This is true when his request is perfectly in order and fully
his right as when he seeks some special consideration not fully in accordance with
administrative regulations (Crow, 1966, p. 174).
The fact that access to the administration is still made on an ascriptive basis is partly cultural,
and reflects the continuing importance of sectarian attachments in Lebanon. It is also in many
respects a practical behavior, reflecting a genuine distrust of administration and government.
Grassmuk for exarnple observes "there is the feeling, not altogether unfounded, that
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administration in Lebanon is not regularized as much as it is personalized, and that only the man
who has friends in key positions can get what he wants from the government" (Grassmuk and
Salibi, 1955, p. 27). Lebanese people thus find the political, sectarian and/or personalized
channel often a more efficacious approach to government than the administrative.
This anomaly in Lebanon may also be due to a distorted concept of public authority /
accountability among Lebanese civil servants. Public authority is still conceived as being
conferred from politicians and higher administrators, rather than from the public. Bashir (1970),
for example, comments that "the majority of public servants in Lebanon still look upward for
favor, knowing that by pleasing their patrons and superiors, they have no need to worry about
the citizenry" (Bashir, 1970, p. 45). The prevailing clientelistic culture thus distorts the concept
of public accountability, undermining responsiveness to the needs of the citizenry.
While improved responsiveness and customer service have been leading objectives of recent
public sector reforms, these reform components have been sadly missing in Lebanon. Most
attempts at reform (both before and after the war) have focused on structural changes, to the
neglect of instilling changes in bureaucratic attitudes and behavior. This may be attributed to the
complexities of the Lebanese environment and the difficulties associated with changing long-
ingrained values/patterns of behavior. It may also be partly attributed to deficiencies in civil
service training programs, which are an important tool (in theory at least) for effecting changes
in employee behaviors, motivations and values.
Indeed, the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) which had assumed in 1959
exclusive responsibility for the training of civil servants in Lebanon encountered serious
problems since its very inception. Besides the difficulty of finding and attracting qualified
training/teaching staff, the Institute initiated its training program in 1960 without undertaking a
systematic survey of the needs of the Lebanese administration. It has thus sought to offer
general training programs (pre and post entry), the objectives and contents of which were
determined in advance by a handful of higher civil servants and foreign experts. Moreover,
there had never been a systematic attempt to evaluate the impact of those programs to assess the
extent to which they have effectuated the desired changes whether in knowledge/skills or
attitudes/behavior.
The combination of these specific patterns of recruitment, socialization and training produces an
administrative culture, which is both peculiar and resistant to change. This in turn further
highlights the complexity of administrative reform in Lebanon, for what is needed is a wide-
scale readjustment or reorientation which involves a systematic reappraisal of the processes of
recruitmentlselection, training, and the complex dynamics of socialization. This is obviously a
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daunting undertaking, and helps explain perhaps the reluctance of Lebanese reform agents (both
before and after the war) to seriously engage in anything but changes of a structural or
reorganization nature. It is clear, however, that in the absence of alternative administrative
styles, the success of structural changes will likely remain limited indeed.
The Impact of the War on the Lebanese Administration
The long years of war have had a devastating impact on all sectors of Lebanese society and
economy, including the public administration. The major productive sectors suffered the most.
Tourism ceased effectively, trade and transit activity through Lebanese ports and territory
shrank considerably, industry incurred substantial damage, and agriculture was in almost total
ruins (UNDP, 1997). Emerging from the war in 1990, Lebanon was deprived of its role as a
regional and financial center, and drastically displaced from the upper echelons of Third World
countries to the position of one of its lowest (Nasr, 1989).
The public administrative sector also suffered heavy losses because of the extensive damage to
office buildings and facilities, and the inability of the government to collect public revenues
throughout the years of war. Studies conducted by the Lebanese government in the aftermath of
the war found the administration wanting in terms of equipment, computer stations, training and
technical assistance (NARP reports, 1995). The administration also sustained serious drains in
personnel due to the forced displacement of workers and the emigration of skilled labor. It is
estimated that as of 1992 about 60 percent of civil service positions were still vacant (Iskandar,
1993). This shortage in personnel constitutes a serious obstacle to administrative reform in the
post-war period.
Moreover, the war virtually isolated the administration from the important developments that
were taking place in the world economy. It thus froze the normal process of administrative
adaptation and insulated the system from the rest of the world for almost two decades - precisely
when technological advances and practical experience were leading many countries to eliminate
redundant controls and formalities, shed certain functions, give more space to individual
initiative, and streamline administrative decision-making. The Lebanese public sector has thus
lost throughout the war years on substantial opportunities to improve its performance and to
deploy its resources more effectively.
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN POST-WAR LEBANON
The Regime of Elias Hrawi: 1989-1998
With the conclusion of the Taif agreement, and the election of a new President in 1989,
Lebanon began its first step on the road to peace and normalcy. The government was faced with
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the daunting task of rehabilitating damaged sectors, providing essentials and services, and
undertaking fundamental reforms. It was obvious to all concerned that such a task could not
possibly succeed without a revitalized and effective public administration. "The revival of the
public administration was not only necessary for reinstating the basic role and services of the
state, but more importantly for restoring public confidence in government and promoting
political unity and stability in the country" (Iskandar, 1996, p. 5).
Despite the increasing awareness of the need to revitalize the public administration, the regime
of Elias Hrawi was not able to devote attention to this matter until 1992 because it was
preoccupied with a variety of political problems, such as amending the constitution to
incorporate the changes included in the Taif agreement, disbanding and disarming the militias,
and re-asserting and extending the authority of the state. The 14-member cabinet formed in the
aftermath of the Taif devoted its attention to those pressing concerns. Its ultimate priority was to
restore basic security and stability to the country and to consolidate the precarious truce among
the feuding political factions.
In August 1990, a new cabinet was appointed, headed by Prime Minister Omar Karami. The
new cabinet was expanded and came to be composed of 30 ministers. The cabinet of Omar
Karami devoted its attention to the process of making balanced sectarian appointments to Grade
I civil service positions as stipulated by the Taif agreement. The process, however, proved to be
cumbersome and frustrating, because of sharp differences within the expanded Council of
Ministers. After long discussions, the Council of Ministers was able to agree on filling only a
small number of those positions, before the cabinet was forced to resign in May 1992.
The Karami cabinet was hastily chased out of office because of the deteriorating economic
situation. For two years the government had been financing the growing war-induced deficit by
printing money, which led in the summer of 1992 to an inflation rate of 120 percent and a
sudden devaluation of the Lebanese pound from 1.150 to the dollar to 2.830 (Denoeux and
Springborg, 1998). The deteriorating social and economic conditions prompted widespread
demonstrations and riots, forcing the cabinet to resign in May 1992. This necessitated the
appointment of a new cabinet under the premiership of Rafic Hariri, a leading business
entrepreneur in Lebanon.
Hariri's first priority was to stabilize the cunency and to improve the deteriorating state of the
economy. He quickly implemented IMF-type stabilization measures, which in combination with
the optimism his presence instilled, resulted within two months in a revaluation of the cunency
by some 1.000 pounds and a sharp decline in inflation to 29 percent in 1993. Hariri also
launched an ambitious reconstruction plan, Horizon 2000. Its centerpiece was the building of an
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entirely new business district for Beirut, in addition to the re-establishment of adequate basic
infrastructure. Table 19 shows a summary content of Horizon 2000 and the planned distribution
of expenditures among sectors.








Physical infrastructure (electricity, communications, roads, and highways)
Social infrastructure (education, youth and sports, vocational and technical training,
higher education, health, social affairs, housing, the displaced)
Socio-economic services (water, effluents, solid wastes, environment, public transport and
railways)
Productive sectors (agriculture and irrigation, industry and petroleum, airport ports, free
zones, tourism, private sector services)
Government apparatus (government buildings, security forces, information, and public
administration)
The total financial requirements of the plan are USS 31 billion at current prices. The plan
scenario expects these financial requirements to be met from external and internal sources, as
shown in Table 20. The plan considers that public outlays of US$ 18 billion are necessary to
stimulate private sector involvement, and, accordingly, expects it to invest around US$ 42
billion over the duration of the program. Indeed, this is consistent with earlier patterns, where
available information indicates that private sector investment in Lebanon has invariably been
four to five times that by the public sector (UNDP, 1997).










































In reality, the reconstruction plan has been financed primarily by treasury bills (T-bills), most of
which have been sold to Lebanese banks (The Oxford Business Group, 1998, p. 18). The high
interest rates on T-bills have in turn deprived the private sector of the capital it needs, since
banks have understandably preferred to invest in safe, high-yield T-bills rather than lend to
private companies. This phenomenon has not only hindered the execution of the plan but has
also contributed to a consistent decline in the economy's growth rate: from 8 percent in 1994,
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Figure 8. GDP Growth (Constant 1994 Prices) (Gressani and Page, 1999)
Also alarming is the mushrooming of the public debt from approximately $2 billion in 1992 to
approximately $15 billion - more than 100 percent of the GDP in early 1998 (The Oxford
Business Group, 1998, p. 21). Moreover, the cost of servicing the debt is eating up an ever-
larger share of government revenues, even as those revenues increase; debt service in 1998 is
expected to consume about half of total expenditures. Salaries and debt servicing combined
devour about 80 percent of the annual budget, leaving a mere 15% for capital expenditure,
thereby causing the reconstruction effort to slowly but steadily grind down (Figure 9).
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Figure 9. Breakdown of Fixed and Capital Expenditures (Barakat, 2000)
The state thus has a desperate need for new revenues, especially considering the low tax rate,
which is well below 20 percent of GNP. Moreover, in 1994, personal and corporate income
taxes were reduced from 32 percent and 50 percent respectively to 10 percent. Since 1996, the
government has been trying to raise some new revenues through the imposition of
miscellaneous regressive taxes and fees. The annual vehicle tax alone rose by 400 percent in
1997. In addition, trade barriers - such as customs duties on imported cars and food imports—
were increased significantly in 1997 and now represent as much as 40 percent of government



















As for tariffs, which already represent the largest single source of the state's income, they
cannot be further raised for three reasons. First, at least half of the goods consumed in Lebanon
are imported, so that further increases in tariffs could contradict the government's low-inflation
strategy. Second, the reconstruction plan is based on the premise of Lebanon regaining its role
as an entrepot, which in turn requires low tariffs. Third, Lebanon is seeking to sign a partnership
deal with the EU and to join the WTO both of which require dramatic reduction in the country's
currently high rate of trade protection (Deneoux and Springborg, 1998).
There is a wide consensus today on the fact that the most important challenge for the
consolidation of stable conditions in the country is the state of government finances. As a
percentage of official GDP estimates for 1999, public debt was reported to be above 136% of
GDP at year-end 1999, against an emerging countries' average of 57.5% (Figure 10). Such a
high debt is imposing a significant burden on Lebanon's budget through debt servicing and
fueling again deficit and debt. The deficit ration likewise was reported at 14% of GDP,
significantly high by emerging countries' standards (the average for emerging markets was
reported at 3.9% for 1999 based on Flemings statistics).
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Figure 10. Public Debt to GDP (in %) (Barakat, 2000)
Various scholars have underscored the centrality of fiscal adjustment to the success of post-war
reconstruction and recovery efforts. In their report Reconstruction in Lebanon: Challenges for
Macroeconomic Management, Gressani and Page (1999) for example note that "the
unsustainability of current fiscal trends and the lack of independent monetary instruments
require that top priority be given to fiscal adjustment in order to ensure that the current
imbalances do not lead to macro-economic instability and thus jeopardize the prospects for a
long term recovery" (Gressani and Page, 1999, p. 9). Without a sizeable reduction in the fiscal
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deficit and real interest rates, the prospects for sustained reconstruction and economic growth
risk indeed being undermined.
Some authors further argue that public finance convergence in Lebanon can no longer be
secured through traditional resource mobilization efforts or rapid reform measures, even within
the context of drastic austerity measures. They insist accordingly that the only way out of this
vicious circle of deficit and indebtedness is through drastic privatization measures, which would
secure significant treasury proceeds, hence helping reduce the yearly deficits to their sustainable
primary levels.
What is for sure is that debt and deficit ratios have indeed reached alarming levels
relative to the size of the domestic economy. What is for sure as well is that budget
measures are not anymore enough to secure inflection of debt ratios even within drastic
assumptions of austerity and further resource mobilization. With 85% of government
spending considered fixed expenditures @ublic sector wages and debt servicing),
austerity and spending restraint have limited maneuver... The breach of such a vicious
circle through drastic privatization measures has become today a critical and timely issue
which constitutes a prerequisite for the state's ability to secure a public finance soft
landing (Barakat, 2000, pp.1 -3).
In the meantime, the budget deficit may continue to increase, in which case the government will
be forced to turn to foreign borrowing to cover it. Already in March 1998, the government
floated a Eurobond loan of $800 million, bringing its foreign debt to some $ 2.4 billion. It is
interesting to note that the dramatic rise in the cost of the state under Hariri has not been driven
by a commitment to establishing a strong state, capable of guiding the economy and reshaping
society. Instead, the Prime Minister's reconstruction strategy has preserved a weak state while
increasing its costs several fold (Deneoux and Springborg, 1998).
Indeed, Hariri failed to show any interest in modernizing the Lebanese state and/or
administration. Instead, he decided to leave the existing state as is and to proceed with his
reconstruction strategy. Some attribute this orientation to the nature of the state that Hariri
inherited. "That state was, as it has always been in Lebanon, an uneasy assemblage of
conflicting interests and leaders with widely different and often irreconcilable objectives and
priorities" (Deneoux and Springborg, 1998). Another explanation is the strengthened role of
Parliament in light of the 1990 constitutional amendments and its reluctance to grant the
government the leeway it needs for quick/decisive action.
Although the Hariri government initially underlined its strong commitment to administrative
reform as a way of enhancing the credibility of the government and encouraging investments in
Lebanon, its various attempts have met with frustration and failure. The first Hariri Cabinet
attempted to secure special legislative powers from Parliament to proceed with its program of
administrative reform. In light of Parliament's refusal to grant it such powers, the government
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referred to it a bill providing for the suspension of the immunity of civil servants. After lengthy
debate and discussions, the Parliament approved the bill in late February 1993.
The Hariri government proceeded by warning civil servants of its upcoming purge movement
and giving them incentives to take advantage of early retirement. This prompted the resignation
of 3100 civil servants. The government then appointed a special committee (consisting of
officials from the CSC and CIC) and entrusted it with reviewing the files of civil servants and
recommending dismissals on grounds of incompetence, unethical conduct, or ill-health.
Following the recommendations of the committee, the government dismissed a total of 450
employees. Most of the discharged employees resorted to appeal and were reinstated by the
Council of State on grounds of violation of due process (Kisirwani, 1998).
The 1993 purge movement was therefore a total failure, frustrating to the government, to the
employees and to citizens. "The unmistakable message of this reinstatement was that crime
pays, and the level of governmental corruption increased noticeably according to informed
observers" (Deneoux and Springborg, 1998, p. 168). The rise of corruption in the wake of this
failed purge movement is not surprising, especially if one also keeps in mind low public sector
wages, the rise in the cost of living and the serious socialleconomic hardships faced by low
income groups in Lebanon. Official mechanisms of accountability in the Lebanese bureaucracy
are also weak, making it easy for the occupants of state office to use their positions for personal
gain or to benefit patronage networks.
Another move of the Hariri government, which met with criticism and denunciation was the
creation in 1993 of twelve new ministries' 0 without due consideration to the potential impact of
such policy on remaining ministries or the overall administrative structure. The newly created
Office of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) has reported a remarkable increase in
problems of overlapping and duplication in the wake of this re-organization effort. Examples
are the overlapping mandates of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the newly created Ministry
of Emigrants, or those of the Ministry of Interior and the newly created Ministry of Municipal
and Rural Affairs (OMSAR, Annual Report, 1997-1998).
'° The ministries established in 1993 are: Labor; Tourism; Hydraulic and Electric Resources; Industry
and Petroleum; Housing and Cooperatives; Environment; Transportation; Emigrants; Culture and
Higher Education; Displaced Persons; Municipal and Rural Affairs; and Vocational and Technical
Education.
The Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) was created in 1994 as an
interim agency designed to promote and coordinate all institutional development endeavors
throughout the administration.
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It is interesting to note that while most countries are seeking to reduce the size of their
bureaucracies, the Lebanese government has opted to increase the size of its bureaucracy by
almost two-fold in 1993. Although some of the ministries created were intended to reflect the
government's commitment to certain policies and priorities in the wake of the war (e.g. sound
environmental policies, infrastructure development, and attending to the problems of the
displaced / emigrants), there is consensus that the ministries were hastily created without regard
to the overall organizational structure or sound management principles. Professor Kaysi of the
AUB attributes this hasty re-organization initiative to political motives, more specifically to the
politics of accommodation,
The idea behind the creation of new ministries as part of the 1993 Hariri re-structuring
movement was to allow for new ministers to assume positions of influence and hence
satisj5i all war leaders and politicalfactions [Kaysi, July 18, 2000].
While some of the ministries created in 1993 might have come into existence in view of some
re-conception of needs and priorities, there is little doubt that the Hariri re-organization
movement was simultaneously intended to satisf' a larger pool of political and sectarian leaders
through the promise of ministerial portfolios. Indeed, the Council of Ministers has come to
include thirty ministers throughout the successive Hariri administrations (1992 through 1995),
as opposed to 14 ministers in 1989 and 16 ministers in 199812. This enlargement can certainly
be attributed in great part to the politics of accommodation.
The Hariri government also encountered serious difficulties in the process of making
appointments to Grade I positions in the administration. This was due to sharp differences in the
enlarged Council of Ministers. "The present Council of Ministers has almost become a mini
Parliament where it is difficult to reach consensus or agreement on important issues" (Iskandar,
1993, p. 49). The process of filling top level positions also resulted in serious disagreements and
friction between the Prime Minister, the Speaker, and the President (the troika), each of whom
was intent on having a say and bringing his own followers and supporters.
Difficulties in making balanced sectarian appointments to Grade I positions in the
administration (as stipulated by Taif) persisted, with the government making limited
appointments when consensus was possible and when the need became urgent/pressing. What is
more alarming, however, is the large number of vacancies in the remaining grades of the
administration and in practically all ministries and administrative departments. The government
has failed in its efforts to fill these vacancies with qualified personnel. This is primarily
attributed to the low salaries offered and the government's inability to make any significant
12	 These numbers are derived from Table 16.
189
salary adjustments in view of the looming financial crisis. Table 21 presents a breakdown of
established positions and vacancies by ministry as of 1995.
Table 21. Current Staffing Situation in Lebanese Ministries
Agency	 Established Occupied Vacancies Contra ctuals
Positions	 Positions in Ministiy & Daily
Workers
Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications 	 7834	 2129	 5705	 2380
MinistryofFinance	 2688	 1568	 1120	 188
Ministry of Justice	 2454	 827	 1627	 -
Ministry of Public Health	 1441	 338	 1103	 2237
Ministry of Agriculture	 1176	 244	 932	 803
Ministry of Transportation 	 1021	 346	 675	 162
Ministry of Public Works 	 938	 286	 652	 1225
Ministry of Interior 	 761	 300	 461	 1089
Ministry of Hydraulic & Electric Resources 	 578	 159	 419	 115
MinistryofSocialAffairs	 470	 115	 355	 -
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 	 453	 265	 189	 48
Ministry of Culture & Higher Education 	 369	 21	 348	 418
Ministry of Housing & Cooperatives 	 294	 69	 225	 51
Ministry of Displaced	 238	 1	 237	 200
Ministry of Economy and Trade 	 235	 56	 179	 339
Ministry of Municipal & Rural Affairs 	 189	 12	 177	 6
Ministry of Tourism	 265	 41	 124	 104
Ministry of Labor	 190	 46	 144	 -
Ministry of Environment 	 139	 5	 134	 24
Ministryoflndustry&Petroleum	 118	 32	 86	 5
Ministry of Emigrants	 114	 31	 83	 -
Ministry of Technical & Vocational Education 	 56	 28	 28	 -
NARP, 1995 Reports
(Not included are the Ministry of Defense; Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sports; and the Ministry of
Information)
It is certain and obvious that recruitment needs in Lebanon today cannot be derived from the
number of vacancies reported here. This is because the number of vacant positions as reported
by ministries has been based on the original number of positions established by cadre, which is
' The National Administrative Rehabilitation Program (NARP) is a short-term recovery program that
sought to rehabilitate ministries and public agencies in Lebanon with office space and basic office
equipment. NARP was funded by the World Bank and the Arab Fund Loan and was based on a
comprehensive institutional audit of missions and mandates, organizational structures, and staffing
situation in all Lebanese ministries and public agencies followed by an estimation of immediate
needs in terms of personnel, training, premises, basic office equipment, furniture, vehicles,
computers, and technical assistance.
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itself outdated and in need of a comprehensive review. The numbers however still reflect acute
personnel shortages in the Lebanese administration. They also show a pattern of large
employment in the contractual/daily worker category. It is speculated that many of those
employees have been put on the payroll through various means used to circumvent civil-service
regulations in order to service patronage networks.
Vacancies in the permanent cadres of the Lebanese administration pose a serious problem to all
reform efforts and initiatives —they exceed 50% of established positions, and in some ministries,
the shortage exceeds 75%14• Moreover, there are acute shortages in some professional areas of
the public service (e.g. engineering, computer systems management, economics, statistics, IT) as
the private sector provides superior terms and conditions of employment for the holders of such
skills. Specialization is thus relatively lacking in the Lebanese public service, especially that
most middle level managers still hold degrees in literature, philosophy, history or geography
(OMSAR, Annual Report, 1997-1998).
The large surplus of contractual and daily workers poses another problem that needs to be
addressed. Based on article 86 of legislative decree 113 of 1959, staff are to be contracted for
specific jobs and for a limited period. In practice, all contract workers in Lebanon have had their
contracts renewed automatically by a decision of the Council of Ministers, regardless of their
job performance or whether they are still needed. Altogether, there are over 10,000 contract
workers in the Lebanese administration, not counting those in the teaching corps (OMSAR,
Annual Report, 1997-1998). If these are reduced according to need, then the administration
could afford to fill the vacant key positions without additional cost to the treasury.
OMSAR has suggested a number of measures to deal with the problem of surplus contractual
and daily workers. None of the recommendations have been acted upon. These include:
U Assessing the needs of each administration for contract staff and determining the number
and performance of existing staff;
U Laying off surplus contractual staff, with a six-month allowance based on most recent
salary;
LI Reducing the retirement age to 58 with a six-month allowance on last salary. This measure
is expected to result in the retirement of half of the existing temporary staff;
4 For example, the Ministry of Information has 90 percent vacancy in its cadre, with only 40 civil
servants, while it has 1700 agents (non-established staff), who, in some instances assume
managerial positions within the Ministry (OMSAR, Annual Report, 1997-1998).
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LI Re-deploying remaining daily workers throughout public enterprises/municipalities
according to needs, while giving them the option to adopt an early retirement plan
(OMSAR, 1998).
While reform attempts in the pre-war period have accorded some attention - albeit very limited-
to issues of human resource management as evidenced for example by the creation of the CSC
and the NIPA, post-war reform attempts have merely focused on structural changes and re-
organization. This trend consists a serious shortcoming in post-war reform efforts, given that
human resource development and management are central concerns to reformers aiming for
greater efficiency and effectiveness in state bureaucracies. Indeed, as outlined in chapter 1,
reform success hinges on the deployment of mutually reinforcing instruments, organizational
and behavioral, and on building indigenous capabilities, which have the capacity to sustain
innovations.
Unfortunately, as this review makes clear, this reform component has been sadly neglected in
post-war reform efforts as evidenced for example by the government's inaction vis a vis the
severe shortages in technical and managerial staff. Lebanese officials also lack training and
expertise in relevant policy fields. The looming financial crisis was such that the function of
civil service training was accorded low priority in the wake of the war, despite its importance in
updating the skills/knowledge of civil servants, providing exposure to new management
principles and technologies, and inculcating new norms and values. Sadly enough,
administrative reform has been equated on too many occasions in Lebanon with changes in
structures, to the neglect of less visible but nevertheless very important attitudinal reforms.
This trend has indeed been re-confirmed once again by the most recent re-organization attempt
of the Hoss government (1998-2000) whereby the merger of a number of ministries and
councils has been hastily effected in August 2000' s . While the streamlining of administrative
structures tends to be a main thrust of administrative reform in periods of fiscal retrenchment,
experts concur that the recent mergers were also not based on sound legal/scientific principles
and that the decision was driven primarily by political considerations. Indeed, the Hoss mergers
5 Upon the recommendation of the new Hoss administration (1998-2000), the merger of a number of
ministries and councils has been approved by the Lebanese Parliament in August, 2000, namely: 1)
the Ministry of Emigrants and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 2) the Ministry of Municipal and
Rural Affairs and the Ministry of Interior; 3) the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Public
Works; 4) the Ministry of Housing and Cooperatives and the Ministry of Agriculture; 5) the
Ministry of Industry and Petroleum and the Ministry of Hydraulic and Electric Resources; 6) the
Ministry of Technical and Vocational Education and the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education;
and 7) the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), the Conseil Executif Des Grands
Projets (CEDP) and the Conseil Executif Des Grands Projets De La Ville De Beyrouth (CEDPVB)
(Lebanon, 2000b).
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were not consistent for example with the merger recommendations of OMSAR' 6. Dr. Kaysi of
the AUB observes in this regard, "In essence, the mergers boil down to an attempt at reversing
everything Hariri has done under the pretext of reducing waste and duplication" [Kaysi, July
18, 2000]. A previous minister of general planning also expressed his opinion to a local
newspaper in these words, "it may actually be true that we have more ministries today in
Lebanon than actually needed. But the mergers were not based on any thorough analysis or firm
foundations, and hence represent a major departure from the fundamentals of administrative re-
organization" (Rifaii, Previous Minister of General Planning, quoted in Al-Safir, 2000, p. 3).
The recent mergers confirm the inclination in Lebanon to solve administrative problems through
the magic of re-organization. They also confirm the patterns of executive discontinuity
prevalent in this country which serve to undermine all sustained efforts at reform and
modernization. The fact that this most recent merger decision has mostly targeted those
ministries/institutions which were created during the 1993 Hariri re-organization movement
suggests not only discontinuity (jolitical and administrative) but also reform politicization, or
the permeation of reform decisions by complex and coveted political considerations. These
themes will be re-visited and explored in more depth in chapters 8 and 9.
In conclusion, a number of factors are compounding and serving to undermine post-war reform
efforts. The looming financial crisis and the limited resources available are obvious constraints.
The financial situation is also working against efforts to adjust public sector salaries and attract
qualified elements. There are also the unchanging realities of turf battles, executive
discontinuity, reform politicization, and the traditional deadlock generated by Lebanon's s brand
of consensual politics. In light of all these factors, patchy patterns of reform have prevailed in
the post-war period with a focus on crisis management, high visibility projects, and symbolic re-
organization to the neglect of long-term planning and policy-making.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Although administrative reform has been an on-going activity in Lebanon since independence, it
has consistently been characterized by significant gaps between initial rhetoric and reality. The
reasons for such discrepancies are complex, and can only be understood by looking at
administrative reform holistically and contextually and examining prevailing economic,
6 Based on a comprehensive review of the organizational structures and missions of all Lebanese
ministries, OMSAR has recommended in 1998 the merger of the following ministries: 1) the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Emigrants; 2) the Ministry of Teclmical and
Vocational Education and the Ministry of Labor; 3) the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs and
the Ministry of Environment; 4) the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and the Ministry of
Information; 5) the Ministry of Economy and Trade and the Ministry of Industry and Petroleum; 6)
the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs; 7) the Ministry of Transport and
the Ministry of Telecommunications (OMSAR, Annual Report, 1997-1998).
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sectarian and political realities. While in the pre-war period, the President of the republic served
as the main locus of power and the instigator of reform, administrative reform in the post-war
period has been mostly initiated by the Council of Ministers in cooperation with Parliament.
The overriding concern of the first President of the independent republic was to consolidate the
newly won independence. He guided Lebanon through the painful process of disengagement
from France and into harmony with other Arab states. However, the President also exploited the
country's traditional pluralism with consummate skill, turning the inherent weaknesses of the
new state to his advantage. This was reflected in his skillful maneuvers of the game of musical
chairs or cabinet politics to halt all reform initiatives. The President did little to improve the
rudimentary administration that he had inherited, using it instead for the allocation of patronage
benefits. He was thus forced to resign in 1952.
The second President, Camille Chamoun, began his term with determination and commitment to
reform, but had to face the uncertainties of turbulent regional and international politics. The
great bulk of the President's attention was thus devoted to regional and international issues and
their domestic implications. Administrative reform was naturally relegated to secondary
importance, overshadowed by the pressing political issues of the day. Little was done during
this period aside from the creation of a Ministry of General Planning in 1954 and some judicial
and electoral reforms. Reform policies during this period were 'non-policies' as they were non-
political and failed to raise serious issues.
The Chamoun experience with regional turbulence, though eased after Chehab's advent, was
more than just a passing episode. It was rather a dramatic manifestation of Lebanon's endemic
schizophrenia in the presence of pan-Arab nationalism. This schizophrenia has chronically risen
and fallen in intensity with every change of developments in neighboring Arab states. In this
sense, the tensions and conflicts among Arab states have exerted a continuously divisive
influence within Lebanon and badly strained the coexistence of the various communities. Fated
by its strategic location, and its peculiar cultural/political complexion, Lebanon could not avoid
repeated embroilment in Arab rivalries and conflicts.
The term of President Chehab was by all accounts the most distinctive of the history of the new
republic. President Chehab was committed to reform, modernization, and the redistribution of
wealth among Lebanese. He was also sensitive to the delicate pluralism that had to be managed
for Lebanon to continue to function. He thus attempted to steer a middle course between
Muslims and Christians, between traditionalists and modernists, and sought to transcend
primordial, sectarian loyalties by focusing on issues of development and social justice. During
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his term, the administration was systematically enlarged and served the interests of the poor,
rural segments of the population.
Chehab also prevented the traditional factionalism of Lebanon from standing in the way of
executive action. He thus attempted to find a way around the weaknesses of the Lebanese State
and the 'non-state model' in existence, by forging a course of autonomous and effective
leadership. While his governing style was labeled dictatorial and authoritarian, it nevertheless
revealed an acute perception of the immobilism that is inevitably generated by Lebanon's
pattern of consociational politics and the need for strengthening the state apparatus and its
executive leadership and insulating the bureaucracy from the everyday squabbles of politics.
The Chehabist attempt to modernize the Lebanese State was thus successful in two ways. First,
the President managed to circumvent traditional politics without disturbing normal political life.
Second, the President undertook the transformation of the state administration with sensitivity to
issues of equitable development and social justice. "For the first time, the Presidency became
the source of a national political philosophy and the term Chehabism entered the political
lexicon. Chehabism - Lebanon's equivalent of the New Deal - was basically a moderate welfare
ideology tailored to the Lebanese situation" (Hudson 1985, p. 297).
The question remained as to whether Lebanon could break out of its political stalemate after
Chehab. The evolution of events suggests that the answer to this question is an emphatic no. A
violent war raged in Lebanon for 15 years defying the best efforts at negotiation. The total
physical damage sustained during this period was estimated by the UN at US$ 25 billion
(UNDP, 1997). The public administrative sector also suffered heavy losses because of the
extensive damage to office buildings and facilities, and the inability of the government to collect
public revenues throughout the years of war. The administration also sustained serious drains in
personnel due to the forced displacement of workers and the emigration of skilled labor.
Moreover, the war virtually isolated the administration from the important developments that
were taking place in the world economy. It thus froze the normal process of administrative
adaptation and insulated the system from the rest of the world for almost two decades - precisely
when technological advances and practical experience were leading many countries to eliminate
redundant controls and formalities, shed certain functions, give more space to individual
initiative, and streamline administrative decision-making. The Lebanese public sector has thus
lost throughout the war years on substantial opportunities to improve its performance and to
deploy its resources more effectively.
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Reform attempts in the post-war period have focused on short-term crisis management and
symbolic reorganization, to the neglect of long-term planning and policy-making. For example,
the government has failed to take any measure to address the acute shortages of personnel in the
Lebanese administration. Nor has the government shown any resolution to deal with the
problem of surplus contractual and daily workers that are consuming dwindling public
resources. The government has also initiated a hasty restructuring program in 1993 which has
been attributed to political motives and the politics of accommodation. Another counter-
reorganization movement has also been effected in August 2000, the motives for which are also
political. Administrative reform has thus been equated on too many occasions in Lebanon with
changes in structures, to the neglect of less visible but important attitudinal reforms.
There are admittedly a number of embedded factors/constraints, which have consistently
worked to undermine reform efforts in Lebanon. Most important in this respect are the
cultural/political realities of the Lebanese multi-confessional context, which have necessitated a
conservative and prudent orientation to reform and change. Also important are the patterns of
weak executive leadership and executive discontinuity, which are justified in Lebanon by the
need to coalesce the leaders of major political factions and communities. The review in this
chapter indeed makes clear that the realities of the Lebanese multi-confessional context and the
adjustments they entail have consistently exerted a detrimental influence on reform efforts and
programs of change.
Indeed, reform efforts in the period before the war have been undermined by a constellation of
cultural/political factors in addition to the infiltration of the turbulence of the Middle East
environment into Lebanon, which aggravated tensions and political complications. Regional
turbulence indeed exerted a consistently divisive influence on communal coexistence in the pre-
war period and was generally detrimental to reform endeavors. As mentioned in this chapter, the
cultural/political complexion of Lebanese society has increased its vulnerability to such
turbulence and facilitated its repeated embroilment in Arab conflicts, which in turn increased
domestic tensions/complications. These were mutually reinforcing forces, which undermined
pre-war reform attempts generally and the Chamoun and Helou attempts more specifically.
Post-war reform attempts have also been undermined by a traditional constellation of cultural /
political factors, but the economic dimension has also become salient in the post-war Lebanese
environment, further constraining reform and policy options. Indeed, as outlined in this chapter,
the reconstruction efforts of the post-war period have contributed to large budgetary deficits and
domestic debt accumulation. The looming financial crisis has in turn reflected in making
planning extremely difficult and necessitating short-term crisis management and symbolic re-
organization to the detriment of more substantive reform and policy-making. It has also
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translated into a huge loss of investment in the type of skilled human resources required for
effective public action. Lebanese policy-makers are thus having to face a post-war environment
where the scarcity of human and financial resources inevitably leaves much to be desired.
The main point to emphasize is that the Lebanese administrative system cannot be adequately
understood if cut off from the cultural context in which it operates. It is thus necessary to view
the administrative system in relation to its cultural setting and to examine reform patterns
holistically and contextually. Such an approach identifies apparent irrationality in policy-
making as it promotes greater understanding of why certain policy choices are made and why
inefficient government expenditures are sanctioned. Only through such a comprehensive and
contextual analysis can one make sense of consistent policy failure in Lebanon.
The next two chapters will provide an in-depth case study examination of two vital sectors for
the post-war Lebanese economy namely, telecommunications and transportation. The chapters
will examine the specific post-war reform initiatives and policies in those two areas. It is hoped
that greater insight could be gained into administrative reform in post-war Lebanon by a
detailed examination of specific administrative sectors. Such examination will undoubtedly
supplement and enrich the information presented in this chapter about general reform trends and





In an emerging global economy characterized by greater trade liberalization and information
needs, telecommunications enhance national productivity and provide a basis for competitive
advantage. There is a general consensus today on the central role of the telecommunications
sector in economic growth and development. This chapter examines telecom reforms in
Lebanon in the wake of the war (1990-present). It is hoped that greater insight could be gained
into administrative reform in post-war Lebanon by a detailed examination of specific-sector
policies and reforms. The chapter will begin, however, by an overview of global trends in
telecom reform to allow a comprehensive evaluation of the performance of the Lebanese
telecommunications sector against international best practice.
TELECOM REFORM: AN OVERVIEW
In many respects, the 1990s mark a turning point in the process of telecom reform taking place
around the world. Although each country is proceeding at its own pace through its specific
policies, all countries are influenced to varying degrees by the dramatic changes in technologies,
markets and the global economy. All countries are also influenced by developments in
neighboring countries, trading partners, and regional and international agencies. Telecom
reform has thus been the order of the day almost everywhere for some time now (Melody, 1999,
p. 8).
Three major market-liberalizing events have made the 1990s an important time of transition in
the process of telecom reform. First, the WTO agreement on telecom services by which 69 (now
72) countries representing 90% of global telecom traffic committed themselves to specific
programs of liberalization over specified future periods. Second the EU policy on full
liberalization of telecom services in member states came into effect. Third, the US
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which liberalized local markets was enacted, bringing full
liberalization to the US (Melody, 1999; Hong, 1998).
The fundamental underlying reason for reform was the inadequate performance of the old
institutional arrangements in light of changing economic, social and political circumstances.
The old regime of national telecom monopolies operating as an international cartel could not
meet the challenges of the new environment. Dramatic technological innovation, coupled with
the now often cited convergence of telecommunications and data processing have undermined
the premises of monopolistic provision, and overstrained an inflexible public administration
arrangement.
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Old Institutional Arrangement and Pressures for Change
For most of the nineteenth century, telecommunications had been considered a part of the public
infrastructure that should be provided by the state. In historical and international perspective, it
had been one of the economic sectors with the highest level of state ownership and activity
(Grande, 1994). In most countries, it had been organized and managed as a public
administration (PTT) with a universal service obligation whose domainlactivities are protected
by a far-reaching legal monopoly. The public telecommunications monopoly encompassed the
operation of telecom networks, the supply of the entire range of services and the licensing,
distribution and maintenance of terminal equipment.
The PTT model of telecommunications was also characterized by an intensive/extensive
politicization of functions (Grande, 1994). As a government administrative body, it tended to
follow political and bureaucratic drummers (Melody, 1999). Tariffs, for example, were always
treated as political prices and manipulated for reasons of social, fiscal, or macro-economic
policy; and the design of technical systems and equipment took national security interests into
account (Grande, 1994). Moreover, telecom services have been commonly used to fund
significant financial contributions to the treasury, and as "a sinecure for political refugees or an
employer of last resort" (Melody, 1999, p. 10). These practices, to mention only a few, were
part of the politicization of the telecommunications sector.
In recent years, there have been, however, overwhelming pressures for change in the field of
telecommunications, rendering old institutional arrangements and practices increasingly
obsolete. New technological developments coming from the electronics industry, the computing
industry, and the equipment-manufacturing sector are challenging traditional telecom monopoly
boundaries and inviting countries to reconsider their traditional market structure. Industrialized
countries were quick to realize that the state-run monopoly carrier was denying market
opportunities to other firms and depriving the industry of significant revenues. "Thus the
traditional industry and market boundaries of the old PTT monopolies were being eroded from
all sides by what today is called convergence" (Melody, 1999, p. 9).
The rapid diversification and specialization in telecom networks (e.g. non terrestrial
transmission facilities like satellite services and mobile communications) and the digitization of
switching and transmission networks have also offered new opportunities to integrate networks
into new integrated services networks and a range of new services and applications. In addition
to conventional services (telephone, telex), new basic services (such as data transmission) and
so-called value-added services (such as information and mailbox services) are now being
offered. The consequence of this 'revolution in services' has been an increasingly blurred
distinction between (i) public telecommunications and private data processing; (ii) between
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bi	 and enhanced telecommunications services; and (iii) between individual
telecommunications and in 	 communications/broadcasting (Grande, 1994).
In light of all these developments, the telecommunications infrastructure, once relatively
standardized and homogeneous, has become a heterogeneous and complex system of publicly
and privately operated components. The boundaries between public and private functions have
become blurred and increasingly permeable. Moreover, new telecommunications applications
have spread exponentially within only a few years, increasing the demands on the flexibility and
innovative-ness of public network operators. "In this new environment, the premises of the old
model of public activity have lost their footing.. .These new and specific conditions have both
facilitated and necessitated a political re-definition of public functions in telecommunications"
(Grande, 1994, p. 147).
Telecom Changes and Institutional Reforms
Accumulating technological and economic pressure has thus helped focus attention in many
countries on the formidable task of converting politicized and bureaucratized government PTT
administrations into efficient, commercial public telecommunications operators (PTOs). The
policy shift was often from an unquestioned acceptance of absolute monopoly restrictions to a
policy that re-examined unjustifiable monopoly regulations in the evolving new environment.
The complex changes that have affected the telecommunications sector are frequently discussed
under the labels of 'deregulation', 'liberalization' and 'privatization'. Grande (1994) provides a
useful analytical distinction between the various aspects of change, namely:
U Organizational Reforms or changes in the status andlor the structure of existing
organizations in telecommunications (e.g. the creation of new agencies, and the break up or
the abolition of existing ones). Examples are the separation of posts and
telecommunications administrations, the transformation of public administrations into
public corporations, and the establishment of new regulatory bodies such as the Office of
Telecommunications in the UK.
o Deregulation that is the relaxation or abrogation of existing laws, statuses, and regulations
by means of which the state tried to influence the activities of private actors. Deregulation
could affect a variety of activities, such as licensing, standardization, access conditions,
procurement instructions, and the fixing of tariffs.
U Liberalization that is the lifting of existing barriers to market entry. Here liberalization
primarily means the relaxation or repeal of the legal monopolies in telecommunications.
Even though liberalization in telecommunications is an aspect of the general deregulation,
the terms are not exactly synonymous and should not be confused.
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U Privatization that is changes in the legal form of public administrations or corporations
from public to private law status, and/or the selling of shares of public owned corporations.
Examples of a privatization in telecommunications were the selling of shares of the public
network operators in Japan (NTT) and Great Britain (BT) (Grande, 1994, p. 141).
Each of these various reforms aims at a change of basic features of the old PTT model. Taken
together, they lead to a completely new model of telecommunications characterized by private
corporations providing optimal supply for rationally calculating citizens within liberalized
markets. The feasibility and opportunities of this new model were first shown in the US, where
the entire organization and regulation of the telecommunications sector has been transformed
fundamentally in an incremental process. The process culminated in the enactment of the
Telecommunications Reform Act of 1996, bringing full liberalization to the US telecom market.
Compared to the developments in the US, the European countries were slightly more resistant to
such a deregulation and liberalization of their telecommunications sectors. By and large, most
European countries adhered to the old PTT model, well into the 1980s. The first West European
country to aim at a full-scale retreat of the state from telecommunications was Great Britain.
The UK enacted its first telecommunications act in 1981, thereby liberalizing the existing
telecommunications monopoly. By selling 50.2 per cent of its shares of British Telecom in
1984, the Thatcher government implemented the first privatization of a former PTT
administration in an advanced industrial country.
The developments in the US and in the UK have served as a background for attempts to reform
the existing public monopolies in various European countries. In Italy, the Co,nmissione
Morganti presented a report proposing institutional reforms of the telecommunications sector in
1984; in the following year, the Streebergen Commission made its recommendations in the
Netherlands; in 1987, the Wise Men Commission in Belgium and the Witte Commission in West
Germany presented their reports (Grande, 1994). All efforts were intensified by the initiatives of
the Commission of the EU, which established itself as a key actor in the field of
telecommunications policy in the mid-1980s.
A brief survey of the degree of the liberalization of telecommunications markets in Western
Europe at the beginning of the 1990s shows a clear trend towards the breakdown of
telecommunications monopolies (Table 22). This is most obvious in the field of terminal
equipment, which by now has been almost completely liberalized, and in the area of value-
added services. Britain with its radical reforms set aside, the public telecommunications
monopoly in Western Europe is restricted more and more to the terrestrial network and basic
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telephone service. The EU commission's directives also provide for the liberalization of these
markets by the end of the 1990s.
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Moreover, both the organizational structures and the ownership of public network operators
have changed considerably (Table 23). In 1992, only 4 OECD member countries —Austria,
Iceland, Luxemburg, and West Germany- were still organizing their public network operators in
the form of a public administration. In 11 countries, the public network operator has the status
of a public company. In 9 countries, these network operators are companies under private law,
only 3 of which are completely owned by the state (in Australia, the Netherlands, and Sweden)
and 2 of which are the objects of privatization plans. By the end of 1992, a full-scale
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privatization of telecommunications, however, had taken place in one OECD country, New
Zealand. In all other cases, the state has kept at least a minor part of the shares (Grande, 1994).






















































































[1] SIP (still in progress)
	
[2] Reform in preparation
[3] Corporatisation under discussion
	 [4] Privatization under discussion
Specific Trends in Telecom Reform
Besides the general trends towards the breakdown of telecom monopolies and the
corporatization and/or privatization of telecom operators, there have also been specific changes
in the direction of the liberalization of telecommunication service and equipment markets. By
1990, Japan, New Zealand and the US had liberalized the provision of public switched
telecommunication networks (PSTN). In other countries, monopolies and a small number of
duopolies were in place. By 1998, however, the market structures for the public switched
telecommunication network had changed significantly. Figure 11 shows the marked progress in
fixed network infrastructure competition.
As liberalization developed in PSTN markets, a growing number of countries felt confident
enough in the benefits of liberalization to issue multiple licenses for the provision of mobile
communication infrastructure. In 1989, only six OECD countries did not have monopolies over
the provision of cellular' mobile communication infrastructure. Each of these six countries had
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duopolies. A decade later, all OECD countries had licensed at least two cellular mobile
communication operators and most have three or more. In 1999, the US had up to seven
competing infrastructure mobile providers. The much more rapid change in mobile cellular
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Figure 12. Mobile Network Infrastructure Competition in OECD Countries (Paltridge, 1999)
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Marked progress has also been achieved in recent years in Internet provision and access. By
July 1999, there were more than 52 million Internet hosts in the OECD area, representing 93%
of the global total (Paltridge, 1999). Host surveys are the most common indicators used to
measure Internet development. However, host data do not provide information about the total
number of users who can access the Internet. Examples of countries recording significant
increases, albeit from smaller base number of hosts, include Turkey, Spain, Luxembourg and
France. Finland is the first OECD country to pass 100 hosts per 1000 inhabitants in 1999 as
depicted in Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Internet Hosts per 1,000 Inhabitants, July 1999 (Paltridge, 1999)
Key Elements of Telecom Reform
The various trends discussed here indicate an increased awareness of the importance of
restructuring traditional telecom institutional structures and markets to enhance national
productivity and acquire an international competitive edge. It is now widely recognized that an
expanded role of the market can facilitate not only improved efficiency, but also the
achievement of public policy objectives. The efficient functioning of markets in turn depends
upon an effective institutional supporting structure. The challenge is thus to structure the new
institutional environment in such a way as to make good use of market forces to achieve public
policy objectives and goals.
Successful institutional restructuring thus depends on three distinct, but related sets of activities










I Policy-making is directed toward fundamental issues of long-term societal implications. It
mainly ensures attention to issues of sector development and their long-run implications.
Policy makers are responsible for formulating a long-term strategy/vision for the sector.
U Operations management is in turn concerned with issues of day-to-day operation, problem
solving and implementation. The management is typically accountable to a Board of
Directors that is insulated from political and governmental pressures and interference.
U Regulation must in turn be independent both from the PTO and from direct government
influence. The regulator's task is to implement government policy. It ensures performance
accountability by the various industry players and monitors changing industry conditions.
Figure 14 illustrates the essential relations among policy-making, operations management and
regulation. The effectiveness by which this fundamental separation of basic functions is
achieved will have a significant impact upon the growth of the sector (Melody, 1999). The more
effective the separation, the better will be the climate to attract financing and undertake
investment. If each function can be performed well, each will provide clarity and stability in an
institutional framework conducive to rapid growth and the effective achievement of economic
and social objectives (Melody, 1999). This requires the unbundling of the different activities
and the establishment of a sufficiently transparent institutional process that can be understood
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Figure 14. The Decentralized Structure of Telecom Reform (Melody, 1999)
Such unbundling of functions, however, is rarely achieved in a single restructuring exercise, but
rather in an incremental process in the direction of the structure illustrated in Figure 14. Each
step has provided experience, learning, and the surfacing of unresolved issues or problems,
which then have been resolved by taking other steps towards greater independence for the PTO
andlor the regulator (Melody, 1999).
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The establishment of the PTO as a commercial enterprise independent of the everyday
squabbles of politics is an important step in the process of institutional restructuring.
Privatization of the PTO is one method of establishing a commercial foundation independent of
governmental interference. But it is not the only method. Government-owned commercial firms
(also referred to as crown corporations) exist in many countries. Whether privatization is the
best method for any country will depend on the objectives of its reform policy and its particular
circumstances. The key issue, however, is not ownership, but rather commercial independence
and access to capital and skills.
Effective regulation is another key aspect of recent restructuring endeavors. Reform objectives
of efficient competition and universal service cannot be achieved/maintained without
strong/independent regulation. As experience has unfolded, there is wider acceptance that
industry-specific regulation must be a permanent part of the new arrangements at least for the
foreseeable future. Regulation guarantees access to public resources, the licensing of operators,
inter-connection with dominant PTOs on reasonable terms, affordable prices and quality of
service. Regulation is thus essential to achieve economic and social policy objectives.
Regulation is also necessary to provide a foundation upon which markets can function more
effectively than they would otherwise. One of the most important issues is how regulators will
act to ensure the dominant PTO does not use its monopoly to cross-subsidize its services or
otherwise prevent or harm competition. The resolution of this issue will have a major impact on
the behavior of the PTO, the nature of the competition that develops and the direction of the
industry. "The challenge for all countries and regions is to design an implementation regime that
provides for participation and due process, and the application of relevant and consistent
substantive decision-making criteria, within a framework of timely and expeditious regulatory
decisions" (Melody, 1999, p.21).
Telecom Sector Performance Indicators
The ultimate test of the success of telecom reform is the sector's performance. The measurement
of carrier (sector) performance is indeed an essential part of the development, monitoring and
evaluation of government reform (Madden and Savage, 1999). However, given the problems
associated with measuring the financial performance of public organizations, four main areas
are usually examined to provide evidence of demonstrable progress in telecom reform: 1)
institutional unbundling and the development of effective regulation as described above; 2) the
actual development of competition; 3) reduced prices and improved service; and 4) an
expansion of universal service penetration (Melody, 1999).
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The process of institutional unbundling is precisely expected to enhance competition, reduce
prices and expand universal service penetration. Although evidence of significant competition
can be found in many countries in VAS, mobile and international services, it has been more
limited for domestic long-distance and rare for local services. Moreover, overall price trends
have been steadily and significantly down, as new technologies permit network capacity to be
used with greater efficiency by service suppliers. Interconnection charges to PTO networks
remain, however, the largest cost element to most competitive service operators and an
important revenue source for PTOs.
High interconnection charges in turn may work against the extension of universal service
coverage. Hence, while network usage charges are falling, connection charges are rising. The
cheaper it is to use the network, the more expensive it is to connect to the network. This will
make it more difficult for those at the margins of the universal service envelope to connect to
the network. It should be remembered that if PTO network costs are the basis of the
interconnection charges as happens in virtually all countries, then competitors will be
contributing to coverage of the PTO universal service costs through their intercormection
charges (Melody, 1999).
A similar trend of cost rebalancing is occurring with respect to international services, with
significant implications for developing countries. Although some developing countries are
making progress in the long process of rolling out a national network, many are not. As
competition forces countries to shift network common costs away from international services
back on to national services and users, developing countries may lose significant hard currency
contributions from international revenue settlements to help fund their national network rollout
(Melody, 1999). This makes the development of a truly universal service more difficult and
magnifies the gap between rich and poor countries.
Besides those four important aspects of telecom reform, productivity measures are also regarded
as reliable indicators of industry performance (Madden and Savage, 1999). Productivity
measurement allows evaluation of telecommunications sector performance against international
best practice. Some commonly used telecommunications (partial) productivity measures are:
0 Penetration rate or tele-density is an international standard measure of network
development and refers to the number of mainlines per 100 population.
0 Mainlines per employee (MPE), or the ratio of telephone mainlines to the number of full-
time equivalent employees. MPE provides an indication of labor productivity relating to
the construction, maintenance and operation of the network.
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IJ Revenue per employee (RPE) or the ratio of total telecommunications service revenue to
the number of full-time equivalent employees. RPE is another indicator of labor
productivity.
IJ Revenue per line (RPM), or the ratio of total telecommunications service revenue to main
telephone lines. RPM is a measure of capital productivity and provides a guide to the
intensity of telecommunications network usage.
J Outgoing calls per capita provides a measure of the average use of total subscriber lines.
L Total number of cellular subscribers provides a measure of mobile use or penetration
(Madden and Savage, 1999).
The discussion so far has focused on global trends in telecom reform, outlining the pressures
and changes which have affected this sector in recent decades, necessitating in turn a major re-
orientation to telecom reform. The changes have revolved around re-structuring traditional
institutional arrangements, breaking down monopolies, unbundling telecommunications
functions, as well as promoting de-regulation, competition, liberalization and privatization (in
some cases). Against this background, it becomes possible to examine recent telecom reforms in
Lebanon in a more meaningful way, emphasizing the specifics of the Lebanese case and the
impact of the unique Lebanese context. The global overview is thus useful as a sensitizing
device, against which to establish the particular features of the Lebanese case.
TELECOM REFORM IN LEBANON
Background
Posts and Telecommunications in Lebanon are organized as a state monopoly under the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Before 1975, the telecommunications sector was
relatively developed and provided modern and reliable services, especially to the business
community centered in Beirut. In 1974, there were about 250,000 direct exchange lines in
service, with a telephone penetration rate of 7%. Pressed by a high level of demand and the need
to decongest and improve services, MPT undertook an ambitious expansion program in 1979
with the goal of more than doubling available capacity. The program, however, was not
completed due to the deteriorating political situation.
A damage assessment report conducted by Dar-Al-Handasah Consultants in the wake of the
war (1991) estimated the total damage to the Lebanese telecommunications sector at US$ 517
million. Although the telephone penetration rate had increased to 12.5% (450,000 telephone
lines), about half of the lines were out of service because of extensive damage to the local
network (local cable plant, distribution boxes, secondary cables, and switching equipment). The
209
international network had also incurred substantial damage, rendering the need for telecom
reform and rehabilitation in Lebanon in the wake of the war a most pressing concern.
Rehabilitation Projects
The objective of the government's rehabilitation program was to install a cost-effective and
productive structure for the telecommunications sector that will help improve the productivity
and competitiveness of Lebanon's economic activities. The ultimate objective was to develop
favorable conditions for attracting domestic and foreign private capital with a view to assuring
the sector's medium and long-term development. Accordingly, the government set out an
ambitious rehabilitation program, with the following short, medium, and long-term objectives:
0 Short-Term Objectives (1991-1993)
	
Target: 450,000 operational lines
> Rehabilitation of all cable networks
> Rehabilitation of the switching equipment
Rehabilitation of the microwave equipment
> Replacement of the old electromechanical lines
> Rehabilitation of buildings
> Replacement of defective power supplies/air conditioning systems
> Rehabilitation of 230,000 lines out of the existing park of 450,000
> Satisfy unmet demand by connecting 500,000 subscribers
0 Medium-Term Objectives (1993-1996)
	
Target: 600,000 lines
> Supply and Installation of new digital switching equipment
> Subscriber line network and outside plant installations
> New fiber optic links
New microwave links
> Two new earth stations (300 channels each)
Two new IDR earth stations (300 channels each)
> New fiber optic submarine and land cables
> Provision of new digital cellular mobile system (30,000 subscribers)
> Supply and installation of new 140,000 telephone lines
Power plants, air conditioning, vehicles, tools, maintenance equipment, material
LI Long-Term Objectives (1997-2001)	 Target: 800,000 lines
> Installation of 200,000 new lines at an estimated cost of US$ 300 million
> Increase GSM stock from 30,000 lines to 250,000 lines
> Establishment of a telecommunications training center
> A master plan for telecommunications development
(Source: Dar-A1-Handasah Consultants, 1991)
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The proposed rehabilitation plan was expected to increase the penetration rate (telephone
density per 100 inhabitants) from 7 per 100 in 1993 to 20 per 100 in 1997 and 30 per 100 in
2001, turning Lebanon into one of the most developed countries in the region with regard to
telecommunications' 7 . The total investment program over the 10-year period was estimated at
US$ 715 million (World Bank, 1994), including US$ 50 million for technical assistance and
consultancy work. The technical supervisory work was originally granted to Nor-consult and
then to Dar-Al-Handasah at an estimated cost of US$ 11 million. A second consultancy contract
was awarded to Cable and Wireless and Deloitte & Touche at an estimated value of $ 9 million.
The rehabilitation of the fixed telephone network was divided into two contracts: the Switching
Contract and the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) Contract. The Switching Contract
of total value US$ 80 million was awarded in 1993 to three contractors: Alcatel, Siemens, and
Ericsson. The three contractors were expected to supply/install digital exchanges and hence
upgrade the overall switching capacity of the network to 1 million lines, in addition to
upgrading the major international gateways. The PSTN Contract was awarded in 1994 to the
same three contractors. The total value of the contract is US$ 420 million, divided as follows:
LI Rehabilitation and expansion of the local network (US$ 185 million)
LI Rehabilitationlexpansion of the local service network through the rehabilitation of
exchange buildings and the construction of new buildings (USS 75 million)
LI Implementation of local and transit exchanges (USS 45 million)
LI Rehabilitation and expansion of the international network (US$ 15.4 million)
LI National service rehabilitation and upgrading (US$ 81 million)
LI Providing spare parts and equipment (US$ 17.5 million) (World Bank, 1994).
The rehabilitation plan also provided for the implementation of a rural telecommunications
network (US$ 8 million) and the rehabilitation of telex exchanges (US$ 5.6). It also provided
for a new Telecommunications training center (US$ 8 million) and the design of a master plan
for telecom development (US$ 2.3 million). Finally, the plan envisaged US$ 3 million for the
rehabilitation and upgrading of postal services. However, those rehabilitation components never
materialized. In 1998, MPT launched the rehabilitation of the postal service through a BUT
contract with Liban Post, a joint stock company owned at 66% by Canada Post Systems
Management Ltd. The duration of the BUT contract is 10 years (extendable to 12) with MPT
' This implies that Lebanon will have a higher service level than countries at the lower end of the
middle-income range. The penetration rate in selected Middle Eastern countries for 1991 is as
follows: Egypt (3.2); Syria (4.1); Tunis (3.75); Kuwait (15.8); and Saudi Arabia (9.3). It should be
kept in mind, however, that there is a clear correlation between GNP per capita and the number of
telephone lines per 100 inhabitants.
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charging Liban Post an escalating revenue sharing scheme. This newly restructured postal
sector, however, will not be covered in this thesis.
Current Telecommunications Sector Status
The Institutional Framework
The telecommunications sector in Lebanon is still organized as a state monopoly under the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT). MPT has three directorates general, one for
posts and the other two for telecommunications, namely, the directorate general of telecom
construction and equipment and the directorate general of telecom operation and maintenance.
MPT plays the role of provider in the fixed telephone service both local and international and
the role of the regulator for the mobile telephone and the data / internet services. So MPT
continues to perform the three main telecom functions in Lebanon: policy-making, operation
and regulation.
While MPT controls the fixed telephone infrastructure, it has transferred some operational
functions to OGERO, a semi-autonomous organization placed under the tutelage of MPT. From
a legal standpoint, OGERO is a wholly owned state organization, supervised by MPT, and
financed by the state budget. It has a CEO and 12 Directors, appointed by the Council of
Ministers, and grouped along functional and operational lines. In 1995, OGERO was entrusted
with billing, maintenance works, connection of new subscribers, and physical extension of the
network. However, its decision-making authority remains limited, in particular regarding tariffs,
investment, and strategic planning.
MPT employs in total about 3000 employees, grouped into 4 categories: old OGERO, new
OGERO, new MPT and MPT-OGERO. Cable and Wireless provides technical assistance to
OGERO, while MPT is assisted by the consultancy of Deloitte & Touche and Dar-Al-
Handasah. As early as 1994, the World Bank recommended that OGERO be transformed into
an independent commercial company, Telecom Liban, in charge of all operating activities and
subject to private commercial law. However, successive governments have failed to take any
steps in this direction. Figure 15 illustrates the current telecom institutional arrangement.
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Figure 15. Telecom Institutional Framework in Lebanon
The current institutional framework is outdated and suffers from a number of deficiencies and
constraints. In the words of a well-respected regional telecommunications expert, "the current
institutional framework is useless, antiquated and a hurdle towards the development of the
sector. It is not logical that the Lebanese government is now working on regulating the sector
and introducing new licensing procedures on the basis of a 1959 institutional framework"
[Shehadi, August 14, 2000].
An international telecom expert and advisor for the international telecommunications union
(ITU) comments on the Lebanese telecom institutional framework in a similar way:
The current telecommunications institutional framework is a heritage of the past. The
same institutional framework that existed before the war has been retained now in the
1990s, despite its obvious deficiencies in the new telecommunications environment. We
do not need today a ministry ofposts and telecommunications because its mere presence
implies the politicization of telecommunications. Telecommunications needs to be kept
away from politics. What is rather needed in Lebanon is an independent regulator and an
efficient operator [Bahsoun, July 13, 2000].
The complaints of these experts become understandable when put in the context of the sweeping
reforms which have affected both the status and internal organization of telecom administrations
and the regulation of telecommunications markets in recent years. As outlined at the beginning
of this chapter, a remarkable redefinition of functions has indeed been under way in this sector,
with global reforms revolving around the re-structuring of traditional institutional arrangements,
the erosion of public telecommunications monopolies and the development of efficient
independent commercial operators (publicly or privately owned) that are insulated from political
pressures and interference.
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The development of an efficient operator in Lebanon in line with global trends in telecom
reform has been undermined, however, by MPT's overwhelming predominance and its
continued monopolization of key operational functions. The Hariri government, realizing the
need for change, attempted to overhaul the telecom institutional framework through OGERO.
OGERO was thus revitalized in 1995, and made directly responsible for maintenance and the
physical extension of the network. A CDR telecommunications official comments on this recent
Hariri intervention in these words:
Hariri found a way to infiltrate into the telecom sector through OGERO, given its status
as a semi-autonomous agency. Accordingly, OGERO was revived in 1995 and made
responsible for key telecommunications functions. A number of professionals were also
recruited and remunerated with high salaries by public sector standards [Faidallah, July
4, 2000].
Realizing the difficult task of reforming the MPT, Hariri thus tried to gain access to and reform
the institutional framework through the window (OGERO) rather than through the main door
(MPT). Lebanese professionals, who have been particularly sensitive to the evolution of events
in this sector, concur however that the granting of the 1995 contract to OGERO was a step in
the right direction. OGERO has since been streamlining transactions and operations, cutting red
tape, and providing services efficiently and expeditiously. And although a remarkable re-
orientation to service provision and customer satisfaction has been noted in the wake of this
recent re-definition of functions, OGERO is still facing a number of structural constraints
dictated by the nature of its relationship with MPT. A CDR telecommunications official who
has been closely involved in post-war telecom rehabilitation efforts, comments in this regard:
Services have improved drastically since OGERO became responsible for maintenance
and physical connection. For example, today, a citizen can apply for a new line and get it
within 24 hours vs. a waiting time of several months in the past. But OGERO is still
bound in its operations by an annual contract that it signs with MPT. It is thus not an
operator in the full sense of the word [Hindawi, July 12, 2000].
Mr. Bu Khaled, who has had frequent contacts with OGERO in recent years in his capacity as
director of PC support and networking at the American University of Beirut, similarly observes:
In the last phase of Hariri 'S tenure, OGERO developed a competent service department.
For example, they designed a new booklet for services and established a 24-hour help
line. They must have realized that they are failing and that they have a stagnant pool of
one million lines. Another reason is that they may have started to understand the
business, but unfortunately, OGERO had no authority. The Hariri government, realizing
the difficult task of reforming the MPT, tried to solve the problem at the periphery. But
the relationship between MPT and OGERO was wrong from the start [Bu Khaled, July
28, 2000].
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Indeed, the continued centralization of all authority in MPT and its control over budget
allocations have severely constrained OGERO's corporate decisions and undermined its
operator functions. The network director at OGERO comments in this regard,
It is true that we have operator functions, but all authority is still centralized in MPT.
The current situation is not sustainable. It was supposed to be a temporary arrangement,
but the temporary never changed. The reasoning of the previous administration was that
OGERO was gradually and naturally turning into the real operator. But I am not
convinced with this argument. Changes of this sort need to be based on firm foundations
and proper legislation [Abu-Farhat, August 14, 2000].
Another OGERO official similarly observes,
The current institutional framework is outdated and in need of change. The current
situation is not sustainable and there should be a move as soon as possible in the
direction of regulating this sector in line with new developments in all parts of the world.
The failure in this respect can be attributed to all previous administrations, including the
current one. The government should at least proceed with creating a national operator in
the full sense of the word, and we were hoping for this to happen during the Hoss
administration. We also need to have a regulator that is independent of the Minister and
of MPT. Otherwise, no one can claim to be satisfied with the institutional framework as it
stands today [Nahed, August 8, 2000].
Although admitting the need for reform and institutional re-structuring, the Director General of
Construction and Equipment at MPT contends however that OGERO was never intended to be a
public network operator, and that any claims to that effect are misguided. He observes,
Although we definitely need some restructuring and unbundling of functions in this
sector, the fact is that we don 't have an operator nor a regulator in Lebanon. MPT is not
a regulator. Nor is OGERO an operator. OGERO has contracts with MPTfor billing,
maintenance, and provision of service and can act only within the limits of these
contracts. Its functions are therefore limited and strictly defined by law [Indraous,
August 21, 2000].
There is thus some confusion as to the respective roles and functions of both MPT and OGERO.
While OGERO officials claim that their institution performs all basic operations functions and
is only constrained by MPT's reluctance to delegate commensurate authority, MPT officials do
not appear to share this view. This rather unusual institutional set up has naturally resulted in
friction between OGERO and MPT, culminating in a full-fledged attack on OGERO in the first
year of the Hoss administration (1998-present). A more or less neutral informant, the director of
PC support and networking at AUB, attributes the recent hostility vis a vis OGERO to the
politicized nature of telecom reform in Lebanon. He observes,
OGERO was a djfference but for a very short period of time, because it did not survive to
show serious results. OGERO has been under attack from the new Hoss administration.
It is simply a political vendetta. OGERO has been tagged as being Hariri 's direct team.
Because Hariri was not able to reform the MPT, he put his direct team and associates in
OGERO. And the new Minister of Post and Telecommunications apparently has a
vendetta against Rafic Hariri. Again you have the same problem. You have a service
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entity run as a political entity. Because it was run as a political set-up, it was politicized
and political vendettas apply to it. Sadly, this is the pattern in Lebanon [Bu Khaled, July
28, 2000].
The OGERO network director similarly confirms the previous observationlexplanation,
There was an obvious hostility against OGERO in the first year of the Hoss
administration. The new government wanted to dissolve OGERO. It was labeled as a
Hariri institution. We tried to express to them that OGERO had existed for years before
Rafic Hariri assumed office and that we have dealt professionally and consistently with
all governments, even during the war. But the new Minister came with a vengeance, as
there was some kind of political animosity between him and Hariri. He was intent on
dissolving OGERO and would not understand that this was not possible. It took one year
to realize that the decision was not realistic, otherwise the fixed phone network would
become non-functional [Abu-Farhat, August 14, 2000].
A CDR telecommunications official further explains along the same lines,
The new (Hoss) government has been trying to marginalize OGERO. The government
has been practically trying to undo all what the previous Hariri government has done.
The functions of OGERO, however, limited as they are, have become indispensable, and
the government has come to terms with the fact that it will not be very easy to do away
with its services. In view of the hostile attitude of the new government vis a vis OGERO,
many qualfled employees have already left for the private sector [Faidallah, July 4,
2000].
A more comprehensive explanation is in turn provided by a regional telecommunications expert
who has been closely involved in post-war telecom reform efforts in Lebanon in his capacity as
advisor to the minister of economy. He observes,
Now the old government and administration no doubt had their mistakes. But what is
even worse is that the new government has come with a vengeance and with the attitude
that everything that the previous government has done is wrong. This has in turn delayed
work and progress on d?fferent fronts and created much discontinuity. Take the example
of OGERO. The decision was that OGERO was a bad institution and needs to be
dissolved. Now MPT cannot do the work, so we create a new autonomous agency to
replace OGERO and assume its functions. Instead of building upon OGERO and seeking
to improve its performance and toprovidefor continuity in governance, they have chosen
to waste a year arguing and looking for alternatives to OGERO. If OGERO will help me
reach my objectives, then why not make use of it? Because they do not look at institutions
as institutions. They still look at institutions as aggregates of individuals with particular
loyalties. This OGERO complex has delayed all the work of OGERO. Now the tenure of
the Hoss administration is nearing its end. Do you think that the new government will
build on what this administration has done? Very unlikely. Unfortunately, this is the
mentality in Lebanon. We don 't have continuity, we don 't have respect for institutions
and for the work of institutions [Shehadi, August 14, 2000].
These explanations in turn combine to point to the undeniable politicization of telecom reform
in Lebanon and the extent to which the process remains in essence a series of political counter-
moves and maneuvers. Objectively speaking, there was no technical justification for the attempt
to dissolve OGERO in the first year of the Hoss administration, although political justifications
abound. OGERO was labeled a Hariri institution, given that the previous prime minister
accorded it special status/importance and tried to enhance its capacity/performance. In the eyes
216
of the new government, OGERO was first a Hariri institution, and of course less importantly, a
semi-autonomous organization with important telecom functions. So politically speaking, it was
justifiable to waste a year looking for an alternative institution to assume its functions.
Besides extensive politicization these examples/explanations also highlight the patterns of
political and administrative discontinuity observed in Lebanon. As noted in previous chapters,
frequent changes in cabinet portfolios are dictated in Lebanon by the need to coalesce the
leaders of major political factions/communities (i.e. the politics of accommodation). Executive
discontinuity however undermines executive capacity. It also deprives the administrative branch
of the needed support and continuity to engage in and implement consistent change programs.
Rotations in political portfolios are also associated with changes in administrative portfolios
(Grade I). The resulting discontinuity is detrimental to reform efforts and programs of change.
Aside from that, the current institutional framework also suffers from weak policy making and
regulatory functions [Bahsoun, July 13, 2000; Rifaii, July 24, 2000; Shehadi, August 14, 2000].
Major decisions are taken in a piecemeal way by Cabinet Decrees or by MPT, with no clear
stated objectives or long-term vision. There is also no clear policy on licensing, as licenses are
mostly awarded at MPT' s discretion. Interconnection procedures are not in place. The existing
legal/regulatory framework is also outdated and in need of a comprehensive overhaul to
facilitate competition and monitor inter-connection tariffs and agreements. A regional
telecommunications expert comments in this regard,
The basic requirement for the success of telecommunications reform in Lebanon is
regulation and the very first action in this respect is new legislation. You can not expect
to regulate telecom provision with laws and regulations dating back to 1959. These are
regulations that were suitable for another age [Shehadi, August 14, 2000].
A draft telecommunications law has been submitted to the Council of Ministers in February
2000. But the law has not been acted upon. The Lebanese Parliament has also recently adopted a
new privatization law which commits the government of Lebanon to establish a regulatory
framework for each sector being considered for privatization (Lebanon, 2000a). The recent
passage of the general law on privatization is a good sign. The telecommunications sector is set
to be the first up for sale and is undoubtedly key. Despite these recent developments, however,
experts remain guardedly optimistic about the ability of the Lebanese government to embrace
telecommunications reform and to streamline/overhaul the antiquated institutional framework.
A telecommunications expert comments in this regard,
Privatization is the only rational way to go, but no steps have or will be initiated in this
direction in Lebanon because of tremendous inertia and vested interests [Bahsoun, July
13, 2000].
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Although privatization could be a viable route for establishing a commercial foundation for the
Lebanese telecom sector independent of government interference, it is not the only method. Nor
is there unanimous consensus regarding the merits and advantages of privatization in Lebanon,
particularly with respect to the fixed network infrastructure. A CDR telecommunications official
comments in this regard,
Privatization of the telecommunications sector is now a hot issue in Lebanon and is being
seriously discussed in political circles. But the sector is generating good revenues for the
government, so I don '1 believe that privatization is necessarily a good idea. Although
specflc segments, such as internet, data transmission and intelligent networks could be
privatized, the fixed line segment should stay with the government [Faidallah, July 4,
2000].
It should be mentioned that as early as 1994, a World Bank mission to Lebanon indicated the
need for a comprehensive overhaul or restructuring of the Lebanese telecom sector. The mission
recommended the preparation of a new telecommunications law during the last quarter of 1994,
and the progressive creation or implementation of Telecom Liban, according to private
commercial criteria. It also recommended the separation of regulatory and policy-making
functions, through the creation of an independent regulatory entity which would oversee
operators' compliance and regulate competition. As of today, none of those recommendations
have been implemented or acted upon.
As the review of the current institutional framework indeed makes clear, there is tremendous
inertia and resistance to change in this country. Despite the overwhelming pressures for change
in this sector and the recommendations of experts, consultants and professionals, the Lebanese
telecom institutional framework has remained unchanged since 1959. Even the modest Hariri
attempt at changing existing institutional arrangements through a nominal expansion in
OGERO's operational functions has been effectively stifled or neutralized with recent changes
in political fortunes. This in turn illustrates how complex political maneuvers and priorities in
Lebanon often translate into system-maintenance and a zero-sum game with respect to
administrative reform.
The Fixed Line Segment
Lebanon's fixed telecommunications network is controlled entirely by MPT. Following the
major rehabilitation program, the PSTN network came to include about 700,000 connected lines
in 1998, or the equivalent of a fixed line penetration rate of 15 lines per 100 inhabitants. This is
a significant improvement, when compared to a penetration rate of 8% in 1994. While this
expansion has significantly reduced the waiting list (from 250,000 in 1994 to 110,000 in June
1998), it has not yet translated into a drastic improvement of services. For example, of the
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current subscriber base, only 16,000 have access to international direct dialing (IDD) and the
call completion rate was estimated at 50% in 1998 (CDR, 1998).
Hence, despite the substantial investment in upgrading the fixed network infrastructure-
estimated at 800 million US$ in 1998- the MPT has been making less than optimal use of
existing capacity and showing less than adequate concern for quality enhancement and service
diversification. This is best illustrated by the complete absence of basic services like voicemail,
dial back, clip or detailed billing. Hence, to the detriment of both government and users, the
enhanced capacity of the network is not being utilized effectively. The chairman and general
manager of Libancell comments in this regard,
Although the infrastructure for the fixed network has been overhauled, MPT has proven
incapable of exploiting this new capacity. Moreover, the fixed network has now lost in
value because it has not been well-maintained [Rifaii, July 24, 2000].
The director of PC support and networking at AUB similarly observes,
The telephone line is the basic service provided. They do not offer any other services,
such as voicemail for example. MPT has also not been catering for businesses by
providing the diversfled range of services (e.g. leased and digital lines) needed by IT,
banking or commercial companies [Bu Khaled, July 28, 2000].
The MPT Director General of Construction and Equipment, however, claims to be satisfied with
the rehabilitation efforts of the fixed line infrastructure, and boasts MPT's multi-service
delivery capability,
We have undertaken a successful rehabilitation of the fixed line infrastructure over the
past seven years. Today, we have around 1,500,000 lines and some 750,000 subscribers.
We also provide latest technology services, including caller ID, call forwarding and
ISDN digital lines [Indraous, August 21, 2000].
The observations of the Director General contrast sharply, however, with the conclusions of a
recent World Bank sector review report (1998), which notes that "the analysis of the main
technical, financial and institutional variables reveals some visible problems in the sector that
should be addressed, including lack of service innovation and diversification, weak marketing
strategy and corporate client analysis, lack of further development of internet and data services,
lack of value added services (VAS) in the PSTN, lack of demand-driven investments, absence
of payphone market strategy and relative low productivity" (World Bank, 1998, p.2).
The fact that the recent rehabilitation of the fixed line network has not translated into significant
improvements in services has also been attributed to the quality of public sector employees.
Chapter 7 has touched upon this theme, when a note has been made of the low priority which
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has been accorded to human resource management, development and training in the wake of the
war. This has proven to be a serious hurdle in post-war reform efforts, particularly in the field of
telecommunications where success hinges on the continuous updating of the skills of employees
and their exposure to constantly evolving technologies. Dr. Bahsoun, an international
telecommunications expert, comments in this regard,
Most MPT employees are old and incapable of coping with the demands of the telecom
environment. Because of civil service laws and sectarianism in Lebanon, it has proven
impossible to dismiss any of those employees or to replace them with fresh blood
[Bahsoun, July 13, 2000].
The chairman and general manager of Libancell also observes,
In a sector in which qualfled people command very high salaries, the Lebanese public
sector is simply not able to deliver the range of salaries to attract qualfled elements
[Rifaii, July 24, 2000].
The director of PC support and networking at AUB similarly observes,
This is the sort of business where you are either competitive and have the right human
resources, or you are out. But the Lebanese government is trying to run the telecom
sector with old, non productive employees [Bu Khaled, July 28, 2000}.
These explanations highlight a number of constraints, which are combining to undermine post-
war personnel management efforts. The first explanation touches upon the lingering influence
and importance of 'sectarian considerations', which typically render downsizing and other
personnel re-adjustment efforts more difficult and complicated in the Lebanese context. There is
indeed the risk that any such efforts will have sectarian implications, repercussions and
interpretations. The second quotation is in turn alluding to the economic constraints of the post-
war Lebanese environment, which as noted in chapter 7, have precluded adjustments in public
sector salaries and hence undermined efforts at attracting and retaining qualified elements.
Working against these constraints, the Hariri government attempted to recruit professionals to
specific institutions according to need and to adjust their remuneration. However, even the few
contractuals that were successfully recruited to OGERO under Hariri have recently left in view
of the hostile attitude of the new government. The OGERO network director bitterly observes,
As a Lebanese citizen and as someone who works in telecom, I find this to be very
unfortunate. We are letting go of our qualjfied elements, when we are in most need for
them. And I can understand why they are leaving, because they have lost all motivation
in this politicized environment [Abu Farhat, August 14, 2000].
Another OGERO official comments defiantly,
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It is true that Hariri empowered OGERO and recruited a number of contractuals. Some
of them were very competent. Unfortunately, all the qua4fled elements are leaving now.
As soon as they find work outside OGERO, they leave because they sense that their work
is not appreciated. Minister Neiman went to the extent of investigating some of the
contractuals that were hired during the Hariri era and part of this scandal was even
publicized. ..And we will likely follow suit, unless a new government takes office and
understands that the telecommunications sector has to be dealt with in a professional
way [Nahed, August 8, 2000].
As Kettl (1996) aptly observes, "building government capacity for the new millennium depends
on creating good systems, but the systems are worthless without the right people in them driven
by the right incentives" (Ketti, 1996, p. 15). The Lebanese experience with the rehabilitation of
the fixed line network confirms this observation. A recent example, which has been cited by yet
another frustrated OGERO official, further illustrates this point,
Imagine that Byblos Bank submitted a request for leased lines from MPT to connect its
various branches (56). Given the current monopolistic provision, MPT is the only entity
that can provide it with leased lines. MPT however could not make Byblos Bank an offer
and we lost several million dollars in revenue. Why? Because MPT does not have the
administrative capability to exploit those leased lines that it has at its disposal. We have
a stagnant pool of 6000 leased lines. We have not exploited a single one. This shows you
that it is not enough to have the infrastructure when you don 't have the administrative
capability to operate it and exploit it [Obeid, August 12, 2000].
Dr. Shehadi, a regional telecommunications expert and advisor to the minister of economy,
refers to MPT's reluctance to admit its limitations as 'myopia'. He explains,
This is myopia. The MPT either does not recognize its limitations or it does not want to
admit them. They don 't have the human resources to do the work internally or the
financial resources to contract the work to someone else. Now, MPT is clearly on the
defensive. They realize that the technology in this field is changing in such a way that
they can themselves not keep up with it. The other side of the problem is that technology
is advancing and making it easier for others to compete with MPT and provide an
alternative service. This is why the idea of liberalization is so important, but it also
happens to be the idea that MPT can not accept. The real reason is that they are
incompetent. Because the public sector is not in a position to compete, it wants to prevent
others from competing [Shehadi, August 14, 2000].
The MPT Director General of Construction and Equipment, however, does not appear to share
the view that liberalization is necessarily suited to the realities of the Lebanese telecom context,
particularly that the government has not yet made a good return on the investment it has made in
the rehabilitation process,
Liberalization is not necessarily a good idea for Lebanon. The main reason is that until
now, we have not made a good return on the investment we have made in the
rehabilitation process. Every country has to tailor its reforms to its own realities. The
fact that other countries are opening up their markets does not imply that we have to do
the same [Indraous, August 21, 2000].
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MPT's reluctance to embrace liberalization and its unilateral control of fixed line tariffs have
also resulted in distortions in the tariff structure, which seems unbalanced, showing high
installation I interconnection charges and international line guarantee fees and an implicit
subsidy of local and long distance calls by international calls (Table 24). Such tariff distortions
have resulted in an excessive dependence on long-distance revenues, hence limiting the
possibilities of introducing competition. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that MPT' s
policy of pursuing revenue maximization in the short term, taking advantage of its monopoly on
international telecommunications calls, will not be sustainable in the longer term. Major
operators, governments and regulators worldwide are forcing international accounting and
settlement rates down, which may eventually deprive MPT and the government of Lebanon of a
large proportion of its revenues (CDR, 1998). Dr. Shehadi made an interesting comment in this
regard to a local business magazine, "this is a service based economy. Do you realize the impact
of reducing the cost of international calls? It would make a huge difference for businesses and
individuals" (Shehadi, quoted in Executive, 2000a, p. 28).
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MPT has also recently banned a new IP protocol that provides voice over the Internet, claiming
that the new service is a breach of MPT monopoly and a threat to MPT revenue. The new
service provides Internet subscribers the chance to make overseas calls at an estimated cost of
10 cents per minute. The same phone call costs US$ 1.4 a minute through the MPT operator.
Although the new service creates a totally different market from the one of the traditional voice
operators, and is likely to generate more revenues to the government through a more frequent
usage of ISPs leased lines, MPT has refused to reconsider its decision. Its rigid position has
been widely denunciated for its stifling of competition and its constraining of the evolution of
this potentially promising service. Dr. Kaysi, a professor of telecommunications engineering at
the American University of Beirut comments in this regard,
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The main reason is that MPT thinks that this service is denying it signflcant revenues.
But the decision is absurd; no one can stop technology. MPT could have instead
legalized this service and imposed additional taxes for each line being used to provide
Voice over the Internet [Kaysi, July 18, 2000].
The MPT Director of Construction and Equipment insists however that MPT never intended to
ban the new IP protocol but that there was an attempt to prevent the illegal use of lines provided
by MPT for that purpose,
We have not banned voice over the internet. In my opinion, this is the kind of service that
should not / can not be banned. We have only banned voice over IP in cases of misuse of
MPTprovided lines [Indraous, August 21, 2000].
While the explanation of the MPT Director General may be true, the mere fact that MPT had to
resort to banning the new IP service at times, however, still implies less than effective
regulation and/or anticipation of the potential misuse of MPT lines. Hence, evidence from the
fixed line segment suggests ineffective regulation, sub-optimal use of existing capacity, acute
shortages in qualified public personnel, tariff distortions and unjustified monopolistic
restrictions. Personnel management / development has also been relegated to secondary
importance in view of the looming financial crisis and the sectarian complications of the
Lebanese environment. The government has thus resorted in this segment to a traditional
capacity expansion approach (i.e. structural changes) to the detriment of longer-term strategic
changes and investments. As the review in this section aptly suggests, however, structural
changes alone are unlikely to produce tangible results unless associated with more substantive
changes and reforms (e.g. liberalization and proper attention to and engagement with human
resource management).
The Cellular Segment
The cellular segment in Lebanon comprises two private companies, offering global systems
mobile (GSM) services. France Telecom Mobile Liban (FTML), commercially known as Cellis,
is a private company created in August 1994, whose shares are 67% owned by France Telecom
and 33% by Lebanese shareholders (irimari1y the local Mikati group, whose chairman is the
current Minister of Transport and Public Works). Libancell is a private company owned by
Telecom Finland International (14% of the shares) and local shareholders (86%). The two
cellular operators were granted 10-year GSM concessions under a Build, Operate and Transfer
(BOT) contract, with a possible extension of an additional two years and were subject to an
escalating revenue sharing scheme.
The incentive for taking the two private GSM networks route in Lebanon stemmed from
the terrible state of its post-war fixed line network. By 1993, and as a result of almost two
decades of civil war, the Lebanese fixed line phone network only had 200,000
operational phone lines, out of a total capacity of 525,000. The government sensitive to
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the importance of a reliable telecommunications network in Lebanon's post-war
reconstruction efforts, decided to award two GSM concessions to private companies by
means of a Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) arrangement, to satisf' the demand for
phone services, while the fixed line network was being overhauled. The cost of
developing and rehabilitating the fixed line network was projected to be a staggering US$
800 million and was scheduled for completion by the end of 1998. Therefore, the
construction of two GSM networks with private capital seemed like a magical solution to
the government (Middle East Communications, 2000, pp. 44-45).
The cellular market currently consists of over 700,000 subscribers (June 2000), an increase from
267,350 in July 1997. The networks of the two operators cover more than 80% of Lebanon and
the GSM penetration rate is around 23%, almost equally shared between the two operators. The
introduction of pre-paid cards, which have enjoyed significant success in Europe, is likely to
result in a rapid increase in cellular penetration rates. Indeed, Libancell has reported having
more than 120,000 pre-paid card subscriptions by July 1998. The two operators have also
increased their international coverage. Roaming arrangements have reached 67 countries and
more than 75 operators for Cellis and 80 live networks in 55 countries for Libancell (Middle
East Communications, 1999).
Tariffs for cellular services are set by the Lebanese government, which fixed a tariff ceiling of
US $0.05 per minute for all domestic calls, on top of which is added a 10% municipal tax. The
end user price for a minute is therefore $0.0779, which is one of the lowest in the world. This
low price made the service very affordable and resulted in a high average use of 750 minutes
per subscriber per month. The government also set an annual 5% cap on increases in tariffs and
fees, as well as on connection and rental charges. The operators are free, however, to set the
rates for all other value-added services, which are subject to competitive pressures. Table 25
shows the current mobile tariff structure and Table 26 highlights some key current market data
of the cellular segment.
Table 25. Mobile Tariff Structure in Lebanon
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Table 26. Lebanese Cellular Segment: Key Current Market Data
(FTML, 1998; Libancell, 1997)
Number of Subscribers 	 700,000
Consumption (airtime minutes per month)
	
750






Price per minute (US $)
	
0.078
Average revenue from value added services (US$ / month / subscriber) 	 10
Estimated average revenue per user (US $)
	
90
Estimated gross yearly revenues (M US $)
	
486
Despite the outstanding success of the Lebanese cellular segment, the future of the GSM
networks is far from decided. The BOT agreements stipulated an eight-year exclusivity period
and a 10-year operating license. The agreement includes a 20 per cent gross revenue share in the
first eight years, rising to 40 percent in the final two years and 50 per cent should the two
companies opt for a further two-year license. However, the massive take-up in GSM
subscription levels has prompted a recent dispute between the government and the private
cellular operators causing the government to limit each operator's subscriber totals to 250,000.
With Lebanon's tremendous cellular growth, the two operators had already reached that mark
by late 1998, resulting in the current stagnation in GSM market growth.
Lebanon's cellular operators, Libancell and Cellis, have expressed their dismay at the current
situation. The two operators' 20 per cent revenue-sharing agreement with the government
reportedly earned the Lebanese Treasury $757.4 million in five years. Cellis for example claims
to have paid some $354 million to the government in taxes over the five-year period,
representing 42.3% of its total revenue, while Libancell reports paying $403.4 million in taxes
to MPT from 1995 to 1999 out of a total revenue base of $802 million. The operators hence
maintain that the decision to cap subscriptions is counterproductive because it deprives the
government of additional revenues.
While the initial dispute between the cellular companies and the government centered on the
250,000 line clause in their contracts, the conflict has further escalated and acquired new
dimensions in recent years. Tensions increased in March-April 1999, as MPT unilaterally raised
taxes on mobile calls by 4 cents per minute, in spite of operators' objections and without
parliamentary approval. Libancell filed a lawsuit with the Council of State to overturn the
decision. Matters came to a head in June 1999, when the State Audit Department produced a
report accusing the two cellular companies of systematically violating the terms of their
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contracts. Based on this report, MPT sent eleven warning letters to each cellular operator
accusing them of numerous violations'8.
In a move seen as further govemmental pressure, the Council of Ministers has unilaterally
imposed $600 million in fines on the two companies in compensation for what it claims are
violations of the terms of their contracts. Parliament approved the Cabinet decision, and the two
companies were given until May 24, 2000 to make a commitment to pay the money. The
Council of Ministers further agreed that the contracts be re-negotiated, and the government's
share of revenue increased from 20 percent to 30 percent for years five to eight of the contract,
adding that the government should receive 50 percent of revenue from all lines sold in excess of
the 250,000 ceiling. The government has even threatened to cancel the contracts and seize the
two companies' assets if an agreement is not reached through talks.
Both companies have reacted defiantly to the MPT and the government's accusations and fines.
Cellis and Libancell maintain that arbitration should be conducted under Lebanese Law with an
arbitrator appointed by the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris as stipulated in their
contracts. "Any issue should be resolved within the parameters of the legal framework of the
contract. One party cannot take unilateral decisions, even if it is an official" (Cellis statement,
quoted in Lebanon Opportunities, May 2000, p. 55). "We maintain that we have not violated
our contract, and that arbitration is the best path to resolve the different interpretations of the
contract" (Rifaii, Chairman of Libancell quoted in Executive, 2000a, p. 7).
Mutual accusations, threats and ultimatums continued to be exchanged throughout the Spring,
2000, with intermittent efforts at mediation. Specifically, Booz, Allen and Hamilton were
contracted to act as mediators between the government and the cellular operators and find a
resolution to the raging dispute. Accordingly, throughout March-April 2000, negotiations have
centered on converting the BOT contracts to licenses. Offers were made by Libancell and Cellis
to pay $1.35 billion each for new licenses, with $900 million paid upfront and the rest coming
in over the 25-year life of the license. Although the key terms of the license were agreed upon
by April 15, 2000, the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications decided to abort the process
unilaterally and broke off negotiations with the two cellular companies on April 17, 2000.
While the license offers were not accepted, nor officially rejected by the government, the matter
was passed once again to the auditing department for re-assessment. Prime Minister Hoss
confirmed that he needed the opinion of the auditing department to support the government's
decision to take the case to court. The awaited report was finally disclosed in July 2000,
' The alleged violations primarily relate to surpassing the 125,000 subscriber limit specified in the
contract, unpaid fees and taxes especially for microwave links, and insufficient geographic and
network coverage (Lebanon Opportunities, May 2000, pp. 53-55).
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imposing over $1 billion in penalties and fines on the two cellular companies for alleged
violations of their contracts. Of the total amount, Cellis is expected to pay $687 million and
Libancell the remaining $371.2 million. The most frequently discussed alleged violation is
surpassing the 125,000 subscriber limit in addition to non-payment of fees for the use of
microwave frequencies. The government has already filed its case in local court.
The evolution of events between the government and the cellular operators has been closely
observed by analysts and officials. Because each informant tends to view the conflict from a
different angle, it becomes important to contrast different outlooks and perspectives to obtain a
reasonable and rounded view/explanation. Although some subjectivity in interpretation is to be
expected, the cross-checking of observations will hopefully allow some plausible inferences and
conclusions to be drawn. An anonymous source, for example, comments on recent
developments between the govemment and the GSM operators in this way,
The dispute has been sorely mishandled by Issam Neiman, the Minister of Posts and
Telecommunications. It could have been resolved quickly, privately and profitably for the
government had they been more politically astute [anonymous].
The chairman and director of Global Com, a data transmission company, similarly attributes the
conflict to government's mismanagement and its obsession with profit,
Instead of encouraging and facilitating the operation of private telecom providers in
Lebanon, the government seems to be focused on maximizing its revenues and
complicating the process [Torbey, July 3, 2000].
A CDR telecommunications official in turn explains the conflict from the perspective of the
government, noting some shortcomings in the original BOT contracts,
The two cellular companies are of course trying to maximize their profits. A major issue
of contention is that many of the services now provided by the GSM operators were not
foreseen in the original contracts [Hindawi, July 12, 2000].
A similar explanation is provided by another CDR telecommunications official, who attributes
the conflict to the profit maximization strategy of the GSM operators,
The two cellular operators are conspiring to turn the cellular market segment into a
quasi-monopoly. The cellular has become a basic necessity in Lebanon in view of the
absence of public pay phones. Therefore the government needs to regulate competition
and ensure that cellular operators do not make undue profits [Faidallah, July 4, 2000].
Dr. Shehadi, a regional telecommunications expert, is more keen on highlighting the
implications of the continuation of this dispute, while also laying the blame on the government,
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The continuation of the dispute is very bad for Lebanon because of what it says about the
government 's policy direction. No investor will invest in a country where governments
decide to shut down a business simply because it is more profitable than its original
business plan had predicted [Shehadi, August 14, 2000].
The Director General of Operations and Maintenance at the MPT sheds light on the origins and
evolution of the conflict in this way,
MPT found itself responsible for supervising the BOT contracts that were granted to
Cellis and Libancell overnight. MPT, however, was not ready for this responsibility. It
did not have the technical/organizational capacity to exercise adequate control and
supervision over the newly established GSM concessions. The conflict arose when MPT
realized that the operators have gone beyond the scope of the contract, which specified a
maximum subscriber base of 250,000. The GSM operators also introduced a range of
new services that were not foreseen in the contracts. This is what prompted the dispute.
The problem is that negotiations have gradually become entangled in politics. In April,
the negotiations took on a strategic turn, when the operators suggested to migrate from
the current BOT agreement to a license. This proposal by the GSM operators has further
complicated the situation. Upon carefully studying the terms of reference of this license,
the government decided that it is not ready to take this step and has since terminated
negotiations with the cellular operators [Oueidat, July 21, 2000].
Hence, the Director General of Operations and Maintenance at the MPT admits to the limited
regulatory capacity of the ministry and attributes the conflict at least in part to MPT's inability
to exercise adequate control over the newly established GSM concessions. The MPT Director
General of Construction and Equipment had a slightly different explanation,
The original BOT contract was confusing and unclear. The dispute currently revolves
around the actual legal content of this contract. The d(fJicult economic situation has
prompted the government to impose on the cellular operators a tax increase. The
operators did not welcome the move, although the government reserves the right in this
contract to impose taxes as it deems appropriate. This is what prompted the original
dispute, which acquired new dimensions over time. The Minister then claimed that the
GSM operators have breached the contract, which explicitly limits their total subscriber
base to 250,000. No one expected this boom in the mobile segment. The economic
situation has recently prompted the government to take drastic measures to increase its
revenues. So there are economic considerations at play that should also be taken into
consideration [Indraous, August 21, 2000].
This quote from a high-ranking MPT official underlines two important aspects of the on-going
conflict. First, the quote represents nothing less than a confession that the dispute with the
cellular companies was partly prompted by the poor state of government finances (i.e. the
importance of the economic factor). Experts indeed concur that successive governments have
sought to squeeze more money out of the cellular operators, by raising cellular taxes and
imposing restrictions as desperate measures to ease their own financial problems [Rifaii, July
24, 2000; Bu Khaled, July 28, 2000]. "Despite the high level of government revenue, politicians
have - almost since the formation of the companies- complained that their profits levels are too
high and that they should pay more in taxes" (Lebanon Opportunities, 2000, p. 53).
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The quote also points to the unclear / confusing nature of the original BOT contract. A regional
telecommunications expert comments in this regard,
Any BOT contract is flawed from the beginning in the telecom sector. A BOT contract is
the right contractual instrument between the government and the private sector when you
are talking about a field where technology evolves predictably, but not in a field as
dynamic as telecom. Why? Because a BOT contract, by its very nature is static and can
not adapt to an evolving situation. Moreover, I think that a BOT contract with a revenue
sharing scheme creates a situation where the government has a conflict of interest. The
government develops a financial stake in these companies. Yet at the same time, the
government is supposed to worry about citizens and consumers and the kinds of services
they are getting. With this conflict of interest, you have all the makings of a dispute, from
the very beginning [Shehadi, August 14, 2000].
Even the international law firm Booz Allen and Hamilton, which was called upon to mediate
and interpret the contract concluded that there could be two legal interpretations of the same
clause. Excerpts from their report indeed confirm that "in certain respects, the terms of the
contracts are not transparent and the impact of supervening law, documentation and discussions
not clear" (Executive, 2000b, p. 23). The rational exit to the crisis according to analysts is to
migrate from the current BOT contract to a license. "Why? Because the license is dynamic and it
does not constrain the operators the same way a BOT contract does" [Shehadi, August 14,
2000]. The reasons for not accepting the license offers were briefly articulated by the Minister,
Issam Neiman, in his press conference of April 17, 2000, namely that the initial installments
were low, the over-extended length of the license, and the fact that the right of refusal for
UMTS, the third generation of mobile phone systems, was included (Executive, 2000a, p. 7).
The MPT Director General of Operations and Maintenance outlines in his words the reasons for
not accepting the license offers,
The license requested is not a standard GSM license. It is in reality a full operator
license for each of the two companies. The operators want to upgrade all their services
and increase their subscriber base by one million. The services that they can provide f
such license is indeed granted will render the fixed line network obsolete. The terms of
reference of the license also make it practically impossible to introduce a third GSM
operator [Oueidat, July 21, 2000].
There is thus some expressed fear of competition in case the license offers were accepted. In
other words, the government expects the GSM operators to be able to take over the entire phone
market if its imposed restrictions were somewhat alleviated or entirely eliminated. The MPT
Director General of Construction and Equipment also observes,
The terms of reference are not acceptable: the GSM operators are asking for an
international gateway and for a sign (ficant expansion in services. They have also
requested the first right of refusal for the UMTS and the cancellation of all tax and
revenue sharing schemes. Also, they have requested a license that extends over 25 years
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and are therefore expecting this government to make a commitment for 25 years
[Indraous, August 21, 2000].
While MPT officials refer to the terms of reference of the license to justify their non-acceptance
of the offers, others point to the vested interests at play and to political wrangling behind the
scenes. The terms of the license could have indeed been re-negotiated and made acceptable to
the government. The Minister, instead, after having agreed to the key terms of the license on
April 15th, decided to abort the process unilaterally and to break off negotiations on April 17th•
An anonymous source tried to rationalize this rather unexpected change in mood on the part of
the government in this way,
What happened during those two days? There is only one explanation, which is that the
Minister came under political pressure from people who have vested interests and have
different plans for GSM operations in the country, people such as Michel El Murr and
Nabih Bern. The license gives exclusivity to the current operators, and some people may
have realized that the terms of this license undermine all their chances of infiltrating into
this important segment [anonymous].
A regional telecommunications expert, who has been involved in recent mediationlnegotiation
efforts in his capacity as advisor to the minister of economy further explains,
We gave the Minister several options to resolve the raging dispute with the GSM
operators, including the idea of a license. Although he was initially supportive and
receptive, there were pressures from all sides, and it became much bigger than the
Minister. At that point, other people stepped in, and they were pushing and pulling in
d?fferent directions. All of it ended up in this big fiasco, where the cellular operators
made their offer, and the government not only refused but could not even get itself to
respond by giving a counteroffer. It is not understandable when there is so much at stake
financially that the government does not attempt to present a counteroffer. This is again
an indication of how incompetent the administration is. The administration simply does
not have the capability to produce a counteroffer of this sort [Shehadi, August 14, 2000].
An international telecommunications expert and close observer of recent developments between
the government and GSM operators also comments,
How can the Lebanese government with its current levels of debt refuse $2.7 billion in
return for extending those licenses. Such decision makes sense only f one takes into
account the hidden agenda of some prominent Lebanese leaders, who have their own
peculiar ideas about how to run telecom {Bahsoun, July 13, 2000].
Similarly, the director of PC support and networking at AUB observes,
The whole story boils down to the fact that there are some politically powerful people
who were hoping to get their fingers in the pie and felt excluded by the terms of the
license [Bu Khaled, July 28, 2000].
Although it is difficult to obtain concrete evidence in support of these explanations, which
remain speculative in nature, their validity can nevertheless be re-asserted by invoking the
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peculiarities of Lebanese political traditions and decision-making patterns. As mentioned
before, the politics of accommodation have permeated decision-making circles in Lebanon,
necessitating balancing and compromise. Political wrangling and bargaining can therefore not
be discounted as having exerted an influence on the course of events and on the sudden decision
of the minister -who is intricately involved in this complex web of interactions and
relationships- to unilaterally abort negotiations on April 17th Suffice it to remember in this
respect the inadvertent words of the MPT Director General of Operations and Maintenance
quoted above "the problem is that negotiations have gradually become entangled in politics ".
Indeed, although the government advanced a number of arguments to justify its non-acceptance
of the license offers, its rationalization remains less than convincing, particularly in view of the
current state of public finances and the expressed willingness of the cellular operators to re-
negotiate the terms of the licenses. But even had the license offers been accepted, analysts
concur that it is unlikely that this step alone would have guaranteed improved telecom operating
conditions in the country. A regional telecommunications expert observes in this regard,
So fyou proceed with a license and you remain in the current institutional set up, where
you have a ministry with very few qua! jfIed people and not capable of regulating the
sector, and with the conflict of interest still in existence, it means that you have not done
much. You are likely to face the same kinds ofproblems again. You will have problems
with the administration every day of the week because the rules of the game are
antiquated [Shehadi, August 14, 2000].
Hence, besides the traditional political wrangling and peddling, the thrust of the problem with
regards to the Lebanese telecommunications sector remains the mentality of monopolization and
the myopic approach to telecom as a profitable means to finance the treasury. Dr. Shehadi
shrewdly explains,
Today the prevailing view of the government with regards to the telecom sector, and it is
not a healthy one, is that telecom is the cash cow to the treasury. This means that they
look at telecom as the oil or petroleum of Lebanon. When you have this view, you tend to
want to maintain your hold over this fortune and maximize your profits. It is precisely
this mentality which has proven to be the biggest stumbling block in resolving the dispute
with the cellular companies [Shehadi, August 14, 2000].
A similar view has been expressed in the cover story of a local business magazine,
Instead of looking at telecom purely as a source of cash flow for the treasury, the
administration should view it as an important sector to spur economic growth, create
employment and encourage investment. As the rest of the world moves into the New
Economy, Lebanon risks being stuck in the Old World (Executive, 2000b, p. 23).
In the meantime, the stalemate will continue to jeopardize Lebanon's impressive cellular market
growth, undermine international investor confidence in the country, and in the long run damage
231
traditional distribution networks by creating a parallel market. Indeed, the dispute has resulted
in effectively halting the two operators' sales efforts, the development of a waiting list for
cellular phones, and a black market for pre-paid cards. Both Libancell and Cellis have put a halt
to new investments, putting money only into maintaining the network. In this respect, the
chairman and general manager of Libancell has expressed his frustration to a local business
magazine, "it is a sad feeling of lost opportunities when we see how all the Arab World is
developing, how they are really forging forward. Because we were pioneers in the cellular field,
to just stagnate right now is something that is extremely frustrating" [Rifaii, quoted in
Executive, 2000b, p. 27].
Some believe that a change in government (expected in October 2000) will go a long way in
improving the state's relationship with the two cellular companies. Others are not so sure that a
new government will necessarily bring about an improved climate. But even if a new
administration comes to power with a different attitude and manages to mend relations and
finalize a deal with the cellular companies, the main issue remains one of embracing telecom
reform and liberalization and dismantling unjustifiable monopolistic restrictions and
regulations. An OGERO telecommunications official observes in this regard,
Today, we continue to have a monopolistic situation because it is believed to be a money-
making arrangement. Because there is no vision, they do not realize that by breaking up
this monopoly, they can make even more profits. This lack of vision in the
telecommunications and other sectors is in turn negatively affecting the national
economy [Obeid, August 12, 2000].
Dr. Shehadi similarly observes,
Successive governments have failed to adopt a consistent telecom policy and law in
keeping with the information age. This can be primarily attributed to the myopic
approach to telecom as the cash cow for public finances. Current trends in telecom
reform reflect badly on Lebanon because they confirm the intention to keep telecom as a
government monopoly worthy only of banana republics [Shehadi, August 14, 2000J.
Hence, evidence from the mobile segment also suggests patchy, half-hearted and incremental
patterns of change. The GSM concessions have been awarded on the basis of a BOT contract,
with a revenue-sharing scheme. The government's limited regulatory capacity coupled with the
serious financial crisis it is facing have engendered a dispute over revenue-sharing with the
GSM operators. The dispute has been allowed to escalate and the prospects of a satisfactory
solution compromised for no obvious justification other than hidden political motives. The
continuing stalemate risks to further undermine Lebanon's impressive mobile growth. The
government has contributed to this stalemate, whether through its inability to detach telecom
reform from politics or through its orientation to telecom as the most profitable means to
finance the treasury.
232
Internet and Data Segment
Internet services in Lebanon are characterized by a relatively high degree of entry and
liberalization as witnessed by the existence of a total of 19 Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
offering e-mail, web browsing, and newsgroup services. At the end of 1998, the overall Internet
market size was estimated at 40,000 subscribers, generating around US$ 14 million in revenues
(Achkar, 1999). The data segment and VAS are partially liberalized, with 5 providers competing
and offering wireless data services. Fixed line data services, however, are exclusively offered by
Sodetel, a company owned at 50% by the Lebanese Government, 40% by France Telecom and
10% by Telecom Italia.
Hence, although the Lebanese government has opened the Internet and Data segment to
competition, private operators are only licensed to provide data-communications services via
wireless access, while the provision of data over physical connections is still reserved to MPT
and its data-communication subsidiary, Sodetel. Companies wishing to provide data services
must submit an application to MPT for approval. "Rules for other companies wishing to
introduce data services are simple: they must submit an application to MPT, which may -at its
discretion- pass on the application to the Council of Ministers. All licenses are granted by a
decree of the Council of Ministers" (Middle East Communications, 2000, p.44). [Italics Mine]
According to one operator, MPT charges private data operators $65,062 a year, and collects a
20 per cent share of revenues. Hence, as with the cellular segment, the Lebanese government
has been keen on introducing a revenue sharing scheme for data transmission licenses. Dr.
Shehadi, a regional telecommunications expert, comments in this regard,
The prevailing perception of telecom as the cash cow to the treasury in turn translates
into something very pernicious, which is the revenue sharing formula. Every time a new
company applies for a data transmission license, they introduce in the terms of the
contract a revenue sharing scheme. The revenue sharing arrangement, whether with
mobile companies or data transmission, means that the government becomes a
shareholder and develops a financial stake in these companies. Hence, instead of being
preoccupied with ensuring the proper delivery of services, the government is concerned
with how much money it is making. Unfortunately, the whole logic has been distorted.
The role of the government is to make sure that citizens are getting the services they need
at reasonable costs [Shehadi, August 14, 2000].
Moreover, the terms of a typical data transmission license reveal the extent to which the legal /
regulatory framework is antiquated. A 1996-200 1 data transmission license is indeed granted on
the basis of regulations dating back to 1959. In way of illustration, a typical license agreement
stipulates the following:
The Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, Decree No. 9288, granting a license to
DataSat to establish a Radio Data Transmission Network on Lebanese territory:
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The President of the Lebanese Republic, based on the Constitution and on Legislative
Decree No. 126 of 12/6/1959 and based on the recommendation of the Minister of Post
and Telecommunications, and after the approval of the Council of Ministers on 7/8/1996,
licenses the company, DataSat, to establish and exploit a Radio Data Transmission
Network on Lebanese territory for a period of five years. Thereafter, the license will be
renewable on a yearly basis by a decision of the Minister of Post & Telecommunications
(Lebanon, 1996, p. 3825).
The Lebanese data transmission segment is thus also facing MPT imposed restrictions, due to
limited liberalization in the fixed provision of data, an outdated regulatory framework, and the
insistence on revenue-sharing schemes. Indeed, the provision of data over physical connections
is still monopolized by MPT and its data-communication subsidiary, Sodetel. Interconnection
procedures are also not in place, with licenses mainly awarded at MPT's discretion. The failure
to clarif' licensing procedures and to fully liberalize fixed data transmission are undermining
the real potentialities of this important segment. This is yet another example of major cost
savings being denied to users because of unjustified monopolistic restrictions.
Table 27 provides a list of some of the companies that are licensed to provide data and Internet
services in Lebanon. Table 28 highlights the overall telecom structure as of 1998.
Table 27. Some Licensed Public Data and Internet Service Operators
(Achkar, 1999)
Company	 Services Licensed	 License Date





















































Table 28. Overall Telecom Sector Structure as of 1998 (CDR, 1998)

































In 1998, Lebanon's telecommunications operators (fixed, cellular and data) had a turnover of
USS 1 billion. MPT announced this figure in late December 1998. Less than 50 per cent of the
total turnover came from the state-owned fixed line service controlled by MPT. The remaining
over $500 million turnover came from the private cellular and data-communications operators.
These figures can be contrasted to those of 1996, where the revenues of MPT amounted to a
mere USS 300 million, of which US$ 107 million were generated from mobile operators. The
US$ 1 billion telecommunications industry is second only to customs in terms of the revenues it
generates for the treasury.
A large proportion of the revenues is being used to service the debt that had been incurred in the
rehabilitation process. The long-term debt is from lending institutions such as the Kuwait Fund
and Credit National and was directed toward network upgrading and expansion. As of
December 1998, the outstanding debt was about US$ 48 million, 83% of which is concentrated
in two creditors, Kuwait Fund and Credit National (CDR, 1998). The short-term debt mainly
consists of government loans. The amount of investment financed by vendors is about US$ 660
million, most of which needs to be repaid by the end of 1998/1999.
While the Lebanese government has implemented an impressive rehabilitation/expansion
investment program over the past few years, the financing strategy (except for the two private
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mobile operators) has actually contributed significantly to the fiscal and public, particularly
domestic debt issues that Lebanon is now facing. By relying mostly on the national budget,
including treasury advances and loans for sector investments, the government was, in the
margin, funding the sector with short-term treasury bills (T-bills) at high interest rates, rather
than longer-term exportlsupplier credits that could have been obtained at much lower rates
(CDR, 1998).
There is also a clear trend towards an increase in receivables over time (Figure 16). Although
the total billed amount from national and international calls has grown from US$ 109 million in
1995 to US$ 223 in 1997, unpaid bills represented about US$ 57 million during the same
period, in addition to US$ 40 million of bills which have been written off over time. As a result,
only 79% of the total billed amount has been cashed during this period (Table 29). The high
cashed-billed ratio is attributed to an outdated billing collection system, which leaves to the
customer the initiative to reach the local branch to pay the bill and an unclear/weakly enforced
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Figure 16. A Trend Towards an Increase in Receivables Over Time (1995-1998)
(OGERO, 1998)
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Table 29. Receivables (1995-1997) (OGERO, 1998)









































Cashed-Billed Ratio 	 79%
Hence, while the government's rehabilitation and expansion effort has indeed been impressive,
the financial management of the telecom sector remains archaic. International auditing and
accounting standards for the preparation of balance sheets, income statements, and cash flow
statements have not been introduced. The Lebanese government has also failed to introduce
billing and customer care systems (BACCS), which have been recently recognized as a key
business component for any modern network operator. Receivables are estimated to increase to
US$ 200 million in 1998. In the absence of a remedial policy, the trend of growth in receivables
will have a clear negative impact on the cash flow of MPT/OGERO, hence jeopardizing the
future development of the sector.
Sector Performance: International Benchmarks
Benchmarking the Lebanese telecommunications sector in an international perspective is
essential to allow a comprehensive evaluation of its current status and performance. Strategic
indicators that are commonly used for this purpose include i) the status of network
development; ii) revenues; iii) quality of services; and iv) Internet and data services.
Network Development
Network development is usually measured in terms of the absolute number of fixed lines and















O Fixed line penetration in Lebanon was about 15 lines per 100 inhabitants in 1998. This can
be compared positively with most of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa
region. In the Middle East, in particular, only Israel (with a penetration of 44%) and
Turkey (with a penetration of 22.4%) show higher figures. Figure 17 compares Lebanon's
fixed line penetration rate with selected Middle Eastern countries.
0 Figure 17 suggests that it may not be unreasonable to compare the Lebanese penetration
rate with European countries, where the average penetration rate exceeds 34 percent. This
observation is supported by the rapid growth of the Lebanese mobile segment, which has
reached high penetration levels even by European standards. Figure 18 shows that Lebanon












Figure 17. Fixed Lines per 100 Inhabitants (CDR, 1998)
Lebanon	 Italy	 France	 Germany	 United	 Sweden	 Portugal	 Spain
Kingdom
Figure 18. Cellular Penetration Rates (subscribers per 100 inhabitants) (CDR, 1998)
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Revenues
An analysis of the revenues of the Lebanese telecommunications sector against international
standards reveals the following:
U Annual telecommunications revenues per inhabitant from fixed line services in Lebanon
are less than US$ 100, which is inferior to indicators of most European operators. For
example, the equivalent figure for Portugal is about US$ 450 per inhabitant, and most of
the European operators position themselves between 400 and 500 US$ per inhabitant.
Higher revenues of European operators may be due to purchasing power differentials.
U Given this possibility, it may be worth comparing Lebanon with a sample of countries with
comparable GDP per capita. Considering a sample of such countries, including Chile,
Croatia, Estonia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Slovakia, South Africa and Uruguay, it can be shown
that the average revenue per inhabitant from fixed line services is about US$ 130, i.e. 30%
to 40% higher than the Lebanese figure.
U A similar result can be obtained from observing telecommunications revenues per line
(RPM), which better reflect the profitability of the single installed line. In this case,
considering again the Portuguese comparison, the revenue per line for Lebanon is USS
600, or about half that of Portugal (USS 1200 per line). Other European operators
commonly achieve revenues in excess of US$ 800 per line.
U An additional indicator is telecommunications revenues per employee (RPE), a measure
that partially reflects the technical productivity of labor. 1996 data indicate that RPE in
Lebanon was about US$ 110 compared to the US$ 230 per employee obtained by the
Italian operator. Most European operators position themselves between US$ 160 and US$
200 per employee. The three indicators combine to suggest that there is room for
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Figure 19. Telecommunications Revenue Growth (CDR, 1998)
Quality of Services
Quality of services is usually measured by number of faults per line and call completion rates.
U Faults per line in Lebanon have shown improvements in the last few years, as annual faults
per 100 lines have dropped from 90 to about 30. This figure is below that of some
European operators, but still exceeds the European average of less than 20 faults per 100
lines per year. The more technically efficient operators are capable of fault rates below
10% (Figure 20).
U Even if the overall quality of service is still below European standards, some prerequisites
for future enhancement already exist. For example, digitalization in Lebanon is close to
100%, higher than most European networks, which show digitalization levels between 80%
and 90%. Figure 21 shows the high level of network digitalization in Lebanon.
U Rapid network growth in Lebanon, coupled with high digitalization has allowed a
significant improvement in the call completion rate for basic voice telephony services
(local and long distance), which has increased from 25% in 1994 to 50% in 1997. Again a
good benchmark for Lebanon would be a call completion rate above 70% (based on
European comparisons).
U Notwithstanding the high digitalization of the fixed line network in Lebanon, some basic





















(BACCS) 19 and voicemail are still under-developed, and not yet offered by MPT/OGERO,
thus keeping aside a serious source of revenues for MPT.
France	 Italy	 Lebanon Indonesia Portugal Greece 	 Turkey Lebanon
(new)	 (old)
Figure 20. Faults per Line (faults per 100 lines per year) (CDR, 1998)
0	 10	 20	 30	 40	 50	 60	 70	 80	 90	 100
Figure 21. Percent Digitalization (CDR, 1998)
19 The rapid development of competition in the telecom marketplace has focused attention in recent
years on billing and customer care systems (BACCS) as key business components for any modem
network operator. BACCS are based on the recognition of customer care as a proactive process and
the inclusion of marketing and business development activities e.g. the use of monthly/quarterly
invoices as a valuable source of customer and market information that can be actively used in
business development strategies.
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Internet and Data Services
A final important benchmark, which is of particular interest given the orientation of the
economy towards services, concerns the use of the Internet as a proxy for data services.
D 1996 statistics show that Lebanon lags behind most European standards, both in terms of
the number of hosts per 10,000 inhabitants, and in terms of users per 10,000 inhabitants.
But the same indicators show that Lebanon is more advanced than some Middle Eastern
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Figure 22. Internet Penetration Rates (CDR, 1998)
Table 30. Internet Hosts by Country (CDR, 1998)
Country	 Jan. 96 Jan. 97 Growth (%)
Israel	 29,503	 38,494	 30.5
Turkey	 5,345	 13,194	 146.8
Kuwait	 1,233	 2,920	 136.8
UAE	 365	 1,802	 393.7
Egypt	 591	 1,615	 173.3
Bahrain	 142	 841	 492.3
Lebanon	 88	 601	 583.0
Morocco	 234	 477	 103.8
Iran	 271	 285	 5.2
Jordan	 19	 140	 636.8
Tunisia	 82	 39	 -52.4


































Table 31. Benchmarking Key Performance Indicators (CDR, 1998)
Indicator






















70 %	 Implementation of
BACCS and quality
management
500	 Leased lines; new tariff
structure
The Role and Recent Experience of CDR
It should be noted that these important benchmarks of the Lebanese telecommunications sector
were derived from a CDR telecommunications sector review report, that was produced with the
help of World Bank experts. Since 1993, CDR has been involved in the rehabilitation and
development of basic infrastructure sectors in Lebanon. Besides conducting the necessary
studies, CDR functions comprise securing financing for projects as well as managing loans and
relationships with donors. Dr. Faidallah, a CDR telecommunications official, explains CDR 's
post-war involvement in the telecommunications sector in this way,
The main reason CDR became involved in the telecommunications sector is that, in the
wake of the war, MPT did not have the capabilities (human and financial) to carry out
rehabilitation and expansion projects. At the request of MPT. CDR conducts the needed
studies and tries to secure financing for projects. It then prepares tender documents,
allocates contracts and supervises implementation [Faidallah, July 4, 2000].
CDR is a relatively newcomer to the Lebanese administrative scene. It was established in 1977
and intended to have an economic planning function. However, given the pressing need in post-
war Lebanon for an agency to coordinate reconstruction/rehabilitation efforts, CDR gradually
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became involved in the implementation/execution of various rehabilitation projects. A CDR
transportation official explains the changing role of CDR in this way:
What happened is that over time, CIJR became involved in execution. The reason is that
the organization of CDR allowed the council to cut red tape and get projects moving. You
had for the first time in Lebanon a council that can cut across ministries and get things
done [Helou, July 26, 2000].
The real powers of CDR over administration thus derive from its influence over reconstruction
and development funds, its control over foreign technical assistance, and its role in negotiating
economic assistance with foreign donors and lenders. Precisely because of these functions, CDR
has served since 1993 as the economic brain trust and staff arm of Prime Minister Hariri. Hariri
indeed entrusted CDR with the coordination of his reconstruction plan - Horizon 2000. CDR
has thus seen its functions expanded and its capacity enhanced during the tenure of the previous
prime minister.
CDR, however, like OGERO, has been under attack from the new Hoss administration, which
has sought to undermine its powers by merging CDR with other executive councils. A proposal
has indeed been submitted to Parliament, suggesting the merger of CDR with other councils
(CEDP and CEDPVB) for purposes of reducing waste and duplication. And although the new
government's justification for the merger sounds plausible, observers and informants concur
that political motives can not be discounted as having prompted this recent merger initiative. A
CDR official comments in this regard,
The merger recommendation is a purely political move against Hariri, who gave CDR
extensive powers and used it during his tenure as a main executive arm for major
infrastructure projects [Faidallah, July 4, 2000].
Other CDR officials similarly concur,
The attack on CDR is mainly a political move against Hariri who empowered this
institution and used it to get on with his reconstruction. There is a trend to weaken or
reverse everything that Hariri has done over the past six years [Hindawi, July 12, 2000].
The proposal to merge CDR with the other councils is not being done for the right
reasons. It is again apolitical move and you can expect the cost to be high. The proposal
is already reflecting on employees' motivation and productivity. We have put all our
projects on hold, awaiting the decision of Parliament. But many qualfled elements will
leave f they actually decide to proceed with the merger and to attach the council to the
regular administrative cadre [Helou, July 26, 2000].
Dr. Shehadi, although mainly concerned with telecommunications, had an important
observation to make in this respect,
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The Hoss government was born with a birth defect from the start, because it was
operating on the assumption that everything the previous Hariri government had done is
wrong. This was the point of departure, whether with respect to OGERO or CDR
[Shehadi, August 14, 2000].
The merger has indeed been approved by the Lebanese Parliament in August 2000 and the
mergers promulgated into law (law 247) and published in the official gazette on August 14,
2000 (Lebanon, 2000b). According to this law, CDR has been effectively merged with the
CEDP and the CEDPVB and the new institution - the unified institution for reconstruction and
development consisting of CDR, CEDP, and CEDPVB- has been placed under the authority of a
higher council, comprising besides the Prime Minister, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of
Public Works and Transport, the Minister of Finance, and two other ministers who will be
appointed in due course by a decree of the Council of Ministers.
While fiscal retrenchment / economic austerity criteria may have prompted/justified this recent
merger, it can not be ignored that the merger has simultaneously served other latent purposes.
Precisely, the merger has effectively undermined the ability of the Sunnite Prime Minister to
exercise exclusive authority over this new institution and forced him to share power with a
group of other ministers. The merger has thus served the function of restoring a traditional
power-sharing formula to this important institution. This illustrates again the politics of
accommodation and the politics of sectarian representation. A CDR official shrewdly observes
in this respect,
CDR has traditionally been attached to the Council of Ministers, which gave the Sunnite
Prime Minister exclusive authority over this important institution. Sectarian leaders have
been looking for an opportunity to infiltrate into CDR and get some share ofpower. This
is a way of restoring a traditional power sharing formula to this important institution
[Faidallah, July 4, 2000].
The merger of CDR with the other councils was nevertheless denunciated by many critics as
representing a fundamental departure from the principles of administrative re-organization.
There is also a general feeling - not altogether unfounded- that the mergers (of councils and
ministries alike) were driven primarily by political considerations. Professor Kaysi of the
American University of Beirut observes in this regard,
In essence, the mergers boil down to an attempt at reversing everything that Hariri has
done under the pretext of reducing waste and duplication [Kaysi, July 18, 2000].
Employees at CDR are demoralized because they realize the political motives behind the merger
and its potential implications for their work and livelihood. They also can not rationalize this
merger decision in view of the impressive performance of CDR and its key role in post-war
reconstruction efforts. One CDR official explains in this regard,
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The new structure can not possibly retain all the existing employees. Some employees will
be let go, especially those that are perceived to have Hariri affiliations... There is a
simple say in English: f it is not broken, then don 'tfix it. CDR is not broken. It has been
performing extremely well; its performance record is simply impressive. No institution in
Lebanon can do the work that we have done since the end of the war in 1990. We find
ourselves in a situation today whereby we are not sure whether we are going to have a
job and earn a living tomorrow or the day after [Faidallah, July 4, 20001.
Hence, for CDR officials and employees, recent years have been characterized by turmoil and
upheaval. Assuming that the motives behind the merger were good, it remains to be seen how
authority over this new institution will be exercised, and whether CDR will be able to resume its
role and functions. CDR has played a central role, for example, in the telecommunications
sector in general, and in the rehabilitation of the fixed line network in particular. As the political
complexion is expected to change once again in late October, the fate of CDR and its various
studies and recommendations will once again be determined. It is a sad feeling, however, that
the fate of institutions in this country is still dependent on changes in political fortunes.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The last decade has witnessed a worldwide move in the direction of liberalizing telecom
markets. The impetus for liberalization has mainly come from technological developments in
the electronics/computing industry, the pressures of globalization, and the growth of the service
economy. Those pressures have combined to undermine in many countries the old premises of
monopolistic provision. The process of liberalization has resulted in a broad range of benefits to
users, including efficiency improvements, technological innovation, reduced prices, and higher
quality services through more modern technology and better operation.
A fundamental aspect of recent telecom reform endeavors has been the re-structuring of
institutional arrangements and the separation of basic functions to meet the challenges of the
new environment. Persistent efforts have thus been made in the way of separating policy-
making/operating functions and enacting a regulatory framework that provides for transparency,
participation and due process. Most reform endeavors have also been guided by the need to
enhance competition and provide an expanded role for the market. The challenge has thus been
to structure the new institutional environment in such a way as to make good use of market
forces to achieve public policy objectives.
Despite the enormous pressures for telecom reform in Lebanon in the wake of the war, the basic
institutional structure has remained unchanged, with MPT monopolizing policy-making,
operation, and regulation functions. Although minor operating functions have been transferred
to OGERO and limited competition has been introduced in the cellular and data transmission
segments, the Lebanese telecom sector is still organized as a state-run monopoly carrier. The
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fact that the monopolistic institutional model has not lost its footing in Lebanon despite
mounting technological and World Bank pressures strongly suggests the inertia of traditional
arrangements.
The failure to institute much needed restructuring in the telecom institutional framework may be
attributed to the uncertainty and risks associated with the process. It may also be due to a high
level of reform politicization and institutional entrenchment. This failure, however, is reflecting
negatively on the development of the sector as the monopoly restrictions are denying market
and new service opportunities to an-ever increasing number of firms and industries. There is
general consensus today that competition and liberalization in telecommunications are better
able to deliver innovation and increase productivity and competitiveness in a very dynamic and
rapidly changing environment.
While the Lebanese government has failed to alter the existing institutional framework, it has
initiated in 1993 a major rehabilitation/expansion program. Investment has been considerable
and the fixed line network has reached appreciable penetration and digitalization. This
impressive capacity expansion and digitalization has not been translated however into a drastic
improvement in services. Access to international direct dialing (IDD) for example remains
limited and call completion rates are low. This suggests less than optimal use of existing
capacity and less than adequate concern for quality enhancement and service diversification.
The current tariff structure is also unbalanced, showing high installation/interconnection charges
and international line guarantee fees and an implicit subsidy of local and long distance calls by
international calls. Such tariff distortions have resulted in an excessive dependence on long-
distance revenues, hence limiting the possibilities of introducing competition. For example,
MPT has recently banned a new IP protocol that provides voice over the Internet, claiming that
the new service is a breach of MPT monopoly and a threat to MPT revenue. This example
clearly illustrates how new service opportunities are increasingly being denied by unreasonable
monopolistic restrictions.
The experience of the cellular operators in Lebanon also provides clear evidence of excessive
state intervention and unreasonable restrictions. Despite the outstanding success of the Lebanese
cellular segment, a shameful dispute has been raging between MPT and the cellular operators
over revenue sharing, causing the current stagnation of GSM market growth. The government
seems once again to have lost sight of the objectives of promoting efficient and universal
service development, and focused only on revenue maximization. In the meantime, the
stalemate continues to jeopardize Lebanon's cellular market growth and distort the delicate
balance between supply and demand.
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The Lebanese data transmission segment is also facing MPT imposed institutional constraints,
due to limited liberalization in the fixed provision of data. The provision of data over physical
connections is indeed still monopolized by MPT and its data-communication subsidiary,
Sodetel. Interconnection procedures are also not in place, with licenses mainly awarded at
MPT's discretion. The failure to clarif' licensing procedures and to fully liberalize fixed data
transmission are undermining the real potentialities of this important segment and limiting its
growth and development. This is yet another example of major cost savings being denied to
users because of unjustified monopoly restrictions.
The financial management of the Lebanese telecommunications sector is also less than
satisfactory. The rehabilitation/expansion program was mainly financed by short-term T-bills at
high interest rates, rather than longer-term exportlsupplier credits that could have been obtained
at much lower rates. International auditing and accounting procedures and BACCS have not
been introduced, thus making it very difficult to reverse the clear trend towards an increase in
receivables over time. In the absence of a remedial policy, the rather archaic financial
management will have a negative impact on the cash flow of MPT/OGERO, hence jeopardizing
the future development of the sector.
International benchmarks of the Lebanese telecommunications sector indicate that the country's
network has reached high penetration rates especially in the mobile segment (15 lines per 100
inhabitants). On the other hand, there is considerable room for improvement in
telecommunications revenues from the fixed line network, which is still under state monopoly.
Regarding quality of services, the fixed line service is still far from European standards, both for
basic (high faults per line) and relatively advanced indicators (lack of international direct dialing
or BACCS), thus keeping aside a serious source of revenues for the government.
Hence, a comprehensive overview of various telecom segments/components reveals that the
Lebanese telecommunications sector of the 1990s suffers from serious deficiencies/constraints:
an outdated institutional/regulatory framework, tariff distortions, lack of public sector expertise,
less than optimal use of existing capacity, less than adequate concern for quality enhancement
and service diversification and unjustified monopolistic restrictions. But more importantly, the
review begins to highlight the underlying dynamics of reform in Lebanon and the extent to
which reform remains in essence a political process, dictated by political priorities and
maneuvers.
The extensive politicization of telecom reform in Lebanon has indeed been repeatedly
highlighted throughout the chapter. For example, there was no plausible technical justification
for the attempt to dissolve OGERO in the first year of the Hoss administration, although
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political justifications abound. Political motives and the politics of accommodation can also not
be discounted as having exerted an influence on the evolution of events with the mobile phone
operators, resulting in the non-acceptance of the license offers and the continuation of the raging
dispute. The merger of CDR with other councils has similarly been attributed to latent political
motives and the politics of accommodation and sectarian representation.
These examples point undeniably to the extensive politicization of reform in Lebanon and the
difficulty of introducing change within prevailing political traditions (Hypothesis I). They also
confirm the patterns of executive discontinuity observed in Lebanon which typically serve to
undermine all sustained efforts at change and modernization (Hypothesis 2). Last but not least,
the Lebanese post-war experience with telecommunications reform also points to the importance
of the economic factor in accounting for post-war reform patterns. Economic constraints have
indeed manifested themselves in this sector in difficulties in attracting qualified elements, the
introduction of revenue-sharing schemes, continued monopolization of telecommunications and
half-hearted attempts at liberalization.
The analysis in this chapter thus highlights the interplay of political and economic factors as a
critical obstacle to reform in Lebanon in the wake of the war. As Dr. Shehadi explains, although
reform in the telecom sector can quickly build momentum and precipitate results, the Lebanese
patterns of reform in this sector have remained modest at best, a fact which can be primarily
attributed to embedded political realities and vested interests,
I believe that all post-war governments had the opportunity to initiate changes in the
telecommunications sector and make a dJference, but they chose not to. They were
simply willing to take half-hearted measures, like proceeding with a BOT contract
instead of a license. The license for example is within the scope of reforming the sector,
the BOT contract is not. But reform and change require above all courage and political
will and that vested interests be defeated. The needed ingredients for reform and change
are thus sadly missing in Lebanon. Although reform in telecom is in principle easier than
in any other field, because you can easily create momentum and achieve results,
unfortunately, nothing of sign flcance has happened in the Lebanese telecom sector in the
past ten years [Shehadi, August 14, 2000].
In an age of intense competition and globalization, it is doubtful that the Lebanese telecom
sector as presently organized could compete internationally. The provision of telecom services
is paying less heed to national boundaries, and the Lebanese telecom sector will have to rise to
the challenge. The telecommunications sector is indeed the foundation of the now often
discussed information superhighway. However, effective access and benefit from the
information superhighway will require much more than an expansion of the capacity of
transmission facilities. It will require a fundamental change in behavior and a systematic effort
to identify issues and priorities, to plan strategically and comprehensively, and to break away





Transport is an important infrastructure sector given the vital role it plays in achieving urban
planning goals and a better quality of life. There is also growing evidence that infrastructure
development through proper transport planning and provision enhances economic viability and
competitiveness. This chapter examines the current status and institutional organization of the
transport sector in Lebanon and the specific reform policies that have been recently initiated
(1990-present). While an overview of the entire Lebanese transport sector will be presented, the
focus will be primarily on land transport reforms and po'icies. It is hoped that greater insight
could be gained into administrative reform in post-war Lebanon by a detailed examination of
specific sector policies and reforms.
BACKGROUND
Lebanon had a well-developed transport infrastructure and a booming transport industry before
the war. The country's strategic location on the Eastern Mediterranean has traditionally enabled
it to play an important role in business, trade, tourism and transit at the regional and
international levels. Before the 1975 events, the Lebanese transport infrastructure included:
U A well developed paved road network leading to all international borders and providing
paved access to all villages;
U A highly efficient airport with traffic approaching 3 million passengers a year and
profitable transit traffic served by over 35 international airlines;
U A highly efficient and active seaport seizing the opportunity of the closure of the Suez
Canal to serve a major part of transit trade to neighboring Arab countries;
U A railway network serving limited national and international traffic;
U Two pipelines for crude oil export from Saudi Arabia to Zahrani and from Iraq to Tripoli;
U Two successful and profitable national airlines, MEA and TMA; and
U A multitude of transport companies, travel agents, freight agents, transit and transshipment
operators active at the local, regional, and international levels (Dar-Al-Handasah, 1992).
The Lebanese transport sector has been, however, drastically affected by the war both in terms
of damage and infrastructure deterioration and in terms of loss of transit traffic and of
government control over the transport industry. Lack of maintenance and material damage
throughout the war years have left the Lebanese infrastructure seriously depleted. Transit traffic
and trade have also been completely lost to other countries, given the re-opening of the Suez
Canal and the creation of transit centers in the Gulf countries. Crude oil exports by pipelines
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through Lebanon have also come to a complete halt, thus depriving the Lebanese government of
an important source of revenues.
The long years of war have also resulted in a completely de-regulated and un-controlled
transport industry in Lebanon, especially in so far as road and sea transport are concerned. Ports
have been seized and operated by militias throughout the war, and the government has just
recently regained control of this strategic transport component. The country has also witnessed
the mushrooming of a multitude of private operators and service providers, who compete over
the same lines without any announced schedules/timetables, thereby increasing problems of
pollution and traffic congestion. The government has been unable to regulate private supply or
provide a reliable mass transit system.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEBANESE TRANSPORT SECTOR
The transport infrastructure in Lebanon consists of 4670 km of roads, 408 km of railways, the
Beirut international airport and the Beirut, Tripoli, and Saida Sea ports. The government plays
an exclusive role in the development, maintenance and management of the transport
infrastructure and a limited role in the operation of transport services, namely in the operation of
public transport within Greater Beirut and the now idle railway for the transport of goods and
passengers. The government is also in charge of the operation of the Beirut international airport
and the seaports.
Road Infrastructure
The road network in Lebanon, excluding municipal roads, is about 4670 km subdivided into
four categories: international roads (490 km); primary roads (1560 km); secondary roads (1220
km) and local roads (1400 km). A comprehensive inventory of the international, primary and a
sample of the secondary roads network during the summer of 1991 revealed that 62% of this
network was in bad condition due to the lack of maintenance during the years of war (Dar-Al-
Handasah Consultants, 1992) (Table 32). The Council of Development and Reconstruction
(CDR) has initiated in 1990 a major program aimed at the rehabilitation of some 60 road links
of a total length of 1000 kms.
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Table 32. Pavement Conditions of the Lebanese Road Network in 1991
(Dar Al-Handasah, 1992)
Very Bad	 Bad	 Fair	 Good	 Total
_____	 (km)	 (7cm)	 (7cm)	 (7cm)
International Roads	 90	 173	 27	 200
	
490
PrimaryRoads	 558	 401	 115	 456
	
1560
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The war years have also witnessed a remarkable increase in the motor vehicle fleet from 264415
in 1974 to 666543 vehicles in 1986, or an annual compound growth rate of 8% (Table 34).
More recent estimates place the fleet at about 800,000 vehicles, which indicates a high level of
car ownership relative to the size of the population (1 car per 5 inhabitants). The private car
represents the prevailing mode of transport, thus accounting for 68% of the Greater Beirut Area
(GBA) trip market. Taxi services ensure 15% of motorized trips, whereas public transport is
nearly non-existent (less than 3%). Privately operated vans and buses account for the remaining
14% of the GBA trip market.
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Railway Transport
The Lebanese rail network consists of 408 km of lines extending along three axes: the coastal
line (224 km long); the Syrian border line in the Bekaa valley (102 km); and the narrow gauge
82 km long Beirut-Zeghraya line. The rail system provided a limited transport of goods (558270
tons in 1974) and passengers (27000 passengers) before the war. The Lebanese railway system
has been however severely disrupted by the war due to extensive damage to fixed facilities and
rolling stock. It has thus effectively ceased operation in the 1990s.
Several studies have been carried out during and after the war for the rehabilitation, upgrading
and expansion of the railway system in Lebanon. One of these studies, conducted in the late
1970s, considered the upgrading of the coastal line between Saida and Tripoli to carry 43200
passengers per day and to ensure fuel transport between the refineries and the power plants
along the coast. The study also suggested the upgrading of the narrow Beirut-Syrian Border
Line, but no action has yet been taken in this regard.
Air Transport
Beirut International Airport was equipped to receive all types of aircraft prior to the war. The
airport reached a peak traffic of 2.75 million passengers in 1974. The airport has incurred some
physical damage during the war. However, it continued operations under very difficult
conditions. Traffic dropped from 2.75 million in 1974 to a lowest of 43800 in 1976 to pick up to
about 1.5 million per year between 1977 and 1980 (Dar-Al-Handasah, 1992). A major
rehabilitationlexpansion of the airport has been initiated under Hariri and is now in the last
phases of implementation.
Two Lebanese airlines have continued to provide services throughout the war. Middle East
Airlines (MEA), which currently employs 4000 persons and operates a fleet of 15 aircraft,
including 3-343, 8-707 and 4-720 Boeing jets. MEA has recently acquired new wide-bodied
aircraft. It has also adopted a strategy of route expansion. Trans Mediterranean Airline (TMA)
operates a fleet of 7 Boeing 707 freight planes and employs 815 persons. The company has
managed, with difficulty, to survive the war and is currently operating within the constraints of
its present fleet and facilities.
Sea Transport
Towards the end of the civil war (1990), Lebanon had 49 ports along a 220 km water coast out
of which 5 only are legal ones (Tripoli, Jounieh, Beirut, Saida and Sour). The government
completely lost control over sea ports throughout the conflict. In addition, facilities of the legal
ports, especially in Beirut, incurred substantial damage and maintenance effectively ceased.
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The Beirut port, one of the most active ports of the Middle East in 1974 has 13 quays of a total
length of 3659 meters. The port traffic has declined drastically as a result of the loss of transit
traffic and the development of illegal ports. According to events of specific years, traffic volume
ranged from a high of 3 million tons in 1980 to a low of 1.3 million tons in 1989. In 1991, the
port of Beirut was estimated to have resumed operation at 85% of its capacity throughput (Dar-
AI-Handasah, 1992).
The Tripoli port has not been seriously affected by the war and has kept its throughput at the
level of the capacity of the port, or about 0,85 million tons per year. Compared to the Beirut and
Tripoli ports, the Saida port handles a small volume of about 140,000 tons per year. Major




The Ministry of Public Works and Transport has traditionally been responsible for the
development, coordination, and regulation of all activities relating to the sector. The Ministry
had four directorates general with transport-related functions or responsibilities:
O The Directorate of Roads, part of the Directorate General of Roads and Buildings, was
responsible for the maintenance and execution of the classified road network.
O The Directorate General of Railways and Public Transport was in charge of operating the
Lebanese railway system (now idle), as well as public transport in Greater Beirut.
0 The Directorate General of Urban and Town Planning was in charge of preparing master
plans for urban centers, including transport systems and networks.
o The Directorate General of Civil Aviation was responsible for the operation and
maintenance of the Beirut International Airport.
Other councils, directorates and agencies were also involved in the transport sector, including:
U The Council for Development and Reconstruction, which has been playing an important
role in the rehabilitation and development of the transport sector since its creation in 1977.
U The 'Conseil Executif des Grands Proj ets', which since its creation in the early sixties was
entrusted with the design and execution of the national expressway network, as well as the
development of local roads to remote villages.
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U The 'Conseil Executif des Grands Projets de la Ville de Beyrouth', which was also created
in the early sixties and entrusted with the design and execution of the major road arteries
within the boundaries of the City of Beirut.
U The Municipalities in charge of local road networks within their municipal borders.
O The Department of Vehicle Registration of the Ministry of Interior, which was in charge of
issuing road transport authorization, license plates, and vehicle inspection.
O The Railways and Public Transport Authority, created in 1961, to extend railways
operations and provide public transport in the Beirut urban area.
Current Institutional Framework
In view of the chaotic state of the transport sector in the wake of the war and the deterioration in
the levels and quality of services, the Hariri government decided to introduce changes and
accord the sector priority attention. The effort culminated in the creation of the Ministry of
Transport in 1993 (Decree No. 214 of April 2, 1993). Many functions of the Ministry of Public
Works and Transport were thus transferred to the newly created ministry, which was made
responsible for all modes of transportation throughout the country. Accordingly, the Ministry of
Transport (MOT) was entrusted, in 1993, with a wide mandate, including:
Mission I:	 To organize and regulate land, maritime and land transport:
U Adopting a policy relative to the land, maritime and air transport which specifies the
role of the government in the provision and regulation of services;
0 Supervising compliance of the private sector with the set regulations;
U Studying and proposing ratification of international transport and transit agreements.
Mission II: To construct / equip / and manage publicly owned transport modes and to
develop them in harmony with the needs of the country:
0 Performing studies to determine the transport services that must be publicly provided;
U Provision of services, when applicable, in ports, airports, railroads and public transport.
Mission III: To supervise the safety of transport modes and facilities as well as to provide for
their maintenance and modernization:
U Establishing safety standards to be complied with by all transport operators;
U Inspecting the operation of the transport facilities, whether public or private to ensure
compliance with regulations and safety standards;
U Ensuring the safety of the various transport modes and minimizing safety hazards.
Mission IV: To prepare plans and studies aiming at operating transport means and facilities at
the highest level of technical competence:
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U Formulating a national policy on the allocation of transport between various operators
and destinations, and through various transport modes;
U Providing input and guidance to the General Directorate of Roads of the Ministry of
Public Works and to municipalities when preparing master transportation plans.
Mission V: To enforce laws/regulations relating to transport and public maritime property:
O Coordinating with the Ministry of Environment and local authorities on the protection
of the coastal line and maritime property;
0 Coordinating with customs and local authorities and international security forces for
combating contraband through the ports and harbors.
Mission VI: To exercise tutelage authority over the autonomous agencies and public
enterprises in the public transport sector.
Mission VII: To exercise control over transport concessions:
0 Deciding on services that will be conceded;
0 Determining the terms of reference of the concession;
U Inspecting compliance of concessions with their terms of reference.
Mission VIII: To control and periodically update transport tariffs:
U Conducting periodic studies on the cost of operation of various transport modes;
U Proposing the transport tax structure, especially fuel taxes, customs duties on vehicles
and their parts, toll rates, etc;
U Setting tariffs of public transport services at reasonable levels to ensure cost recovery
and the meeting of social and public policy objectives (NARP reports, 1995).
The Ministry has thus been entrusted with a wide scope of functions and organized around 2
General Directorates: the Directorate General of Civil Aviation and the Directorate General of
Land and Maritime Transport. From this review, it is possible to synthesize a number of core
functions, which MOT was expected to pursue/accomplish, namely:
0 Policy-making and regulatory functions (Mission I)
U Transport provision functions (Mission II)
U Construction of infrastructure (Mission II)
U Promotion of safety and inspection functions (Mission III)
U Planning function (Mission IV)
U Law enforcement functions (Mission V)
U Tutelage and supervision functions (Missions VI & VII)
U Tariff setting function (Mission VIII)
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A closer look thus reveals that the various functions entrusted to the MOT primarily revolve
around policy-making and regulation. Experts indeed concur that the main motive behind the
creation of the MOT —aside from the political- was primarily the separation of the infrastructure
aspects of transport (traditionally handled by the MPW) from regulatory and policy-making
functions. A director in Team International, a transportation company which has been closely
involved in post-war transport rehabilitation efforts, explains in this regard,
The Ministry of Public Works was predominantly pre-occupied with the infrastructure
aspects of transport, while the regulatory aspects were neglected and their importance
never really appreciated. I believe that the motive for the creation of the Ministry of
Transport in 1993 was the separation between the infrastructure aspects and the policy-
making and regulatory aspects [Nakkash, July 20, 2000].
Dr. Slam, another director and partner in the same company similarly observes,
I think that the Ministry of Transport was conceived to be needed to take care of the
policy-making / regulatory aspects of transport, not simply the infrastructure [Slam, July
20, 2000].
While this may have been the declared technical motive for the creation of MOT, the political
motive of course goes hand in hand, and in the context of Lebanon, can not be underestimated.
A professor of transportation engineering at the American University of Beirut indeed observes,
In reality, there were two objectives for the creation of the MOT: one is definitely
political, and the other one technical relating to enhancing the performance of the
Lebanese transport sector. If one wants to assign weights to those objectives, 80% should
be given to the political one [Kaysi, July 18, 2000].
Even the Director General of Land and Maritime Transport at the MOT admits that the ministry
was created mainly for political reasons,
They needed to create positions for thirty ministers, so they expanded the number of
ministries accordingly; this is how MOT came into existence [Kaysi, July 20, 2000].
The Director General further clarifies that while the MOT was intended to have policy-making
and regulatory functions, it was not able to assume this role,
In theory, MOT has policy-making and regulatory functions. But up to the present day,
there has been no clear vision or overall policy in this sector. MOT has thus been
handling decisions of a routine nature, implementing ad hoc policies and addressing
urgent problems [Kaysi, July 20, 2000].
The Director General of Land and Maritime Transport thus attributes the failure of the MOT to
assume its policy-making and regulatory role to the absence of a clear policy for the sector;
others, however, point to the limited capacity of the ministry itself and to severe shortages in
needed personnel. One director/partner in Team International observes in this regard,
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We sort offollowed that ministry from its conception awaiting changes and results. The
ministry, however, remained like a shell with minimum personnel. And although MOT
had the mandate to really do all the things that we would have liked a ministry to do, it
could not do them because of limited capacity [Slam, July 20, 2000].
Another director/partner in the same company similarly observes,
What happened is that the ministry was created in 1993, but its administrative cadre
remained empty. This meant that we had a ministry without having the people to do the
work [Nakkash, July 20, 2000].
The scarcity of public personnel thus constitutes a recurring theme in post-war reform accounts
and a serious constraint on policy options, whether in telecom or transport. The Director
General of the Railways and Public Transportation Authority (RPTA) observes in this regard,
In theory, the MOT has the mandate for policy-making and for formulating a
comprehensive plan of action for the sector. The question is whether MOT is capable of
assuming this function. MOT does not have the technical staff and cadre who could take
initiative in this respect [Krayem, July 27, 2000].
A CDR transportation official in turn provides a brief account of the reasons behind the creation
of MOT, its assigned mandates, and why it has not been able to assume its role,
MOT was created for political reasons. MPW never did real planning. MOT was
intended as a regulatory and policy-making unit. The separation was important, but
MOT did not assume the essential functions it was entrusted with. The reason is that the
administrative body is weak and there is a serious shortage of staff There is also no
political will to do the things that need to be done [Helou, July 26, 2000].
A report from Dar Al-Handasah (1994) similarly notes the shortages of qualified staff at the
MOT, attributing the vagueness and interface of transport responsibilities to the weaknesses of
this important Sectoral Ministry,
The Ministry suffers from shortages of qualified staff, absenteeism, declining morale,
inadequate working conditions and lack of modem office equipment. The vagueness of
transport responsibilities is mainly due to the weaknesses of this Sectoral Ministry and
the assumption of a major part of its functions by CDR (Dar Al Handasah, 1994, p. 22).
By creating empty shells or structures, the reform of 1993 hence signaled a half-hearted attempt
at re-organization. More importantly, the reform of 1993 failed to resolve existing problems of
institutional fragmentation in the transport sector. Instead, as argued in Chapter 7, the attempt
has indeed increased problems of overlapping and duplication. Indeed, a cursory look at the
institutions currently involved in transport reveals the extent of jurisdictional fragmentation.
The following ministries/public agencies are presently responsible for various transport-related
components, namely:
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U The Ministry of Transport (MOT)2°
U The Ministry of Public Works (MPW)
U The Ministry of Interior (MOl)
U The Ministry of Environment (MOE)2°
U The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA)2°
U The Municipalities
U The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)
U The Conseil Exécutifdes Grands Projets (CEGP)
U The Conseil Exécutifdes Grands Projets de la Ville de Beyrouth (CEGPVB)
U The Railways and Public Transport Authority (RPTA).
It is important to provide a short statement of the transport-related missions of each of those
institutions to highlight the interdependence and interface of responsibilities.
a) The Ministry of Public Works (MPW)
Although the two directorates general of civil aviation and land and maritime transport have
been transferred from the Ministry of Public Works to the Ministry of Transport, MPW has
remained in charge of urbanism, roads and government buildings. The Directorate General of
Roads (DGR) of the MPW has retained responsibility for road planning, design, maintenance,
and overall management, which translate into the following specific missions and functions:
Mission I:	 To collect and analyze data and statistics relating to existing roads, road sections,
traffic, and patterns of vehicle ownership and road use.
Mission II: To oversee the process of road design through the proper classification of roads
and the preparation of a road master plan and numbering system.
Mission III: To perform and supervise road studies and execution by studying the status of
existing road networks and deciding on rehabilitation programs.
Mission IV: To oversee road maintenance (maintaining roads as to pavement, wearing course,
drainage channels, retaining walls, bridges, culverts, traffic signs, etc.)
Mission V: To ensure traffic safety by conducting traffic surveys, providing and installing
traffic signs, and defining conditions for granting driving licenses.
Mission VI: To operate a national road materials lab responsible for sampling and analyzing
road construction material.
20 The Ministry of Transport (MaT), the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and the Ministry of
Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) were all created as part of the Hariri reorganization
movement of 1993.
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b) The Ministry of Interior (MOl)
The missions of MOl are very diverse. Those related to transport and traffic include:
Mission I:	 The management of vehicle registration and inspection and driver licensing.
Mission II: Law enforcement, including the enforcement of the traffic code.
Mission HI: The organization and management of civil defense activities, including rescue
services of victims of accidents and incidents, first aid, and emergency assistance.
c) The Ministry of Environment (MOE)
MOE is a newly established ministry, which is still under organization. Air quality and emission
control are within the scope of this ministry. Studies were recently conducted by MOE
pertaining to vehicular emission and to the phase-out of leaded gasoline. The increased
involvement of MOE in transport related issues and activities is anticipated.
d) The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA)
MOMRA was also created as part of the re-structuring movement of 1993. The missions of
MOMRA as stated in Law No. 197/93 still require a lot of clarification and crystallization. The
idea behind its establishment was the strengthening of administrative decentralization and the
activation of local government. MOMRA is to act as a supervising and coordinating body
among the various municipal units. The ministry is thus directly responsible for supervising the
activities of field/local units, including transport and traffic-related functions.
e) The Municipalities
Municipalities are in theory responsible for the construction and maintenance of the local roads
within their municipal borders. Some of the larger municipalities have traffic engineering
departments in their organizational structure.
J) The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)
Since its creation in 1977, CDR has played an important role in the rehabilitation and
development of the transport sector. The functions of CDR include planning and arranging for
the financing of projects as well managing loans and relationships with donors. After the war,
CDR has been directly involved in the design and implementation of rehabilitation projects in
all sectors, including transport.
g) The Conseil Executf Des Grands Projets (CEGP) and the Conseil Executf des Grands
Proj ets De La Ville De Beyrouth (CEGPVB)
Both of these councils have been created in the early sixties and assigned the responsibility of
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projects in various Lebanese regions outside Beirut. CEGPVB is in charge of executing specific
transport projects within the Greater Beirut Area (GBA).
h) The Railways and Public Transport Authority (RPTA)
RPTA was created in 1961 and entrusted with extending railways operations and providing
public transport in the Beirut urban area. RPTA is an independent authority under the tutelage
of MOT (previously MPW). After the war, RPTA was made responsible for providing public
transport in the entire Lebanese territory, but has only managed to extend coverage to the GBA
and the Bekaa.
This brief institutional overview shows that the jurisdiction over the transport sector in Lebanon
remains fragmented. Despite the creation of the Ministry of Transport in 1993, several
ministries and public agencies are still responsible for various transport system components.
Limits of authority are not always clear, leading to a low level of accountability, and causing
inter-ministries' friction. While there are numerous instances of overlapping functions, there are
also serious functional and process gaps, which are illustrated as shaded areas in Table 34.
Table 34. Transport Functional Responsibility Matrix
	
Modes and	 Urban	 Road	 Parking	 Road	 Vehicle	 Public
	
Functional Issues 	 Transp.	 Construction Policy And Safety Licensing And Transport
Process	 Modal	 And	 Control	 Control/Traffic
ResDonsibilitv	 Coordination Maintenance 	 Enforcement
Policy and Research	 MOT
	
MOPW_______ MOPW _________ MOT
Standards and	 MOT
	
MOPW	 MOPW	 MOT	 MOl	 MOT
Regulations
	 (DGR)	 MOPW	 MOI
MOE
* MOT Ministry of Transport, MOT = Ministry of Interior, MOPW = Ministry of Public Works, MOE = Ministry
of Environment, MOF = Ministry of Finance, DGR = Directorate General of Roads, MOMRA = Ministry of
Municipal and Rural Affairs, MUNI = Municipalities, RPTA = Railways and Public Transport Authority, CDR =
Council for Development & Reconstruction, CEGP = Conseil Executif Des Grands Projets, CEGPVB = Conseil
Executif Des Grands Projets De La Ville De Beyrouth
261
The functional responsibility matrix illustrates the fragmented jurisdiction over various
transport components and the lack of coordination between institutions with transport-related
functions. In way of illustration, six different institutions are responsible for the function of road
construction and maintenance (MOPW, CDR, CEGP, CEDPVB, MUNI, MOMRA), while three
institutions can formulate standards/regulations relating to vehicle licensing and traffic
enforcement (MOl, MOPW, and MOE). This complex fragmentation in turn heightens the need
for coordination, a coordination which is often lacking because of unclear and contested
jurisdictions, prerogatives and authority. Noting this complex fragmentation in transport
responsibilities, a Dar Al Handasah report (1994) makes the following recommendation,
The responsibility for the conception, design, implementation, maintenance, and
operation of transport infrastructure should be clearly defined and the authorities in
charge trained and equipped to resume such responsibility. The challenge is to carry out
the necessary institutional reforms and to attract the necessary skills by the concerned
authorities to ensure the introduction of computerization, data bank systems, management
systems, and to proceed with a scientific and modem planning of reform activities in this
sector (Dar Al Handasah, 1994, pp. 18-19).
The Director General of Land and Maritime Transport at the MOT highlights in his own words
the interface of responsibilities and the fragmentation of authority among the different
institutions involved in the transport sector. He notes for example how the placement of the
department of vehicle registration in the MOl undermines MOT's regulatory functions. He
observes,
The department of vehicle registration of the MOl belongs and should become part of the
MOT. MOT can not be expected to regulate land transport provision when licenses and
red plates are separately granted by another institution [Kaysi, July 20, 2000].
Mr. Kaysi notes that such fragmentation of authority is in turn leading to more bureaucratization
and working against efforts to evolve / enforce consistent transport policies. Again, in the words
of the MOT Director General,
We are now discussing new regulations that will require taxi drivers to obtain a license
from the MOT, besides the red plate license that they obtain from the MOI. While this is
an instance of in creased red tape, it is nonetheless essential to enhance the regulatory
functions of MOT [Kaysi, July 20, 2000].
A Dar Al Handasah report (1994) similarly concurs that the function of transport regulation in
Lebanon needs to be entrusted to a single authority, which should comprehensively set
standards and regulations for the sector,
The Transport Ministry should be the sole authority in charge of all modes of transport
regulations including those relating to road transport. Other ministries / authorities may
retain the implementation role including the issuing of driving licenses, license plates and
vehicle inspection, but the Ministry of Transport should set the norms / standards for
262
vehicle characteristics, weights and dimensions and the laws I regulations regarding the
traffic code, the rights of entry of passengers and goods to the public transport system, as
well as safety and environmental criteria. A fragmented institutional framework will only
result in fragmented policies and regulations (Dar Al Handasah, 1994, p. 24).
Professor Kaysi of the American University of Beirut highlights in turn the inconsistency of
post-war transport policies. He notes, for example, that while all CDR studies and projects are
pro-auto or pro-car (e.g. BUTP 21 ), there is another study or proposal being promoted by a
different governmental group to encourage mass transit and re-activate passenger railway
transport [Kaysi, July 18, 2000]. Such inconsistency can be partly attributed to the involvement
of several actors in transport-related functions. More importantly, according to Dr. Kaysi, it can
be attributed to the absence of a single and effective policy-making authority.
It is important to have one authority that is responsible for policy-making and for
encouraging transport policies that are consistent and responsive to the needs of the
country [Kaysi, July 18, 2000].
Professor Baaj similarly notes that awareness and consensus on the desirability of mass transit
in Lebanon have not translated into effective and consistent actions in this regard,
Although there is general consensus today on the need and desirability of promoting
mass transit in Lebanon, all feasibility studies and projects that are currently being
funded and implemented revolve around traditional road capacity enhancement [Baaj,
July 19, 2000].
Such awareness and consensus have indeed been reflected in the recommendations of a recent
workshop on transportation problems in the Beirut Metropolitan Area, held at the AUB on June
8 and 9, 1993, which emphasized the need to encourage mass transit and re-activate passenger
railway transport. "The workshop participants affirmed the major role of public and mass transit
in serving transportation flows in Greater Beirut and in limiting congestion difficulties" (AUB,
1993, p. 3). This recommendation conflicts in turn with recent BUTP efforts, which revolve
around enhancing road capacity and streamlining mobility on the GBA networks.
While not denying that the BUTP is auto/road-oriented, Dr. Nakkash, director and partner in
Team International, explains that the organization of parking and roads is a natural starting point
given the chaotic transport realities of the country,
The Beirut Urban Transport Project is pro-auto. This is true. But this is the only place to
start given the chaotic parking and transport realities of the country. We need to start by
organizing streets and roads to open room for public transport [Nakkash, July 20, 2000].
21 The Beirut Urban Transport Project (BUTP) is a major transport project, financed by the World
Bank, aiming at capacity building in the transport sector, reducing congestion and streamlining
mobility on GBA networks. The project includes transport, traffic and parking management
components at an estimated cost of 100 MUS.
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Professor Kaysi of the American University of Beirut explains in turn the interconnectedness of
transport policies and the need for cooperation among various actors to evolve and enforce a
consistent transport orientation,
Policies are obviously inter-related. For example, citizens can not be asked not to make
use of their private cars when there is no reliable mass transit system. Similarly, the
government can not raise taxes on fuel or parking lots when there is no public transport
system in operation. All actions have to be moving in the same direction. This in turn
requires the cooperation of the various entities with transport-related functions.
Unfortunately, it is veiy dfJlcult for each of these entities to see the whole picture. This
makes it imperative to have a single policy-making organization to entice the various
institutions with transport responsibilities to cooperate and coordinate with each other
[Kaysi, July 18, 2000].
Experts concur that there is an acute need for a transport management unit to coordinate among
the various actors involved and ensure a coherent and comprehensive policy for the sector. A
recent move in this direction has been catalyzed by the combined efforts of the World Bank,
CDR, and Team International as part of the Beirut Urban Transport Project (BUTP). The BUTP
aiming at capacity building in transport and traffic management in the Greater Beirut Area has
indeed allocated US$250 thousand for the creation of a Transport Management Organization
(TMO) to be responsible for transport and traffic management and coordination in the entire
GBA. Both the preparatory studies for the project and its eventual implementation will be
financed by the World Bank.
The creation of a new transport management organization (TMO) was suggested by the World
Bank for at least two reasons. The World Bank wanted to entrust the implementation of the
BUTP to an organization that can coordinate across existing institutions to get the project
moving despite the complex jurisdictional fragmentation. It also wanted to ensure that the
project will not only be implemented but also operated and maintained in a professional and
sustainable manner. Dr. Slam, a director/partner in Team International, a Consulting Company
that is also involved in the project, explains in this respect,
So the World Bank wants to ensure that there is a caretaker, somebody in the government
who is going to be responsible for overseeing and operating the project and that is why
the TMO issue was raised. This is part of their policy, that whatever financing they put,
they want to make sure at the end that they put the money in a project that is well
operated, well-maintained and sustainable [Slam, July 20, 2000].
Dr. Slam further clarifies why the BUTP and its TMO component have been delayed for many
months. He attributes the delay to traditional immobility on the part of the government.
The Wold Bank intends to finance the implementation of the project. We are now doing
the preparatory work, including preliminary designs, feasibility studies, environmental
and social impact assessments. The BUTP was however delayed for many months,
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because there was no decision on behalf of the government to specj5i a location for the
new TMO... The seat of this new organization lies best of course, within the Ministry of
Transport.. .Now all this is easy, it is professional work, it can be done, but anything
which has to do with decisions by the government is something that takes time, and
somehow does not find a champion; and this is our suffering in many projects that we do
here [Slam, July 20, 2000].
Professor Kaysi of the AUB, who is also involved in the project on a consultancy basis, explains
how the placement of this new TMO has become entangled in politics,
It has been recently suggested as part of the BUTP to create a new TMO. A central
question that immediately came to the fore was to which ministry the TMO would
eventually be attached: Will it be part of the Municipality of Beirut? Will it be part of the
Ministry of Interior? Will it be part of the Ministry of Transport? Or should it be part of
the Ministry of Public Works? Logically speaking, the TMO may have best been attached
to the Ministry of Transport, to enhance its current status and functions. Unfortunately,
the direction today is to attach it to the Ministry of Interior. This has to do with the fact
that the Minister of Interior today is a strong figure, and was able to flex some muscles
and pull the string to his side. But structurally speaking, there is no reason for the TMO
to be part of the Ministry of Interior. Where it ends up being placed will ultimately not be
determined in a scientUIc way. It is more a reflection of who currently has more political
influence and can pull the strings to his side [Kaysi, July 18, 2000].
The MOT Director General of Land and Maritime Transport does not deny his frustration with
the TMO placement decision. He observes,
The World Bank is now financing the BUTP feasibility studies, including those relating to
the TMO. Naturally, we wanted the TMO to be attached to the MOT. It was decided,
however, that the new TMO will be attached to the MOl under the pretext that the Traffic
Control Center of the TMO can not function without the enforcement agents of the MOl.
The Minister of Interior claims that the two can not be separated [Kaysi, July 20, 2000].
Dr. Nakkash, another partner in Team International, explains in more detail the dynamics which
have affected the creation of this new TMO. His explanation captures nicely the consensual
decision making patterns and the politics of accommodation prevalent in this country,
The establishment of a TMO was studied thoroughly as part of the BUTP. So an essential
part of the preparatory work was to determine, among other things, where to place this
new TMO. The government created a committee, including a representative of the
Ministry of Transport, a representative of the Ministry of Interior, a representative of the
Ministry of Public Works, a representative of CDR and we used to meet with them as
well. For several months, the representatives worked very hard on finding a solution
which really keeps some kind of balance between the dJferent people at stake. They
always start from the premise and spend much effort finding a suitable compromise. They
also wanted to find a solution that does not require a new decree or law, because
otherwise the process will take too much time. So the decision was to work within existing
institutions. Keep in mind that what they are always looking for in Lebanon is not the
best solution, but rather the best compromise solution that will keep everyone happy.
Afier much debate and negotiations, they reached a decision to place the new TMO
under the tutelage of the Ministry of Interior. If there had been a strong champion for
this TMO in the Ministry of Transport, the same way there was a strong champion for it
in the Ministry of Interior, it would have ended up in the Ministry of Transport. The
Ministry of Interior, besides having a strong champion was an acceptable candidate
because it included the department of vehicle registration and a small traffic enforcement
unit. But at the same time, the decision to place the TMO within the Ministry of Interior
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was not very suitable, for the simple reason that it risks giving this new organization a
para-military aspect. Moreover, the Ministry of Interior is already too big, and its
functions too fragmented and divers/Ied [Nakkash, July 20, 2000].
Indeed, a comprehensive preparatory study for the Beirut Urban Transport Project comprised an
assessment of alternative TMO placement scenarios, outlining the pros and cons of alternative
TMO placement decisions within the administrative cadre. The study concluded that although
"the attachment of TMO to the MOl implies fair chances of coordination, the TMO function is
in essence a transport sector function and falls within the scope of the MOT. Moreover, MOT is
a new ministry that is still undergoing organization, so the integration of TMO should be easy"
(Team International, 1998, p. 28).
The TMO story reveals very well the dynamics of decision-making in Lebanon. The placement
of TMO was ultimately determined, not by rational scientific criteria, but rather by political
peddling and the politics of accommodation. Indeed, the emphasis throughout the process was
on finding a suitable compromise that will maintain a balance between the different people at
stake. The formula evolved in the way of placing the new TMO under the tutelage of the strong
Minister of Interior and to institute a governing board at the top of the organizational hierarchy
consisting of representatives of the various institutions that have transport-related
responsibilities.
Although "the seat of this new organization lies best of course within the MOT", a less than
optimal -compromise- solution was nevertheless adopted. This confirms again that decisions in
this country are not based on optimization. Rather, decisions are often determined by conflicting
political interests and the politics of accommodation. The process is oriented primarily towards
balancing and compromise, lest smaller gains be lost in the efforts to win greater benefits. This
inclination in turn translates into half hearted reform measures and less than optimal
compromise solutions. A CDR official observes in this regard,
The attachment of TMO to the Ministry of Interior was again a compromise solution.
TMO could have well been attached to the Ministry of Transport. But in my opinion,
where it ends up being placed ultimately makes no d?fference. What is really important is
whether the agency will be allowed to assume its functions of coordination and resolve
the feuds among the d?Jjerent institutions. The creation of TMO signals an effort to
coordinate but the effort is still lacking. Much remains to be done. It is really a shame
that in ten years after the war, we have achieved nothing of value or signflcance in this
sector. We have built a few roads here and there, but this is all. It is hardly surprising
though, with the nature of politics and the caliber of politicians that we have in this
country [Helou, July 26, 2000].
These observations, and the details of the recent creation of this new TMO, also highlight some
cynicism about the workings of the Lebanese political system and the difficulty of introducing
reform within prevailing political traditions (Hypothesis 1). Systematic effort was made to avoid
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referring the placement decision to the Cabinet or to Parliament, which have become notorious
in Lebanon as bottlenecks of decision-making. Dr. Shehadi, a regional telecommunications
expert, made a pertinent comment in this respect,
In Lebanon, a two-page law needs on average six months in the Council of Ministers and
one year and a half in Parliament. In the meantime, the momentum is lost and the
initiative dies of its own. The question is why, and the answer is that our political system
is designed in such a way as not to allow for change to happen. Our political system is
fragmented. In the wake of Ta(/, I think that there was even more of a paralysis in our
political system. We had to live with this weakness known as consociational politics or
consociational democracy; this means that every minister can delay even paralyze the
work of the Council of Ministers and every deputy can delay the work of the Chamber of
Deputies. This is it; it is paralysis and it continues, and I don 't think that new
parliamentary elections or a new government will change this reality [Shehadi, August
14, 2000].
Dr. Slam, a director and partner in Team International similarly observes,
Now we are in a situation where Minister Xdoes not want to antagonize Minister Y; and
Minister Z does not want to create problems, so we are keeping more or less the status
quo. In Lebanon, people are somehow afraid to make strategic decisions, controversial
decisions. This is why there are a lot of decisions which are not based on optimization.
The decision to place the TMO under the Ministry of Interior is a typical example. So we
accumulate a lot of mistakes, and when it is time to make new decisions to correct what
has been done, we find that the decision has to be very courageous and has to cost
money. So we try to patch up by making small decisions and trying to keep everyone
happy. Let us not rock the boat, this is the modus operandi in Lebanon [Slam, July 20,
2000].
Harmony, stability, consensus-building, compromise, negotiation, and accommodation have
indeed become the modus operandi in Lebanon and the hallmarks of Lebanese political and
administrative processes. They are sacredly respected and reflected in political interactions and
decision-making patterns. These consensual traditions have permeated the formal institutional
structures (e.g. Cabinet/Parliament) which have become notorious in Lebanon as bottlenecks of
decision-making. They also manifest themselves in micro-level interactions and decisions, as
the dynamics of the recent creation of the TMO clearly reveal.
One can safely assume that the same dynamics that have determined the creation of TMO have
also affected the creation of other institutions in the sector. "The development of the transport
sector in Lebanon has not taken into consideration real needs criteria but rather ad-hoc
allocation of public resources as dictated by conflicting political pressures and interests" (Dar-
A1-Handasah, 1992, p.14). There has been no attempt at rational policy formulation, which
explains the overlapping functional responsibilities as well as the serious gaps in transport
regulation and enforcement as per Table 34. These deficiencies translate into practical problems
of congestion, accident hazards, excessive pollution and overall loss of economic productivity.
These deficiencies are further illustrated in the review of the land transport sector below.
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REVIEW OF THE LAND TRANSPORT SECTOR PERFORMANCE
Elements of the Land Transport Sector
Lebanon is one of the few countries in the world that allow transport vehicles (private and
public) to move freely anywhere in the country without planning or regulation. Besides the large
number of private passenger cars (estimated at 800 000 vehicles in 1998), the country has
witnessed a three fold increase in the taxi fleet over a period of two years (from 110,650 service
plates in 1996 to 33,300 plates in 1998), a sharp increase in the privately owned bus fleet (2,400
buses and 2,000 minivans in 1998) and the concurrent operation of 225 buses of the Railways
and Public Transport Authority. Currently, the land transport sector comprises the following
elements or transport providers:
U 800,000 private passenger cars, a large proportion of which are old polluting vehicles;
U 33,000 red service plates (taxis arid shared taxis) whose owners have the right to provide
service in any part of the Lebanese territory;
U 2,400 private sector buses operating mainly within urban areas;
ci 2,000 minivans as part of a total of 4,000 minibus plates allowedby law in i996;
U 225 RPTA buses in operation out of a total of 302 such buses owned by the government.
A 1998 study estimated the transport demand at about 1.75 million daily motorized trips within
the Greater Beirut Area (GBA). The demand is expected to increase to 3 million and 5 million
daily motorized trips in 2005 and 2015, respectively. The different transport providers
contribute unequally to meet this growing demand. Indeed, the shares of the different transport
providers of the GBA trip market were recently estimated as follows: 68% for private cars, 15%
for service and taxi vehicles, 14% for private sector buses, and 3% for RPTA buses (Team
Intemational-laurif-Sofretu, 1995a). Table 35 illustrates the 1998 demand distribution by
vehicle classification for the cities of Beirut and Tripoli. Table 36 is a tentative comparison
between Beirut and Amman with regards to land transport provision.
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It is important to note in this respect that the number of red plates in Lebanon (taxis/shared
taxis) increased exponentially in 1994 by a decision of the Minister of Interior 22 . The decision
was made despite its expected aggravation of congestion, pollution and regulation problems.
And despite the obvious non-rationality of such a decision in the context of post-war land
transport realities, it was again completely justifiable in political terms, given that it has served
to advance the political/economic interests of the strong Minister of Interior. Although the
precise political motives and compromises that have prompted this recent decision remain
obscure, there is little doubt that the decision was determined by political considerations. A
professor of transportation engineering at the AUB and advisor to the Minister of Transport
explains the tactful maneuvers of the Minister in this respect and his ingenious solution to
overcome potential hurdles/opposition,
There used to be 11,000 red plates which used to be inherited across generations. To
open the door for the selling of 11,000 new red plates without antagonizing traditional
plate owners, the Minister of Interior suggested to offer them each one free red plate in
compensation. This is how the number of red plates jumped from 11,000 to 33,000
overnight. This happened simply for political reasons and to benefit some groups and
regions [Baaj, July 19, 2000].
Another professor of transportation engineering at the AUB comments on the absurdity of this
recent decision,
22	 The Department of Vehicle Registration is part of the Ministry of Interior.
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The granting of 22,000 new red plates was an unbelievable decision. The number was
approved without studying how much the market can actually assimilate or how to divide
them amongst Lebanese regions. We are now paying the price. Many taxis that are in
operation today can not find sufficient passengers and their operation is not sustainable.
They are also not making enough money to maintain their vehicles in a safe way or to
revamp the existing fleet. So we have simply increased the number of vehicles roaming
the streets and exacerbated problems of congestion and pollution [Kaysi, July 18, 2000].
Dr. Nakkash explains that Team International was consulted regarding this recent decision, but
that their recommendation was considered absurd in view of prevalent motives/inclinations,
Team was consulted about the 1994 decision to issue new license plates, but their
opinion was considered a heresy, because it was not in line with dominant interests at the
time. We suggested to the government to buy all red plates from existing owners and then
re-issue licenses and allocate them according to routes. The response was that this was a
kind of nationalization and was not in harmony with our free economic principles and
traditions [Nakkash, July 20, 2000].
Dr. Nakkash further suggests that although there is no explicit transport policy in Lebanon,
there is nevertheless an undeclared de-facto policy guiding actions/decisions in this sector,
There is no explicit transport policy in Lebanon. I am emphasizing the word explicit,
because I believe that there is an undeclared policy that is guiding action in this sector.
The government's defacto policy is that transport problems in Lebanon can be resolved
by increasing the number of cars and vehicles. Otherwise, why would the government
license 22,000 new red plates in 1994? [Nakkash, July 20, 2000].
Dr. Baaj in turn comments on the inconsistency of post war transport policies,
Even in the wake of the war, successive governments have continued to institute patchy
and inconsistent policies. It was all a matter of expediency and of serving constituency
needs and political interests. The 22,000 red plates for example, were granted for
political reasons. The new buses that the government has acquired for RPTA comprised
part of a big deal between Hariri and Renault. What we need today is regulation, but
regulation is beyond the capacity of the Lebanese government because it is politicized
[Baaj, July 19, 2000].
The Director General of the Railways and Public Transport Authority (RPTA) also makes a
general comment about the politicization of transport policies in Lebanon,
In Lebanon, transport in general and public transport in particular are very politicized.
The reason is that this is a service that affects billions of voters, especially poor voters.
Vested interests are at play and policies are often determined by political considerations
{Krayem, July 27, 2000].
Although none of these explanations provides a precise account of what prompted the
Minister's recent decision - the motives for which remain well coveted behind the scenes- they
all testify nevertheless to the absurdity of this exponential overnight increase in the number of
red plates, and to the politicization of post-war transport policies. The 'red plate saga', although
still obscure in some respects, nevertheless reveals once again that decisions in this country are
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not always based on optimization or guided by the public interest. They are rather determined
by complex political priorities, compromises / considerations, which are always justifiable in
political terms in view of the modus operandi of the country - "harmony, consensus,
accommodation".
The IneffIciency of Public Land Transport Services
The current levels of congestion on the road network make it very difficult to operate an
efficient or reliable mass transit system. 1998 RPTA reports reveal that the number of
passengers transported that year was 14 million passengers. Moreover, in 1998, RPTA
requested and was granted a 13.5 billion LL subsidy from the Lebanese Treasury. The same
subsidy was requested by RPTA in 1999, and a subsidy of 20 billion LL (equivalent to 13.5
million US$) was requested in the year 2000 (a 40% increase). While the subsidy has been
growing steadily to account for 0,25% of the budget of the Lebanese state, it has not translated
into any significant improvement in services or productivity.
Indeed, a cursory comparison of the performance of RPTA' s bus operation with that of a
private bus operator - the Lebanese Commuting Corporation- reveals the extent of RPTA' s
inefficiency. The Lebanese Commuting Corporation (LCC), a major bus competitor to RPTA,
owns a fleet of 185 Mercedes buses deployed on 12 routes. It transported 18 million passengers
in 1998 (29% more than RPTA) generating revenues of about 9 billion LL. LCC' s 1998 route
mileage was 12.8 million bus-km (22% more than RPTA, whose fleet covered only 10.5 million
bus-km). LCC' s cost per bus-km was 54% less than RPTA' s (920 LL/bus-km Vs 2,000
LL/bus-km for RPTA). Table 37 presents the comparison between RPTA and LCC.
Table 37 reveals that the private Lebanese Commuting Corporation (LCC) has managed to
outperform its public competitor —RPTA- despite the fact that the latter is receiving a yearly -
costly- government subsidy. LCC indeed manages to transport 4 million passengers a year more
than RPTA, making 2 billion US$ in revenue every year in excess of RPTA. It is possible to
attribute this discrepancy in part to the mis-allocation of routes between the two providers (LCC
is providing services on 12 profitable routes only), but the numbers still suggest the
government's inefficient operation and regulation. Table 38 presents the 1998 budget of RPTA
and Table 39 presents the 1998 employment levels in RPTA compared to international norms.
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20 buses in the Bekaa
22 in Beirut and its suburbs
















Table 37. Comparison between RPTA and LCC in 1998 (RPTA, 1999)
RPTA	 LCC
Fleet Size in Operation 	 1164 buses in Beirut	 I 185 buses
Routes in Operation
Yearly Number of Transported Passengers
Yearly Travel Distance
Yearly Revenue - LL
Yearly Cost - LL
Cost/Bus-km - LL
Annual Deficit - LL
Ration of Employees to Operational Fleet
Size
Table 38. 1998 Budget of the RPTA (RPTA, 1999)
Revenues	 Million	 LL Expenses
Railway Revenues	 0	 Railway Expenses
Public Transport Revenues 	 12,000	 Public Administration
Charles Helou Station	 750	 Charles Helou Station
Public Sector Contribution 	 13,000	 Public Transport Expenses
Other Business Operations	 5	 Unusual non-recurring










Total Revenues	 27,594	 Total Expenses	 27,594
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Consequences for Quality of Land Transport Networks and Services
The actual distribution of transport allocations, the inefficiency of public provision, and the high
number of private passenger cars lead to high transport costs and poor service levels. In fact,
traffic congestion in the GBA results in very long trip times and a high consumption of gasoline,
causing in turn serious pollution problems 23 . The consequences for Lebanese consumers and the
overall economy are multi-faceted: higher gasoline import bills, congestion, accident hazards,
excessive pollution, noise and overall loss of productivity.
Furthermore, in the absence of any regulation, the driving pattern of service providers
(particularly taxi services and minivans) is one of random roaming, which increases problems of
pollution and traffic congestion. Thousands of service providers compete over the same routes,
roaming the streets in search for limited passengers. Taxis stop frequently, without warning,
anywhere on the network to negotiate prices and destination with passengers, thus usurping an
unreasonable share of the total road capacity and increasing traffic hazards and congestion.
Traffic safety has thus become a serious issue in Lebanon. The competition between the various
service providers leads to daily irritations. The driving pattern is often spontaneous and
aggressive, thus endangering the safety of passengers, pedestrians and other car occupants.
Moreover, most of the service vehicles operate without mandatory insurance, and do not
undergo mechanical or emissions testing programs. Annual inspection is only a paper formality
to ensure the cashing of fees. In the absence of effective emissions inspection, many vehicles
illegally utilize cheaper diesel fuel or leaded gasoline, thus releasing excessive emissions that
pose environmental / health hazards.
Road safety has also become a serious concern. More than one third of the road network in
Lebanon is in poor condition and the traditional maintenance practices have been twice as costly
as those for stable well-maintained networks. Road safety devices such as signing, marking,
collision barriers and delineators are generally lacking. The fatal accident rate on the northern
GBA highway, for example, was estimated as double that expected in the US for similar
highways. On-street parking is still a free activity, resulting in the consumption of vital road
space and denying both moving vehicles and pedestrians the benefits of using the roads. Traffic
violations are beyond enforcement capabilities and axle loads are consistently violated.
Many of the land transport problems can be attributed to the complex institutional framework
discussed above. They can also be partly attributed to the tendency to solve transport problems
in Lebanon by extending the road network and a modest enhancement of police enforcement
23	 Beirut city was reported as early as 1986 to have a high road network density (23 km/km 2), twice as
dense as that of Paris (11 kmlkm 2) (TEAM, International 1995b).
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effort. More importantly, they can be attributed to the politicization of transport reform in
Lebanon and to the patchy and inconsistent policies which have been adopted in the wake of the
war (e.g. half-hearted attempt at rationalization through the creation of a nominal MOT; weak
policy-making and regulatory oversight; random increase in red plate numbers, etc.).
A fragmented institutional set up and inconsistent policies may have been sustainable when the
road net-work was still evolving, vehicle ownership was low, and the urban structure was simple
and sparse. The Lebanese urban scene of the 1990s is characterized, however, by a dense road
network and high vehicle ownership. The road network has reached saturation levels with
considerable loss of utility and productivity to the users. This implies that increasing transport
demand cannot simply be met by additional physical expansion. Similarly, traffic cannot be
controlled by the traditional enforcement effort.
The complexity of the situation has thus outgrown existing institutional capacity, which has not
been adapted enough to meet the new challenges. As in the case of telecommunications, the
Lebanese government has adopted with respect to transport a traditional physical expansion
approach to the detriment of effective institutional reform, re-organization, and regulation.
There is thus a strong inclination in this country to improvise temporary and patchy solutions,
and to postpone engagement with the core issues, perhaps indefinitely.
RECENT LAND TRANSPORT REFORM EFFORTS
There is increasing awareness today of the need for a comprehensive reform of the Lebanese
transport sector. A workshop on 'Land Transport Policy in Lebanon' has been recently
organized by the MOT (July 6-8, 1999). The workshop was attended by local and international
experts and by representatives of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD). The participants reviewed past studies relating to the land transport system, identified
the problems of the sector, and formulated policy recommendations to cope with the complex
transport issues / problems.
The principal recommendation of the workshop participants was one pertaining to the strategic
role of the Lebanese government in reforming and regulating the sector. The participants
recommended that the Lebanese government abandon its public provision effort though RPTA
and enhance its functions of planning and regulation. While encouraging the private sector to
play a more significant role in land transport provision, the government should regulate prices
and competition and ensure a rational supply of services. This recommendation is reminiscent of
the Osborne and Gaebler' s entrepreneurial principles of 'steering rather than rowing' and
'empowering rather than serving'.
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A second important recommendation of the workshop participants pertained to the enhancement
of the managerial, policy-making, and regulatory capacities of MOT. Acting on this
recommendation, a 'Transport Regulatory Unit' (TRU) was recently established in MOT
(ministerial decision No. 138/99, dated October 13, 1999). The TRU effectively began
operations on September 1, 1999 and is working in collaboration with the World Bank and with
local and international transport experts. The main assignment of this unit is the development of
a land public transport reform plan and the subsequent supervision of its implementation.
The reform plan is now in the last phases of formulation. The plan envisages that a restructured
Railway and Public Transport Authority shall be the ultimate regulatory authority. The plan also
envisages the corporatization of the bus operation division of RPTA. This will allow the new
commercial company to focus on upgrading its performance and reducing its operating costs. In
the second phase, the company shall be partially or fully privatized and required to compete
with other private sector providers. It is estimated that the process of re-structuring and
commercialization will require three years, by the end of which the government will be relieved
of its costly RPTA subsidy.
Moreover, the plan proposes a number of practical measures to meet the growing demand for
transport services, namely:
U Identifying the layout and capacity of routes of the RPTA bus lines and those allocated to
the privately-operated bus companies;
U Identifying the layout and capacity of routes allocated to service and taxi vehicles;
U Identifying the allowable number of competing service and taxi vehicles on the routes;
U Reallocating excess service vehicles and buses to new routes or terminating their service;
U Setting tariffs on routes of service;
U Identifying routes where service is important from a social perspective (poor, isolated,
and/or deprived areas) and contracting with private sector operators to cover those routes;
U Supervising and monitoring private operators' compliance with rules and regulations;
U Construction and operation of new bus terminals;
U Enhancing the quality of services offered by requiring transport drivers to undergo
specialized training in an academy established for this purpose.
The plan thus envisages a proper methodology for route allocation and performance evaluation
via a continuous monitoring of private sector operations to ensure a rational supply of services
at reasonable costs. These functions will ultimately be assumed by the newly restructured
RPTA. Moreover, both syndicates of service and taxi owners/operators have recently submitted
to MOT a plan suggesting routes for service vehicles and identifying locations that are suitable
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for service stops. The plan constitutes a positive start, but is still awaiting TRU modifications in
light of the overall national transport policy and a comprehensive allocation of routes.
Although the new land transport reform plan is a preliminary positive step in the right direction
and involves an effort towards restructuring/re-organization, nothing has yet changed about land
transport problems or the realities of people's existence. It will remain to be seen whether this
attempt to address the complex land transport problems will indeed enter the phase of practical
implementation. Unfortunately, the general pattern of administrative reform in post-war
Lebanon suggests that the likelihood is slim, given the economic situation and the strong inertia
of traditional arrangements.
Experts concur and express guarded optimism about the ability of the Lebanese government to
embrace transport reform and re-organization in the foreseeable future. The Director General of
Land and Maritime Transport at the MOT observes for example,
Chances are slim that any changes will take place before the year 2001. The main reason
is that we are now awaiting new parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for August
27 and September 3, 2000. Any changes will have to be approved by the new parliament.
The new parliament, however, will initially devote its attention to issues of budget
allocation for the year 2001. It will then turn its attention to other pending issues. A new
council of ministers will also be appointed in October. In the meantime, the current
cabinet will be reluctant to take any radical decisions. The stakes are too high [Kaysi,
July 20, 2000].
Professor Baaj, who has been closely involved in the drafting of the land transport reform
proposal in his capacity as advisor to the Minister of Transport since 1998 comments,
The Minister is no longer backing the proposal. The upcoming parliamentary elections
have put everything on hold and changed the power and alliance equations. The current
Minister of Transport, Najib Mikati, who has aspirations for the premiership in the new
government, wants to stay on good terms with his Directors General, both of whom are
opposed to the plan, but for d(fferent reasons. Krayem wants MOT and its RPTA division
to retain their operation functions. Kaysi on the other hand, perceives the new proposal
as undermining the regulatory functions ofMOT [Baaj, July 19, 2000].
The Director General of RPTA indeed confirms his dissatisfaction with the recent land reform
proposal, which he considers to be shallow and lacking in substance. He further explains his
intention to submit a new reform proposal to the Council of Ministers, outlining in more details
how to approach the regulation of land transport provision in Lebanon,
The land transport reform proposal that was recently submitted to the Council of
Ministers consists of broad and shallow guidelines, and does not accord due attention to
implementation and feasibility considerations. I have in mind to present a complete
proposal to the Council of Ministers outlining how to proceed with regulation and the
spec (tIc steps that should be initiated. But putting together a comprehensive proposal of
this sort may take several years [Krayem, July 27, 2000].
276
The RPTA Director General is obviously not impressed with the land transport reform proposal
which has recently been submitted to the Council of Ministers and by implication has no
intention to cooperate / take part in its implementation. This highlights in turn the lack of
coordination between the various actors in the sector and the resulting fragmentation in policies.
Professor Baaj further sheds light on why the implementation of the proposal has been delayed,
given that the plan has been ready and awaiting cabinet approval since November, 1999.
The worst part is that the plan has been ready since November 1999 and went to the
Council of Ministers for approval. At that time, MOT did not have a Director General for
land transport. The previous director general was jailed, and the position was vacant for
a while. Unfortunately, the Council of Ministers did not immediately approve the plan.
The question is why, or what happened during those five months. The answer is that the
Minister of Interior, Michel El-Murr, objected to the proposal and requested from the
Council of Ministers time to review its details. Up to that point, he had sold 2,000
minivan plates and had the intention to provide another 2,000. Knowing that the granting
of more minivan plates was in conflict with the essence of the land reform proposal which
essentially calls for a freeze on taxi and minivan permits, he vetoed the proposal until
April. When the 4,000 minivan permits had been finally sold in April, the Minister of
Interior retreated his veto, but there was now a director general in the MOT who was
opposed to the plan for dUjerent reasons. The new director general assumed his position
in December 1999. Kaysi is opposed to the plan because he perceives it as undermining
his role and authority and those of MOT. The Minister now has a stake in preserving
good relationships with his directors general in view of the upcoming parliamentary
elections. But you can not push a program of change without creating problems or even
enemies [Baaj, July 19, 2000].
The explanation of Dr. Baaj illustrates once again the political constraints on reform initiatives
in Lebanon. The recent land transport reform proposal, which advanced a number of fruitful
ideas and practical solutions to existing land transport problems, was submitted to the Council
of Ministers for approval in November, 1999. It was nevertheless vetoed by the Minister of
Interior in his capacity as representative of the Greek Orthodox community in Lebanon. By the
time the Interior Minister retreated his veto in April - after having accomplished his strategic
objectives - the Minister of Transport was no longer supporting the proposal in view of the
upcoming parliamentary elections and changing power and alliance equations.
This example in turn suggests that there are serious constraints on reform endeavors in Lebanon
dictated by the nature of the political system and the rules of the political game. While the
mutual veto, another feature of the politics of accommodation in Lebanon, can in theory be used
to protect vital community interests, it is not intended to be abused to promote personal political
objectives. Unfortunately, the rules of the Lebanese political game are too often abused and the
consequence is immobility and stagnation. Similarly, while political support for reform
proposals should in theory depend on their value and merit irrespective of electoral
interests/maneuvers, this is rarely the case in the highly politicized Lebanese environment.
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These examples in turn further reinforce the observations made earlier regarding the politics of
accommodation and their detrimental influence on patterns of reform and change (Hypothesis
1). Moreover, the story of this recent land transport reform proposal suggests that the
multiplicity of institutional veto points (jolitica1 leaders, ministers and deputies) introduces
further rigidity into the system and decision-making processes by allowing for reform proposals
to be assessed by their prospective consequences for the interests of specific factions,
communities and even individuals (Hypothesis 2). The limits on political action in the Lebanese
multi-confessional context are thus narrow and constraining, rendering radical and innovative
reform practically impossible. Dr. Shehadi, for example, observes in this regard,
If you are seeking radical and positive change, you have to be ready to upset some
people and even shock them before you reach your objectives. You can not deal with
reform with shyness and timidity. You have to push for change with courage and will.
The rules of the political game in Lebanon, however, dictate prudence and compromise,
so reform and change are not likely. The needed ingredients for reform are sadly lacking
in Lebanon because of the nature of the political system [Shehadi, August 14, 2000].
Dr. Baaj observes along the same lines,
We have in Lebanon clusters of factional power bases. All reform attempts have to
survive the pushing and pulling of these power bases. Progress ultimately depends on the
possibility of reconciling the interests of these power bases and finding acceptable
compromises. In the final analysis, reconciliation is only possible, however, over issues
that are of little importance and that somehow promote personal and factional interests
[Baaj, August 22, 2000].
Other informants have also shown sensitivity and awareness of the complex limitations of the
Lebanese environment. Dr. Slam, a director and partner in Team International, expressed his
skepticism with regard to the implementation of the recent land transport reform proposal,
Although the workshop was rich and some very serious recommendations came through,
I don 't think anything will be implemented. The reason is that the objectives of
individuals in the government are not in line with rocking the boat.. .Reform requires
above all courage and political will. One can say in short that most of the problems of
the Lebanese administration stem from a political system which is not healthy and does
not allow reforms to thrive [Slam, July 20, 2000].
Dr. Nakkash, another partner in the same company also made a very pertinent observation,
We were hoping that the recent land transport policy proposal which involves the
creation of an independent regulator will acquire momentum. But nothing has happened
in this regard, because our politicians are not much concerned with regulation. They are
more interested in ceremonial events, like building a bridge or expanding a road, for
which they can get credit. In one word, our problem in this country is one of governance.
Reform has to start at the top. We first need to reform our political system before we
move to reforming specflc sectors [Nakkash, July 20, 2000].
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Indeed, our problem in this country is one of governance, a governance system that is peculiar
and complicated to say the least because of embedded cultural/political realities. It would be
simplistic to characterize the problem as one of jurisdictional fragmentation or non-
implemented reform proposals. Rather, the essence of the problem lies with the rules of the
Lebanese multi-confessional political game. As one colleague has poignantly observed in an
informal discussion about the topic "administrative reform in Lebanon is the casualty of the
political system and the rules of the Lebanese political game. It is like when you have pollution
in your river, it does not help to apply treatment to the stream (administration), you have to put
it at the source" [Khashan, informal discussion, October 27, 2000].
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Land, sea and air transport had traditionally been a main source of income for the Lebanese
government (rail transport is an exception). Prior to the war, income from the transport sector is
believed to have exceeded the budgets allocated for infrastructure development and
maintenance. The war years, however, have resulted in a fully deregulated transport industry in
Lebanon and the loss of a substantial part of government revenues from this important sector.
Most transport laws/decrees and institutional structures are now at least 20 to 30 years old.
During this long period, the transportation environment has notably changed, mainly because of
the war, but also because of the complex evolution of urban life.
The institutional overview presented in this chapter suggests that the development of the
Lebanese infrastructure in general and the transport infrastructure in particular have been ad-hoc
and subject to political considerations, rather than a clear conception of needs and priorities. Dar
Al Handasah consultants wrote in 1991 that "the development of the transport sector in Lebanon
has not taken into consideration real needs criteria but rather ad-hoc allocation of public
resources as dictated by conflicting political pressures and interests, through which the MOPW
and the Executive Councils under its tutelage are believed to have been executing policies set by
politicians rather than carrying the responsibility of rational policy formulation" (Dar-Al-
Handasah, 1992, p.14).
The review presented in this chapter indeed confirms this observation. The current situation of
the transport sector in general and the land transport sector in particular is chaotic and in need of
comprehensive reform. The sector is characterized by a complete jurisdictional fragmentation.
Several ministries and agencies share various transport responsibilities. Limits of authority and
responsibility are not clear and coordination is absent. There are also severe shortages in
personnel in key ministries and departments. These deficiencies in turn translate into practical
problems of congestion, accident hazards, excessive pollution and loss of economic
productivity.
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Moreover, the review has suggested that the 1993 Hariri re-organization movement has
increased problems of overlapping and duplication. While the reform effort culminated in the
creation of the MOT in 1993, it simultaneously created a number of other ministries and
organizations that have transport-related responsibilities (e.g. MOE, MOMRA). Moreover, the
MOPW and the MOl have not completely relinquished their transport functions. The complex
jurisdictional fragmentation and the lack of coordination are working against the government's
efforts to evolve consistent policies to meet growing transport demand.
But the general overview of the land transport sector in Lebanon reveals more than problems of
fragmentation, duplication, lack of coordination, or shortages of personnel. It also reveals
problems of politicization in the transport sector or more precisely the permeation of post-war
reform policies by political considerations and the politics of accommodation. This has been
clearly illustrated in the details of the recent creation of the TMO. What has been referred to as
the 'red plate saga' (or the exponential increase in the number of red plates overnight) similarly
suggested that decisions in this country are rarely based on optimization or guided by the public
interest. They are rather determined by complex political compromises and considerations. The
recent delay in implementing the land transport reform proposal similarly suggested the
complex political maneuvers and constraints on reform endeavors in Lebanon.
Hence, there is ample evidence in this chapter to suggest that the rules of the Lebanese political
game severely constrain reform and policy options. The politics of accommodation which have
become the hallmarks of Lebanese political/administrative processes, render innovative change
almost impossible. The emphasis on balance and compromise indeed tends to translate into half-
hearted, sub-optimal reform decisions, high tolerance for political abuses and irregularities, and
an orientation towards system-maintenance which subdues all inclinations to articulate the
really important issues. Evidence in this chapter thus lends further support to the research
hypothetical model and highlights the salience of cultural/political factors in accounting for the





While the research presented in this thesis began with an interest in analyzing administrative
reform dynamics in a multi-confessional setting, it is not and was never meant to be an
exhaustive study of administrative reform in Lebanon. Rather, it was an attempt at
understanding the workings of the Lebanese bureaucracy and the dynamics of administrative
reform within the larger Lebanese social, political and economic environment. Indeed, the
analysis presented in this thesis is based on the simple observation that administration does not
function in a vacuum and must necessarily be related to the social context in which it thrives.
The isolated treatment of administrative reform is thus not possible and needs to be inextricably
linked to a variety of factors, cultural, political and economic.
Within this broad orientation, the research has sought to accomplish four objectives:
1. To place administrative reform in a specific social, political, and historical context and link
it to the realities of pluralism and sectarian politics in Lebanon.
2. To link administrative reform to embedded institutional factors (the nature of the Lebanese
political system, administration, and society in general) as these have been hypothesized in
the literature to have a significant influence on the fate of reform initiatives.
3. To link administrative reform in Lebanon to the specific constellation of cultural, political
and economic factors in specific periods from independence (1943) until the present.
4. To examine post-war reform dynamics and policies in specific administrative sectors and
hence gain greater insight into Lebanese post-war reform patterns.
Administrative reform has not been the subject of extensive research in Lebanon. This may well
have to do with the fact that the landscape of Lebanese political and administrative phenomena
is so variegated and complex that a comprehensive analysis is too vast an undertaking. Although
some scholars did attempt to explore specific areas and facets of Lebanese administration (e.g.
Iskandar, 1964; Bashir, 1970; Iskandar, 1996), there was no attempt to examine administrative
reform holistically and contextually, and to link it to what remains today the most undeniable
fact of Lebanese political life, that of sectarianism and diversity. Despite its over-ambitious
scope and comprehensiveness, this thesis is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature, and
provide additional data for theories of administrative development and comparative analysis.
In an attempt to tie the main themes, arguments and threads of thought together, the conclusion
to this thesis will: i) present a summary of the study and its findings; ii) highlight the main
281
conclusions of the thesis and their relevance for wider fields of knowledge; and iii) suggest
ideas for further research on the topic.
A SUMMARY OF THE STUDY AND ITS FINDINGS
Administrative reform theory has always been polarized between a branch of political science
and managerial or organization studies. The focus in this thesis was on theories that occupy a
middle ground between these two ways of studying the public sector. Chapter 2 highlighted the
gradual ascendancy of four different paradigms for studying the public sector (the traditional
model of public administration, the new public administration, the new public management and
the new institutionalism), but also emphasized that there has not been a single uniform response
to any single paradigm. Indeed, although the new public management ideas have achieved great
currency in many parts of the world (mostly Western industrialized countries), it was
nevertheless underlined that the obstructiveness of national contexts/values does raise the usual
question of transferability. Both old and recent claims of historical inevitability and
international reform convergence, of widespread policy transfers and diffusion of administrative
innovations, founder on the grounds that national political styles and cultural environments offer
different countries different kinds of opportunities to pursue specific reform trajectories. Indeed,
persistent variation has been noted in the adaptation patterns and reform trajectories of Western-
style democracies -- and more variation can be anticipated for LDCs. This variation has been
largely predicated on historically determined patterns of state-society relations and significant
variations in political cultures.
Given this observation, namely, that there is no administrative reform framework with universal
applicability, the review in chapter 2 has instead focused on examining the administrative
reform literature critically and selectively, to extrapolate those variables that have been
commonly advanced to account for such persisting variation. It was thus possible to synthesize a
number of factors that have been hypothesized to mitigate the effects of administrative reform
initiatives in specific national contexts, namely, the nature of the political system (consensual
vs. adversarial), the national reform capacity which is dependent on the strength of executive
leadership, institutional entrenchment, and bureaucratic powers, and the specific configuration
of the national political nexus triad, in turn determined by the relative power of politicians,
bureaucrats, and civil society. Based on this extrapolation, a number of specific hypotheses were
derived to be tested in the Lebanese context, namely that national reform capacity will be
limited given the country's special brand of consensual politics (Hypothesis 1); that national
reform capacity will be limited in view of prevailing patterns of weak executive leadership and
strong institutional entrenchment (Hypothesis 2); a pattern of politician-driven administrative
reform was also hypothesized for Lebanon in light of the continuing minimalist influence of
bureaucracy and civil society on the course of reform initiatives in this country (Hypothesis 3).
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Further, based on the same and firmly grounded observation that there is no administrative
reform framework with universal applicability, an attempt was made in chapter 2 to evolve a
hypothetical model that identifies those factors which most significantly influence and condition
the fate of reform initiatives in Lebanon. Cultural/societal factors were highlighted as very
salient in the Lebanese context and as potentially very important in defining the acceptable
directions of change and reform. Indeed, more than anything else, the sectarian divisions in
Lebanese society remain the key to understanding the whole picture. Political factors and the
nature of the political system were also highlighted as important for understanding reform
action and non-action in Lebanon. Specific and peculiar political power configurations have
evolved in Lebanon to accommodate the realities of pluralism and sectarianism and these set
limits both on the types of changes that can be promoted in the public sector and on the speed of
change. Economic factors were also underlined as potentially important and as presenting
specific opportunities (before the war) and constraints (after the war) in the pursuit of reform
goals. Finally, the research hypothetical model highlighted the potential influence of the
external environment (regional and international) on country-specific planned programs of
change. This is especially true in Lebanon, which has been receptive to such influences in view
of its strategic geographic location and the unique composition of its population.
As per the research hypothetical model, the analysis in chapter 3 has focused on issues of
pluralism and diversity, and their relevance and salience in the specific Lebanese context.
Chapter 3 thus reviewed the theoretical literature on pluralism and diversity with the objective
of accounting for the resilience of ethnic and religious identifications and attachments in
Lebanese society today. The chapter highlighted how the dynamics of inter-communal conflict
in Lebanon evolved with time from traditional (parochial) religious rivalries to intense struggles
over political and economic rewards. Theorists have indeed warned that far from eliminating
particularistic group loyalties, modernization tends to accentuate them as group awareness
mobilizes men along familiar solidarity lines. As ethnic groups modernize, they increasingly
desire the same economic, political, and symbolic values, and as supply fails to satisf' these
increasing and competing expectations, tensions tend to mount. The Lebanese experience
indeed lends support to this observation. Rigid religious demarcations took on political
importance in Lebanon to the degree that they were relevant in legitimating differential claims
and access to resources. Indeed, in the period leading to the war of 1975, religious and ethnic
identities were consciously manipulated and re-asserted as powerful instruments for utilization
in the ensuing political competition. The specific patterns of mobilization of the main religious
communities in Lebanon in the period leading to the war of 1975 (also highlighted in chapter 3)
indeed suggests that the circumstantial, situational and contingent use of ethnic identification in
the pursuit of material advantage cannot be under-estimated. Ethnicity provided individuals and
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groups in Lebanon with their most important political resource in the competition for the scarce
goods of modernity.
With the same kind of concern for further exploring and clarif,ing the undeniable salience of
pluralism in the Lebanese environment, chapter 4 attempted to describe the genesis of ethnic
politics in Lebanon by examining three phases that have marked the historical development of
the divisions in Lebanese society, namely the Ottoman Period, the French Mandate, and the
Independence Phase. The ethnic and confessional legacy of the Ottomans in the Middle East
and in Lebanon relates to their promotion of the religious community as the main unit of social
organization. Although this practice contributed to stability, it also made the differences
between the religious communities more conspicuous and reinforced communal separateness
and distinctiveness. Lebanon indeed witnessed the first formal institutionalization of
communalism and sectarianism under Ottoman rule, precisely in 1845 and 1861. Under the
French mandate, Lebanon witnessed increased tensions and polarization along religious lines,
prompted primarily by the addition of new provinces -predominantly Muslim- to Mount
Lebanon. This caused a major disruption to the traditional sectarian composition of the
population and "restated the problem of Lebanon all over again". The problem became one of
reshaping the balance of power among the various sects. It is exactly this problem that is still
manifesting itself today and impacting all aspects of Lebanese politics. In 1943, Lebanon
embarked on its independence with all its historical, political, social, ethnic and religious
cleavages intact. The reality of this situation necessitated the enactment of a compromise
agreement between Muslims and Christians, the National Pact of 1943. The National Pact was a
re-confirmation of the need to institutionalize communalism, and to preserve a delicate sectarian
balance of power between the many ethno-religious communities. The National Pact thus
established the foundation upon which Lebanese politics had been grounded from 1943 until the
present (with slight power-sharing modifications introduced in the Taif Accord of 1989). While
chapter 4 is mainly grounded in history, it was nevertheless perceived to be essential to promote
a better understanding of present-day Lebanon, with all its cleavages, its social structure, and its
peculiar political and administrative styles. A historical approach indeed provides a better
starting point for understanding the context of public administration than does a 'snap-shot'
description of some idealized particular point in history.
Having examined the main historical forces that shaped the evolution of the divisions in
Lebanon, chapter 5 embarked on exploring how the sectarian realities have in turn shaped the
democratic order of the Lebanese republic. Indeed, a unique democratic tradition has evolved in
Lebanon in response to the imperatives of coexistence, commonly referred to as confessional or
sectarian democracy. Chapter 5 highlighted the main pillars of this unique democratic order
namely the Constitution of 1926, the Census of 1932 and the National Pact of 1943. And
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although these devises embodied the main features of Liphart's consociational model (namely
power-sharing and proportional representation) and proved to be successful conflict-regulation
mechanisms in the early independence years, their effectiveness was seriously called into
question in the 1970s. In trying to account as to why the Lebanese democratic order collapsed at
that critical juncture, the research highlighted the complex interplay of domestic and regional
factors which contributed to Lebanon's vulnerability and eventual breakdown. On the domestic
scene, the research pointed out to new demographic realities which were not reflected in the
state's representative structures, to asymmetrical political exchange patterns which perpetuated
the hegemonic posture of the Maronite - and to a lesser extent-- the Sunnite communities, in
addition to rising socio-economic (sectarian) inequities. The turbulence of the Middle East
environment of the 1 960s- 1 970s and the influx of Palestinians into Lebanon further strained an
already fragmented social structure. The consequence was a violent war that raged in Lebanon
for nearly fifteen years, def'ing the best efforts at negotiation. Ironically, the exit to the war
came through a revival of the National Pact and its consociational principles, while introducing
minor changes to the power-sharing formula to reflect new communal realities. The chapter
analyzed the Taif agreement comprehensively given that it has marked a turning point in the
history of Lebanon. The Taif Accord, which has been adopted as the new constitution of the
second Lebanese Republic, thus culminated in the restoration of the principles of
consociationalismlconsensual politics to the Lebanese democratic order. The significance of this
agreement lies in its expression of a widespread national consensus on the necessity to restore to
Lebanon the politics of accommodation.
As outlined in chapter 6, the politics of accommodation have also permeated the political
institutions of the Lebanese Republic -Presidency, Parliament, and Cabinet- before and after the
war, which have become oriented to performing representational, conflict-management, interest
communication and especially solidarity functions for members of the various communities, to
the detriment of other more important responsibilities. Indeed, the overriding political objective
of the country has become that of maintaining harmony and stability, and this message has come
through more strongly in the wake of the war. This higher political purpose, in turn, justifies the
politics of accommodation and the less edifying acts of balancing, bargaining and negotiation. It
also justifies the paralysis of the executive branch of government and the frequent redistribution
of cabinet portfolios to maintain a delicate state of equilibrium and coalesce the leaders of the
major political factions. This higher political purpose also justifies the improvising of temporary
settlements, the repression of unmanageable claims/issues, and the stifling of opposition and
repression of public demonstrations. It justifies the division of major sources of wealth among
the key players in the country's political economy. It also justifies Syrian intervention in
purely domestic political affairs to avoid rocking the ship of state. Or does it, indeed? While
chapter 6 has touched on those various themes, it also highlighted an important —albeit informal-
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aspect of micro and macro political processes in Lebanon, namely that of clientelism and
patronage. Informal patronage networks have indeed permeated Lebanese policy circles and
political processes and these networks are cemented in Lebanon by ties of kinship and ethnicity.
The review in chapter 6 indeed suggests that hardly any dimension of Lebanese politics has
been immune to the contamination of confessional-patronage networks and that post-war
political elite have proved incapable of breaking out of the narrow confessional-patronage
politics game.
Having explored the complexities of the Lebanese political landscape, chapter 7 examined the
various attempts at administrative reform in Lebanon before and after the war. In light of the
contextual material introduced to this point, it should not come as a surprise that while the need
for reform and transformation has been repeatedly espoused, old behavior patterns have had a
remarkable sustaining quality and performance has tended to lag behind normative
requirements. The review in chapter 7 indeed suggests that only one reform attempt was
relatively successful in the pre-war period, namely that of President Fuad Chehab (1964-1970).
The research attributed the success of this reform experience to a presidential leadership of an
exceptional caliber. President Fuad Chehab was indeed able to stand above partisan politics and
circumvent Lebanon's traditional political stagnation and immobility. He also managed to
insulate Lebanon from the turbulence of the Middle East environment by adopting a
neutral/diplomatic stand in foreign policy. All other reform attempts before the war were
undermined by a constellation of traditional sectarian rivalries and factional politics in addition
to the infiltration of the turbulence of the Middle East environment into Lebanon, which
aggravated tensions and political complications. While the regional environment has been
relatively stabilized in the 1990s, post-war reform attempts have been undermined by a
constellation of cultural/political and economic factors. The economic dimension has indeed
become very salient in the post-war Lebanese environment. The reconstruction efforts of the
post-war period have contributed to large budgetary deficits and domestic debt accumulation.
Large fiscal imbalances have in turn seriously constrained the policy options of successive
governments. Reform attempts in this period have focused on symbolic re-organization and high
visibility projects, to the neglect of long-term planning and policy-making. The looming
financial crisis has also stood in the way of adjusting public sector salaries and attracting
qualified elements. Post-war public sector employment patterns indeed reveal acute shortages in
personnel and the lack of training and expertise in relevant policy fields. It is doubtful that the
Lebanese administration as presently organized can face the challenges that lie ahead.
The review of post-war reform policies in the telecommunications and transportation sectors
indeed confirms this observation. The review in chapter 8 suggests that although telecom reform
has been the order of the day in almost all countries for some time now, the Lebanese patterns
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of reform in this sector have remained modest at best. The massive investment in the
rehabilitation of the fixed network infrastructure (estimated at US$ 800 million) has not
translated into drastic improvements of services. The pre-war institutional structure has also
remained unchanged, with MPT monopolizing policy-making, operation and regulation
functions. MPT monopoly restrictions are in turn denying market and new service opportunities
to an-ever increasing number of firms and industries. The review in chapter 8 thus makes clear
that the Lebanese telecommunications sector of the 1 990s suffers from serious deficiencies /
constraints: outdated institutional/regulatory framework, tariff distortions, lack of public sector
expertise and qualifications, less than optimal use of existing capacity, and less than adequate
concern for quality enhancement and service diversification. But more importantly, the review
in chapter 8 begins to highlight the underlying dynamics of reform in Lebanon and the extent to
which reform remains in essence a political process dictated by political interests, priorities and
maneuvers. The extensive politicization of telecom reform in Lebanon has indeed been
repeatedly highlighted throughout the chapter. For example, there was no plausible technical
justification for the attempt to dissolve OGERO in the first year of the Hoss administration,
although political justifications abound. Political motives and the politics of accommodation can
also not be discounted as having exerted an influence on the evolution of events with the mobile
phone operators, resulting in the non-acceptance of the license offers and the continuation of the
raging dispute. The merger of CDR with other councils has similarly been attributed to latent
political motives and the politics of accommodation and sectarian representation. These
examples point undeniably to the extensive politicization of reform in Lebanon and the
difficulty of introducing change within prevailing political traditions (Hypothesis 1). They also
confirm the patterns of executive discontinuity observed in Lebanon which typically serve to
undermine all sustaincd efforts at modernization and change (Hypothesis 2). Last but not least,
the Lebanese post-war experience with telecommunications reform suggests the importance of
the economic factor in accounting for post-war reform patterns. Economic constraints have
indeed manifested themselves in this sector in difficulties in attracting qualified elements, the
introduction of revenue-sharing schemes, continued monopolization of telecommunications and
half-hearted attempts at liberalization. In summary, the analysis in chapter 8 highlights the
interplay of political and economic factors as a critical obstacle to reform in Lebanon in the
wake of the war.
The second case study, presented in chapter 9, provides further insight into post-war reform
patterns and the underlying dynamics of reform. The review in chapter 9 suggests that the
transport institutional framework has been allowed to evolve in an ad-hoc manner without a
clear conception of needs and priorities. The Lebanese transportation sector is indeed
characterized by a complete jurisdictional fragmentation. Several ministries and agencies share
various transport responsibilities. Limits of authority and responsibility are not clear and
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coordination is absent. The complex jurisdictional fragmentation and the lack of coordination in
turn translate into practical problems of congestion, accident hazards, excessive pollution, and
overall loss of productivity. As to why successive Lebanese governments have continued to
pursue patchy and inconsistent policies in this sector, the answer lies once again with prevalent
political styles and traditions. The details of the recent creation of the TMO highlighted for
example the patterns of decision-making by bargaining and negotiation prevalent in Lebanon.
The attachment of the TMO to the MOl rather than the MOT was determined, not by scientific
criteria, but rather by political peddling and the politics of accommodation. What has been
referred to as the 'red plate saga' (or the exponential increase in the number of red plates
overnight) similarly suggested that decisions in this country are rarely based on optimization or
guided by the public interest. They are rather determined by coveted political considerations and
compromises. The reasons for the delay in implementing the recent land transport reform
proposal similarly suggested the narrow limits on political action dictated by the rules of the
Lebanese political game. The objective of reform in Lebanon, as in other countries, is to achieve
maximum strategic impact within the limits of political feasibility. The problem in this country
is precisely with those limits, which seem to be very narrow and constraining. Reform that seeks
to preserve consensus/harmony and a delicate balance of power among leaders and conmiunities
is no reform as it typically culminates in maintaining the status-quo. The rules of the Lebanese
political game indeed dictate restraint, prudence and compromise, lest higher political objectives
(harmony) be lost in the effort to win smaller benefits. The consequence is immobility and
stagnation born of too much balancing and fragmentation. Evidence in this chapter thus lends
further support to the research hypothetical model and highlights the salience of cultural /
political factors in accounting for the patchy and incremental reform patterns observed in
Lebanon in the wake of the war.
MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH
The main contribution of this research lies in its multi-dimensional approach to administrative
reform. Administrative reform is explored contextually and holistically and linked to prevailing
social, political and economic realities. The reality of modern governance is such that public
administration and administrative reform can only be understood by placing them within a
larger historical, cultural and political frame of reference. Indeed, public administration cannot
be understood outside the same historical, political, and constitutional context that has shaped
the evolution and development of other societal institutions. Similarly, administrative reform
cannot be adequately understood if cut off from the cultural, political and economic context in
which it thrives.
Given this orientation, the research did not limit itself to exploring the technical dimensions of
reform. Administrative reform has also been analyzed from the perspective of the socio-political
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dynamics of a system, trying to adjust by accommodating the demands of a pluralistic society.
An attempt was thus made to link administrative reform to what remains the most salient facet
of Lebanese politics and society, namely that of sectarianism and diversity. The sectarian
cleavages in Lebanese society indeed remain the key to understanding the whole picture. They
have shaped the constitution and the democratic process and have dictated peculiar political
consensual patterns and traditions. While these patterns realized great benefits in some
instances, they have also limited the ability of politicians and change agents to launch reforms,
which represent major deviations from pervious practice.
The research has also presented a number of fruitful hypotheses and a research hypothetical
model, which could widen the comprehension of the topic and prove useful and relevant in
other contexts. The first hypothesis suggested the need to link administrative reform to the
nature of the political system and to prevailing political styles and traditions. The second
hypothesis suggested the need to link administrative reform to the general capacity for executive
leadership, to the multiplicity of institutional veto points, and to the influence of the
bureaucracy on policy-making. The third hypothesis suggested the need to link administrative
reform to the configuration of the political nexus triad, reflecting in turn the relative influence of
politicians, bureaucrats and citizens on the course of administrative reform in any particular
nationlcountry.
The three hypotheses have proven to be very fruitful in the Lebanese context. The research in
this thesis indeed confirms the salience of the political factor and of national political styles and
traditions in administrative reform endeavors. The Lebanese political system embodies the
norms of balancing and accommodation. The arts of reconciling and accommodation which
Lebanese politicians have come to master, however, often translate into a zero-sum game with
respect to administrative reform. Too much balancing and compromise indeed introduce a high
degree of rigidity into the system and preclude comprehensive reform programs which represent
major deviations from previous practice. While accounting for variations in intensity and extent,
a similar rigidity can be expected in other nations where the politics of accommodation prevail.
The research presented in this thesis also lends support to the second hypothesis, namely that
limited administrative reform capacity can be expected in cases of weak executive leadership
and multiple institutional veto points. The patterns of weak executive leadership observed in
Lebanon have been justified by the need to coalesce the leaders of the major political factions
through frequent rotation of cabinet portfolios. Executive discontinuity, however, undermines
executive capacity. The multiplicity of institutional veto points, on the other hand, implies
opposition to any changes that risk to alter the balance of interests among political factions and
communities. Hence, a pattern of patchy and incremental reform can be expected as long as
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actions in the public sphere continue to be assessed by their prospective consequences for the
situation of specific factions and communities.
The third hypothesis suggests that the Lebanese political nexus triad is tilted in favor of
politicians. This is especially true in view of the continuing minimalist influence of bureaucracy
and civil society on the course of reform initiatives in this country. Lebanese bureaucracy
indeed has had to compromise many of its autonomous functions to adjust to the clientelistic
race prevalent in Lebanon. It thus exerts very little independent influence on policy formulation
and implementation. This is why the Lebanese administration does not fit Knill's typology very
well. It is not an autonomous bureaucracy but is not instrumental either for it has forged some
symbiotic - primarily clientelistic- relationships with key politicians and sectarian leaders.
The citizenship role, on the other hand, has never been a compelling one in the history of
Lebanon. It has been weakened by an over-emphasis on community rights and divergent
interests without a balancing concern for common interests and needs. The ritualistic visit to the
voting booth becomes a way of maintaining a semblance of a role, but without much of its
substance. The reconstruction and amplification of the citizen role is thus a necessary task in
Lebanon but it is also a challenging one in the face of the forces of pluralism. Citizens who find
themselves alienated from the political process may easily take refuge in pluralism. The
trappings of pluralism may indeed distract citizens from engaging each other in an effort to
discern their common needs.
The research has also presented a hypothetical model that could widen comprehension of the
topic. The model emphasizes the contextual distinctiveness of administration and reform in each
country and identifies embedded cultural, political, and economic factors as important variables
to account for in any comprehensive analysis of administrative reform. The model suggests that
the complex inter-relationships of these factors and their specific constellations in specific
periods can exert a significant influence on the course and fate of reform endeavors and help
account for specific reform trajectories. The model also highlights the potential influence of the
regional and international environments on country-specific programs of planned change.
The evolution of such a research hypothetical model was deemed useful and necessary based on
the simple observation that reform endeavors are undertaken within a specific environment that
affects and shapes their dynamics and operations. Notwithstanding the vastness and complexity
of the word 'environment' and the many additional elements which could have been included in
this model, a subjective evaluation had to be made to incorporate those factors which are of
most significance and relevance to the phenomenon of interest. Although such delineation is
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obviously difficult, it was nevertheless facilitated by a comprehensive review of the literature as
well as by an intimate familiarity with the peculiarities of the Lebanese context.
The elements of the national environment which were included in the model (cultural, political
and economic factors) have indeed been consistently emphasized by researchers on the topic.
The contribution of the research, however, is in underlining and highlighting the complex causal
texture and interrelationships between those environmental elements and between them and the
phenomenon of interest (administrative reform). The research has also attempted to underline,
where possible, the interaction of those elements with regional and international forces at play.
The objective has thus consistently been to avoid linear, simplistic conceptions of reform and to
highlight the complexity and contingency inherent in deliberate attempts at reform and change.
The first component of the model, cultural/societal factors, has proven to be particularly salient
in Lebanon. The research has revealed in this respect how the segmentation of Lebanese society
into numerous, politically salient communities exercises a major influence on the directions of
reform and change. There is the ever-present consideration, under conditions of pluralism and
diversity, that reform initiatives will be interpreted and evaluated, not on their own merit, but by
their potential consequences for the situation of specific factions and communities. This has
been illustrated for example in the divergent communal stances which have ôeen consistently
invoked in Lebanon to accommodate changing demographic realities, namely the Muslims' call
for political secularization Vs. the Christians' call for a total secularization of state and society.
Besides providing important frames of reference for individuals/groups in society and shaping
their orientation to reform and change, cultural factors also influence the political configurations
and political dynamics of the system (and consequently reform dynamics as well). The research
has underlined in this respect the peculiar political power configurations and consensual
decision-making patterns which have evolved in Lebanon to promote communal coexistence.
Such consensual traditions have also permeated reform dynamics, resulting in patterns of patchy
and incremental change. There is no doubt that this complex cultural/political cluster exercises a
major influence on reform initiatives and dynamics in Lebanon.
It has been emphasized in this research that the critical political issue relating to cultural
diversity is whether people belonging to different communal groups move beyond this simple
awareness to taking action based on their community interests. This is precisely when
cultural/political factors become a cluster rather than neatly compartmentalized environmental
components or categories. This also illustrates the vivid causal texture and interrelationships
between the various elements of the model. Moreover, it is this cultural/political cluster, for
example, which helps account for Lebanon's vulnerability vis a vis regional/international
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turbulence. As illustrated in the review of pre-war reform attempts, the cultural/political
cleavages of Lebanese society have facilitated its repeated embroilment in great power and
inter-Arab rivalries.
The third component of the model is the economic. The complexity of this factor lies in the fact
that it represents an environmental element which the government is trying to influence / change
through reform and which is simultaneously placing constraints on policy and reform options.
The economic factor has proven to be particularly salient in post-war reform attempts in
Lebanon. It has translated for example into a huge loss of investment in the type of skilled
human resources required for effective public action and an orientation towards reforms, which
promise short-term returns and benefits. Lebanese policy-makers are thus having to face a post-
war environment where the scarcity of human and financial resources inevitably leaves much to
be desired.
The influence of the regional/international environments on country-specific programs of
change has also been highlighted in this research. It has been shown, for example, that the
infiltration of the turbulence of the Middle-East environment into Lebanon in the pre-war period
has reflected in further constraining reform options by increasing tensions and political
complications. The influence of the international environment was felt in the pre and post-war
periods through the persistent attempts of developed nations to influence Lebanese reform
trajectories by guiding or gearing them in specific directions (e.g. technical assistance efforts in
the pre-war period and World Bank interventions in post-war telecom and transport reforms -
e.g. BUTP).
The international environment is expected to exert a more significant influence on country-
specific programs of planned change given contemporary processes of globalization. Indeed,
one feature of the international scene which seems to have remained unchanged over the years
is the belief in reform diffusion and the continued propensity of donor nations and their
multilaterals to transfer their policy models and ideas to developing countries without adequate
consideration for embedded contextual differences. The research presented in this thesis,
however, constitutes a reminder that the impact of such efforts is likely to remain limited as the
outcomes of planned change are invariably conditioned by a multitude of contingent and
embedded contextual factors, cultural, political and economic.
The patterns of reform observed in Lebanon can thus only be explained in light of these
complex clusters of interrelated environmental factors and forces. Although the factors
identified in this model have been highlighted as potentially important by other researchers, the
contribution of this research lies in its attempt at i) organizing them systematically; ii)
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highlighting their causal texture and interrelationships; and iii) validating their salience
empirically, through a comprehensive study of administrative reform in a specific context and
through the case study approach. The two case studies presented in this research constitute an
original contribution, in the sense that no attempt has been previously made at analyzing
administrative reform dynamics in the Lebanese context using this perspective or approach.
The case studies of the Lebanese telecommunications and transportation sectors have indeed
illustrated the politicization of reform in Lebanon and the persistent influence of Lebanese
peculiar cultural/political configurations on reform dynamics. Administrative reform in Lebanon
remains in essence a political process, which involves conflict, bargaining, coercion,
compromise, and coalition-building. Reform processes in Lebanon have thus been permeated by
the politics of accommodation. They are guided less by technical rationality and the public
interest than by power dynamics and political compromises and considerations. The research in
this thesis thus confirms the importance of the political factor in administrative analysis and the
need to abandon mechanistic views of reform focusing on objectivity and technical rationality.
More than just an affirmation of the importance of the political factor in administrative analysis,
the research in this thesis has highlighted the interconnectedness of several environmental forces
and factors and their influence on reform dynamics. The objective has consistently been to
highlight the complexity and contingency inherent in deliberate attempts at reform and change.
Admittedly, the research hypothetical model could have been expanded by including other
factors (e.g. demographic) but the comprehensiveness of the research suggests that the most
salient/significant factors in the Lebanese context have indeed been incorporated. In any case,
the environment is anything but a clear empirical reality; it has been and will likely remain a
zone of subjective evaluation and fervent contestation.
In view of the findings of the research, the model can however be slightly re-adjusted to reveal
the permeable boundaries between cultural and political factors in the Lebanese multi-
confessional context and the fact that these should be viewed as a cluster, rather than neatly
compartmentalized environmental components or categories. Figure 23 thus presents the











Figure 23. Revised Hypothetical Model
Although the model presented in this research may be useful and relevant in other contexts,
claims of general applicability will be avoided (consistent with the essence of this research).
The main reason is that countries vary enormously in terms of culture, history and political
orientation. Collective titles, such as the South, the Third World, or even pluralistic societies
give an aura of similarity to a disparate and differentiated group of countries. What constitutes
the environment of public administration in Bosnia may be quite different from what is
encountered in Lebanon. Suffice it to say in this respect that the research in this thesis confirms
the usefulness of a multi-dimensional approach to reform which takes into account embedded
contextual realities.
FINAL COMMENTS AND IDEAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The research in this thesis has explored the processes and dynamics of administrative reform in
a multi-confessional setting. But the research has also implicitly touched upon a number of
other themes including among others, the challenge of reconciling effective administration with
democracy. This concern has been an eternal one in the study of public administration. Indeed,
as early as 1887, Woodrow Wilson advocated the reexamination of political and administrative
roles and functions, suggesting that democratic politics could profit from an administratively
efficient public service. The main rationalization of Wilson and other democratic theorists is
that government by the people is useless unless it produces effective governmentfor the people.
A main theme in this thesis has been the failure of the Lebanese political system to seek
alternative counterweights to the excesses of representative democracy that have permeated
legislatures and other arenas of decision-making. The challenge is thus one of reconciling
294
effective administration with representative democracy, of balancing rational policy making
with participatory democratic processes. Research about Lebanese democracy however is still in
its infancy. There has been no comprehensive attempt to explore the peculiarities of the
Lebanese democratic order and the extent to which it conforms or deviates from Arent Liphart's
consociational model. There has also been no research about the relationships between the
legislative, executive and administrative branches of government or how the new equilibrium in
the Lebanese political system resulting from Taif has affected the democratic process generally
and relationships with the administration more specifically.
These are examples of questions, which remain pertinent in the Lebanese context. A number of
more general questions have also remained unanswered and these constitute challenging themes
to be pursued. Is it possible to reconcile representative democracy with administrative
efficiency? In other words, is administrative efficiency necessarily compromised in cases of
representative democracy? What are other factors that can mitigate the effects of administrative
reform initiatives in specific national contexts? Is it possible to assign weights to such factors or
grade them in terms of salience and importance? Have the complexities of modern governance
rendered the Wilsonian mandate irrelevant? Or have escalating policy and managerial problems
within public administration made it even more necessary to resurrect it as a model for
administrative reform?
The research presented in this thesis implicitly calls for a reconsideration of the
politics/administration dichotomy. The research has demonstrated how bad politics can be bad
administration and how administrative reform has been the casualty of the excesses of the
Lebanese political system. Some have indeed suggested that the search for an apolitical
administration has not been totally abandoned in contemporary times, but rather that it has
assumed different forms and dimensions. Caiden (1984) for example, notes that the myth of the
politics-administration dichotomy has not died and that for some, it still buttresses ideas about
the nature and role of the public bureaucracy in the modern state. For others (Lebanese people
included), it still remains an ideal that may be attained, and a symbol of the struggle against
spoilsmen and corruption and the private administration of the public weal.
Notwithstanding the complexities of modern governance generally, and the complexities of
Lebanese governance more specifically, the prospects of insulating the Lebanese administration
from spoils, patronage, corruption and selfish partisanship remain enticing. Admitting that the
preservation of representative processes will remain the number one political objective in
Lebanon and that open bargaining, negotiation, and consensus building will continue to occupy
center stage and remain the hallmarks of Lebanese political and administrative processes, the
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question is whether these givens necessarily preclude the emergence of a different type of
administrative culture and a scheme of values reflecting responsibility for the public interest.
The research in this thesis should by no means be interpreted as an invitation to despair or
inaction. Rather, by identif'ing the constraints of the Lebanese multi-confessional context, it
should be viewed as an invitation to move beyond the shrugging of shoulders to an attempt to
construct a politics of policy improvement. There are undoubtedly potent embedded constraints
to effective policy-making and implementation in Lebanon, but even under adverse conditions,
there is room for maneuver and improvement. The cultural/political constraints are not going to
be removed from the Lebanese policy process, but the question remains if they can be made to
produce policies which are more effective and which make better use of scarce resources.
Those themes, among others, represent potentially fruitful lines of inquiry. Answers to such
questions can undoubtedly enrich the study of public administration and comparative public
administration. Those questions were not ignored intentionally but were also not addressed
because of the specific scope and orientation of the research as well as the daunting complexity
of the Lebanese political and administrative landscapes. Much more however needs to be known
of the Lebanese polity, not only to enhance the state of the art, but also to provide additional
data for theories of public administration and comparative administrative analysis.
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NATIONAL RECONCILIATION (TAIF) ACCORD
October 22, 1989
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND REFORMS
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
U Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country; a final homeland for all of its
citizens; a unity of people, land, and institutions within its borders as defined by the
Lebanese constitution and recognized internationally.
U Lebanon is of Arab affiliation and identity; it is a founding and active member of the Arab
League and it is bound by its character; it is a founding and active member of the United
Nations and abides by its charter, and it is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. The
Lebanese state manifests these principles in all fields and domains without exception.
U Lebanon is a democratic, parliamentary republic founded on the respect for public liberties,
the foremost of which are freedom of opinion and belief, and on social justice and equality
of rights and duties among all citizens without discrimination or distinction.
U The people are the source of power and the possessors of sovereignty, which they exercise
through the constitutional institutions.
U The system is founded on the principle of separation, balance, and cooperation of powers.
U The economic system is a free system that assures individual initiative and private
ownership.
O The balanced cultural, social, and economic growth of the region is a principle pillar of the
principles of unity of the state and of the stability of the system.
U The Lebanese State seeks the realization of comprehensive social justice through financial,
economic and social reforms.
U The land of Lebanon is but one land for all Lebanese; and every Lebanese has the right to
reside on any part thereof and to enjoy it under the supremacy of the law. No segregation of
people on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever: no partitioning, dividing, or settling.
U No legitimacy to any authority that contradicts the charter of cohabitation.
B. POLITICAL REFORMS
I. Parliament
Parliament is the legislative authority; it exercises comprehensive control over the policy of
government and its affairs.
1. The head of parliament and his deputy are elected for the duration of the term of parliament.
2. Two years following the election of the head of parliament and his deputy, and in the first
meeting it holds, parliament may, for one time only, withdraw its confidence from the head
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of parliament or his deputy by a two-thirds majority of its members pursuant to a petition
signed by at least ten deputies. Parliament must immediately in this case hold a meeting to
fill in the vacant position.
3. Each project law referred to parliament by the Council of Ministries that is classified as
urgent shall not be issued except, after being listed on the agenda of a regular session and
read therein, after the passage of the time delay mentioned in the constitution, without being
acted upon and after the approval of the Council of Ministries.
4. The electoral unit is the Mohafazah.
5. Until parliament enacts an election law which is not based on religious affiliation, seats in
parliament shall be allocated according to the following rules:
a) Equally between Christians and Muslims
b) Proportionally among the sects of each of the two categories
c) Proportionally among the regions.
6. The number of members of parliament shall be increased to (108), divided equally between
Christians and Muslims. The newly created positions based on the present charter, as well
as the positions, which became vacant prior to its declaration shall, for once and by
exception, be filled in by appointment of the anticipated government of national
reconciliation.
7. Concurrent with the election of the first parliament on a national rather than confessional
basis, a Senate will be created wherein all spiritual families will be represented with its
authority being confined to matters of destiny.
II. The President of the Republic
The president of the republic is the head of the state and the symbol of the unity of the nation;
the independence of Lebanon, its unity, and the safety of its land as mandated by the
constitution. He is the supreme commander of the armed forces, subject to the authority of the
Council of Ministries. The president exercises the following authorities:
1. He chairs the Council of Ministries at his discretion without voting.
2. He heads the Supreme Council of Defense.
3. He issues the decrees and requests their proclamation. He has the right to ask the Council of
Ministries to re-consider any decision taken by it within a period of fifteen days from the
time the said decision is deposited with the presidency. If the Council of Ministers insists on
the decision taken, or if the delay has passed without the decree being issued or returned,
the decree or the decision becomes imperatively effective and must be proclaimed.
4. He issues the laws as per the delays stipulated by the constitution, and requests their
proclamation following their ratification by parliament. He has the right, following
notification of the Council of Ministers, to demand the reconsideration of a [new] law
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within the delays stipulated by the constitution and in conformity with its mandates; and in
the event the delays end without their issue or return, the law becomes imperatively
effective and must be proclaimed.
5. He refers project laws, submitted to him by the Council of Ministries, to parliament.
6. He nominates the designated prime minister in consultation with the head of parliament
based on binding parliamentary consultations that he officially communicates to the head of
parliament.
7. He individually issues the decree nominating the prime minister.
8. He issues, in agreement with the prime minister, the decree constituting the government.
9. He issues the decrees accepting the resignation of the government or the resignation or
dismissal of ministers.
10. He accredits ambassadors and accepts their credentials, and awards official state decorations
by decree.
11. He assumes negotiation in entering into international treaties and their execution in
agreement with the Prime Minister; such treaties do no become effective except after the
consent of the Council of Ministers; the government shall, whenever national interest and
the safety of the state permit, present them to parliament. As to treaties comprising terms
that are related to state finance and commercial agreements and other agreements, which
may not be abrogated on a year-to-year basis, they must not be executed except by consent
of parliament.
12. He addresses, when necessary, letters to parliament.
13. He calls parliament, in agreement with the Prime Minister and pursuant to a decree, into
extraordinary sessions.
14. The president has the right to present to the Council of Ministers any emergency issue not
included on the meeting agenda.
15. He exceptionally convenes the Council of Ministers, as he deems necessary, in agreement
with the Prime Minister.
16. He grants private pardons by decree.
17. The president shall not bear the consequences of carrying out his function, except when
violating the constitution or in the case of high treason.
III. The Prime Minister
The Prime Minister is the head of government; he represents it and speaks on its behalf, and is
considered responsible for the implementation of the general policy established by the Council
of Ministers. He exercises the following authorities:
1. He heads the Council of Ministers.
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2. He conducts parliamentary consultations to form the government and signs with the
president the decree for its constitution. The government shall, within a period of thirty
days, present its ministerial address to parliament to obtain its confidence; and it shall not
exercise its authorities prior to acquiring the confidence of parliament, or following its
resignation or being deemed resigned, except in the narrow meaning of canying out
business.
3. He presents to parliament the general policy of government.
4. He signs all decrees, except the decree designating the Prime Minister and the decree
accepting the resignation of the government or deeming it resigned.
5. He signs the decree calling for an extraordinary session and the decrees proclaiming the
laws and the request for their reconsideration.
6. He calls on the Council of Ministers to convene and draws up its meeting agenda; and
informs the president, a priori, of the subjects included thereon as well as of the urgent
matters that will be discussed, and signs the original minutes of meetings.
7. He follows up the activities of the departments and public agencies and coordinates among
the ministers, and gives general directives so as to ensure a proper flow of work.
8. He holds, in the presence of the minister concerned, working sessions with involved parties
in the state.
9. He is, imperatively, the deputy head of the Supreme Council of Defense.
IV. The Council of Ministers
Executive power is vested in the Council of Ministers, and among the powers it exercises are
the following:
1. Formulating the general policy of the state in all domains, drawing out project laws and
decrees and taking necessary decisions for their implementation.
2. Overseeing the implementation of laws and regulations and supervising the activities of all
state agencies with no exception, including departments and civil, military, and security
institutions.
3. The Council of Ministers is the authority to which the armed forces are subject.
4. Appointing state employees, dismissing them, and accepting their resignation in accordance
with the law.
5. The right to dissolve parliament pursuant to a request by the president, if parliament has
abstained from meeting during the term of a regular or extraordinary session extending for a
period of not less than one month, despite being called in two consecutive times, or if it
rejects the national budget in its totality for the purpose of disrupting government activities.
The exercise of this right may not be repeated for the same reasons that resulted in the
dissolution of parliament the first time.
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6. If present, the president heads the meetings of the Council of Ministers. The Council of
Ministers convenes regularly in a specific quarter, and the legal quorum for its meeting shall
be a two-thirds majority of its members; and it takes its decisions by consensus, and in the
absence of consensus, they are taken by voting. Decisions are taken by simple majority of
the attendants, except major issues, which require the consent of two-thirds of the Council's
members. The following subjects are considered major issues:
The state of emergency and lifting it; war and peace; general mobilization; international treaties
and agreements; the national budget of the state; comprehensive development and long-range
plans; appointment of the employees of the first category and its equivalent; reconsideration of
administrative divisions; the dissolution of parliament; elections law; naturalization law;
personal statues laws; the dismissal of ministers.
V. The Minister
The authority of the minister shall be strengthened in line with the general policy of government
and the principle of collective responsibility, and he shall not be dismissed except by a decision
by the Council of Ministers or by parliament withdrawing confidence from him individually.
VI. Resignation of Government, Deeming it Resigned, and Dismissal of Ministers
1. The government shall be considered resigned in the following cases:
a) If the Prime Minister has resigned.
b) If it loses more than one-third of the number of its members specified in the decree
constituting it.
c) Upon the death of its head.
d) At the commencement of a presidential term.
e) At the commencement of a parliament term.
f) Upon losing the confidence of parliament as a result or the latter's initiative or by
pledging it itself.
2. The dismissal of a minister shall be pursuant to a decree signed by the president and the
Prime Minister following the approval of the Council of Ministers.
3. Upon the resignation of government or deeming it resigned, parliament shall enter into an
extraordinary meeting session until a new government has been formed and obtained
confidence.
VII. Political Deconfessionlization
Political deconfessionlization is a principle national objective that must be pursued in
accordance with a transitional plan. Parliament, which is elected on the basis of an equal
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distribution of Muslims and Christians, shall take appropriate measures to achieve this objective
and to form a national commission headed by the President and comprising political, intellectual
and societal personalities in addition to the head of parliament and the prime minister. The
mission of the commission is to study and recommend the means of eliminating confessionalism
and to present them to parliament and to the Council of Ministries and to follow up the
implementation of the transitional plan. During the transitional stage, the following shall be
achieved.
1. The rule of confessional representation shall be abolished and qualification and
specification shall be adopted in public offices, the judiciary, the military and security
establishments, public and mixed agencies, and independent authorities as may be required
to achieve national reconciliation, except for first category positions and their equivalent
positions therein, which shall be shared equally by Christians and Muslims with no position
being confined to either sect.
2. Abolishing the mention of religion and sect on national identity cards.
C. OTHER REFORMS
I. Administrative Decentralization
1. The Lebanese state is a single unified state with a powerful centralized authority.
2. The authority of governors and of deputy governors shall be extended and all the
departments of the state shall be represented in the administrative regions at the highest
level possible so as to facilitate the provision of services to the citizens and respond locally
to their needs.
3. Reconsidering administrative divisions so as to secure national fusion and preserve
cohabitation and the unity of land, people, and institutions.
4. Adopting maximum administrative decentralization on the level of small administrative
units (Kada' and below) by electing a council for each Kada' headed by a deputy governor
so as to ensure local participation.
5. Adopting a unified development plan encompassing the nation and enabling the economic
and social development of all Lebanese regions, and strengthening the resources of the
municipalities, the united municipalities and the municipality unions with necessary
financial means.
II. The Courts
1. In order to secure the submission of all officials and citizens to the supremacy of the law
and to secure the conformity of the legislative and executive authorities to the postulate of
cohabitation and to the basic rights of the Lebanese citizens stipulated in the constitution.
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a) The Supreme Council stipulated in the constitution shall be formed with its mission
being the impeachment of presidents and ministers. A special law devoted to the
council's legal proceedings shall be decreed.
b) A Constitutional Council shall be established for the purpose of interpreting the
constitution and monitoring the constitutionality of the laws and to rule on all disputes
and appeals relating to parliament and Presidential elections.
c) The following parties have the right to consult with the Constitutional Council
regarding the interpretation of the constitution and the monitoring of the
constitutionality of the laws:
U The president of the republic.
U The head of parliament.
U The prime minister.
U A certain percentage of the members of parliament.
2. To safeguard the principle of harmony between religion and state, the head of the Lebanese
factions shall have the right to consult with the Constitutional Council with regard to:
a) Personal statues.
b) The freedom of belief and practice of religious rites.
c) Freedom of religious education.
3. To strengthen the independence of the judiciary, a determined number of the members of
the Supreme Council of Justice shall be elected by the judicial body.
III. The Law of Parliamentary Elections
Parliamentary elections shall be conducted in accordance with a new election law based on the
Govemorate (Mohafaza) and that considers the principles that guarantee cohabitation among
Lebanese and that insures the accuracy of political representation of the various categories of
people and their generations and the effectiveness of such representation, after the
reconsideration of administrative divisions within the framework of the unity of land, people,
and institutions.
IV. The establishment of Economic and Social Objectives for Development
A Social Economic Council shall be established to ensure the participation of the
representatives of various sectors in the formulation of the economic and social policy of the
state by offering advice and suggestions.
V. Education and Instruction
1. To put education at the disposal of people and to make it mandatory, at least in the
elementary stage.
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2. To emphasize the freedom of education in accordance with the laws and regulations.
3. To protect private education and strengthen state control over private schools and the
school textbooks.
4. To rehabilitate formal, vocational, and technical education and strengthen it and to develop
it in such a manner so as to fulfill and suit the developmental and constructive needs of the
nation. To rehabilitate the Lebanese University and support it, especially in its applied
faculties.
5. To review and develop the curricula in a manner that strengthens national cohesiveness
and fusion, and spiritual and cultural openness, and to standardize the textbooks in the
history and civil education courses.
VI. Information
To reorganize all media under the law and within the framework of responsible freedom, and in
a manner that serves the objectives of reconciliation and of ending the state of war.
VII. Reinstating the Sovereignty of the Lebanese State over the Entire Lebanese Land
Whereas an agreement was reached among the Lebanese parties on the establishment of a strong
and able state founded on national reconciliation, the government of national reconciliation shall
draw up a detailed one-year security plan aiming at gradually reinstating the authority of the
Lebanese state over its entire territory by means of its own forces, with its broad lines being
characterized as follows:
1. Disbanding all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and surrendering their arms to the
Lebanese state within a period of six months after the ratification of the National
Reconciliation Charter, the election of the president, the formation of the government of
national reconciliation, and the adoption of political reform in a constitutional manner.
2. Reinforcing Internal Security Forces through:
a) Opening the door to all Lebanese, without exception, to volunteer and commence their
training centrally and then to distribute them to the units in the mohafazat, and to
subject them to periodic and organized training programs.
b) Strengthening the security system in such a way so as to be capable of controlling the
entry and exit of persons across land, sea, and air borders.
3. Reinforcing the Armed Forces:
a) The primary duty of the armed forces is to defend the nation and, if necessary, to protect
national order whenever the danger exceeds the capability of the internal security forces
to deal with it.
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b) The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in preserving
security under circumstances as may be determined by the Council of Ministers.
c) The armed forces shall be unified, prepared, and trained so as to be capable of assuming
its national duties in facing Israeli aggression.
d) The armed forces shall return to barracks at the time when the internal security forces
become ready to assume its security mission.
e) The intelligence activities of the armed forces shall be re-organized to serve military
purposes only.
4. Fundamentally solving the problem of the Lebanese immigrants by approving the right of
every Lebanese immigrant who emigrates since 1975 to return to the place from which he or
she emigrated; passing the necessary legislation securing this right and providing the
necessary means for reconstruction.
Whereas the aim of the Lebanese state is to reinstate its authority over the entire Lebanese
territory by means of its own forces, which are represented primarily by the internal security
forces, and out of the brotherly ties that bind Syria to Lebanon, Syrian forces shall, with due
thanks, assist legitimate Lebanese forces in reinstating the sovereignty of the Lebanese state
within a maximum of two years after the ratification of the National Reconciliation Charter, the
election of the President, the formation of the government of national reconciliation and the
adoption of political reforms in a constitutional manner. At the end of this period, the Syrian
government and the Lebanese government of national reconciliation will decide on the
repositioning of Syrian forces in the Bekaa area and the access to western Bekaa in Dahr-El
Beidar up to the Hamana-Mdeirej-Ein Darah line and, in necessary, other points to be decided
by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee. Also, an agreement shall be signed by both
governments which determines the size and duration of the presence of the Syrian forces in the
above areas and the relation of these forces with the Lebanese state authorities present in these
areas. The Tripartite Supreme Arab Committee is ready to assist the two states in reaching this
agreement, if they so desire.
VIII. The Liberation of Lebanon from Israeli Occupation
Regaining the authority of the state up to internationally recognized Lebanese borders requires
the following:
1. Pursuing the implementation of UN Resolution 425 and all Security Council resolutions
promulgating the total elimination of the Israeli occupation.
2. Adhering to the truce agreement signed on March 23, 1949.
3. Taking all necessary measures to liberate all Lebanese territory from the Israeli occupation,
extending the authority of the state over all of its land, deploying the Lebanese army along
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the internationally recognized borders and pursuing the reinforcement of the existence of
the internationally peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon so as to ensure the withdrawal
of Israel and allow for the return of law and order to the border zone.
Lebanese-Syrian Relations
Lebanon, a country of Arab affiliation and identity, is tied to all Arab states by true fraternal
relations; and there exists between Lebanon and Syrian distinguished relationships which draw
their strength from the roots of kinship, history, and common fraternal interests, which is the
concept on which the coordination and cooperation between both countries are and will be
manifested in agreements between them in various domains, and in the manner which serves the
interests of both countries within the framework of the sovereignty and independence of each of
them. Based on that, and because strengthening the bases of security provides the needed
atmosphere for the development of these distinguished ties, Lebanon shall under no
circumstances be made a source of threat to the security of Syria. And Syria, which is keen on
preserving the security, independence, and unity of Lebanon and concurrence among its people,
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Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination
May 22, 1991
The Lebanese Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic:
By virtue of the distinctive brotherly ties that bind them and that derive their strength from the
roots of kinship, history, single affiliation, common destiny, and common interests;
Convinced that achievement of the widest scope of cooperation and coordination would serve
their interests, provide the means to guarantee their development and progress, the protection of
their national security, provide prosperity and stability, enable them to confront all regional and
international developments and meet the aspirations of the peoples of the two states in keeping
with the Lebanese National Charter approved by the Council of Deputies on May 11, 1989;
Agree on the following:
Article I
The two states will strive to realize the highest degree of cooperation and coordination between
them in all political, security, cultural, scientific, and other concerns in pursuit of the interests of
the two brotherly countries within the framework of the sovereignty and independence of each
of them, so as to enable the two countries to utilize their political, economic, and security
resources, guarantee their national security, and expand and strengthen their common interests
in affirmation of brotherly relations and for the preservation of their common destiny.
Article II
The two states will strive to achieve cooperation and coordination between the two countries in
the fields of economics, agriculture, industry, commerce, transportation, communications,
customs, the initiation of joint projects, and the coordination of development plans.
Article III
The inter-relationship of the two countries' security requires that Lebanon not be made the
source of a threat to Syria's security, or Syria to Lebanon's in any circumstances whatsoever.
Lebanon shall therefore not allow itself to be a passageway or a base for any power or state or
organization the purpose of which is the violation of its security, independence, and
sovereignty, or that of Syria.
Article IV
After the approval of the political reforms in a constitutional manner, as the Lebanese National
Charter provides, and when the periods specified in the charter expire, the Syrian and Lebanese
324
governments shall decide to re-deploy the Syrian forces in the Bekaa region and the Bekaa's
western approach in Dahr el-Baider and up to the Hammana-Mdairej-Ain Dara line and, if
necessary, in other posts to be determined through a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee.
The two governments shall also arrive at an agreement that determines the size of the Syrian
forces and the duration of their presence in the aforementioned areas, and also determines the
relationship of those forces with the authorities of the Lebanese state in the areas where they are
present.
Article V
The two countries' foreign policies, both Arab and international, shall be based on the following
principles:
1. Lebanon and Syria are two Arab countries committed to the charter of the League of Arab
States, the Arab joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty, and all other agreements
promulgated in the framework of the League. They are also members of the United Nations,
committed to its Charter, and members of the Non-Aligned Movement.
2. The common destiny and common interests of the two countries.
3. Each will support the other in matters relating to its security and its national interests, in
keeping with the provisions of this treaty.
The governments of the two countries shall therefore strive to coordinate their Arab and
international policies, realize the greatest possible cooperation in Arab and international
institutions and organizations, and coordinate their positions on the various regional and
international issues.
Article VI
The following agencies shall be instituted to achieve the objectives of this treaty, and other
agencies can be established by a decision by the Higher Council mentioned below:
A. The Higher Council
1. The Higher Council shall be comprised of the president of the republic of each of the two
contracting states and the Speaker of the People's Council [parliament], the prime minister
and the deputy prime minister of the Syrian Arab Republic; the speaker of the Council of
Deputies; the prime minister and the deputy prime minister of the Lebanese Republic.
2. The Higher Council shall meet once a year and when the need arises, the venue to be agreed
upon.
3. The Higher Council shall define the general policy for coordination and cooperation
between the two states in the political, economic, security, military, and other fields and
shall oversee its implementation. It shall also approve the plans and decisions of the Follow-
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up and Coordination Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Economic and Social
Affairs Committee, and any other committee that may be created later.
4. The decisions of the Higher Council are binding and applicable within the framework of
each of the two countries' Constitutional rules.
5. The Higher Council shall determine the topics on which the specialized committees are
authorized to make decisions that are automatically implementable in accordance with the
Constitutional rules and principles in each of the two countries or if they do no conflict with
those rules and principles.
B. The Follow-up and Coordination Committee
The Follow-up and Coordination Committee shall be comprised of the prime ministers of the
two countries and a number of ministers concerned with relations between them, and it shall
have the following tasks:
1. Following up the implementation of the decisions of the Higher Council and reporting to the
Council on the stages of implementation.
2. Coordinating the recommendations and decisions of the specialized committees and
referring the suggestions to the Higher Council.
3. Holding meetings with the specialized committees when necessary.
4. The Commission shall meet once every six months and whenever the need arises, the venue
to be agree upon.
C. The Foreign Affairs Committee
1. The Foreign Affairs Committee shall be comprised of the Foreign ministers of the two
countries.
2. The Foreign Affairs Committee shall meet once every two months and whenever the need
arises, in one of the two countries in rotation.
3. The Foreign Affairs Committee shall strive to coordinate the foreign policies of the two
states in their relations with all states, and shall also strive to coordinate their activities and
positions in the Arab and international organizations and shall, for that purpose, prepare
plans for approval by the Higher Council.
D. The Economic and Social Affairs Committee
I. The Economic and Social Affairs Committee shall be comprised of the ministers concerned
with the economic and social sectors in the two countries.
2. The Economic and Social Affairs Committee shall meet in one of the two countries in
rotation once every two months and whenever the need arises.
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3. The task of the Economic and Social Affairs Committee shall be to strive for economic and
social coordination between the two states and to prepare recommendations to that end.
4. The recommendations of the Economic and Social Affairs Committee shall go into effect, in
keeping with the constitutional principles of each of the two countries, when they are
approved by the Higher Council.
E. The Defense and Security Affairs Committee
1. The Defense and Security Affairs Committee shall be comprised of the ministers of Defense
and the Interior in each of the two countries.
2. The task of the Defense and Security Committee shall be to study the means by which the
two states' security can be preserved and to propose joint measures to confront any
aggression or threat to their national security or any disturbances that jeopardize the internal
security of either state.
3. All plans and recommendations prepared by the Defense and Security Affairs Committee
shall be refereed to the Higher Council for approval, in keeping with the Constitutional
principles of each of the two countries.
F. The Secretariat General
1. A Secretariat General shall be set up to follow up the implementation of the provisions of
this study.
2. The Secretariat General shall be headed by a Secretary General appointed by a Higher
Council decision.
3. The Headquarters, jurisdiction, staff, and budget of the Secretariat General shall be
determined by a Higher Council decision.
Final Rules
1. Special agreements shall be signed by the two countries in the fields covered by this treaty-
such as the economic, security, defense, and other fields-in accordance with the
constitutional principles of each of the two countries, and these shall be considered a
complementary part of this treaty.
2. This treaty shall go into effect when it is promulgated by the authorities concerned in
accordance with the constitutional principles of the two contracting states.
3. Each of the two states shall take action to annual laws and regulations that are not in
conformity with this treaty, without violating the rules of each of the two countries'
constitutions.
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DEFENSE AND SECURITY AGREEMENT
September 1, 1991
Based on the Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination Treaty between the Lebanese
Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic signed in Damascus on May 22, 1991 and ratified by the
Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on May 27, 1991 in Beirut, including its third, fifth, and sixth
Articles, particularly Clause 5 of the six Article, agreement has been reached on the following:
1. Structure
A defense affairs committee consisting of the two countries' defense and interior ministers is to
be formed. This committee will meet every three months, alternating between the capital cities
of Beirut and Damascus or in any other location agreed upon, and will also meet whenever it is
deemed necessary. The committee may seek assistance from any of the chiefs of the two
countries' security authorities for from the chiefs of other branches of the two ministries. The
army commands, the security services, and other concerned administrative departments will
meet every month, alternating between the capital cities and will meet whenever the need arises
at an agreed-upon location to implement the defense and security committees' programs and
supervise their details.
2. Missions
The defense and security affairs committee is charged with studying ways to safeguard the two
states' security and with proposing joint plans to confront any aggression or threat against their
national security and any disturbance that may upset either country's internal security.
In implementation the contents of Article III of the Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination
Treaty, the following must be realized:
In an effort to reaffirm the two states' pledge and ensure that Lebanon does not become a source
of threats against Syria's security and vice versa, the military and security authorities in the two
countries must implement the following:
A. Ban all military, security, political, and media activity that might harm the other country.
B. Refuse to give refuge to, facilitate the passage of, or provide protection to persons and
organizations that work against the other state's that state must arrest them and hand them
over to the other side at the latter's request.
C. To enable the military and security services in each of the two states to carry out their duty
of implementing the aforementioned Clauses A and B, these services must meet regularly in
each of the two countries to exchange information involving all issues of strategic, national,
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and internal security, including those related to drugs, major financial crimes, terrorism, and
espionage. Th military and security services will coordinate their work to follow up and
resolve these issues within each country as well as abroad, and will cooperate with
international institutions as necessary. All legal and procedural steps must be taken to
facilitate the joint action of the two states' authorities as part of the agreement to expedite
the adoption of legal prosecution and ways to solve these problems.
D. The two countries' defense ministries and their relevant department will meet every three
months, alternating between the capital cities, and as necessary, to exchange information on
everything that concerns the two countries' security and all hostile activities in an effort to
reach a mutual understanding on the dangers and their dimensions, and consequently, to
draw up integrated plans at various levels to confront these dangers. In this regard, the two
Defense Ministries will establish joint organs to follow up and supervise strategic
coordination.
E. The two countries' Ministries of Defense and Interior will increase the exchange of officers
and troops through training courses at various levels, including the exchange of military
instructors in the military colleges, in order to achieve a high standard in military
coordination and adequate familiarity to confront common threats.
F. The ministerial committee for defense and security affairs will draw up the necessary plans
to promote exchange and development in each country's civil defense field.
3. Final Provisions
In addition to its tasks, the defense and security committee will do the following:
A. Follow up the implementation of all the provisions of the agreement and give the necessary
instructions to ensure its progress.
B. Propose to the Higher Council the bases, principles, and regulations that are bound to ensure
full and effective implementation of the agreement.
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APPENDIX C
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF SELECTED
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It is common to find in the last pages of a PhD thesis a methodological appendix that guides the
reader through the steps of the research and sheds light on the specific methodological issues
that have not been clarified at length in the dissertation. A brief attempt will be made here to
outline the steps of the research generally, and explain the fieldwork process more specifically.
It is important to start by calling attention to the scant literature available about administrative
reform in developing countries generally, and administrative reform in Lebanon more
specifically. In view of this limitation, it was necessary to start with a comprehensive
examination of the administrative reform literature available about industrialized countries, and
then to re-examine this literature critically and selectively to extrapolate the hypotheses and
factors that embody the most potential in the Lebanese context. Although this proved to be a
tedious and time-consuming endeavor, it was nevertheless a logical approach to the study,
dictated by practical considerations and limitations.
Having identified some fruitful hypotheses and factors, the research attempted to validate them
empirically, primarily through the case study approach. The two sectors (telecommunications
and transportation) were selected because of their importance in the Lebanese post-war reform
context. The fieldwork comprised an initial examination of a variety of internal documents and
technical reports, obtained through frequent visits to the ministries and institutions involved in
the two sectors. A significant number of reports and unpublished manuscripts were also
obtained from the CDR archival center, and special thanks are extended in this regard to Ms.
Rajaa Hamawi for her dynamism and cooperation. A number of studies were also obtained from
various friends and acquaintances, especially Dr. Tammam Nakkash, in his capacity as Director
and Partner in Team International, a consulting company which has been extensively involved
in the Lebanese transportation sector, and from Dr. Hadi Baaj, in his capacity as Professor of
Transportation Engineering at the AUB and advisor to the Minister of Transport since 1998.
The various reports and studies collected provided an initial roadmap to the two sectors and to
the nature of the issues at hand. Indeed, there was no other way to gain familiarity with the two
sectors, given the scant literature available about Lebanese administration. Although this may
sound rather unbelievable in countries like the UK or the US, this is very much the reality in
Lebanon, where there was not a single published study about Lebanese telecommunications or
transportation. The sectors were almost like black boxes to be explored through careful
detective work. The studies collected thus provided pertinent information, and allowed for in-
depth familiarity and understanding of relevant issues, but faceless, technical reports also
inevitably left many questions unanswered. The challenge was thus to fill the gaps through a
series of interviews with government officials, informants and key participants in the sectors
who are especially sensitive to the areas of concern. The interviews, comprising the second part
of the fieldwork, were conducted in Lebanon in the summer 2000.
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The interviews were intentionally postponed until then for practical and logical reasons.
Practically, I had been residing in England for most of the year, benefiting from intensive
supervision and library resources. Logically, it was thought that there was no harm in leaving
the interviews until then, as this allowed for further refinement of the questions and for a clearer
identification of issues and gaps. Hence, based on a comprehensive review of sectoral reports
and manuscripts and a clearer identification of the overall orientation of the research, a list of
relevant questions was developed for each sector to be subsequently tackled in the interviews. A
decision was also made at that point to make use of the semi-structured interview to allow
flexibility and a subtle way of addressing sensitive questions. Indeed the nature of the issues to
be explored coupled with the sectarian and political complications of the Lebanese environment,
dictated prudence, tactfulness and apprehension. In view of these expectations, the semi-
structured interview was deemed appropriate to allow for building rapport, steering
conversation, as well as probing more deeply into sensitive questions.
The semi-structured interview is indeed generally regarded as more appropriate in field
research, given that it resembles a natural conversation that the researcher attempts to direct to
fit his/her plan of inquiry. Also, the fact that semi-structured interviews do not dictate the
specific wording or order of questions permits building rapport and waiting for more
appropriate / opportune times to probe deeply into sensitive issues. The flexibility is also such
that this type of interviewing leaves room for following leads by noting and following up on
new relevant issues/variables. The challenge, however, with semi-structured interviews is to
subtly direct the flow of conversation to cover relevant issues or topics. There is also the risk of
noting only those explanations that support one's theoretical arguments. Hence, while semi-
structured interviews offer flexibility, new insights, and a depth of meaning and understanding,
they also embody a risk of subjectivity, which is inherent in all personal observations and
measurements. The challenge was thus to approach the interviewing process with maximum
objectivity and open-mindedness.
July-August, 2000 hence comprised a period of intensive interviewing. 25 formal interviews
were conducted in total almost equally divided between the two sectors. Interviewees were
primarily selected based on their familiarity with the sectors. Hence, the target population
comprised professionals currently involved in the sectors and who are consequently in a
position to witness significant and relevant events. A systematic effort was made to diversify the
sample, in terms of including informants with potential contrasting perspectives/outlooks. This
was made possible by seeking professionals who were involved in those two sectors, but in
different capacities (e.g. as private operators, business / academic consultants, advisors for
ministers, and public officials). The research has thus made use of quota sampling to the extent
that it managed to include informants representing different participation categories. Because
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each informant tends to view the issues from a different angle, and some subjectivity in
interpretation is naturally to be expected, the cross-checking of observations was intended to
provide a reasonable and rounded view/explanation and to allow some plausible inferences and
conclusions to be drawn. Credibility was thus not taken for granted but carefully evaluated in
view of each informant's position, potential motives and other divergent sources of data and
accounts.
The first interviews were conducted with informants who were accessible through personal and
family ties. The remaining respondents (the majority) were identified and contacted through
chain referral or what is technically referred to as snowball sampling. Each new informant
would thus direct me to other respondents. I was lucky when the informant contacted the new
respondent directly to make an appointment and less fortunate when I was simply provided with
his/her phone number. There were also instances when, having identified a good informant, I
inquired with my respondents as to how he can be reached/contacted. In either case, I continued
with these chain referrals only to realize that the informants in each sector often formed part of a
closed interconnected circle or network. In other words, in most cases, the respondents knew
each other (either directly or indirectly); interestingly, when they were opponents on issues, they
were sometimes keen to interrogate me about the other side's account and interpretation. The
difficult part in this process, and in field research more generally, was to grasp those multiple
perspectives and interpretations, to maintain openness and secrecy, involvement and
detachment, and to always go back to an outside researcher's point of view.
The interviewing process was terminated when it was felt that the interviews were no longer
providing new insights or raising new issues, but becoming more or less repetitive. Also, it was
felt that those more or less closed networks had practically been exhausted. One of my
respondents even exclaimed that there was no one left for me to interview. The majority of the
interviews were tape recorded, except in few cases where the respondents expressed concern
over the implications of tape recording and the potential restrictions involved. In those cases,
notes were taken (in the form of major headings) and the interview transcribed immediately
upon arriving home. Although the transcription process proved to be tedious and time-
consuming, the analysis part was more challenging and stimulating. For each sector, the analysis
mainly revolved around connecting various realms of arguments, looking for patterns and
inconsistencies in the data/accounts, and critically evaluating the validity of explanations in
light of the evidence. There was also the added challenge of identifying trends within and across
sectors, and linking those in turn to the theoretical part in chapter 2.
Although some interviews were more fruitful than others, I thank all respondents for being
generally cooperative and helpful. The interviews indeed proved to be essential and
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instrumental in unraveling the underlying dynamics of administrative reform in Lebanon and
the extent to which reform in this country remains in essence a political process dictated by
political considerations. Many respondents expressed frustration over the existing state of affairs
and I share their bitterness and frustration. The fieldwork process indeed confirmed to me that
Lebanon does not lack professional expertise andlor innovative reform ideas. Rather, Lebanon
lacks the political will to make use of this expertise and those ideas. Many of the respondents
were working independently on policies and projects that embody tremendous potential for
reform in Lebanon (e.g. Dr. Shehadi, Dr. Slam, Dr. Nakkash) and are striving not to lose
hope/motivation in the midst of the complexities of the Lebanese environment.
It should also be pointed out that the interviews were conducted at a time when the traditional
patterns of immobility and stagnation characteristic of Lebanon were even more accentuated in
view of the upcoming parliamentary elections. Lebanon indeed witnessed new parliamentary
elections in August 27 and September 3, 2000. A new government has also assumed power in
October 26, 2000, under the leadership of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. As many of the
respondents pointed out, the summer 2000 represented a peak period in terms of immobility and
stagnation. There are many reasons for this. First is the tendency in Lebanon to put everything
on hold when awaiting a change in government. Second is the preoccupation of ministers and
deputies with electoral issues, which typically diverts their attention from on-going reform
proposals and projects. Third, is the fact that immobility had been gradually building up over
the past two years of the Hoss administration.
The years 1998-2000 were indeed characterized as the worst in the history of the Second
Lebanese Republic. Although the realities of fiscal imbalances and debt accumulation were not
new to the Lebanese post-war reform scene, it became obvious in 1998-1999 that the economic
crisis had reached alarming proportions. The floss administration chose to put a halt to all
reconstruction efforts and to freeze expenditures, which only highlighted the magnitude of the
problem and aggravated the stagnation and immobility. The government's policy (or non
policy) vis a vis the crippling state of public finances have seriously undermined investor
confidence and precluded the re-activation of domestic and foreign investment. And although
Lebanon witnessed the liberalization of the South from Israeli occupation during this period,
which should in theory improve economic prospects by reducing the levels of risk, the recent
Israeli pullout has not yet translated into any significant changes in economic scenarios.
Lebanon is witnessing today a compelling social and economic crisis. The country needs
immediate action, and measures that can end financial panic, provide instant employment relief,
restore economic confidence and stimulate investment. The burden of this tremendous
responsibility falls on the new Hariri administration. There has indeed been an unprecedented
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wave of public support for Prime Minister Hariri in the wake of the recent parliamentary
elections. Lebanese have put their trust once again in this dynamic business entrepreneur to find
an exit to the crisis and mitigate the rising tensions in the country. And although previous Hariri
administrations no doubt had their failings and mistakes, there is consensus today that they
largely stemmed from good intentions and an eagerness to make a difference within the narrow
constraints of the Lebanese political game.
Prime Minister Hariri is undoubtedly aware of the dimensions of the crisis. His traditional
prescription for breaking out of this impasse is through economic growth. Indeed, Hariri keenly
realizes that the availability of increasing income and opportunities for education, jobs and
social mobility provides a cushion against group tensions. Without this growth and the public
awareness of it, zero-sum thinking risks to take hold of public decision-making and nullify
efforts at group accommodation. Hariri is also very much aware of the daunting complexity of
administrative reform in Lebanon. Traditionally, he has chosen to overstep the public
administration and proceed with his reconstruction strategy. It remains to be seen whether there
will be a change in orientation and a genuine willingness to engage in the difficult task of
reform and modernization.
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